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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the work and critical thought of Oscar Wilde from the 
perspective of postmodernism, and presents the argument that Wilde’s thinking 
can be read as strikingly similar to various postmodern approaches. It positions 
Wilde as a ‘proto-postmodernist’: not as a forerunner of postmodernism, nor a full 
postmodernist, but rather someone who employs ideas and practices that would 
now commonly be regarded as postmodern, but who had those ideas and engaged 
in those practices before postmodernism arrived on the scene. The thesis is 
divided into three parts, each of which groups similar theoretical fields in a 
discussion of similarities (and, sometimes, differences) between Wilde and 
postmodernism. In part one, the discussion moves from a basic look at binaries, 
though deconstruction, to a discussion of truth and falsehood in postmodernism. 
In part two, there is a discussion on simulacra, hyperreality, and postmodern ideas 
on surface and depth. Finally, the third part discusses the disappearance of a 
naturally delineated field of expertise by discussing intertextuality, word and 
music studies, moving finally to ekphrasis and postmodern theories on the 
photograph.  
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Preface 
 
The following document contains a theoretical discussion undertaken as part of a 
PhD thesis by Kees de Vries. It reflects four years of research and writing on 
Wilde as a proto-postmoderist. 
 Though no part of the current thesis has been published prior to this 
moment, a condensed version of the discussion in Part 3 of the present thesis was 
previously published as part of the 2011 volume Refiguring Oscar Wilde’s Salome 
(edited by Michael Y. Bennett) in the form of its fifteenth chapter, entitled 
‘Intertextuality and Intermediality in Oscar Wilde’s Salome or: How Oscar Wilde 
became a Postmodernist’. Additionally, a discussion on Wilde and Ekphrasis was 
previously undertaken by the author as part of a Master thesis in English 
Language and Culture at the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen; a similar discussion 
appears in Chapter IX here, but no element of that discussion previously appeared 
in the Master thesis.  
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Introduction 
 
Increasingly, Oscar Wilde has become a writer whose work is open to a large 
number of interpretations. From the sparkling socialite whose brilliant verbal 
fireworks dazzled late-Victorian England, he became a fallen star, the author of 
The Picture of Dorian Gray and The Importance of Being Earnest only; then to a 
gay martyr and finally to an author whose work attracts a great many approaches, 
such as post-colonial, materialist, and others. It would be an understatement to say 
that interest in Wilde is currently higher than ever before, with the possible 
exception of the five years before he fell from grace in the 1895 trials. This peak 
does not just concern critical attention; most of Wilde’s plays have been in 
continuous production around the world, in smaller scale during the first half of 
the twentieth century, but with growing popularity in the second half, so that Ian 
Small, in a review of Wilde’s Complete Works, is able to note that ‘As the interest 
of the general public in Wilde has grown over the past thirty years, so too has a 
demand for all things Wildean’.1 And recently, a film adaptation of Dorian Gray 
(2009) joined an ever-growing list of the novel’s adaptation, cinematic or 
otherwise. In a word, Wilde is, once again, popular. 
 Wilde’s popularity represents at once a success and a mystery. A success, 
because Wilde is unashamedly literary and philosophical. His texts are long, 
elaborate and require a great deal of effort on the reader’s part; in their humour 
and references, they often bear the mark of time. Yet his works are continually in 
                                                             
1 Ian Small, ‘Popular Wilde: A Review Essay’, English Literature in Transition, 1880-1920, 40.3 
(1997), 310-316 (p. 311). 
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print. This is also the mystery, since his works are full of references to late-
Victorian social practices and to the news of his day, and his jokes often require a 
working knowledge of people and politicians whose time is long since past. The 
answer, and the argument of this thesis, is that Wilde is relevant today in a way 
that he was not in the first half of the twentieth century, and specifically that he is 
relevant because his ideas resemble those popularly and critically held in the 
second half of the twentieth century. 
 
Wilde and Postmodernism 
This thesis seeks to position Oscar Wilde as a proto-postmodernist, which is to 
say, not as a forerunner of postmodernism, nor a full postmodernist, but rather 
someone who employs ideas and practices that would now commonly be regarded 
as postmodern, but who had those ideas and engaged in those practices before 
postmodernism arrived on the scene. That Wilde’s work resembles 
postmodernism has been observed by a great many critics. In fact, when writing 
on Oscar Wilde, critics often specifically establish that the study of Wilde is 
relevant in modern a context. The worry here seems to be that Wilde’s artistic 
theories have traditionally been firmly grounded in the Aesthetic movement of the 
nineteenth century, so that some effort is required to justify continued critical 
attention to them – at least, then, outside of a historical approach. Some critics 
have noted that he seems to be an early proponent of, or at least anticipates, 
modernism, such as when one critic, writing on T.S. Eliot, calls it ‘startling to be 
reminded of how many of the fundamental formulations of Eliot’s poetics can be 
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traced to Intentions’ central essays’.2 Others have explored strands of modernity 
in Wilde’s plays, such as Salome.3 But even beyond modernism, critics note that 
Wilde feels contemporary, at times postmodern. At the same time, such comments 
are, without fail, either not followed up or quickly qualified. It is a move that is 
exemplified in Lawrence Danson’s ‘Wilde as Critic and Theorist’, which is 
included in a standard work on Wilde, The Cambridge Companion to Oscar 
Wilde. Danson states that Wilde’s theoretical approach ‘sounds presciently, even 
shockingly, modern’.4 The use of the word ‘prescient’ clearly suggests that 
Wilde’s ideas make sense in a modern context, but the article sidesteps that 
argument: ‘but despite his own breezy dismissal of history, the best way to 
understand Wilde’s intentions (whether in the biographical lower case or the 
titular upper) is to locate them in the context of the times’.5 This is, of course, an 
important argument, and Wilde’s ideas are tied to his own time in a very crucial 
way; but the additional point here is that, while the possibility of Wilde’s 
seemingly (post)modern outlook is raised, it is also immediately dismissed. It is in 
this way that such mentioning often happens: raising the possibility on the one 
hand, but dismissing it on the other. 
 Another example is Neil Sammells’s book Wilde Style. In its focus on 
Wilde’s use of language, it goes quite far in pointing out the link: ‘Wilde’s view 
of language and, equally important, the way he deploys it, has much more in 
common with influential poststructuralist critics such as Lacan, Derrida and de 
                                                             
2 Ronald Bush, ‘In Pursuit of Wilde Possum: Reflections on Eliot, Modernism, and the Nineties’, 
Modernism/Modernity, 11.3 (2004), 469-485 (p. 473). 
3 J.P. Riqueline, ‘Shalom/Solomon/Salomé: Modernism and Wilde’s Aesthetic Politics’, The 
Centennial Review, 39.3 (1995), 537-580. 
4 Lawrence Danson, ‘Wilde as Critic and Theorist’, in The Cambridge Companion to Oscar 
Wilde, ed. by Peter Raby (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 80-95 (p. 81). 
5 Danson, p. 81. 
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Man than it has with his Victorian contemporaries’.6 After raising these three 
names, all of them central to some area of postmodernism, the passage continues 
by narrowing this general statement down to the specific movement: Wilde is 
placed in ‘a postcolonial perspective’, where his ‘predicament is that of a colonial 
subject operating within the discourse of his imperial masters’.7 Wilde’s position 
becomes that of an Irishman under English rule – an additional step away from 
postmodernism and to an approach to Wilde that has been generally accepted and 
explored, also by Sammells himself.
8
 This is not to say that post-colonialism is 
not a central part of the approaches to Wilde, but simply that this has already been 
established, unlike Wilde’s apparent postmodernism. In Wilde Style, Sammells 
does not return to the point of post-structuralism after the above passage – most 
importantly because the book focusses on the reception of Wilde’s works 
throughout time, as well as the development of Wilde’s own style. Sammells does 
not make a proto-postmodern connection, but rather focusses on Wilde in the 
context of his own time. As one reviewer observes, the book mainly makes the 
point that ‘some of the styles of Wilde […], such as his use of the fairy tale genre, 
his appropriation of the society comedy conventions and finally, his dandyism, 
were elaborately constructed rebellions against the norms of classicism, sexism, 
racism, and homophobia rampant in England.’9 The fact of Wilde’s possible 
postmodernism, then, is only mentioned. 
                                                             
6 Neil Sammells, Wilde Style: The Plays and Prose of Oscar Wilde (Harrow: Longman, 2000), p. 
40. 
7 Sammells, p. 42. 
8 Neil Sammells, ‘The Irish Wilde’, in Approaches to Teaching the Works of Oscar Wilde, ed. by 
Philip E. Smith (New York: Modern Language Association of America), pp. 35-41. 
9 Valerie A. Murrenus, ‘Wilde Style: The Plays and Prose of Oscar Wilde’, New Hibernia Review, 
5.1 (2001), 156-157 (p. 156). 
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A third and final example is a comment by Terry Eagleton. In a foreword 
to his play Saint Oscar, Eagleton says on Wilde and his modern appearance: 
  
Another such point was my sense of how astonishingly Wilde’s work 
prefigures the insights of contemporary cultural theory. Or perhaps it 
would be more accurate to say that such theory, for all its excited air of 
novelty, represents in some ways little advance on the fin-de-siècle. 
Language as self-referential, truth as a convenient fiction, the human 
subject as contradictory and ‘deconstructed’, criticism as a form of 
‘creative’ writing, the body and its pleasures pitted against a pharisaical 
ideology: in these and several other ways, Oscar Wilde looms up for us 
more and more as the Irish Roland Barthes.
10
 
 
Here Eagleton seems to be arguing for Wilde in a postmodern light through a 
reference to a notable postmodernist, Roland Barthes; Eagleton, however, follows 
up his above observation by stating that: ‘As I moved more deeply into his work, I 
began to discover that the two factors which had triggered my fascination with 
Wilde – his Irishness, and his remarkable anticipation of some present-day theory 
– were in fact closely interrelated’.11 As in Wilde Style, Wilde is linked to post-
colonialism and no further examination of the parallel with postmodernism is 
undertaken. 
                                                             
10 Terry Eagleton, ‘Saint Oscar: A Foreword’, New Left Review, I.177 (1989), 125-128 (p. 126). 
11 Eagleton, p. 126. 
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Engaging slightly more with the idea of postmodernism and Wilde, 
Jonathan Dollimore, in Sexual Dissidence: Augustine to Wilde, Freud to Foucault, 
does discuss this when he writes: 
 
If [Wilde's] transgressive aesthetic anticipates post-modernism to the 
extent that it suggest a culture of the surface, the decentered and the 
different, it also anticipates modernism in being not just hostile to, but 
intently concerned with, its opposite: depth and exclusive integration as 
fundamental criteria of identity.
12
 
 
However, the focus here is not on Wilde's extensive critical work and its echoes in 
his creative fiction. The passage on Wilde bases itself on Wilde's epigrammatic 
style in order to move on to an argument on Jacques Derrida’s philosophy, taking 
the familiar Wildean inversion as similar to Derrida's deconstruction: ‘Derrida [...] 
insists that a crucial stage in the Deconstruction of binaries involves their 
inversion, an overturning, which brings low what was high’.13 This is, however, 
the extent to which the book discusses this connection, and the rest of the 
argument concerns itself primarily with how Wilde subverts prevalent sexual 
constructs of the time. The connection with deconstruction (which this thesis itself 
takes up in Chapter II) is more substantial than the common mention of Wilde’s 
theoretical position; here too, however, the work hardly progresses beyond that 
point, at least in terms of exploring Wilde’s ideas. 
                                                             
12 Jonathan Dollimore, Sexual Dissidence: Augustine to Wilde, Freud to Foucault (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 73. 
13 Dollimore, p. 65. 
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 This, then, is the starting point. Oscar Wilde’s ideas clearly have many 
correspondences in various postmodern theoretical approaches, and this has been 
signalled, but not explored, in a great many critical works. This thesis will take up 
and expand those suggested parallels, sometimes from expected points (such as 
the aforementioned link to Derrida and deconstruction), other times from less 
well-known or predictable theoretical grounds. The specific ways in which this 
will be done are discussed below in the synopsis. 
However, before examining what exactly the idea of a proto-postmodernist 
entails, it is crucial to examine Wilde’s own context and to provide the elements 
from which Wilde constructed his approach. 
 
Contexts 
Though born and partially educated in Ireland, Wilde’s context is explicitly that of 
a late-Victorian England, specifically London. After he shed much of his Irishness 
from his public persona while studying at Oxford, he moved to London in order to 
pursue a literary career, a move that placed him in a very public position. The 
working conditions of his chosen trade have been excellently explored in 
Josephine Guy and Ian Small’s Oscar Wilde’s Profession, which details the actual 
circumstances of Wilde’s literary career, first as a reviewer, later as a writer of 
predominantly theatre, but also of stories and a novel. The book reminds the 
reader that, far from an incorrectly Romantic view of Wilde’s writing for a living, 
the reader must realize that ‘in both occupations he was writing for money: the 
fact that the sums involved in the theatre were considerably larger, and the tastes 
of the audience more difficult to satisfy, only made the commercial pressures 
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heavier’.14 The availability of a professional writing career had only recently 
become an option. Just before Wilde’s time, in the period of 1840 to 1880, the 
audience for literature had grown significantly, which, according to Regenia 
Gagnier, resulted ‘in the professionalization of authorship – for example, 
specialist readers at publishing houses, literary agents, author’s royalties, the 
Society of Authors’ as well as in ‘high and low culture industries’.15 In other 
words, culture and literary production as an industry were a recent development 
when Wilde started out in London. 
 Though commercially unsuccessful as a poet, Wilde managed to sustain 
himself as a writer through reviews and an editorship of The Woman’s World 
(1887-1889), working on his literary career with a variety of stories and the 
serialization of a novel. Despite equally unsuccessful early forays into theatre with 
Vera; or, The Nihilists (1880) and The Duchess of Padua (1883), he eventually 
made a name for himself as the playwright of social comedies, starting with Lady 
Windermere’s Fan (1892). The wildly successful comedies were very closely 
linked to their times, set, as they were, in his own present day; Wilde’s stage 
characters could either be ‘identified as contemporary types by his audience or 
represented an older, and by 1890 relatively ineffectual, nobility and gentry at 
whom the new administrative and enterprising classes could laugh, even while 
they prided themselves on having usurped their power’.16 In either case, as 
Regenia Gagnier notes, audiences identified with Wilde’s characters. However, a 
different problem lay with the reviewers, who, since they often ‘enlisted their 
                                                             
14 Josephine M. Guy and Ian Small, Oscar Wilde’s Profession: Writing and the Culture Industry 
in the Late Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 44. 
15 Regenia Gagnier, Idylls of the Marketplace: Oscar Wilde and the Victorian Public (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1986), p.26. 
16 Gagnier, p. 106. 
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sympathy with labor rather than administration or enterprise, identified Wilde’s 
characters with the new upper classes; thus they frequently attacked his plays, or 
less frequently interpreted them as satires on Society’.17 Wilde did not draw his 
audience from the lower classes, though they represented a very large portion of 
Victorian paying audiences. Those audiences no longer frequented the traditional 
Victorian theatre: 
 
The first-night audiences who frequented George Alexander’s St. James’s 
and Beerbohm Tree’s Theatre Royal, Haymarket – the two theaters that 
initially monopolized Wilde’s comedies – and whose approval guaranteed 
the prolonged runs of Wilde’s plays, included little more than the 1890’s 
version of social Exclusives. Since the 1860’s, music halls had been 
drawing the lower classes from the theaters, leaving room for smaller, 
discriminating audiences.
18
 
 
It was these discriminating audiences to whom Wilde’s very successful comedies 
played, and who provided the relative financial success that he enjoyed during the 
first half of the last decade of the nineteenth century. 
Aside from worries over money, however, Wilde had other problems, most 
predominantly his sexual nature, which deviated from a norm which had fairly 
recently become much stricter. By the end of the nineteenth century, ‘the mildness 
and tolerance that characterized the lingering traces of the early modern structures 
of heterosexism were gradually displaced by a much harsher and less forgiving set 
                                                             
17 Gagnier, p. 106. 
18 Gagnier, p. 107. 
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of attitudes’, of which an important contributing factor was ‘the gradual 
emergence throughout the nineteenth century of a professional discourse which 
attempted to understand and define the phenomenon of “same-sex passion” 
according to medical and scientific criteria’.19 Victorian definitions of Wilde’s 
sexual orientation established him to be, if exposed, unequivocally an outsider to 
be shunned: 
 
The behaviour which had been deemed criminal by civil and ecclesiastical 
courts of law, and which had previously been understood by most people, 
within traditional ontological parameters and within a Christian moralistic 
context, as a deficiency of willpower and a lack of self-control (i.e. the 
sodomite considered as ‘dissipated, dissolute debauchee,’ or simply as 
‘sinner’), was being increasingly characterized as representing an 
alternative ontological reality altogether, that is, a third sex, a ‘sexual 
invert,’ whose inclinations and behaviour were biologically determined 
and manifestly ‘other’.20 
 
Victorian public morality was coming down hard on anything that it saw as sexual 
deviancy. It was a public debate, which, beyond politics, took place very much in 
the written word. The debate’s participants actively sought to place any aberrant 
sexuality in the realm of mental disease, and in print writers ‘argued that sexual 
vice, especially masturbation, was both a cause and an effect of mental 
degeneracy, [and] signs of sexual nonconformity on the part of artists were 
                                                             
19 Michael S. Foldy, The Trials of Oscar Wilde: Deviance, Morality, and Late-Victorian Society 
(London: Yale University Press, 1997), p.69. 
20 Foldy, p.69. 
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especially ominous’.21 The debate was not one-sided, though any authors going 
against the prevailing trend needed to pick their words carefully. Among those 
attempting to nuance the discussion was Walter Pater, who, ‘by deciding to 
celebrate Leonardo’s perversity, attempts […] to convert the perceived disabilities 
of sexual nonconformity into sources of cultural growth.’22 Part of the problem for 
those authors trying to produce a positive construction of differing sexuality was 
the fluidity of the terms; rather than having been crystalized and available for 
debate, the terminology surrounding the debate on sexuality was unclear, so that, 
for example, while ‘men’s effeminacy had been read by this time as signalling 
sexual deviancy, and even homosexuality explicitly, the correlation was still 
ambiguous for many’.23 In Wilde’s time it was entirely unclear what it meant to be 
a homosexual – indeed, the term itself is problematic, as several gender theorists 
have noted the word had very different connotations over the span of history. 
Wilde himself rested much of the interpretation of his sexuality on Ancient Greek 
models of sexuality, but was unable to control the narrative at the time of his trial, 
so that when he was sentenced, ‘the press, apart from one or two notable 
exceptions, vilified him’.24 
 In public, Wilde did not associate himself openly with these issues of 
sexuality – though he did not shy away from veiled references in his work, as the 
relationship between Dorian Gray and Basil Hallward in The Picture of Dorian 
Gray (1890) shows. Rather, he associated himself with Aestheticism, even going 
                                                             
21 Richard Dellamora, Masculine Desire: The Sexual Politics of Victorian Aestheticism (London: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1990), p. 118. 
22 Dellamora, p. 118. 
23 Dennis Denisoff, ‘“Men of my Own Sex”: Genius, Sexuality, and George Du Maurier’s 
Artists’, in Victorian Sexual Dissidence, ed. by Richard Dellamora (London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1999), pp. 147-170 (p. 149). 
24 Joseph Bristow, ‘Introduction’, in Wilde Writings: Contextual Conditions, ed. by Joseph 
Bristow (London: University of Toronto Press, 2003), pp 3-37 (p. 5). 
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so far as to style himself ‘Professor of Aesthetics’ on his lecture tour through the 
United States, in order ‘to undertake the education of America’.25 Wilde’s 
interpretation of this movement is his explicit emphasis on beauty and the 
individual, but in general Aestheticism was not a clearly defined and delineated 
movement; a ‘vagueness is startlingly evident in accounts of literary Aestheticism. 
If there is any consensus, it is that Aestheticism as a category is exceptionally 
elusive’.26 Nevertheless, among its core principles was included the idea of art for 
art’s sake, an aphorism that had been incorporated into the movement by the time 
Wilde had become interested in it: ‘In the 1870s, though, the term “art for art’s 
sake” was gradually superseded by “Aestheticism”’.27 The movement was in 
development in Victorian England, becoming crystalized in criticism and art as 
the era went on: ‘The distinction of Victorian Aestheticism may be its 
thoroughgoing attempts to realise the speculative notion of the “purely aesthetic” 
in the concrete forms of works of art and literature’.28 Thus, by the time that Wilde 
came down from Oxford in 1878, Aestheticism was available to him, both as a 
movement which he could subscribe to, and as an approach that, only partially 
solidified, he could still make his own. 
 In addition to Aestheticism, Wilde is often associated with Decadence. 
This artistic movement originated in France, but spread to Britain through writers 
such as George Moore, Arthur Symons and Wilde himself, but also by means of 
academic authors such as Pater. Decadence was a good fit for Wilde, as Kirsten 
                                                             
25 Peter Raby, Oscar Wilde (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 31. 
26 Elizabeth Prettejohn, ‘Introduction’, in After the Pre-Raphaelites: Art and Aestheticism in 
Victorian England, ed. by Elizabeth Prettejohn (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 
pp. 1-16 (p. 2). 
27 Prettejohn, p. 3. 
28 Prettejohn, p. 6. 
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MacLeod notes: 
 
Aestheticism shared many of the same tenets as Decadence – a 
commitment to art for art’s sake, a rejection of bourgeois industrialism and 
utilitarianism, and a desire for intensity of experience – its force as a 
resistant aesthetic for the literary élite was, by the 1880s, on the wane. In 
part, Aestheticism’s declining power was a result of its popularity with the 
middle class, a group against which proponents of the movement sought to 
define themselves. To add insult to injury, Aestheticism had become the 
subject of much ridicule and parody, notably in the caricatures of its main 
proponents, James McNeill Whistler and Oscar Wilde.
29
 
 
However, much like Aestheticism, Decadence remained a term that was only 
broadly sketched, and so here, too, the ‘problem of meaning around Decadence 
derives, as numerous critics have argued, from the instability of the term itself. 
Because […] the definition of Decadence is predicated on an opposition to 
“arbitrarily defined norms”, its meaning changes in relation to its context.’30 As a 
result, both Aestheticism and Decadence are more clearly definable through their 
adherents than they are through formulated rules and accepted practices – as is 
appropriate for an approach that foregrounds personality and individual reaction. 
This personalized element gives Decadence a connotation of the subjective, and 
perhaps even of the non-serious, so it is important to note that ‘the decadent novel 
                                                             
29 Kirsten MacLeod, Fictions of British Decadence: High Art, Popular Writing, and the Fin de 
Siécle (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 2. 
30 MacLeod, p. 19. 
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can deal in very earnest matters’.31 Wilde’s own novel, The Picture of Dorian 
Gray, certainly does. 
Three names are especially important in the context of Wilde’s critical 
writing, two of whom are named by Wilde himself. Walter Pater and Matthew 
Arnold feature in Intentions (1891) in ‘The Critic as Artist’, but John Ruskin’s 
thoughts are also in the background of Wilde’s critical thought. Ruskin argued, in 
the second volume of The Stones of Venice (1852), that individual expression was 
extremely important in art, taking as his example the rough but therefore unique 
craftsmanship of Gothic architecture. His praise of beauty and individualism links 
him to Wilde, though the two writers part ways, theoretically speaking, in 
Ruskin’s emphasis on an underlying natural reality that an artist may touch – 
essentially a Romantic idea, for Ruskin ‘assumes that fidelity to natural 
phenomena is wholly consistent with the expression of noble, personal style. He 
assumes that only a noble individual does wholly perceive and represent nature 
truly, fully’.32 This in contrast to Wilde, who in ‘The Critic as Artist’ soundly 
rejected the idea that it is important to see an object for itself. 
‘The Critic as Artist’ does mention both Arnold and Pater. Wilde was 
clearly more enthralled with Pater, on whose book The Renaissance (1873) he 
wrote: 
 
But Mr. Pater’s essays became to me ‘the golden book of spirit and sense, 
the holy writ of beauty.’ They are still this to me. It is possible, of course, 
                                                             
31 George C. Schoolfield, A Baedeker of Decadence: Charting a Literary Fashion, 1884-1927 
(London: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 70. 
32 Wendell Stacy Johnson, ‘Memory, Landscape, Love: John Ruskin’s Poetry and Poetic 
Criticism’, Victorian Poetry, 19.1 (1981), 19-34 (p. 31). 
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that I may exaggerate about them. I certainly hope that I do; for where 
there is no exaggeration there is no love, and where there is no love there 
is no understanding.
33
 
 
In fact, Wilde follows Pater’s articulation of an Aesthetic philosophy closely, 
something he almost acknowledges in ‘The Critic as Artist’. In one sense at least, 
though, Wilde is nearer to Arnold: ‘for Wilde, as for Arnold, finally, criticism 
offers more than delight. For Arnold, the value of criticism is in discovering the 
object as it really is’, while Pater is more interested in the expression of the artist, 
and ‘considered the results of criticism rather than its larger possible functions, its 
value is in increasing our delight in art; for Wilde it offers both insight and 
delight’.34 A fuller exploration of Wilde’s attitude towards criticism and art will 
be made in Part 1 of this thesis, but here, the most important point is Wilde’s 
theoretical context, which was shaped strongly by these great names of Victorian 
England. 
 Outside Victorian England, however, there were other philosophical and 
artistic movements that were part of the intellectual circumstances in which Wilde 
wrote his most important work. On the one hand, according to Philip Smith and 
Michael Helfand, there is ‘Wilde’s interest in the theories of Max Müller and John 
Ruskin’, but, 
 
                                                             
33 Oscar Wilde, A Critic in Pall Mall, Being Extracts from Reviews and Miscellanies, ed. by E.V. 
Lucas (London: Methuen, 1919), p. 188. 
34 Wendell V. Harris, ‘Arnold, Pater, Wilde, and the Object as in Themselves They See It’, 
Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900, 11.4 (1971), 733-747 (p. 745). 
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at Oxford, Wilde also found in William Wallace’s and Benjamin Jowett’s 
explanations of Hegelian theory a variety of idealism better fitted than 
Müller’s and Ruskin’s to incorporate the materialist assumptions and 
findings of science, and especially evolutionary theory. Furthermore, 
Wilde adapted Hegel’s aesthetic theory and a modified version of his 
history of art, which he learned either first hand or indirectly from Walter 
Pater or J. A. Symonds.
35
 
 
As the authors of Oscar Wilde’s Oxford Notebooks also explore, Hegel was a 
logical fit for Wilde’s Classically-oriented interest in beauty, since Hegel had 
posited that ‘artistic beauty reveals absolute truth through perception […]. He 
holds that the best art conveys metaphysical knowledge by revealing, through 
sense perception, what is unconditionally true.
’36
 Hegel’s phenomenology, which 
advocates a focus on the (artistic) object under discussion, furthermore serves as a 
model for Wilde’s own exploration of art for art’s sake, which advocates the same 
kind of attention to a work on its own. 
Hegel is not the only continental philosopher who inspired Wilde. His 
work also shows remarkable similarities with that of Friedrich Nietzsche, who 
shares with him a thinking on individualism as almost transcendental. In this 
context, Kate Hext has pointed out, speaking of The Antichrist (1888) and 
Twilight of the Idols (1889), that ‘Nietzsche’s spirit in these mature works is more 
                                                             
35 Philip E. Smith and Michael S. Helfand, ‘The Context of the Text’, in Oscar Wilde’s Oxford 
Notebooks: A Portrait of Mind in the Making, ed. by Philip E. Smith and Michael S. Helfand 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 33-34. 
36 Robert Wicks, ‘Hegel’s Aesthetics: an Overview’, in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, ed. 
by Frederick C. Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 348-377 (p. 349). 
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than a little like Wilde’s in the late 1880s and early 1890s’.37 Among the 
similarities is a tendency to make philosophical points in a literary way, as 
exemplified for example in Wilde’s essay-story ‘The Portrait of Mr. W. H.’: ‘The 
works of Nietzsche and Wilde exemplify “philosophy in literature”. Their visions 
of Romantic Individualism are inextricably linked to their reforming styles and 
forms, which operate to bring the reader into being as a creative subject’, a 
similarity that manifests in both Nietzsche’s and Wilde’s ‘idiosyncratic and 
divisive poses, aphorisms and contradictions, [which] grant their readers freedom 
from disciplineship to a dogmatic or systematic argument; they ask each reader to 
realise their own truths and thus to become “perfectly and absolutely” him or 
herself’.38 The extent to which Wilde and Nietzsche influenced each other – the 
two were contemporaries – is unclear, but strong parallels between them certainly 
exist. This is a crucial point, as Nietzsche in many ways figures heavily as a 
forefather of postmodernism, and if Wilde’s thought matches his, this is an 
indication that the similarities may extend to postmodernism, too. 
Though Nietzsche shares some characteristics with Wilde, there is also a 
difference that is, in the context of this thesis, crucial: while Wilde has only been 
connected to postmodernism in the sense of the mentioned but unexplored 
similarity, Nietzsche’s role as a philosopher whose work has a place in 
postmodernism has been widely critically debated.
39
 Even if critics do not 
necessarily agree that Nietzsche himself represents an early, actual step towards 
postmodernism, most critical debates take his status as an (indirect) forefather of 
                                                             
37 Kate Hext, ‘Oscar Wilde and Friedrich Nietzsche: “Rebels in the Name of Beauty”’, 
Victoriographies, 1.2 (2011), 202-220 (p. 203). 
38 Hext, p. 211. 
39 Clayton Koelb, ed. Nietzsche as Postmodernist: Essays Pro and Contra (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1990). 
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postmodernism as given.
40
 The acknowledgement of Nietzsche even goes so far as 
to explore the link between Nietzsche and postmodern feminism: though often 
labelled a misogynist, ‘Nietzsche's texts contain many possibilities for postmodern 
feminism, since these texts strongly exemplify the two themes that characterize 
much of the postmodern feminist position: woman as multiple and woman as 
representation’. 41 Because Nietzsche’s relationship to postmodernism has already 
been so profusely discussed, his role in relation to postmodernism will not be 
further explored in this thesis other than to discuss similarities with Wilde at 
select points. 
 This is the late-Victorian context of Wilde’s ideas, sketched briefly here, 
since this context does not feature heavily in the arguments presented in this 
thesis. Where appropriate, Wilde’s debt to contemporary or preceding thinkers 
will be acknowledged, but, as stated, the goal is not to examine Wilde’s ideas in 
their historical circumstances and connections, but to investigate his striking 
resemblance to postmodernism. 
Approaches 
The study of Oscar Wilde’s life and work has had a strange course over the 
twentieth century. After the high point in the 1890s, Wilde fell from grace and his 
work went into disrepute, not to be looked favourably upon for a while after his 
death in 1900. In 1917, for example, his work was characterized in the following 
way: 
                                                             
40 Ronald Beiner, ‘Gadamer's Philosophy of Dialogue and Its Relation to the Postmodernism of 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, and Strauss’, in Gadamer’s Repercussions: Reconsidering 
Philosophical Hermeneutics, ed. by Bruce Krajewski (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2004), pp. 145-157. 
41 Lewis Call, ‘Woman as Will and Representation: Nietzsche’s Contribution to Postmodern 
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(1995), 113-129 (p. 113). 
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Wilde was a third rate poet who occasionally rose to the second class but 
not once to the first. Prose is more difficult than verse and in it he is rather 
sloppy […] on any catalogue of Wilde’s plays there should be written: 
Here lions might have been. For assuming his madness, one must also 
admit his genius and the uninterrupted conjunction of the two might have 
produced brilliancies.
42
 
 
Although his works never completely disappeared from public view – The Picture 
of Dorian Gray and The Importance of Being Earnest remained popular – there 
was little attention, certainly not academic, for Wilde in the first half of the 
twentieth century. In fact, as late as 1993, Ian Small was able rightfully to 
complain that ‘until very recently there were none of the basic tools for a proper 
study of Wilde: no standard – nor even adequate – editions of the collected works, 
no satisfactory biography, no full census or description of the manuscripts’.43 The 
absence of a ‘satisfactory’ biography had been partly solved by Richard 
Ellmann’s biography Oscar Wilde, which openly and frankly discussed Wilde’s 
sexuality.
44
 Small is perhaps a little harsh on a handful of preceding critics; the 
scholarship of Sir Rupert Hart-Davis, for example, resulted in an edition of the 
Complete Letters (at the time not quite as complete as the title would suggest), 
while an early attempt at a critical edition of Wilde’s poems was undertaken by 
Bobby Fong (who would later publish the Oxford critical edition together with 
                                                             
42 Edgar Saltus, ‘Edgar Saltus on Wilde’s Literary Ability’, in Oscar Wilde: The Critical 
Heritage, ed. by Karl Beckson (London: Routledge, 1970), p. 379. 
43 Ian Small, Oscar Wilde Revalued: an Essay on New Materials and Methods of Research 
(Greensboro: ELT Press, 1993), p. 1.  
44 Richard Ellmann, Oscar Wilde (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1987). 
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Karl Beckson).
45
 Most early Wilde scholarship relied on editions of Wilde’s 
works, including an early Complete Works, which had been compiled by Wilde’s 
literary executor, Robert Ross. Ross’s editing of those texts, in turn, was 
problematic, as will be discussed during the treatment of Wilde’s De Profundis. 
Notably, Wilde’s own family stayed active in preserving his legacy, and 
especially Wilde’s grandson, Merlin Holland, has assumed an active role in this, 
even taking over the editorship of the complete letters from Hart-Davis. Holland’s 
stake as a surviving family member may be more personal than some of the more 
independently-minded critics would like; on the other hand, his contributions in 
bringing Wilde into current scholarship are beyond reproach. 
 Wilde’s return to prominence occurred in the latter part of the twentieth 
century, and is in no small part thanks to the attention afforded him by theorists 
who were developing what was to become queer theory. Major names include the 
aforementioned Jonathan Dollimore, and Alan Sinfield, whose work is examined 
in Chapter I of this thesis. At the same time, Wilde became an important name in 
Irish post-colonial studies, as exemplified by the earlier quotation from Neil 
Sammells, but also by Declan Kiberd, who links Wilde’s theme of lying to Irish 
roots, where locals lied to English scouts for the sake of saving Irish lives.
46
 The 
comprehensive study of Wilde has much reason to thank these two approaches, 
for among their achievements is a renewed interest in Wilde, one that allowed 
others to come to Wilde and read him again. 
                                                             
45 Oscar Wilde, The Complete Letters of Oscar Wilde, ed. by Merlin Holland and Rupert Hart-
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With some exceptions, the quotations used in the present work have been 
derived from the 2003 HarperCollins’ Complete Works edition of Oscar Wilde’s 
works. This represents a widely available text, with which many readers, both 
popular and academic, will be familiar; as such it represents not just Wilde’s 
works, but a popular perception of it. The present thesis draws on this edition in 
order to provide a version of Wilde that is relevant to the twenty first century – 
and thus based on a popular edition that is readily available in that century. 
However, a more central problem lies with the available critical alternatives. An 
obvious choice would have been the emerging Oxford editions of Wilde’s 
complete works, of which presently four volumes are available, with a fifth (the 
early plays) and a sixth (the journalism) to become available in June 2013. These 
scholarly editions offer a meticulous and annotated version of the texts. There are 
several problems there, however. Firstly, there is an issue in consistency, with the 
Oxford editions being far from complete at the time of the writing of this thesis. 
The Oxford editions also make editorial choices that are potentially a source of 
discussion; in printing the essays of Intentions, for example, the editors have 
opted to print those essays including passages that were cut after a discussion 
between Wilde and Intentions’ original editor. This prompts textual discussions 
which the present thesis has neither the range nor focus to consider in detail. Thus, 
for the sake of simplicity, the texts almost all derive from the HarperCollins 
edition. 
Nevertheless, the HarperCollins volume is not without its problems. For 
example, it provides the four-act version of The Importance of Being Earnest, a 
choice that is, critically, not without controversy. Additionally, a major issue is 
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the basis for many texts in the edition, which still rests in Robert Ross’s 
posthumous editing of Wilde’s work. As Josephine Guy and Ian Small have 
argued in their critical examination of De Profundis – discussed below – Ross 
made substantial, and at times controversial, changes to Wilde’s work in 
preparation for the 1908 edition of Wilde’s works. Differences between the 
HarperCollins edition and other scholarly editions have been checked where 
possible, in order to make sure that no textual differences arise that could affect 
the arguments presented in this thesis. 
Similarly, the choice of postmodern texts must be clarified. It will become 
immediately obvious that this thesis sometimes draws on anthologies or 
introductory texts, such as Peter Barry’s Beginning Theory. The presence of such 
sources in the argumentation is primarily due to their pervasiveness in modern 
critical approaches. If Wilde corresponds to the approaches as they are presented 
in their most current, widespread form, as well as to the more specific sources of 
postmodern thinkers, this can only strengthen the comparison. Additionally, if 
Wilde’s thought can be linked to texts which are chosen or constructed for their 
accessibility, this in turn aids the argument that Wilde himself is as accessible, 
and as relevant, as these widely-read postmodern critics. 
In discussing Wilde as a proto-postmodernist, the focus of the argument is 
primarily on Wilde’s essays, as they regularly contain the clearest articulation of 
specific aspects of his thinking. Nevertheless, often the argumentation will move 
beyond the critical work and into the creative output. Wilde’s ideas may be clearly 
formulated in his essays, but they are also woven into the stories, novel, plays, and 
poetry. 
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Thus, the assumption is that Intentions is at the critical heart of Wilde’s 
work. His fame rests mostly on other works, but it is through the lens of the 
collection of essays that this thesis re-examines the rest of Wilde’s work in terms 
of proto-postmodernism. The volume shows the author arriving at critical 
positions that had been simmering in previous works and that would find 
expression and development still in the works created and published after 
Intentions had appeared. Thus, for example, Wilde’s intertextual interests had 
started to emerge as early as the time of the publication of his poetry; it would be 
prominent still in his final work, ‘The Ballad of Reading Gaol’, but their foremost 
moment comes when Wilde writes, in Intentions, that ‘Art takes life as part of her 
rough material, recreates it, and refashions it in fresh forms, is absolutely 
indifferent to fact, invents, imagines, dreams’.47 Such points allow the meaningful 
exploration of Wildean literary ‘thievery’ as a technique rather than a 
transgression, as will be explored in Chapter VII. 
 In the same way, one of the great concerns of Wilde’s work is the 
combination of creative art on the one hand and criticism on the other. That 
combination itself is never clearly stated before the arrival of Intentions in 1891, 
but there are signs before that time. Wilde, after all, was a Trinity and Oxford 
graduate who looked to poetry after his days in university. When he became a 
prolific reviewer and editor of the magazine The Woman’s World, Wilde was also 
writing poetry. During his editorship of that magazine between 1887 and 1890 he 
also wrote short stories, including the entire collection The Happy Prince and 
Other Tales as well as working on the manuscript of the magazine version of The 
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p. 1078. Further references to Wilde’s work from this edition are given after quotations in the text. 
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Picture of Dorian Gray. 
 Linked to this idea of creative criticism are Wilde’s artists. There are 
several in the works he had written before the publication of Intentions. Many if 
not all of them exhibit, as artists, a fine critical instinct, which is to say that they 
have achieved some mastery in life through their critical faculty. The immediate 
example is Basil Hallward, whose perception of Dorian enables him to create a 
portrait special enough to become the supernatural receptacle for Dorian’s sins 
and ageing, even if he does not quite grasp what, exactly, is going on. Prior to 
Intentions, indeed before the publication of its separate articles (the significant 
entries were published in January 1889), there are already various examples. 
There is Alan Trevor, the painter in ‘The Model Millionaire’, who has attained a 
carefree life and who is capable of speaking in the typical, telling Wildean 
manner: at one point he says that ‘the only people a painter should know […] are 
people who are bête and beautiful, people who are an artistic pleasure to look at 
and an intellectual repose to talk to’ (p. 209). He also ends the story by remarking 
that ‘millionaire models […] are rare enough; but, by Jove, model millionaires are 
rarer still!’ (p. 212). Trevor has the same kind of verbal intelligence that suggests 
the aforementioned critical faculty. 
 Such faculty also appears in ‘The Portrait of Mr. W. H.’, although there the 
interplay of life and art is much more dangerous, killing one man and ruining 
another’s final days. The protagonists of this work are also engaged in critical 
reflection; the reader finds two of the three main characters discussing the merits 
and flaws of forgery, while the third, though a gentlemen, is clearly also a gifted 
actor. Of his playing Rosalind, it is said that ‘it was a marvellous performance. 
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[…] It would be impossible to describe to you the beauty, the delicacy, the 
refinement of the whole thing. It made an immense sensation’ (p. 305). This is the 
same man who will go on to create a theory of Shakespeare’s Sonnets that is 
compelling enough to inspire death. This, too, is an instance where protagonists 
are both artistic and powerfully critical. 
 These examples represent an author who is adept at combining art and 
criticism, an act which he subsequently enshrined in ‘The Critic as Artist’. After 
Intentions Wilde turned to writing plays, and his wish to combine criticism and art 
receded into the background, becoming a theme woven into the works rather than 
a concrete point he tried to make. It is good to remember, however, one of the 
many points offered in ‘The Critic as Artist’: that the two supreme arts are ‘Life 
and Literature, life and the perfect expression of life’ (p. 1114). Linked to the 
artist’s critical faculty, this allows for the view of Wilde’s plays as acts of 
criticism. Specifically, they are criticism of life and thus a continuation of the 
practices he had combined in the years before: ‘some writing practices in the early 
poems are the first examples of a strategy which Wilde later developed in more 
sophisticated ways’, meaning that readers may read, for example, Wilde’s poetry 
‘as an attempt to renegotiate the relationship between concepts such as originality 
and creativity, journalism and art’.48 
 Where much attention is given to Intentions, another work will be entirely 
absent from the analysis in this thesis. For several reasons, De Profundis is not 
included as either theory or as an illustration of Wilde’s thought at work. For one, 
the more religious overtones of the argument, especially the prolonged discussion 
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26 
 
on Christ, does not sit well with much of Wilde’s other theory. Whereas much of 
Intentions seems to problematize the existence of an objective, accessible reality, 
De Profundis seems to counter that. Rather than pursue a coherent argument, the 
work is a combination of a biographical document on Wilde’s relationship with 
Lord Alfred Douglas with a musing on art and Christ. The two do not seem to be 
related, in the sense that neither passage illustrates nor reinforces the other. 
Scholars have therefore suggested that, given the fact that it was written during 
Wilde’s imprisonment, when he was clearly mentally and physically suffering, the  
 
recognition of the manuscript’s artificial nature should alert us to the 
possibility that the complex and conflicting personality we find in it might 
be the result of rather more prosaic circumstances, of Wilde’s inexpert (or 
unfinished) ‘welding’ together of documents initially composed separately 
and with different audiences in mind.
49
 
 
These different audiences are most likely partly a general public interested in 
criticism, which might have benefitted from Wilde’s discussion on the role of the 
artist; and, separately, Lord Alfred Douglas, for whom it is a letter, and one 
containing a bitter lover’s quarrel at that. 
 Furthermore, critics have pointed out the ‘need to acknowledge that the 
manuscript is uneven to the point of inconsistency; and that Ross’s editing of it 
should be revalued’.50 Ross, who edited Wilde’s works after the latter’s death, is 
known to have made extensive cuts and changes; the full version of De Profundis, 
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for example, was not released to the public until the second half of the twentieth 
century, possibly because Ross feared further damage to Wilde’s reputation over 
the more explicit parts of Wilde’s letter. 
Useful as it may be in terms of biographical details, as a theoretical 
development the arguments of the work come at a late phase, as Bruce Bashford 
notes when he discusses the theoretical elements emerging from De Profundis: 
Wilde ‘underestimates the difficulties that he creates for himself by discarding the 
basic principle of his earlier position, and as a result, his new theory lacks 
development’.51 De Profundis, then, presents several important problems: it has an 
internal inconsistency that, crucially, is not compatible with Wilde’s earlier theory 
– even when taking into account that Wilde promoted self-contradiction to some 
degree; it has a problematic history in terms of its composition and editing; and its 
late creation under mentally and physically difficult circumstances throw doubt on 
the theories Wilde presents within. The issue of De Profundis is one that Wildean 
scholarship will have to solve one way or another; in the current thesis, however, 
it is not brought in. 
The aim of this thesis is to compare Wilde’s work to general ideas of 
postmodernism, in order to show Wilde’s apparent proto-postmodernity. This 
immediately runs into a considerable problem, as it has been noted that ‘there is 
no such thing as a “postmodern theory,” only postmodern theories and 
theorists’.52 Postmodernism, much like Aestheticism and Decadence, is a hard 
term to define. Since the correspondence between Wilde’s thought and 
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postmodernism should be more than a mutual adherence to hard-to-define ideas, 
there will need to be some assumptions about postmodernism on which to base 
the arguments. One illuminating example is Christopher Norris’s rather strong 
depiction of a version of postmodernism by Jean Baudrillard. Norris defines a 
postmodern viewpoint, which he sees specifically as a process: 
 
that everything is appearance, that ‘truth’ was always a species of self-
promoting fiction, and that scepticism misses the point since it still makes 
a big dramatic scene of this belated discovery. […] It is pointless to 
deplore or to criticise this process, since it represents not only an accurate 
diagnosis of our present condition but, beyond that, a readiness to cope 
with the absence of all ‘metaphysical’ guarantees, all those old self-
deluding appeals to reason, truth, reality, and so forth.
53
 
 
This version of postmodernism is in one sense the foregrounding of the fictive 
nature of many basic assumptions and, in another, a dismissal of a coherent, 
pervasive concept of metaphysics. 
The same sort of starting point of postmodernism is described by Jean-
François Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition. In it, Lyotard famously identifies 
postmodern thinking as ‘incredulity towards meta-narratives’.54 This incredulity 
entails a scepticism of absolute ideas: the ‘metanarratives’ that Lyotard identifies 
are grand ideas that seek to explain reality to the exclusion of all other ideas – for 
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example, the idea that Western civilization is objectively superior to other kinds of 
civilization and should therefore always be preferred. ‘Postmodern critique attacks 
the transcendental illusion, which is [the description of] life in universal, context-
overruling Ideas.’55 Instead of these ‘context-overruling Ideas’, postmodern 
thought favours that context, allowing any number of ideas to approach a given 
topic from various directions. 
Lyotard has also stated, in an effort to define the term postmodernism more 
clearly: 
 
the postmodern would be that which, in the modern, puts forward the 
unpresentable in presentation itself; that which denies itself the solace of 
good forms, the consensus of a taste which would make it possible to share 
collectively the nostalgia for the unattainable; that which searches for new 
presentations, not in order to enjoy them but in order to impart a stronger 
sense of the unpresentable. A postmodern artist or writer is in the position 
of a philosopher: the text he [sic] writes, the work he produces are not in 
principle governed by preestablished rules, and they cannot be judged 
according to a determining judgment, by applying familiar categories to 
the text or to the work. Those rules and categories are what the work of art 
itself is looking for.
56
 
 
There are several key moments in this passage that already illustrate Wilde’s 
                                                             
55 H. R. Brons, ‘Philosophy under Fire: J.F. Lyotard transcending the trenches of postmodernity’, 
in History of European Ideas, 20 (1995), 785-790 (p. 785). 
56 Jean-François Lyotard, ‘Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?’, in 
Innovation/Renovation, ed. by Ihab Habib Hassan and Sally Hassan (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1983), pp. 71-82 (p. 82). 
30 
 
proto-postmodernism, introducing these for chapters to come: the ‘unpresentable 
in presentation’ will return in the discussion on ekphrasis; the postmodern artist 
being ‘in the position of a philosopher’ will show in the chapters where Wilde’s 
fiction is used to reinforce his theory; and the statement that the critic can no 
longer apply ‘familiar categories to the text or to the work’ will be extensively 
discussed in the chapters on deconstruction and truth. In all these, it will be 
demonstrated that Wilde’s work bears a similarity that goes beyond the 
coincidental. 
This is the general sense in which this thesis will explore postmodernism. 
That exploration is divided into three parts, each of which examines a particular 
postmodern aspect. These parts, in turn, each contain three chapters, with every 
chapter zooming in on one particular aspect. The choice is to focus on different 
elements that exist in postmodernism and which, in some way, may themselves be 
called postmodern because they respond to issues specifically raised by 
postmodernism. 
Synopsis 
The argumentation is divided into three parts, each corresponding to a major 
element of postmodernism. Each part, in turn, consists of three chapters, taking up 
and analysing the various finer points that constitute the major element. 
 Part 1 deals with the foundations of postmodern thought. Much of 
postmodernism is based in some way about a change in thinking about binary 
oppositions, and Chapter I takes up these basics, moving from binary inversion to 
collapse, and also investigating the correspondences to Wilde’s statements on the 
surface and the symbol. Chapter II follows the logical continuation of the binary 
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debate in examining deconstruction, which is partly based on problematic 
oppositions such as centre and margin or writing and speech. The chapter 
examines a broad similarity between Wilde’s starting points and those of 
deconstruction, and then spends some time on specific similarities between Wilde 
and Jacques Derrida, before discussing the implications of deconstruction for 
creativity. Chapter III then picks up on the complications, introduced by 
deconstruction, of concepts of truth, reality and nature, and discusses their 
implications for law, crime and the monstrous. 
 Part 2 moves on from the implications of a problem of the reality/fiction 
divide, originating in Chapter III, and discusses some prominent postmodern 
theories on the subject. Chapter IV focusses on Jean Baudrillard’s articulation of 
the simulacrum and proceeds to show the power and persuasiveness of such 
simulacra and their mirrors in Wilde’s work. Chapter V follows Baudrillard’s 
development of the simulacra into the full simulation of reality known as 
hyperreality, discussing its implication for theory, but also for the punishment of 
crime, after which the strong link between hyperreality, magic realism and 
Wilde’s fiction is explored. Chapter VI then rounds off the discussion of reality by 
looking at other ways of representing it, including issues of responsibility for 
interpretation and instances of (self-)portraiture. 
 Finally, Part 3 takes up the implication of fading boundaries and the 
disappearance of strictly delineated fields of research, emphasizing the blending 
and fragmentation that is foregrounded in postmodernism. Chapter VII tackles 
intertextuality, with a special eye towards its implications for Wilde’s much-
signalled plagiarist tendencies. Chapter VIII partly moves away from a focus on 
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text and explores the newly emergent field of word and music studies, 
foregrounding the similarities between that field and Wilde’s own treatment of 
music and musical language within his work. The last chapter, Chapter IX, 
contains a discussion of ekphrasis, or the representation of images in words, by 
sketching this recent theoretical field in correspondence with Wilde’s profound 
interest in the image, revealed especially in his attitude to painting, but also in a 
rare use of photography in Wilde’s work. 
 Before moving on to Part 1, a final note must be made on the use of 
language and gender. The use of personal pronouns in the case of unclear gender 
has been pluralized to ‘they’ and ‘their’, rather than opting for a generalized 
masculine or feminine option. The reader might therefore encounter a sentence 
such as ‘in other words, it is up to the artist to construct meaning out of the many 
fragments available to them’ (which appears in Chapter III). In all cases, the 
intention is to maintain gender neutrality, as the academic criticism presented by 
Wilde may have been aimed mostly at men, but in the reading presented in this 
thesis it is available to readers, regardless of gender.  
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Part 1 Postmodern Foundations 
 
The first part of this thesis examines some of the elements that are consistently 
viewed as foundational to postmodernism. Starting from a basic questioning of the 
binary opposition so fundamental to much pre-postmodern thought, the chapters 
expand the argument advanced by post-structuralism and deconstruction that there 
is no such thing as a stable text for interpretation. After discussing deconstruction 
and one of its eminent thinkers, Jacques Derrida, Part 1 then moves on to explore 
the theoretical implications of these developments for ideas of natural meaning, 
most importantly the concept of truth. 
 Part 1 thus seeks to establish the foundations on which much of the rest of 
this thesis will be built. These include both Wilde’s foundational ideas – his 
attitudes towards objectivity or crime, for example, or his famous use of the 
literary device, the epigram – as well as foundational postmodern ideas. 
 Chapter I examines how Wilde makes use of binary oppositions and 
juxtaposition to achieve subversion and humour in his work. It also explores the 
relationship of the critical stance towards binaries with the development of 
postmodernism. Chapter II then examines how these critical and philosophical 
developments resulted in this rise of deconstruction, while also showing parallel 
developments in Wilde’s ideas. Finally, Chapter III picks up the issues of truth 
and nature, ideas rendered highly unstable by the blows against them in 
deconstruction’s wake, all the while showing how these complications feature in 
Wilde’s critical thought, too.  
34 
 
 
 
Chapter I  Binaries and the Wildean Epigram 
 
Editions of Wilde’s complete works have always remained in print, and there is an 
important place in the British theatrical canon for The Importance of Being 
Earnest, generally considered to be his ‘most successful play’.1 Yet modern 
readers must miss what was apparently one of Wilde’s most striking gifts: his 
conversation, of which Wilde famously remarked to André Gide: ‘I’ve put my 
genius into my life; I’ve put only my talent into my works’.2 His conversation was 
widely praised, a fact often noted by his biographers. Although this conversation 
is lost to modern audiences – there are no recordings of Wilde speaking nor any 
verbatim accounts of these private performances – a hint of them remains in one 
of Wilde’s most prominent stylistic feature: the epigram. Wilde’s style in general 
has been described as epigrammatic and he has been identified as a master: 
‘Among the later masters of the English epigram [is] Oscar Wilde’.3 This Wildean 
epigram follows a particular style that goes beyond the standard definition. 
Epigrams, as defined in the OED, may be seen as ‘an inscription, usually in 
verse’; as ‘a short poem ending in a witty or ingenious turn of thought’ or ‘loosely 
used for a laudatory poem’; and as ‘a pointed or antithetical saying’. Wilde’s 
epigram lies somewhere in between the latter two definitions: his epigrams are 
most often the ‘pointed saying’, but they incorporate the short poem’s use of a 
‘witty or ingenious turn of thought’. Wilde’s own views on language put him 
                                                             
1 Russell Jackson, ‘The Importance of Being Earnest’, in The Cambridge Companion to Oscar 
Wilde, ed. by Peter Raby (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 180-197 (p. 180). 
2 Barbara Belford, Oscar Wilde: A Certain Genius (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2000), p. 
240. 
3 Poetry and Drama: Literary Terms and Concepts, ed. by Kathleen Kuiper (New York: 
Britannica Educational Publishing, 2012), p. 28. 
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closer to poetry on account of his own ideal language – in The Critic as Artist he 
argues that poetic art and critical language are very close, as explored below. 
 The Wildean epigram follows a set formula, which is, for example, at work 
in one of Wilde’s more famous lines, spoken by the character of Lord Darlington 
in Lady Windermere’s Fan. Remonstrated for calling someone a ‘fascinating 
puritan’, the aristocrat counters that he could not help doing so, saying, ‘I can 
resist everything except temptation’.4 The basic pattern of this kind of epigram 
starts with a factual statement, which the reader is invited to take at face value. 
That is done here by the opening of Lord Darlington’s statement: ‘I can resist 
everything’ – the position, after all, publicly expected of a morally upright 
Victorian gentlemen. From this starting position, the Wildean epigram then 
undertakes an in- or subversion, so that the first part of the sentence or phrasing is 
undermined by the second part. In Lord Darlington’s statement, this is achieved 
through qualifying the earlier statement: he adds one exception to the ‘everything’ 
he is able to resist. ‘Temptation’, the very category that encompasses everything 
that one could need to resist, effectively negates the first part of the sentence; if 
temptation is not resisted, there is very little else to resist (except perhaps such 
things as authority or morality). This basic pattern, then, works on expectations 
aroused by a statement only to reverse or subvert them. 
These Wildean epigrams thus represent a juxtaposition, often of two 
extremes; they can also be called paradoxes, as Wilde himself hints when, in The 
Picture of Dorian Gray, he has Dorian label the extremely epigrammatic Lord 
Henry as ‘Prince Paradox’ (p. 140). These paradoxical, epigrammatic statements 
                                                             
4 Oscar Wilde, The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003), p. 
424. Further references to Wilde’s work from this edition are given after quotations in the text. 
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occur very frequently in Wilde’s work: ‘Paradoxes in Oscar Wilde are an obvious 
phenomenon in the works written between 1887 and 1895.’5 Their appearance and 
frequency depends to a large degree on the kind of work: The Importance of Being 
Earnest, a comedy that derives much of its humour from its wit and particular use 
of language, contains many more epigrams than a tragedy like Vera, or, The 
Nihilists. This is not to say that epigrams are wholly absent there: the character of 
Prince Paul Maraloffski utters several, such as ‘experience, the name men give to 
their mistakes’ or ‘to make a good salad is to be a brilliant diplomatist—the 
problem is so entirely the same in both cases. To know exactly how much oil one 
must put with one’s vinegar’ (p. 696). The Duchess of Padua has the character of 
the Duke, who says about his people’s opinion of him: ‘I hold its bubble | praise 
and windy favours | In such account, that popularity | Is the one insult I have never 
suffered.’ (p. 614). Like Wilde’s tragedies, his fairy tales contain relatively few 
epigrams. One notable example of them is the statement in ‘The Remarkable 
Rocket’, spoken by the eponymous rocket: ‘The only thing that sustains one 
through life is the consciousness of the immense inferiority of everybody else, and 
this is a feeling I have always cultivated’ (p. 297). Here is the same basic move: 
an expectation is set up – that there is a thought that keeps one going and that this 
thought is something positive, like a hope or a wish – only to be subsequently 
defeated when the sustaining thought turns out to be supremely negative – the 
assumption that all other people are of ‘immense inferiority’. The epigrammatic 
subversion here is all the more powerful since it represents the basic human 
impulse of viewing one’s own actions in a much more positive light than those of 
                                                             
5 Rolf Breuer, ‘Paradox in Oscar Wilde’, Irish University Review, 23.2 (1993), 224-235 (p. 224). 
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others. 
Other parts of Wilde’s writing use the paradox or epigram much more 
frequently. The essays of Intentions are full of them. A notable example occurs in 
‘The Decay of Lying’, where the writer George Meredith finds his writing rather 
paradoxically praised: ‘As a writer he has mastered everything except language: 
as a novelist he can do everything, except tell a story: as an artist he is everything 
except articulate’ (p. 1076). In ‘The Critic as Artist’, Meredith is again at the 
receiving end of a paradoxical or epigrammatical statement, this time coupled 
with the poet Robert Browning: ‘Meredith is a prose Browning, and so is 
Browning’ (p. 1111). The essay ‘Pen, Pencil and Poison’ is no exception: the 
forger and poisoner Wainewright returns to England in order to obtain some funds 
that are tied into his marriage – funds he has obtained through fraud. Wilde writes 
that the poisoner ‘knew that his forgery had been discovered, and that by returning 
to England he was imperilling his life. Yet he returned. Should one wonder? It was 
said that the woman was very beautiful. Besides, she did not love him’ (p. 1104). 
The statement ‘besides, she did not love him’ is in stark contrast to the preceding 
fact of the woman’s beauty; suddenly the forger’s motives are not the traditional, 
possibly romantic ones (a woman’s beauty) but rather the more malicious impulse 
of wanting what one cannot have. 
With few paradoxical statements present in the poetic works, the 
remaining Wildean epigrams are found in the plays and prose (with, as noted, the 
early tragedies as something of an exception). Both are full of them. Even more 
radically, some of Wilde’s smaller works are comprised almost entirely of the 
inversion technique, such as A Few Maxims for the Instruction of the Over-
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Educated. Here, even the title itself turns on its head the idea that an overeducated 
person needs anything but instruction. The same is true for his Phrases and 
Philosophies for the Use of the Young, containing lines such as: ‘The ages live in 
history through their anachronisms’ (p. 1245). Wilde, though by far not the 
epigram’s first or last great proponent, was indeed a master of them. 
Binary Oppositions 
The underlying foundation of the Wildean epigram – the raising of expectation 
followed by a surprise negation or reversal – is essentially the disruption of a 
binary opposition. This attention to a binary and to its alternation is as typical of a 
great deal of postmodern thinking as the epigram is to Wilde. The origin of 
postmodern attention to the binary lies with two prominent thinkers: Ferdinand de 
Saussure and Jean-François Lyotard. Saussure postulated a linguistic theory – 
foundational for structuralism, but later very much complicated by the post-
structuralists – which rested on a division between a sign and the mental construct 
it refers to. This division means that ‘for Saussure, the linguistic sign is binary or 
bilateral, since it consists of two parts. Its meaning, its content, is defined as a 
concept and therefore as a psychological or mental entity’.6 Since much literary 
theory after Saussure was built on a linguistic model, this binary mode proved 
extremely influential. 
 Doubts about this binary approach came with the advent of post-
structuralism. Though articulated as much by Jacques Derrida and Roland 
Barthes, and to some degree anticipated by structuralist thinkers such as Claude 
Lévi-Strauss, it is elaborated upon clearly by Lyotard in his various attempts to 
                                                             
6 Leanhard Lipka, English Lexicology (Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 2002) , p. 56. 
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determine and define postmodernism. Lyotard posits that postmodernism went 
against the ‘call for order, a desire for unity, for identity, for security, or 
popularity’.7 He argues, in other words, against a strict, binary opposition of right 
or wrong, either this or that. This binary thinking is deeply ingrained in Western 
modern thought, as 
 
for two centuries, the West invested in the principle of a general progress 
in humanity. This idea of a possible, probable, or necessary progress is 
rooted in the belief that developments made in the arts, technology, 
knowledge, and freedoms would benefit humanity as a whole.
8
 
 
In postmodern approaches, then, there is pronounced attention to the binary and, 
more specifically, to its instability. It is a general postmodern ‘tendency to reverse 
the polarity of common binary oppositions like male and female, day and night, 
light and dark, and so on, so that the second term, rather than the first, is 
‘privileged’ and regarded as the more desirable.’9 This reversal is not simply 
based on whim, but rather employed to demonstrate the inherent arbitrariness of a 
given binary’s positions. Nothing can be objectively established about the 
juxtaposition of light and dark in terms of the one’s superiority over the other; in 
many cases the desirability depends on the context in which it appears. Thus 
binary oppositions are, as a rule, constructs, and moreover, as Jonathan Dollimore 
                                                             
7 Jean-François Lyotard, ‘Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?’, in 
Innovation/Renovation, ed. by Ihab Habib Hassan and Sally Hassan (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1983) , pp. 71-82 (p. 73). 
8 Jean-François Lyotard, ‘Note on the Meaning of “Post-“’, in The Postmodern Explained: 
Correspondence 1982-1985 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), pp. 64-68 (p. 
65). 
9 Peter Barry, Beginning Theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), p. 74.  
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has pointed out, they are ‘unstable constructs whose antithetical terms presuppose, 
and can therefore be used against, each other.’10 In many cases, the basic 
postmodern move is to show their inherent instability through the process of 
inversion. 
However, postmodernism also involves an interest in oppositions that are 
not simply reversed, but collapsed altogether. The point then becomes not whether 
light or dark is the position of greater importance, but whether it is possible to 
point out moments where neither point of the binary is valid, e.g. dusk or dawn. 
The development of many schools of postmodern thought increasingly went in the 
direction of this collapse of binaries, realizing that a diverse and rich theoretical 
approach did not lie in the direction of attempting only a reversal, bringing low 
what was high and vice versa – an approach that would keep the discussion 
‘within its limited framework’, when the framework was the very thing which was 
flawed.
11
 In a general sense it is possible to speak of a historic development 
spanning the second half of the twentieth century. Although both reversal and 
collapse remain of equal importance, the former no longer receives as much 
critical attention. This is because, as Derrida stated, the inversion of binaries 
constitutes a crucial step in deconstruction, even when later deconstructionists did 
not necessarily hold the same opinion and preferred to jump past the inversion: 
‘despite this emphasis in Derrida, some of his adherents still want to make that 
jump, insisting that the inversion of a binary achieves nothing, and opting instead 
for its ahistorical, conceptual deconstruction’.12 (Wilde himself, as will become 
                                                             
10 Jonathan Dollimore, Sexual Dissidence: Augustine to Wilde, Freud to Foucault (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 64. 
11 Dollimore, p. 64. 
12 Dollimore, pp. 66. 
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apparent, favours the inversion more than the outright negation of a binary 
opposition – though in a complicated way – if only because many of his epigrams 
rest on the surprise of bringing high what was low.) 
One example of the move from inversion to collapse occurs in post-
colonialism, and is exemplified by the works of Edward Said and Homi Bhabha. 
In his discussion of Orientalism, Said introduced (and severely criticized) a binary 
opposition between colonizer and colonized. This system placed the colonizer on 
one end as a negative but powerful, even overpowering, force, with the colonized 
on the other end, framed by the colonial subject as exotic and alien. Said, by 
contrast, framed the colonized as a resisting recipient of that overpowering force: 
he points out ‘the staggering human cost of each of the reductive and oppressive 
figures of representation’, and that ‘starting with the basic dichotomy between 
East and West, one is always already exposed to binary oppositions of human 
existence which rule out the possibility of nuance’.13 This nuance is where Bhabha 
enters the discussion, pointing out that ‘such a coherent system […] fails’ 
precisely because its coherence is imposed – because it is framed as a binary 
opposition, even if that binary is reversed. Rather, ‘the closure and coherence of 
Said’s system of representation neutralize the disturbing effects that the 
unconscious and its fantasies have on the colonial system.’14 The colonial 
situations that post-colonial approaches seek to study are messy and complicated 
and resist being framed in a neat duality. 
                                                             
13 William Schouppe, ‘Orientalist Visions and Revisions: Edward Said’s Orientalism and 
Representations of the Orient in Paul Bowles’, in Oriental Prospects: Western Literature and the 
Lure of the East, ed. by C.C. Barfoot and Theo D’haen (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998), pp. 209-223 
(p. 209); The emphasis is Shouppe’s. The text being referred to is: Edward Said, Orientalism 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978). 
14 Shai Ginsberg, ‘Signs and Wonders: Fetishism and Hybridity in Homi Bhabha’s The Location 
of Culture’, CR: The New Centennial Review, 3.9 (2003), 229-250 (p. 231). 
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Other critical approaches underwent similar developments: both feminism 
and gender studies have gone through considerable changes that duplicate the 
postmodern move from binary to complexity. Early feminism was involved in the 
binary of male-female. Only a few notable exceptions exist early on, one of them 
being Virginia Woolf, whose discussion on feminine and masculine roles attempts 
to get away from strict adherence to the male-female binary. Woolf does this 
through the introduction of the idea of androgyny: 
 
In effectively stating that all adults are androgynous, Woolf disrupts both 
the notion that gender has an essence and the belief that only rare types 
have the experience of thinking or feeling like both a man and a woman. If 
everyone is androgynous, then androgyny is nobody’s distinguishing 
characteristic, nobody’s rare trait.15 
 
For Woolf, the desired move is away from a male-oriented definition, or at the 
very least away from a definition of androgyny along the binary of male-female, 
and towards a more complex take on the term. This move away from classic male-
female opposition is achieved through Woolf’s disrupting of the ‘essence’ of 
gender. 
Woolf’s attempt at changing perception did not take hold at the time. 
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century feminism remained largely 
occupied with the binary of male and female. It was not until later in the century 
that feminism, in a particularly postmodern gesture, opened itself up to a non-
                                                             
15 Brenda Helt, ‘Passionate Debates on “Odious Subjects”: Bisexuality and Woolf ’s Opposition 
to Theories of Androgyny and Sexual Identity’, Twentieth Century Literature, 56.2 (2010), 131-
167 (pp. 148-149). 
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binary point of view, so that a feminist critic was able to write in 2007 that 
‘feminist critics now recognize the ways in which [feminism] is ever more 
precarious, ever more uneven and uneasy, ever more divergent, as we attempt to 
find a cosmopolitan or planetary view that would incorporate all women within its 
scope.’16 There is an emphasis here on a very diverse spectrum of feminisms, 
which may or may not fit within the general scope of more classically defined 
feminism. The binary gives way to a mass of complications. The current position 
is one that critics have identified as being postfeminist: ‘a feminism that would 
deconstruct the binary between equality-based or “liberal” feminism and 
difference-based or “radical” feminism.’17 Feminism, possibly in the guise of 
postfeminism, has embraced the idea of multiple viewpoints at the cost of aligning 
itself along a single binary opposition. 
Gender studies underwent the same development, albeit in a slightly 
different time frame. Its approach to criticism not only focussed attention on 
differences in gender, but also included sexuality and most importantly, 
homosexuality. Early gay and lesbian studies of the 1980s aimed mostly at the 
critical emancipation of those two particular groups; this was also the time when 
the study of Wilde, held up as a gay martyr, first started seriously to resurface, for 
example in the words of Sinfield and Dollimore. Soon, however, the same 
postmodern preoccupation with multiplicity arose: ‘what is more important than 
genital similarity is the fact of some kind of difference: age difference, class 
difference, gender difference. As numerous scholars have pointed out, across time 
                                                             
16 Felicity Nussbaum, ‘Risky Business: Feminism Now and Then’, Tulsa Studies in Women's 
Literature, 26.1 (2007), 81-86 (p.84). 
17 Misha Kavka, ‘Feminism, Ethics, and History, or What is the “Post” in Postfeminism?’, Tulsa 
Studies in Women’s Literature, 21.1 (2002), 29-44 (p. 29). 
44 
 
and space those differences have in more cases than not structured what we call 
same-sex acts in ways that are far more important to the people involved and to 
the societies in which they lived than the mere fact of the touching of similar 
bodies.’18 The single polar opposite of heterosexual versus homosexual was 
discarded in order to make room for these other considerations of gender, class 
and age, to name but a few. Nor was it just the theoretical basis of this approach 
itself that was changing; its target body of art works similarly expanded, so that a 
story or other work of art could not simply be read as commenting on same-sexual 
interest. The reality of such stories became far more complicated: 
 
There are rich stories of same-sex sexuality out there that will tell us a 
great deal about gender, class, ethnicity, nationality, bodies, emotions, 
social relations, religion, law, identity, community, activism, culture, and 
just about every other thing that is part of what we think of as history.
19
 
 
Finally, just as the term feminism came under pressure and some critics started 
voicing the idea of a post-feminism, so did queer theory find its very name under 
discussion: ‘Critiques of the term queer and our difficulties with naming raised 
the central concern of whether sex or sexuality could or should be isolated from 
other social formations, like gender, race, ethnicity, and class.’20 Again the move 
is towards the organisation around a diverse field rather than a single opposition. 
One particular focus of queer theory has been the Early Modern period. 
                                                             
18 Leila Rupp, ‘Toward a Global History of Same-Sex Sexuality’, Journal of the History of 
Sexuality, 10.2 (2001), 287-302 (pp. 287-288). 
19 Rupp, 302. 
20 Carolyn Dinshaw, ‘The History of GLQ, Volume 1: LGBTQ Studies, Censorship, and Other 
Transnational Problems’, GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, 12.1 (2006), 5-26 (p. 9). 
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The study of Shakespeare, performance and gender proved fertile ground for 
critics who would also contribute to the renewed interest in Wilde. These critics 
include Simon Shepherd, but also Alan Sinfield, whose book The Wilde Century 
(1994) has directly helped Wilde to regain critical prominence; Sinfield’s 
sometime co-author Jonathan Dollimore is also the author of Sexual Dissidence: 
Augustine to Wilde, Freud to Foucault (1999), which, as noted in the Introduction, 
portrays Wilde’s theoretical significance through his sexual politics.  
The move away from binary oppositions and towards attention to multi-
faceted diversity itself was a product of the philosophical movement of 
deconstruction, which is discussed in the second chapter. As touched on above, 
however, the complicating of binary oppositions and the move away from them 
clearly underpinned more widespread developments in postmodern approaches 
other than deconstruction. 
 
Binary Inversion in Wilde’s Works 
Playing with binary oppositions, as Wilde does in his use of the epigram, also 
informs some arguments in Wilde’s writing. One of these instances underlies the 
tone that Wilde adopts in much of his non-fiction writing. There is a distinct 
playfulness to his criticism, something that was realized in as early as 1913, when 
Holbrook Jackson wrote in reflection of Wilde as thinker and artist that ‘his 
intellectual playfulness destroyed popular faith in his sincerity. […] One can be as 
serious in one’s play with ideas as in one’s play with a football’.21 Underlying this 
playfulness is a sustained attention to, and in some ways reversal of, the binary 
                                                             
21 Holbrook Jackson, ‘Wilde as Dandy and Artist’, in Oscar Wilde: The Critical Heritage, ed. by 
Karl Beckson (London: Routledge, 1974), pp. 325-338 (p. 329). 
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opposition of playfulness versus seriousness. The presumed opposition lies in the 
idea that only the serious may bring intelligent insight, while the playful may be 
easily dismissed; in other words, that only the serious is a suitable tone for critical 
discussion. 
Wilde’s frivolous tone sometimes belies the serious nature of the work. 
One example, from ‘The Decay of Lying’, is Wilde’s portrayal of lying as 
potentially beautiful, the capitalized ‘Lying, the telling of beautiful untrue things’ 
(p. 1091). What Wilde proposes here – and has put into practice – is the 
presentation of work in a (frivolous) way that takes the focus off that work’s 
serious nature. Through confrontation with a serious point couched in an obvious 
lie, the reader is forced to consider the point closely on their own terms. The 
critical position, thus, is made stronger because it is bereft of a conveniently 
packaged point, uncritically to be digested wholesale. One instance in ‘The Decay 
of Lying’ where Wilde discusses this approach comes when he argues that the 
creation of content is spurred on by innovation of form. Talking about the force of 
art, and specifically theatre, he states that: 
 
Then [theatre] enlisted Life in her service, and using some of life’s 
external forms, she created an entirely new race of beings, whose sorrows 
were more terrible than any sorrow man has ever felt, whose joys were 
keener than lover’s joys, who had the rage of the Titans and the calm of the 
gods, who had monstrous and marvellous sins, monstrous and marvellous 
virtues. To them she gave a language different from that of actual use, a 
language full of resonant music and sweet rhythm, made stately by solemn 
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cadence, or made delicate by fanciful rhyme, jewelled with wonderful 
words, and enriched with lofty diction. She clothed her children in strange 
raiment and gave them masks, and at her bidding the antique world rose 
from its marble tomb. A new Caesar stalked through the streets of risen 
Rome, and with purple sail and flute-led oars another Cleopatra passed up 
the river to Antioch. Old myth and legend and dream took shape and 
substance. (p. 1078-1079) 
 
This force of art, then, manifests through a ‘language different from that of actual 
use’, or simply, the language used in theatre. On the one hand this results in 
creativity – manifested, for example, in the creation of a ‘new’ Caesar – while on 
the other hand this newness entails an element of retelling: it is very clearly the 
existing images and names of the antique world that take ‘shape and substance’. 
That use of theatrical language – which is, after all, ultimately fiction – does not 
necessarily cause falsehood; rather it may lead, for example, to ‘keener’ 
perception of joys. Wilde is getting at the idea of a difference between the 
presentation – those ‘gods, who had monstrous and marvellous sins, monstrous 
and marvellous virtues’ – and the subject being treated, such as the concepts of sin 
and virtue. The effect would have been very different if such Lying behaviour had 
been no part of theatre: ‘Of course the aesthetic value of Shakespeare’s plays does 
not, in the slightest degree, depend on their fact, but on their Truth, and Truth is 
independent of fact always, inventing or selecting them at pleasure’ (p. 1166). 
Thus the ‘fact’ of normal speech or of the historical accuracy is, in Wilde’s 
examination of Shakespearean theatre, to be entirely disregarded unless it serves 
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to enhance the play. Rather than being accurate, the plays can present things 
entirely as they like, the result being a truth that is far richer than fact alone. That 
this truth is not, or only partially, based on facts, is a problem that, as illustrated in 
the above quotation, readers of Wilde were aware of from a very early point. 
 Such frivolous treatment of facts is not reserved for theatre, but also finds 
expression in Wilde’s critical work. In ‘The Truth of Masks’, the same essay 
where he makes the point about truth in Shakespearean plays, Wilde ends on a 
qualification of some of the positions that he has taken up in order to arrive at his 
arguments. He writes, surprisingly: ‘Not that I agree with everything that I have 
said in this essay. There is much with which I entirely disagree’ (p. 1172). Several 
things are going on here. First of all, Wilde is showing in critical practice what he 
has argued for in theatrical practice: that to gain a certain truth he does not have to 
adhere to fact, or even to opinion that he himself holds. His critical positions can 
be adopted temporarily without, he feels, impinging on the validity of the arising 
argument. Secondly, Wilde is putting up for discussion the ideas of consistency 
and seriousness in this essay. In making a rather frivolous claim at the essay’s 
ending, he undermines the certainty that an essay will have a serious tone and will 
lead up to a conclusion, resulting from the preceding arguments, where all facts 
remain valid. Thirdly, the essay’s ending also complicates the simple binary of 
agreement and disagreement, in that Wilde uses facts that he apparently disagrees 
with in order to establish a critical position he does agree with. (In fact, Wilde’s 
ending of the essay points to a common but crucial feature of his writing: his 
apparent disregard for internal consistency. This will be explored further in a later 
chapter.) 
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 Wilde wrote from a similar critical view when he constructed the Preface 
to The Picture of Dorian Gray. While the book itself is fiction, the Preface offers 
its readers some critical views from which to approach the novel and, presumably, 
other works. Indeed the Preface presents, among other things, a critical position 
on art. Wilde included it ‘to make his position clearer to future critics by 
inculcating them with the “right” set of artistic values in the hope of influencing 
their reviews’.22 These ‘right’ values also include the juxtapositions of the serious 
and the frivolous. Thus Wilde writes in the Preface: ‘No artist desires to prove 
anything. Even things that are true can be proved’ (p. 17). Here again seriousness 
is discredited and the process of ‘proving’, of arriving meticulously at a reasoned 
point, is ridiculed. This happens again later in the Preface: ‘The only excuse for 
making a useless thing is that one admires it intensely’ (p. 17). Again Wilde is 
asking his reader to take the non-serious, the ‘useless’, as cause for admiration 
and thus as occupying a high position, in contrast to more standard assumptions, 
which place seriousness above frivolity. 
 The reversal of binaries is something that Wilde also develops in his 
fiction. One of the richest and most illustrative sources is Wilde’s collection Lord 
Arthur Savile’s Crime and Other Stories. It contains five short stories, in all of 
which binary opposition plays some part. In addition to the title story, the second 
work, ‘The Canterville Ghost’, portrays an American family moving into a 
typically haunted British mansion and being very pragmatic. They are comically 
unafraid of, and actually helpful towards, the resident ghost. Here Wilde inverts 
the binary of fear, with its normally high end of the reaction of fear being 
                                                             
22 Norbert Kohl, Oscar Wilde: The Works of a Conformist Rebel, trans. by David Kohl 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 167. 
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upturned by its normally low end of practicality. The third in the volume, ‘The 
Sphinx Without a Secret’ concerns a woman who creates an elaborate plot to make 
it appear that she has something to hide, when in reality she does not: it turns out 
she just wants to appear interesting. This story inverts a binary opposition of 
secrecy as opposed to openness. It accomplishes this inversion by making secrecy 
and the appearance of a possibly ruinous secret a desirable thing instead of a 
problem. The fourth story in the volume, ‘The Model Millionaire’, is about a 
reasonably well-to-do gentleman bachelor who cannot marry because he is not 
rich enough. When he gives alms to a beggar who is, unbeknownst to him, a 
millionaire in disguise, he receives from the millionaire more than enough money 
in order to be able to marry the woman he loves. ‘The Model Millionaire’ places 
the low poor in opposition to the high rich, questioning this juxtaposition by 
bringing high the supposed beggar, and by making the man who thought he was 
giving instead the recipient of all he hoped for. The fifth and final story of the 
volume (not official part of the collection until later editions) is the longer story, 
and half essay, ‘The Portrait of Mr. W. H.’, which deals with a man who becomes 
convinced of the truth of a theory by its association with a forged portrait. Its 
inversion is yet another variation on the opposition of truth and lies: the portrait 
gains the ability to inspire belief in the theory, while its status as a forgery ought 
to inspire direct dismissal; the portrait is the theory’s only proof. (The portrait’s 
unusual power is discussed in more detail in Chapter VI.) Again, lying is 
portrayed as superior to the truth. 
 ‘Lord Arthur Savile’s Crime’ represents a strong example of a narrative 
that plays with a number of sets of oppositions. Wilde presents the morally upright 
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gentleman Lord Arthur, engaged to Sybil Merton, a woman he loves so much that 
‘the idea that anything could come between them made his eyes dim with tears’ 
(p. 165). When a palm reader tells Lord Arthur that he will commit murder, the 
young lord is naturally disturbed – but the disturbance is caused not by the 
revelation that he will be a criminal, but by the realization that he ‘had no right to 
marry until he had committed the murder’, lest the imminent death cloud the 
marriage (p. 169). He then spends the rest of the story in pursuit of the perfect 
murder, with all his carefully laid out plans going awry due to chance, until finally 
chance puts the palm reader in his path in an ideal situation for murder. The deed 
being done, Lord Arthur can finally marry.  
 Three binaries are at work throughout the title story. The first is the 
opposition of crime and innocence, with the default high position being attributed 
to innocence. Wilde’s inversion of it lies in the attitude which Lord Arthur 
assumes towards crime: instead of seeing it as a vile and possibly laughable thing, 
he considers it his moral duty to commit the predestined murder. Although Lord 
Arthur is suitably horrified by it, he nevertheless comes to regard it as the thing 
from which all good things in his life will flow. Rather than attributing bad 
consequences – evil, imprisonment, shame – to this criminal act, he foresees only 
good ones in the form of his impending marriage to Sybil. ‘Romance was not 
killed by reality’, the narrator notes, shortly after telling the reader that ‘never for 
a single moment did Lord Arthur regret all that he had suffered for Sybil’s sake’ 
(p. 182). 
The second binary is that of chance as opposed to careful planning, with 
careful planning as the higher of the two. Having established that the imminent 
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murder is necessary, Lord Arthur proceeds to plan very carefully, choosing his 
victims with care and selecting the most suitable and least painful ways to dispose 
of them. Yet every carefully wrought plan fails completely. His first target, an old 
woman, dies of age before she can consume the poisoned sweet meant to kill her. 
His second target, a clergyman, fails to be blown up when the explosives that Lord 
Arthur has had hidden in a decorative clock produce little more than the ironic fall 
of Liberty. It is not until he goes on an impulsive walk to clear his head that the 
protagonist comes across the palm reader, purely by chance, and is presented with 
a situation in which he can murder the man without any possible link to himself. 
The situation turns out to be so perfect that even the newspapers immediately 
assume that the victim has committed suicide. Pure chance has arranged matters 
much better than any careful planning could ever have done. 
Finally, a third binary appears when Lord Arthur has finally committed the 
crime. Now he is free to pursue his marriage. Conventionally, he should be racked 
by guilt over the deed he has had to perform to get his life back, but he feels no 
such remorse: ‘he has retained his innocence and saved his happiness, and by a 
continuation of the inverted logic he cannot suffer remorse, for that would be 
selfish.’23 Remorse is made subservient to remorselessness, which is raised up in 
its place. 
Surface, Symbol and the Tertium Quid 
However, the postmodern approach to the binary sometimes goes farther, leading 
beyond inversion to complication or collapse, which is to say, moving away from 
a scale of two extremes. This is what Richard Ellmann has called Wilde’s ability 
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Murray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 1-17 (p. 7). 
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‘to rise beyond alternatives to a tertium quid.’24 The notion that Wilde plays with 
opposites in this way has been critically examined before, such as the stylistic 
tendency in Wilde of ‘establishing his position by collapsing apparent 
opposites.’25 This, however, has not been examined outside of the immediate 
historical or postcolonial context. 
 The move from reversal or inversion of binaries towards their collapse 
must take the intermediate step of making the binary opposition suspect or 
problematic – in other words, must show it is faulty beyond the repair of a 
‘simple’ inversion. The Preface to The Picture of Dorian Gray contains many of 
these instances. For example, Wilde writes that ‘The highest, as the lowest, form 
of criticism is a mode of autobiography’ (p. 17). While he will elaborate greatly on 
this idea in the essay ‘The Critic as Artist’, the line given here in the preface is, at 
least in part, confounding. The very essence of a binary, after all, is a high and a 
low position; yet Wilde specifically asserts there that the genre occupies both ends 
of this spectrum – essentially what an opposition is not, as this involves being 
either the one or the other. The line undermines the very idea of a binary 
opposition. 
 On other occasions a line simply conflates two opposites into a single 
point. In the same Preface Wilde writes that ‘vice and virtue are to the artist 
materials for an art’ (p. 17). The classic opposition here between high virtue and 
low vice is not merely reversed – though often in Wilde it is – but is rather 
blended into a starting point for art. This equation makes the binary more 
complex: rather than either inspire or horrify, vice and virtue together combine 
                                                             
24 Richard Ellmann, Oscar Wilde (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1987), p. 503. 
25 Neil Sammells, Wilde Style: The Plays and Prose of Oscar Wilde (Harrow: Longman, 2000), p. 
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into a work of art, something infinitely more complicated than a binary. 
 Such conflation and combination of the seemingly opposite also occurs 
when Wilde states that ‘all art is at once surface and symbol’ (p. 17). Here, too, 
opposition between the surface and the symbol is not simply inverted but 
altogether collapsed when the introduction states that they occur at once – a feat 
that should be impossible for opposites. Moreover, this collapse also illustrates 
how Wilde endeavours to change the meaning of the oppositions themselves 
slightly. In the above example, ‘symbol’ is used in its normal meaning, but 
‘surface’ put in opposition to symbol finds itself altered. The OED defines a 
surface in its various guises as ‘the outermost part of a solid object considered 
with respect to its form, texture, or extent; an exterior of a particular form or 
finish’ and as ‘the most superficial layer or element of anything; that part or aspect 
which is apparent on casual consideration; outward appearance’. These meanings 
of the word surface refer to either the material, external elements of a work of art, 
or a surface reading, which explore none of the possible additional interpretations 
that might arise when a reader reads a work in different contexts or, indeed, when 
interpreting its use of symbolism; they represent, in other words, the standard 
assumptions that a reader has about the concept of a surface. Wilde, however, does 
not necessarily use the word in this way. The author who proposes physical beauty 
as one of the pillars of art may indeed have a different meaning in mind 
altogether, one which does not mesh so easily with the unambiguous meaning of 
the term ‘surface’. There is, for example, this passage from Wilde’s American 
lecture ‘The House Beautiful’: 
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In asking you to build and decorate your houses more beautifully, I do not 
ask you to spend large sums, as art does not depend in the slightest degree 
upon extravagance or luxury, but rather the procuring of articles which, 
however cheaply purchased and unpretending, are beautiful and fitted to 
impart pleasure to the observer as they did to the maker. And so I do not 
address those millionaires who can pillage Europe for their pleasure, but 
those of moderate means who can, if they will, have designs of worth and 
beauty before them always and at little cost. (p. 913) 
 
In the description of a beautifully decorated house, Wilde’s choice of words is 
telling: he carefully points out the need for beauty and the fact that this is not 
intrinsically linked to large sums of money; clearly the emphasis here is on the 
physical appearance of everyday things (Wilde mentions such items as hat racks 
and floor covering.) More importantly, Wilde uses the word ‘art’ in this context. 
Art, then, is to be located in the physical appearance, or surface of these items. 
This signals Wilde’s position that the beauty which lies in the appearance of these 
items can most definitely be considered art. In this sense, Wilde’s words are as 
much an echo of the Romantic era as they are a prefiguration of postmodernism, 
mirroring, as they do, lines such as the concluding statement of Keats’s ‘Ode to a 
Grecian Urn: ‘“Beauty is truth, truth beauty,” – that is all | Ye know on earth, and 
all ye need to know’.26 
 When Wilde notes that ‘all art is at once surface and symbol’ his meaning 
for surface becomes something entirely different altogether: rather than making 
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the basic opposition, his surface is already art, capable of inspiring in people 
complex feelings and appreciation. It is a far more complex concept of surface 
than found in the expression ‘surface reading’, with its connotation of haste or 
superficiality. In collapsing this binary Wilde also makes the terms involved 
problematic and newly expressive. 
 
Collapsing Binaries in the Essays and the Plays 
Some of Wilde’s essays, such as ‘The Decay of Lying’, focus on a single binary. 
That essay is full of Wilde’s typical, inverting style, like the remark about a 
novelist who ‘is so loud that one cannot hear what he says’ (p. 1074). At the basis 
of the essay is the (Platonic) opposition of nature and art. Art is represented in this 
essay by lying, a position defended by one of the two speakers, Vivian. This is 
done by linking art strongly to such things as poetry – Vivian at one point states 
outright that ‘Lying and poetry are arts’ and points out that, ‘as one knows the 
poet by his fine music, so one can recognise the liar by his rich rhythmic 
utterance’ (p. 1073). He establishes his definition of a lie early on: ‘After all, what 
is a fine lie? Simply that which is its own evidence’ (p. 1072). The opening 
passages establishes this opposition clearly, enacting an apparent reversal of the 
binary as nature is brought low in Vivian’s damning speech against it: 
 
But Nature is so uncomfortable! Grass is hard and lumpy and damp, and 
full of dreadful insects. Why, even Morris’s poorest workman could make 
you a more comfortable seat than the whole of Nature can. Nature pales 
before the furniture of ‘the street which from Oxford has borrowed its 
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name,’ as the poet you love so much once vilely put it. I don’t complain. If 
Nature had been comfortable, mankind would never have invented 
architecture, and I prefer houses to the open air. In a house we all feel of 
the proper proportions. Everything is subordinated to us, fashioned for our 
use and our pleasure. Egotism itself, which is so necessary to a proper 
sense of human dignity, is entirely the result of indoor life. Out of doors 
one becomes abstract and impersonal. One’s individuality absolutely 
leaves one. And then Nature is so indifferent, so unappreciative. Whenever 
I am walking in the park here, I always feel that I am no more to her than 
the cattle that browse on the slope, or the burdock that blooms in the ditch. 
Nothing is more evident than that Nature hates Mind. Thinking is the most 
unhealthy thing in the world, and people die of it just as they die of any 
other disease. […] In the meantime, you had better go back to your 
wearisome uncomfortable Nature, and leave me to correct my proofs. (pp. 
1071-1072) 
 
In this fragment nature is contrasted with man-made objects: architecture, but 
more importantly items ‘fashioned for our use and our pleasure,’ a turn of phrase 
reminiscent of Wilde’s description of the House Beautiful. Vivian is establishing a 
contrast between nature and art, with art here represented by the decorative items 
that Wilde himself had praised in his lecture. The artificial, that which is not 
natural, thus becomes art. 
 However, the binary is not simply reversed. Rather, in a move to 
complicate rather than invert, the essay turns to one of the central themes of 
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Wildean criticism: the contention that life imitates art. In the latter half of the 
work, Vivian concludes that ‘Literature always anticipates life’ (pp. 1083-1084). 
This seems a straightforward extension of the inverted binary of nature and art, 
simply taken one step farther. However, just prior to this statement, Vivian has 
already noted a few things in his discussion on art, nature and life that have put 
the apparent reversal in a different light: a series of qualifications, each of which 
move the binary farther away from a clear-cut inversion. For example, Vivian 
notes: ‘Paradox though it may seem—and paradoxes are always dangerous 
things—it is none the less true that Life imitates art far more than Art imitates life’ 
(p. 1082). Vivian takes a step away from the outright elevation of one side (art) 
over the other (life) when he notes that there is influence going both ways, even 
though the flow from one side might be much more substantial than the other. 
Rather than establish the one as superior, the two sides are drawn into a complex 
relationship. 
 Further complicating the relationship between the two binary opposites is 
another passage, where Vivian is drawing on the example of Romantic poets: 
‘Wordsworth went to the lakes, but he was never a lake poet. He found in stones 
the sermons he had already hidden there’ (p. 1078). These lines play upon the 
opposition introduced at the beginning of Wilde’s essay, but also develop that 
opposition to a more complex degree. Vivian argues that Wordsworth the artist 
already had the art within him – an argument also reminiscent of Wilde’s critical 
position that great art stems from intense personality. He does not, however, 
outright dismiss the role of nature in Wordsworth’s discovery of the poems within 
himself. The location of the lakes is crucial to Wordsworth’s discovery of the 
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poems, even when they do not create those poems within him. What the reader is 
left with is not a reversed, but rather a collapsed binary. Wilde has set nature and 
art in opposition, but the emergent term of art carries with it the influence of 
nature (such as Wordsworth’s lakes) both different and more complex than the 
original idea of art. This new concept of art is what Vivian describes as ‘lying’, 
the decay of which he laments. It is the result of a carefully collapsed binary, in a 
way that is strikingly similar to modern approaches. 
 When this phenomenon appears in Wilde’s creative works, it is often under 
the guise of the criminal who, paradoxically, is rewarded in some way for his 
crime. One clear instance of this is An Ideal Husband, which moves along the 
lines of the development of three problems: Robert Chiltern’s wife having a very 
high moral opinion of him while he is in fact a criminal; Chiltern’s own problems 
with being blackmailed because of his criminal act; and Lord Goring’s trouble in 
finding his place in life (much of which depends simply on him somehow getting 
rid of his father’s insistences that he take life seriously and get married). 
 At the opening of the play, Gertrude Chiltern holds her husband to very 
exacting standards. She is absolutely certain of her own high moral position and 
equally secure in that of her husband. Yet over the course of the play’s events, she 
has to face a number of revelations and developments that shake her faith in Sir 
Robert’s moral superiority. This feature of a morally upright wife demanding the 
same morality of her husband is a staple of late-Victorian theatre, as shown by 
Kerry Powell.
27
 The typical end of such a play is the decision of the husband (who 
often has a criminal act in his past) to either withdraw from public life or to 
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commit suicide. In An Ideal Husband things progress in a different way. Sir 
Robert himself will not have changed by the end, and moreover, will be victorious 
in every way: he has secured both power, through a seat in the cabinet, and love, 
through his wife’s acceptance of him for who he really is. Wilde, meanwhile, sets 
up a double binary. The first is the opposition between low and high morality in 
regards to Lady Chiltern. The second is rewarded innocence and punished crime. 
In both cases these binaries are inverted in the now-familiar fashion: Gertrude 
Chiltern accepts her husband’s criminal past and need for power, thus rewarding 
low morality instead of high; and Sir Robert himself is rewarded for his crime and 
ruthless pursuit of power by acquiring a loving, accepting wife and a seat in the 
cabinet. This is an inversion of the accepted tradition of the Victorian theatrical 
representation of the ideal husband, where ‘the usual outcome is […] the male 
becoming the “ideal husband” or “model husband” of his wife or fiancée’s 
imagining.’28 
Up to this point it seems that Wilde is content with merely inverting the 
binaries. However, Robert Chiltern’s own problem – being blackmailed – is 
resolved in a far less straightforward way. When he is initially presented with the 
problem, Chiltern puts up only nominal resistance before acquiescing. He finds 
himself on the wrong end of the binary, so to speak: having committed a crime, he 
will now pay dearly, his crime punished in some way, as the traditional binary 
requires. At the play’s finish, his position will have changed once again to that of 
a criminal allowed to bask in his illegitimately obtained glory, which has even 
been increased. The binary is not fully inverted, though, as Chiltern’s victory is far 
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from unambiguous, and indeed the process by which he gains that victory adds a 
few important footnotes to the whole proceeding. As the play goes on he will 
wrongly assume that his best friend Lord Goring is having an affair with the very 
woman blackmailing him, mistake a letter suggesting Goring and his wife are 
similarly having an affair for her love-note to himself, write a letter to resign from 
public life only to have it torn up by his wife, who requested it in the first place, 
and almost refuse the cabinet position but for the intervention of Lord Goring with 
Gertrude. Indeed, it can be said that Chiltern’s triumph at the play’s close is due to 
everyone but himself. The binary here is not inverted, but rather the opposition 
between rewarded innocence and punished crime is altered. While Chiltern’s 
initial wealth is acquired through criminal means, his subsequent good fate at the 
end of the play is achieved through his innocent, almost naïve behaviour. The two 
opposites literally become one, as by the time the curtain closes, it is no longer 
certain what has brought Chiltern his wealth: his initial act of ‘strength and 
courage’ to yield to the temptation of an extraordinarily rewarding act of fraud, or 
his fumbling navigation through the ordeal of being blackmailed (p. 538). The 
distinction is blurred and the binary is collapsed. 
 The role that Lord Goring plays in these events follows a similar path. The 
binary here is less distinctive, but crucial. Throughout the first act, Goring is 
portrayed as having the personality of a dandy. This phenomenon was 
characterized through ‘displaying conspicuous idleness, moral scepticism and 
effeminacy. […] The dandy represents the over-refinement and moral laxness that 
middle-class hegemony ascribed as one way of stigmatizing upper-class 
62 
 
pretention.’29 Lord Goring certainly qualifies, with lines such as ‘I love talking 
about nothing, father. It is the only thing I know anything about.’ Or, just a little 
later, ‘You see, it is a very dangerous thing to listen. If one listens one may be 
convinced; and a man who allows himself to be convinced by an argument is a 
thoroughly unreasonable person’ (p. 523). In the juxtaposition of the ‘preferred’ 
moral, hardworking place, against the (disavowed) morally lax, lazy positioning, 
Wilde’s Lord Goring upsets the scales. The dandy occupies the high, rather than 
the low position; but again it turns out that the process is not quite a 
straightforward inversion. 
 As Powell discusses, Goring’s character is far from an uncomplicated 
portrayal of a dandy.
30
 His moral judgements of Sir Robert’s crime in the second 
act as well as of Lady Chiltern’s strict views in subsequent acts, in addition to his 
active pursuit of marriage, do not necessarily sit well with his status as a dandy. 
However, this is anticipated in Goring’s description when he enters a short while 
into act one, where he is identified by Wilde as being ‘clever, but would not like to 
be thought so’ and ‘fond of being misunderstood. It gives him a post of vantage’ 
(p. 521). His is the role of the grand architect of most beneficial turns of events in 
the play: he provides an ear to the troubled Sir Robert and offers good advice, 
influences Gertrude Chiltern to forgive her husband and to cease standing in the 
way of his career, and even disarms the threat of Mrs. Cheveley late in the fourth 
act. In this way, the status of the dandy as a supremely capable problem-solver is 
assured. Yet at the end, Lord Goring is getting married, and confesses that he 
prefers the domestic; he has subscribed to a very traditional, almost reactionary 
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moral concerning the role of women by stating (without a hint of irony) that, 
unlike the logic of men, women’s lives are governed by ‘curves of emotion’, and 
that ‘a man’s life is of more value than a woman’s. It has larger issues, wider 
scope, greater ambitions’ (p. 579). He has also chided Robert Chiltern for 
achieving great success by flouting conventional morals – by committing fraud. 
Goring, then, is something half way in between the two extremes of the idle dandy 
and the morally upright, industrious Victorian. Wilde takes the term dandy and 
seems to reverse the binary by ascribing the higher point to that position; but 
again, as seen earlier, in doing so he alters the subject to something else entirely, 
collapsing the binary opposition into something new. 
 As noted earlier, the postmodern attention to subversion of commonly 
accepted binary positions was foundational for many postmodern approaches. 
Chief among these is deconstruction, a critical approach so typically postmodern 
that it is often popularly confused wholesale with it. And, as it turns out, Wilde’s 
tendency to play with juxtapositions is indicative of a strong similarity to 
deconstruction, which is explored in the next chapter.  
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Chapter II  Deconstruction 
 
Denis Donoghue has argued that there are three different ways of reading, and he 
links each to a prominent Victorian name.
1
 The first is represented by Matthew 
Arnold’s well-known claim that the critic must ‘see the object as in itself it really 
is’.2 For Donoghue, this represents a formalist or structuralist approach to 
literature. The second way of reading is represented by Walter Pater, in whose 
work The Renaissance Donoghue finds Arnold’s phrase again, altered: ‘the first 
step towards seeing one’s object as it really is, is to know one’s own impression as 
it really is, to discriminate it, to realise it distinctly’.3 This represents a middle 
ground between objectivity and subjectivity in criticism. It is, however, 
Donoghue’s choice of an author to embody the third way that is intriguing. He 
quotes Wilde’s ‘The Critic as Artist’ to represent purely subjective criticism: ‘the 
primary aim of the critic is to see the object as in itself it really is not’.4 Donoghue 
links Wilde’s phrase to Jacques Derrida, and specifically to Derrida’s sense of play 
in literature.
5
 He does not detail what, if anything, the exact nature of the link 
between the Victorian Wilde and the postmodern Derrida is. He seems much more 
interested in qualifying, perhaps even dismissing, Derrida: his article occasionally 
contains sentences such as ‘When Jacques Derrida writes about Rousseau, 
Nietzsche, Hegel, Celan, Mallarmé, Ponge, or Genet, he is not much interested in 
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saying what is there in the works under consideration; he is far more concerned to 
invent a piece of writing by improvising upon the themes they offer.’6 This 
represents, as will become evident, something of a misreading of the French 
philosopher. Unfortunately, as much as he has to say on Derrida, little more is said 
about Wilde in the essay; Donoghue continues his examination of the three ways 
of reading and does not return to the idea that Wilde is in some way compatible 
with postmodernism. In this way, Donoghue’s comments conform to the general 
trend of critics who mention, but do not follow through in defining, Wilde’s 
apparent postmodernism. 
 
Deconstruction 
The parallel that Donoghue draws between Wilde and Derrida, however, is 
absolutely valid. There are significant connections between Wildean critical 
thought and the tenets of deconstruction; these connections arise in part from a 
shared interest in the analysis of binary opposition. This is not to say that 
deconstruction merely constitutes the analysis of binaries, though they do lie at 
the heart of the approach. The critical interests of deconstruction are primarily 
philosophical; the study of binaries is one tool in a larger collection of goals, 
techniques and critical assumptions. 
 Making matters more problematic is the fact that there has traditionally 
been great confusion over the precise nature of the concept of deconstruction. 
Many critics operating under its critical and philosophical tenets employ their own 
version or variation on deconstruction, placing different emphases, in an approach 
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that is in itself very postmodern. Deconstruction is often somewhat misunderstood, 
or at least dismissed as obstructing a positive critical approach. It is a type of 
assumption that is exemplified by Donoghue’s quotation above, with Donoghue 
misreading Derrida’s interest in subjective elements by assuming this means that 
Derrida is interested only in what he himself has to say about the thing under 
scrutiny. Deconstructive critics must often defend themselves against what they 
perceive as ‘the popular idea of Deconstruction as a species of out-and-out 
hermeneutic licence, a pretext for critics to indulge any kind of whimsical, free-
wheeling or “creative” commentary that happens to take their fancy.’7 This is not 
to say that creative commentary is not an essential part of deconstruction. 
However, the frequent assumption that critics interested in deconstruction operate 
in an intensely egotistical, seemingly random way, does not fit the philosophy 
itself. 
 The misunderstanding arises in part from the set of tools that 
deconstruction offers for the critic to employ. Critics working on deconstruction 
focus on the use of language and the way in which that language carries not one, 
but multiple meanings. They also have a keen eye for the assumptions and 
prejudices that underlie a text but are never mentioned outright, so that the critic 
‘engages the “unthought axiomatics” of philosophers like Plato, Husserl and 
Austin, exposing their ideological blind-spots, their moments of complicity with a 
naïve or pre-critical attitude.’8 This means that deconstruction can sometimes 
sweep the very theoretical ground from beneath a critic’s feet by questioning 
previously secure critical grounds, a matter which, understandably, can raise some 
                                                             
7 Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: theory and practice, 3rd edn (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 
136. 
8 Norris, p. 139. 
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measure of frustration on the part of the receiving theory or critic. 
 The misunderstanding also arises due to the problematic status of 
deconstruction as a critical method or approach. While it is possible to discuss the 
practice of deconstruction, the approach itself is not a critical method. 
Deconstruction’s thesis is that it is already to be found within any text that the 
critic cares to examine – including within deconstruction itself – and therefore it is 
not a question of subjecting a text to deconstruction, but rather of analysing a text 
in order to find deconstruction already at work within it. Therefore the critic who 
keeps an eye out for deconstruction at work within a text will, along the lines set 
out by Derrida, pay special attention to ‘the uncanny effect by which one is 
invited to sense the unfolding of all of his thinking starting out from anywhere, 
from any idea, any word, any thought that happens to be at issue. [..] In some 
sense its effects are always already going on.’9 Thus the term deconstruction 
represents at once a method – analysing a text with attention to deconstructive 
forces at work within it – and no method, meaning that a critic does not bring 
deconstruction from outside into the text as a method by which to analyse that text. 
This may seem as immediately divergent from Wilde’s thought – Wilde’s advice 
to see an object ‘as in itself it really is not’ seems to deny any forces, including 
deconstruction, already at work in the text. As will be shown, however, Wilde’s 
denial of the text’s content is more complicated than that, and much closer to what 
Derrida and others aim for with deconstruction.  
 One qualification, however, must be placed on the usages of the word 
deconstruction in the present thesis. Because of the complexity of saying to what 
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degree it is or is not a method, it is desirable to keep pointing out that critics 
search for deconstructive forces at work in a text, and do not ‘use’ deconstruction 
in that way; at the same time the idea of a deconstructive critic is not wholly 
beside the point. For ease of use, the references are simply to ‘deconstructive’ 
critics and to critics ‘deconstructing’ a text. Whenever such phrases appear, 
however, they must be read as shorthand for the more complex sense of 
deconstructive analysis. 
 One important consequence of deconstruction always already being at 
work in the text is the implication that literary theory can no longer search for an 
objective, outside, ‘natural’ or rational explanation of a text. This is the main 
thrust of deconstructionists such as Paul de Man. His views on these implications 
are described by Martin McQuillan in the following way: 
 
Literary theory is interested in literature in reference to itself (in its own 
right) rather than as a way of referring to a ‘real world’ beyond the text. 
Rather than saying that literature represents the real world and texts have 
value because they tell us something about that world, literary theory is 
concerned with the internal processes of literature itself. […] This 
conventional way of understanding literature is supported by an idea of 
language which proposes that language has meaning as a result of the 
natural and intuitive use of words by humans to describe their world. In 
contrast, literary theory thinks of meaning as a function of language itself 
rather than an act of human will.
10
 
                                                             
10 Martin McQuillan, Paul de Man (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 51. 
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The kind of literary theory that goes with deconstruction, then, juxtaposes the 
concepts of a ‘conventional’ literary approach with one that is based on language. 
The use of the word ‘natural’ here will become crucial once it is examined 
alongside Wilde’s essay ‘The Decay of Lying’ a little later on; and the idea of 
language as a basis for literary theory will likewise be examined. What results 
from this shift of focus is a move away from a ‘natural’, which is to say pre-
existent and objective, meaning that resides in the correct interpretation of a given 
text: it is no longer the expression of a creator whose stance must influence the 
text’s meaning. The text becomes truly textual, literally only words. This links up 
with Derrida’s own famous and often misunderstood phrase that ‘there is nothing 
outside the text’.11 This means simply that, along the lines also suggested by Paul 
de Man, the reader has only the text before them, not some objective meaning that 
arises from the natural use of language by a specific author. (A common 
misconception is that Derrida meant to say that everything is just text, something 
which, as Nicholas Royle has observed, is incorrect.
12
 He proposes Derrida’s own 
clarification of text as context: ‘there is nothing outside context’.13 This is close to, 
but not the same as, stating that everything is textual.) 
 Two things result from this: firstly, texts do not have a single, stable 
meaning, and secondly, writing does not rely for its meaning upon the person with 
whom that writing originated. Writing becomes something that functions on its 
own, as Derrida remarks; it becomes ‘a mark that will constitute a sort of machine 
                                                             
11 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 
163. 
12 Royle, pp. 61-69. 
13 Jacques Derrida, ‘Afterword: Towards an Ethic of Discussion’, in Limited Inc, trans. by Samuel 
Weber (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), pp. 111-160 (p. 136). 
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which is productive in turn, and which my future disappearance will not, in 
principle, hinder in its functioning.’14 Authority over the text no longer rests on a 
person or one distinct interpretation; rather, that text can function perfectly well 
on its own. 
 This, in turn, means that the meaning of a text may change depending on 
who reads it. It is here that the process of deconstruction enters the study of a 
given text: rather than finding the one true meaning, a critic is capable of finding 
multiple, sometimes contradictory meanings within the one text. Contradictory 
here might mean that a statement could mean the opposite of what it seems to 
mean, but the word is also used in the sense that an argument seeming to support 
an essay’s case may, under deconstructive scrutiny, turn against the very point it 
was enlisted to make. 
 Deconstruction’s reaction against the idea of the ‘natural’ (a topic that will 
be further explored in Chapter III) is part of what sets it apart from preceding 
critical and philosophical movements. Although it goes without saying that it 
would be difficult to sum up all preceding movements, nevertheless 
deconstruction clearly turns against a prior interest in mimesis, which is to say, 
how art reflects the world (and is therefore dependent upon it). Such approaches 
were present in Wilde’s time (with Arnold’s quest to see the object ‘as in itself it 
really is’) and remained influential up to and including structuralism, which 
sought to fix language in place scientifically (though not mimetically). Though it 
may be considered something of an oversimplification, it is nevertheless valid to 
place deconstruction against these movements, just as Wilde can be placed against 
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them. 
 Deconstruction often works with a text’s binary oppositions. One example 
of this play with binaries involves Thomas Docherty’s treatment of the binary 
opposition of male and female.
15
 Docherty describes the deconstruction of the 
terms ‘male’ and ‘female’ by pointing out a traditional assumption that ‘male’ is 
defined by the presence of a penis, while ‘female’ is defined by the lack thereof. 
The deconstructive move is then to consider how to take the terms ‘presence’ and 
‘absence’; Docherty points out that the presence of a penis becomes entirely 
meaningless unless there is a female present with which to contrast it. The male 
requires a female to be present for the binary to work, which means that female 
can be associated with presence, transferring absence to the male. This highlights 
a vital point in much deconstructive thinking: the fact that often the binary 
opposition is caused by itself rather than an outside – again, ‘natural’ - force. 
 The best example of this is Derrida’s emphasis on the opposition of 
writing and speech. In the standard deconstructive move, Derrida shows that 
speech and writing, with the former thought superior, are not in a binary 
relationship at all given that writing brings the writing/speech binary into 
existence. Kathleen Wheeler gives an excellent summary: 
 
Derrida placed writing under scrutiny, and reversed the traditional priority 
of speech as antecedent to writing, as closer to self-present truth. In a 
second movement or stage he also gave up the priority of writing over 
speech, once he had shown the absurdity of the former priority. […] 
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‘Writing’ is not opposed to speech, but is that which enables 
conventionally conceived-of writing and speech to occur.
16
 
 
In the sense rejected by deconstruction, the written word is a representation of the 
spoken word, an imperfect echo that gets away from its originator and from the 
chance to be clarified by that originator. But, as discussed, deconstruction is not 
interested in this natural explanation outside of the text; the writing is a thing on 
its own, the ‘machine which is productive in turn’. It is this specific focus on 
writing as something different from spoken words written down that originates the 
perception of deconstruction as playing with a text. Refusing to be bound by prior 
explanations outside a text, the deconstructionist explores the text for its own sake 
and with its own implications – a process that appears to be a kind of free-form, 
improvisatory exercise. 
It is worth nothing that, though Wilde engages with this same topic of 
writing and speech, he is much more traditional. At one point in ‘The Critic as 
Artist’ he claims that ‘writing has done much harm to writers. We must return to 
the voice’ (p. 1115). In this particular statement, Wilde is decidedly not a 
forerunner of deconstruction, as he upholds the distinction, with its preference for 
speech and its distrust of writing – at least in the context of appreciating Greek art 
criticism, which is where the above quotation appears. Yet, as will be shown, 
Wilde’s linguistic playfulness links him strongly to the more postmodern side of 
this division.  
 In its exploration of texts, deconstruction also focuses on language use in 
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order to expose gaps and illogical leaps of faith inherent in critical or 
philosophical texts. It asks for attention to the multiple available interpretations of 
words and for the unspoken assumptions at the base of a text, in order to show 
how arguments are incoherent. Deconstruction frequently asks that the reader 
discard the obvious meaning or connotations of a word or stock phrase in favour 
of its multiple alternate meanings.
17
  This is a move which establishes the text as 
polyphonic rather than unified. This is a facet of most of postmodern literary 
approaches, but is certainly emphasized in deconstruction. It engages Roland 
Barthes’s concept of the irrelevance of the writer regarding the interpretation of 
their text – Barthes notes that ‘textual analysis indeed requires us to represent the 
text as a tissue […], as a skein of different voices and multiple codes which are at 
once interwoven and unfinished’.18 The result is an unstable text – meaning that a 
single, stable meaning cannot be produced because the text contains contradictory 
meanings within itself. A reader is free to approach the text with the goal of 
exploration through a sense of play, or at the very least an associative interest that 
takes little account of traditional assumptions. 
 The element of play is not simply a derogatory misreading of 
deconstruction’s aims. Consider the following passage, taken from a discussion by 
Derrida of the role of the centre in deconstruction. First he notes that ‘the concept 
of the centered structure is in fact the concept of a play based on a fundamental 
ground, a play constituted upon the basis of a fundamental immobility and a 
reassuring certitude, which itself is beyond the reach of play’. He then argues that, 
                                                             
17 Norris, pp. 18-40. 
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334). 
74 
 
based on this reassuring certitude, ‘anxiety can be mastered, for anxiety is 
invariably the result of a certain mode of being implicated in the game, of being 
caught by the game, of being as it were at stake in the game from the outset’.19 
The two things to note here are the recurring words ‘game’ and ‘play’. Even 
within this relatively short passage, they both appear three times, though Derrida 
shifts their meanings in some instances. Play and viewing the interpretative 
process as a kind of game are indeed pivotal to deconstruction. 
 This central role of the sense of play within deconstruction leads to a very 
personal and individual approach to texts. The reader is capable of playing this 
game with a text because that game is an extension of the process of generating 
meaning. As Barbara Johnson writes, interpretation, like the game, is 
individualized because  
 
what we can see in a text the first time is already in us, not in it; in us 
insofar as we ourselves are a stereotype, and already-read text; and in the 
text only to the extent that the already-read is that aspect of a text which it 
must have in common with its reader in order for it to be readable at all. 
When we read a text once, in other words, we can see in it only what we 
have already learned to see before.
20
 
 
The deconstructive act becomes personal because the text is always personal; its 
meaning is to be found within the critic and not within the text, thus making 
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objective criticism impossible. The reader is free to play games with(in) a text so 
as to expose the multiple meanings that Barthes supposed to reside within it. 
  Though deconstruction originated as a philosophy, this shows that it is also 
something of a method for literary criticism. It is one of the approaches that 
allows for the focus on text alone, bringing out whatever interesting element the 
analysis strikes upon. ‘All that a poem can be about, or what in a poem is other 
than trope, is the skill or faculty of invention or discovery, the heuristic gift.’21 In 
other words, the approach frees up, for the critic, the acts of creativity and the 
freedom of selective analysis because the act of criticism is now based on 
personal interest and background. Criticism becomes subjective, and though 
subjective, contributes to a greater understanding of the text’s possibilities through 
the exposition of its ‘different voices’. 
Derrida and Wilde 
The immediate similarity between Wilde’s approach to art and criticism, which 
emphasizes personality, and deconstruction, which places the act of interpretation 
squarely with the specific reader and the specific texts being read, is that both find 
themselves emphasizing the personal. The next step is to examine some of the 
positions held and, to some degree, shared specifically by Derrida and Wilde. 
 The first point of correspondence is that neither Derrida nor Wilde presents 
a straightforward method for the critical activity that they employ. In both their 
cases, this is because what they present is a way of viewing the literary or artistic 
act – or simply the text – rather than an all-encompassing methodology that 
remains the same regardless of the critic or text. Derrida, as stated earlier, does not 
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see deconstruction as something that is done to the text, but rather a force present 
in the text already. This lack of a structured method has resulted in the impression 
that Derrida’s writing is obscure or vague. However, as Royle suggests, ‘there is 
nothing vague or impressionistic about his work. His concern is to respond to a 
text or situation with the utmost rigour and clarity. If we are to talk in terms of his 
“ideas”, key or otherwise, these ideas are in the world, changing the world’.22 In a 
sense this is the one central idea of Derrida, ‘this “key idea of no key idea”: it 
depends on the context, in particular on what text, situation, etc., is being 
analysed’.23 There is no single, central tenet in analysis because every text is 
different and thus will have different, deconstructive forces at work within it. This 
means that the critic only has at their disposal the circumstances of a particular 
text and their own capacity for reading that text. This particularity is further 
increased by that lack of a natural referent to resort to; had there been, for 
deconstruction, an objective thing, an intention that language purely refers to, then 
a general method could have been built upon that possibility. But Derrida denies 
this natural option in the pursuit of deconstruction. 
  Wilde’s method, likewise, does not prescribe solid ways to analyse any and 
all texts, because, like Derrida, Wilde’s method of responding to a text is personal: 
he does not see the critic’s role as an explicator of the natural contents of whatever 
text is under consideration. The Wildean critic, he suggests in ‘The Critic as 
Artist’, ‘will not be an interpreter in the sense of one who simply repeats in 
another form a message that has been put into his lips to say’ (p. 1131). Wilde is 
here denying that the critic’s responsibility is to convey a message ‘put into his 
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lips’, which is to say, already present in the text naturally. Rather, critics bring to 
bear their own personality as the prime interpretative tool. It must be a strong 
personality in order to create a kind of contrast: 
 
For, just as it is only by contact with the art of foreign nations that the art 
of a country gains that individual and separate life that we call nationality, 
so, by curious inversion, it is only by intensifying his own personality that 
the critic can interpret the personality and work of others, and the more 
strongly this personality enters into the interpretation the more real the 
interpretation becomes, the more satisfying, the more convincing, and the 
more true. (p. 1131) 
 
Thus it is the critic, emphasizing their own interpretation in its most personal – 
through the intensification of personality – who must approach a singular text and 
highlight what they may find within that text. Wilde makes it clear in this above 
passage that there are two forces present here: the text, which has personality of 
its own – Wilde’s phrase ‘the personality and work of others’ suggests that both 
the author and the work have a personality available for reading – and the 
personality of the critic, whose function it is to gain understanding through 
contrast. This corresponds to Derrida’s concept that deconstruction is not a 
method but a force to be detected by bringing together a text and a personality 
reading and interpreting that text. 
 Additionally, both Derrida and Wilde share a sense and specific usage of 
humour. As shown in the first chapter, the often humorous epigram is one of the 
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bases for Wildean thought and it engages with destabilizing binary oppositions. In 
that sense humour is, for Wilde, a tool that can be used to make critical points. 
Thus, for example, before stating that Wilde’s critic will not become an interpreter 
in the sense of repeating a message that was simply already waiting for him in the 
text, he has actually made an effort to discredit those critic-interpreters who 
attempt such a thing. In a very lengthy passage, he makes a list of everything one 
ought to know: 
 
He who desires to understand Shakespeare truly must understand the 
relations in which Shakespeare stood to the Renaissance and the 
Reformation, to the age of Elizabeth and the age of James; he must be 
familiar with the history of the struggle for supremacy between the old 
classical forms and the new spirit of romance, between the school of 
Sidney, and Daniel, and Johnson, and the school of Marlowe and 
Marlowe’s greater son; he must know the materials that were at 
Shakespeare’s disposal, and the method in which he used them, and the 
conditions of theatric presentation in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, 
their limitations and their opportunities for freedom, and the literary 
criticism of Shakespeare’s day, its aims and modes and canons; he must 
study the English language in its progress, and blank or rhymed verse in its 
various developments; he must study the Greek drama, and the connection 
between the art of the creator of the Agamemnon and the art of the creator 
of Macbeth; in a word, he must be able to bind Elizabethan London to the 
Athens of Pericles, and to learn Shakespeare’s true position in the history 
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of European drama and the drama of the world. (Wilde 1130.) 
 
This bold passage serves to ridicule the idea that a critic can get at the true 
meaning of any particular Shakespearean text. The requirements become more 
absurd as Wilde continues to name them, going to far as to request that the 
Shakespeare scholar learn the entire history of the world so as to be able to 
connect Shakespeare to ancient Greece in an effort to place him in his ‘true 
position in the history of European drama’. The requirements are impossible to 
follow completely, illustrating how this search for the one, objective message of a 
work of art is essentially futile. At the same time Wilde endangers his positions 
with this kind of humour, as there will have been many a professor in Wilde’s day 
– Wilde even names one, the ‘Rector of Lincoln’ just before the passage – who 
would have gone along as far as two-thirds of this list before realizing that the 
joke really was on them. Like most of Wilde’s humour, it is instrumental in 
making his points, yet it also defuses, so that ‘the force of his humor [sic] not only 
challenged the hegemony of these identifications, but simultaneously destabilized 
the “seriousness” of his critique’.24 
  The same problem, if it is a problem, is found in reading Derrida. Critics 
hostile to Derrida have often pointed to his tone and his sense of play as a 
disrupting element to the serious pursuit of literary theory. At the same time there 
is distinct humour in Derrida’s work. This humour is not the same as Wilde’s, in 
that the tone is different; but the overlap lies in the fact that both use humour as 
part of their method. Derrida is ‘a very funny writer: this is one of the things that 
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some people evidently find infuriating about him. It is difficult not to feel that he 
is doing something strange with words: language can come to seem like very 
funny stuff’.25 In part this returns to game-playing as an important critical 
component of deconstruction: if the game is played with some enjoyment and fun, 
humour becomes the next logical step. However, Derrida’s humour also serves 
another purpose: by drawing, for example, attention to puns, unfortunate alternate 
meanings of words, and other things such as these, he is able to emphasize the 
unstable nature of the language being used. 
Creativity in Deconstruction and the Critic as Artist 
Beyond the specific correspondences between Derrida and Wilde, there is a 
broader agreement with the general movement of deconstruction and the Wildean 
critical approach. Wilde constantly questions what language can express, and 
shows that language may turn on itself or come to express things in a paradoxical 
way, the prime example of this being his epigrams. 
  The Wildean paradox is itself a kind of deconstruction. As a type of 
literary approach, deconstruction foregrounds ‘the sort of paradox […] at work 
not only in literary texts but in criticism, philosophy and all varieties of discourse, 
its own included’.26 Deconstruction allows for this paradox, these apparent or 
even outright contradictions, to be an integral part of all text, including criticism 
and theory. It even allows for contradictions within its own discourse, something 
to which Wilde certainly was no stranger. For example, in the article ‘London 
Models’ Wilde writes about ‘the great truth that the aim of art is not to reveal 
personality but to please’ (p. 978). However, he takes an opposite approach to the 
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subject of personality in ‘The Critic as Artist’. There he states that art is ‘made 
vivid and wonderful to us by a new and intense personality’ (p. 1131). The 
apparent contradiction invites closer scrutiny as to what exactly ‘art’, ‘personality’ 
and the intention ‘to please’ involve. Different readings allow the critic to draw 
out ideas on art, for example, taking the comments as engendering a discussion on 
popular or elitist art. The contradiction itself remains in Wilde’s work, with Wilde 
making no apparent effort to clarify it. Something similar happens at the end of 
‘The Truth of Masks’, where, as noted earlier, Wilde states that he disagrees with 
some of the things he has just argued; and again in the preface to The Picture of 
Dorian Gray where he states that ‘when critics disagree the artist is in accord with 
himself’ (p. 17). That latter quotation comes closest to Wilde making a statement 
that fully fits deconstruction avant la lettre: it suggests that the artist should not 
worry about the one true meaning of their work, or indeed over being understood 
or misunderstood, because this will be a normal and acceptable result of art. The 
critic, either deconstructionist or Wildean, approaches the work for its own sake 
and along personal lines, making it all but certain that there will be disagreement 
between critics. 
 Deconstruction also places in doubt the concept of different kinds of texts, 
or genres. This results from the notion that there is nothing but text and that 
readers do not have a natural referent to fall back to when searching for meaning; 
genre is seen as problematic because it does not reflect the natural category of any 
given text. The text exists; genre is imposed upon it by the reader. Thus the 
concept of the genre is held ‘together as a provisional coalition rather than a 
structure, and the utterance represents a fragmentary and descriptive discursive 
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practice’ which is opposed to the traditional, formal view of genre as a naturally 
authoritative definition, where it ‘demands rigorous compliance, and then carries 
that imperative’.27 This does not negate the existence of genre, but does diminish 
its authority, which is to say that a text cannot be wrong for failing to fit the 
criteria of the particular genre it finds itself in. This, in turn, allows deconstruction 
to call into question the distinction between literature and the literary criticism, or 
literary theory, that supposedly stands apart from it. A strong distinction between 
the two is somewhat problematic for deconstruction, and this shows in Derrida’s 
view on literature: ‘we should acknowledge the logic of contamination between 
the two. “Good” literature, the only worthwhile kind, in his view, is itself 
necessarily “critical”. And conversely, “good” literary criticism always involves a 
certain inhabiting of the literary’.28 Thus Derrida clearly proposes that the critical 
is to be viewed as a kind of literary practice. 
 This, as it happens, is the focus of Wilde’s essay ‘The Critic as Artist’. 
Central to the essay is the argument that the critic himself must be considered an 
artist and criticism a type of art. Wilde establishes this by working at the 
distinction between the two, transforming the concept of criticism and bringing it 
closer to art. To do so, Wilde destabilizes criticism, showing that the term’s 
conditions and assumptions make it something other than what had previously 
been assumed. The method Wilde uses is meticulous; he takes care to subvert the 
traditional underpinnings of the term ‘criticism’ in order to loosen it from its 
position. The process by which he does this is very similar to deconstruction. In 
the course of this process – the game that Wilde plays with these underpinnings – 
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he makes the following moves: first there is the default position of criticism as 
required to maintain a kind of objectivity; second is criticism as deductive rather 
than creative; third is criticism as dependent upon, rather than equal to, art; and 
fourth and final is the need to be clear and concise. 
 Wilde’s first move must be to establish art as subjective rather than 
objective, as this is a necessary step if he is to claim the subjective for criticism as 
well, once art and criticism have been equated. The point is articulated in the 
following exchange: 
 
ERNEST. Surely you would admit that the great poems of the early world, 
the primitive, anonymous collective poems, were the result of the 
imagination of races, rather than of the imagination of individuals? 
GILBERT. Not when they became poetry. Not when they received a 
beautiful form. For there is no art where there is no style, and no style 
where there is no unity, and unity is of the individual. No doubt Homer 
had old ballads and stories to deal with, as Shakespeare had chronicles and 
plays and novels from which to work, but they were merely his rough 
material. He took them, and shaped them into song. They become his, 
because he made them lovely. (p. 1119) 
 
By making art an intensely personal thing he situates it in the realm of the 
subjective. The key move lies in the phrase ‘there is no art where there is no style, 
and no style where there is no unity, and unity is of the individual’. At first he 
seems to be arguing for objective categorisation, such as a prescription for style in 
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terms of unity. The ultimate move is away from such general prescription, 
however, when Wilde defines unity as something ‘of the individual’. Again Wilde 
keeps away from prescriptive claims as to the natural meaning of art. 
 His next step is carefully to establish a strong link between creativity and 
criticism. Earlier in the essay Ernest has claimed that the Greek had no art critics. 
Dismissing this notion entirely, Gilbert replies that the Greek were ‘a nation of art 
critics’, and necessarily so because creativity and criticism are intrinsically 
connected: ‘there has never been a creative age that has not been critical also. For 
it is the critical faculty that invents fresh forms. The tendency of creation is to 
repeat itself. It is to the critical instinct that we owe each new school that springs 
up, each new mould that art finds ready to its hand’ (p. 1119). Wilde then 
mentions thinkers like Aristotle and Plato, who wrote on art criticism. The link 
between art and criticism becomes more intimate, with criticism granting some 
kinetics to the otherwise static, self-repeating creation. 
 Wilde, of course, had rich contemporary debates on art and criticism to 
draw on. Critics such as Pater, John Ruskin and Thomas Carlyle had already made 
the delineation of art and criticism into the subject of discussion, as, for example, 
when Pater lists inspirations for art and thought: ‘every moment some form grows 
perfect in hand or face; some tone on the hills or the sea is choicer than the rest; 
some mood of passion or insight or intellectual excitement is irresistibly real and 
attractive to us, – for that moment only’.29 
 However, unlike Pater and Ruskin, Wilde concedes the higher position to 
criticism: he displays an apparent preference for the critical over the creative. In 
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the above quotation the two are shown to be symbiotic, with the critical gradually 
emerging as seemingly higher. First Gilbert asserts that ‘criticism demands 
infinitely more cultivation than creation does,’ and then goes on to make a similar 
claim in saying that ‘it is very much more difficult to talk about a thing than to do 
it’ (p. 1121). These claims allow criticism to rise above creation. In the realms of 
culture and cultivation, effort and difficulty, criticism appears to be the greater 
achievement, while art must be content with second place.  
 Having destabilized the term ‘criticism’ and put parts of its relationship to 
art in question, Wilde moves towards equating the two terms. In the following 
passage, Gilbert attempts to make a case for criticism and the art it discusses: 
 
Criticism is no more to be judged by any low standard of imitation or 
resemblance than is the work of poet or sculptor. The critic occupies the 
same relation to the work of art that he criticises as the artist does to the 
visible world of form and colour, or the unseen world of passion and of 
thought. […] To an artist so creative as the critic, what does subject-matter 
signify? No more and no less than it does to the novelist and the painter. 
Like them, he can find his motives everywhere. (p. 1125) 
 
There are traces in this passage of the earlier argument concerning criticism’s 
superiority, but here they work towards a different goal: to assert the creative 
independence of the critic. As Wilde has Gilbert ask in the above quotation, ‘to an 
artist so creative as the critic, what does subject-matter signify?’ Divorced from 
the need to be based on the original intent of a work of art, criticism is given a 
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freedom normally reserved for the artist, a freedom ‘no more and no less’ than that 
accorded ‘to the novelist and the painter.’ This important step, seemingly only a 
small one in the line of reasoning within the essay, undermines that assumption of 
the critical pursuit of natural meaning, especially when that meaning is dependent 
on art, its very subject matter. Wilde does this not by discarding art as the source 
for criticism, but by removing the natural subservience associated with it. And he 
essentially does so by rhetorical means, by using the tricks and leeway of 
language and assumption to come to a conclusion that departs significantly from 
the accepted Victorian position. 
 Deconstruction also views the practice of textual criticism as a kind of 
writing of fiction. Like Wilde’s critical position, deconstruction seeks to create 
meaning in a sometimes unexpected but nevertheless coherent way. Interpreting a 
text becomes the same as writing a text. ‘By seeing interpretation itself as a 
fiction-making activity, deconstruction has both reversed and displaced the 
narrative categories of “showing” and “telling”, mimesis and diegesis.’30 This is in 
part grounded in the idea that philosophical and critical language itself makes 
copious use of metaphoric – thus artistic – language and, indeed, cannot do 
without that language. For deconstructionists like Derrida, the fact that metaphor 
and philosophical language are entwined, becomes 
 
an implicit justification for his style of writing philosophy, and for putting 
the aesthetic at the centre of thought. If metaphor cannot be eliminated 
from philosophy, and the attempt to do so is necessarily metaphysical, then 
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there is a reason for writing philosophy that emphasizes the forces of 
metaphorical play which are always necessary for there to be language, 
including the language of philosophical writing.
31
 
 
For both Wilde’s critical thought and deconstruction, art and criticism are, in a 
complex way and through some sort of symbiosis, interchangeable. 
 In ‘The Critic as Artist’, Wilde’s next move is to return to criticism as a 
creative discipline. Earlier Gilbert has asserted the role of creativity within 
criticism a few times. Now the point is articulated much more clearly. Gilbert 
discusses the role of poetry, comparing the work of the poet to that of the critic. 
This comparison carries him so far as to state that criticism ‘works with materials, 
and puts them into a form that is at once new and delightful. What more can one 
say of poetry? Indeed, I would call criticism a creation within a creation’ (p. 
1125). Having earlier dismissed any idea of inferiority regarding the creativity of 
criticism, criticism’s ‘creation within a creation’ establishes it as a work that 
employs creativity in the exact same way as art itself does. Another concept 
inherent to the understanding of criticism, that of its analytical rather than purely 
creative role, is here reduced by its clever equation with a poetic method. 
 The next point he makes is the most contentious one, and again one that he 
has been preparing carefully. Having established the independence and creativity 
of the critic, Wilde now turns to the idea of criticism as purely subjective, as based 
on personal impression. Gilbert lectures Ernest on the follies of assuming 
criticism ought to be objective by telling him that 
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this is a very serious error, and takes no cognisance of Criticism’s most 
perfect form, which is in its essence purely subjective, and seeks to reveal 
its own secret and not the secret of another. For the highest Criticism deals 
with art not as expressive but as impressive purely. (p. 1126) 
 
In other words, good criticism does not concern itself with what readers believe 
the work of art is trying to express, but rather, what they themselves can read in it 
– the impressions they may receive from it. Ernest, who has already accepted that 
criticism is independent and creative, has no choice but to go along with this; after 
all, subjectivity is the hallmark of creativity. The essay’s speakers thus move 
towards a theoretical stance that more and more clearly defies standard 
assumptions of the role of the critic, at least those articulated by critics such as 
Arnold and Pater, who speak of the ‘object as in itself it really is’. 
 Having established that criticism is not objective and prefers invention 
over deduction, and having shown that it is equal to art itself rather than 
subservient to it, Wilde then moves to tackle the assumption that criticism should 
be clear and concise rather than broad and elaborate. This is another way in which 
Wilde’s work resembles deconstruction: if he were to aim for an objective point 
and avoid any kind of playful treatment, then the default position would be to 
establish points in a concise and clear manner, moving from objective point to 
objective point until, finally, the ‘truth’ has been revealed. Wilde has very 
different ideas on the way critics present their material, and he provides an 
example of how it can be done when he describes the manner in which the 
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Wildean critic chooses their source materials: 
 
He does not even require for the perfection of his art the finest materials. 
Anything will serve his purpose. And just as out of the sordid and 
sentimental amours of the silly wife of a small country doctor in the 
squalid village of Yonville-l’Abbaye, near Rouen, Gustave Flaubert was 
able to create a classic, and make a masterpiece of style, so, from subjects 
of little or of no importance, such as the pictures in this year’s Royal 
Academy, or in any year’s Royal Academy for that matter, Mr. Lewis 
Morris’s poems, M. Ohnet’s novels, or the plays of Mr. Henry Arthur 
Jones, the true critic can, if it be his pleasure so to direct or waste his 
faculty of contemplation, produce work that will be flawless in beauty and 
instinct with intellectual subtlety. Why not? Dullness is always an 
irresistible temptation for brilliancy, and stupidity is the permanent Bestia 
Trionfans that calls wisdom from its cave. To an artist so creative as the 
critic, what does subject-matter signify? No more and no less than it does 
to the novelist and the painter. Like them, he can find his motives 
everywhere. Treatment is the test. There is nothing that has not in it 
suggestion or challenge. (p. 1125) 
 
It would have sufficed, in order to make his point, merely to state that the critic 
may take anything as their source material and to give the one example of 
Flaubert. Wilde, however, moves into a list of what appear to be (to Wilde) rather 
mediocre artists, and the passage acquires an element of humour as Wilde takes 
90 
 
shots at some of his creative contemporaries. Then Wilde makes the only slightly 
relevant, sweeping statement that ‘dulness is always an irresistible temptation for 
brilliancy’. Yet he returns to this point of subject matter at the end of the passage, 
restates his case for criticism as using the same type of subject material as the rest 
of art, and justifies his profuse examples with the statement that ‘there is nothing 
that has not in it suggestion or challenge’. The point has been made, but not in a 
short and clear way. Nothing about the passage suggests that Wilde feels the need 
to be clear and concise, but rather, like deconstruction, he follows where the 
associations will take him; and the subject of suitable subjects happens to take 
him down the path of humorous comments on mediocrity. 
 After the four steps that Wilde undertakes to unsettle the traditional 
Victorian understanding of criticism, one final obstacle remains. Though not 
objective, analytical, and in service of understanding a greater work of art, the 
idea yet remains that criticism should shed some light on its subject, and in some 
way increase an audience’s understanding of it. Gilbert tears down this final 
distinctive element of criticism with the usual verbal playfulness. At the start of 
the second part of the essay, Ernest and Gilbert have dined, and Gilbert has 
promised that he will talk a little about the critic as an interpreter. Ernest is a little 
relieved by this more concrete approach, which has more in common with 
traditional practices of criticism. Gilbert’s concession, however, is just another 
move in the rhetorical game he has been playing. Soon enough the tables are 
turned again: Gilbert states that 
 
yes; the critic will be an interpreter, if he chooses. He can pass from his 
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synthetic impression of the work of art as a whole, to an analysis or 
exposition of the work itself […]. Yet his object will not always be to 
explain the work of art. He may seek rather to deepen its mystery. (p. 
1130) 
 
Again Ernest is tricked into following an argument through Gilbert’s language 
games. Gilbert, meanwhile, uses this latest indulgence in verbal pyrotechnics to 
suggest that criticism’s aim, if anything, should not be clarification, but rather the 
opposite: mystification. 
 All of the previously solid distinctions between art and criticism are 
reduced to flexible positions that can be accepted or rejected seemingly at will. 
Where criticism was assumed to have certain aims and methods, Gilbert argues 
that in fact there is little difference with art, whose assumptions and choices are 
radically different. The essay goes on to argue, on this basis, the place that 
criticism ought to have in his ideal version of things, but at this point the main 
event, something very much like a deconstructive analysis of the relationship of 
art and criticism, has been completed. Displaying a meticulous attention to 
language use and to assumptions ripe for overturning, Wilde exposes just how 
strongly the distinction between criticism and art is based on entirely arbitrary 
points, which fall quite easily before the effort he displays in ‘The Critic as 
Artist’. The technique is basically a deconstructive one, and where it misses the 
philological aspect that is often an element of deconstructive analysis – 
specifically the eye towards the roots and variant meanings of words – it more 
than resembles the approach in these other aspects. 
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Deconstruction and ‘The Soul of Man Under Socialism’ 
 ‘The Soul of Man Under Socialism’ is an essay that was not included in 
Intentions originally (though Wilde himself suggested that for the French edition 
of Intentions it should replace ‘The Truth of Masks’). In this essay Wilde does not 
employ speakers but writes in one voice. Despite the lesser emphasis on rhetoric 
and artificiality resulting from not employing fictional speakers, he makes use of 
the same kind of verbal trickery and play on concept and convention. As the title 
suggests, Wilde takes on ‘Socialism, Communism, or whatever one chooses to 
call it’ (p. 1175). In doing so he attempts to claim for socialism what is commonly 
accepted to be the hallmark of a Democracy, namely individualism. He does this, 
as in ‘The Critic as Artist’, by exposing the hidden assumptions and prejudices 
associated with the two forms of government. For ‘The Soul of Man Under 
Socialism’ Wilde deals with three aspects that he wants to destabilize: the concept 
of authority, the ideal of the working man, and the complex and developed 
personality. 
 The first point Wilde takes up is that of authority. He starts off by noting 
that ‘it is to be regretted that a portion of our community should be practically in 
slavery, but to propose to solve the problem by enslaving the entire community is 
childish’ (p. 1177). The remark in itself is quite straightforward and Wilde 
continues: ‘every man must be left quite free to choose his own work. No form of 
compulsion must be exercised over him. If there is, his work will not be good for 
him, will not be good in itself, and will not be good for others. And by work I 
simply mean activity of any kind’ (p. 1177). This point is only a small step from 
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the previous position, but the implication, as Wilde notes, is much wider: it allows 
every person to do exactly as they please. To qualify, Wilde goes on to say: ‘I 
hardly think that any Socialist, nowadays, would seriously propose that an 
inspector should call every morning at each house to see that each citizen rose up 
and did manual labour for eight hours. Humanity has got beyond that stage, and 
reserves such a form of life for the people whom, in a very arbitrary manner, it 
chooses to call criminals’ (p. 1177). In this way Wilde distils a strong sense of 
individualism and freedom of choice from the basic concept of socialism, 
establishing these as its primary qualities. 
 Having established this personal freedom as a basis of Communism (or 
socialism – Wilde’s use of the terms appears to be interchangeable), Wilde’s next 
step is to take the argument in an unexpected but nevertheless logical direction. 
Moving from individualism and freedom to personality, Wilde places the 
emphasis not on action or physical labour – aspects more commonly associated 
with Communism – but instead focusses on thought, and art specifically. 
Freedom, he argues, lies in the expression of personality; and ‘it is a question 
whether we have ever seen the full expression of a personality, except on the 
imaginative plane of art. In action, we never have. […] Wherever there is a man 
who exercises authority, there is a man who resists authority’ (p. 1178). The 
essence, for Wilde, lies in thought, not in action – just as when he notes in ‘The 
Critic as Artist’ that ‘it is very much more difficult to talk about a thing than to do 
it’ (p. 1121). 
 Now that Wilde has shown that the arguments for Communism can lead in 
the direction of contemplation rather than action, which is associated with 
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physical labour, he takes it one step farther. In the following passage, which 
occurs just a little later, Wilde is describing the personality that will emerge once 
socialism has been put into practice: 
 
It will be a marvellous thing—the true personality of man—when we see 
it. It will grow naturally and simply, flowerlike, or as a tree grows. It will 
not be at discord. It will never argue or dispute. It will not prove things. It 
will know everything. And yet it will not busy itself about knowledge. It 
will have wisdom. Its value will not be measured by material things. It will 
have nothing. And yet it will have everything, and whatever one takes 
from it, it will still have, so rich will it be. It will not be always meddling 
with others, or asking them to be like itself. It will love them because they 
will be different. And yet while it will not meddle with others, it will help 
all, as a beautiful thing helps us, by being what it is. The personality of 
man will be very wonderful. It will be as wonderful as the personality of a 
child. (p. 1179) 
 
(Wilde’s positive use of the word natural here, in ‘it will grow naturally and 
simply, flowerlike, or as a tree grows’, seems to contradict the assumption that he 
does not wish to base his criticism on the assumption of a natural truth within the 
work of art. Again this is misleading, but the discussion of truth and consistency 
in postmodernism is a complex one and will be undertaken in the next chapter.) 
  The description is, if anything, almost ascetic. In combination with the 
previous point, however, it starts to sketch a picture that is divergent, in that the 
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personality being described is, if anything, idle. It will not ‘busy itself about 
knowledge’ or ‘meddle with others’; it will act towards others ‘by being what it is’ 
and ‘will have nothing’. The description conjures up associations with the recluse, 
with meditations and contemplation. It is also strikingly similar to a passage from 
‘The Critic as Artist’, where a similar stance of inaction is described in the 
following way: ‘I am certain that, as civilisation progresses and we become more 
highly organised, the elect spirits of each age, the critical and cultured spirits, will 
grow less and less interested in actual life, and will seek to gain their impressions 
almost entirely from what Art has touched’ (p. 1132, emphasis is Wilde’s). Wilde’s 
emancipated worker is exceptional: a person who spends their time in 
contemplation, rather than mindless, hard labour. 
  Wilde adds a flourish to the argument by positing that the criminal will be 
as free as all others. Another unforeseen consequence of the freedom and 
personality that Communism will bring the individual is a freedom from morality. 
Because there is no need for authority (which Wilde equates with slavery earlier in 
the essay) the consequence must be that ‘with authority, punishment will pass 
away’ (p. 1182). What is to be considered harmful crime flows, for Wilde, from 
personal possession and influence over others; with those crimes abolished by the 
individualistic approach to Socialism, all other crimes simply become expressions 
of personality, which are to be celebrated and not punished. 
 It would be easy to dismiss this whole line of reasoning as Wilde’s wilful 
attempt at paradox, or as some elaborate game that Wilde is playing in defiance of 
Victorian ideals and morals. Such an argument, however, would be remarkably 
similar to the accusations levelled against deconstruction. Wilde does not argue 
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merely for the joy of arguing. The analysis of “The Critic as Artist” conducted in 
this chapter shows a sustained effort to expose the term ‘criticism’ for what it 
really is and is not. Wilde achieves this exposition not simply by showing his 
readers a different meaning for the term, but also by playing a rhetorical game 
with each and every element underpinning criticism’s position. He shows just how 
much the term is flexible in either direction, and thereby alerts the audience to the 
assumptions and, perhaps, prejudices underlying the subject of criticism. That 
these sorts of critical enquiries ultimately lead to themes such as truth and crime – 
opening up from a critical approach to social-political themes – is one implication 
that can now be explored. 
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Chapter III  Truth, Lying and Crime 
 
In April 1895, Oscar Wilde found himself at the receiving end of a very different 
kind of public scrutiny. Until that time he had been considered mostly scandalous 
and immoral in artistic terms. Now the Crown had brought a case against him of 
gross indecency after evidence of his sexual encounters with other men surfaced 
during his attempted suit against the Marquess of Queensberry. At one particular 
moment of the trial, Wilde was forced to defend himself against insinuations 
based on a poem by Lord Alfred Douglas. Wilde felt that he was being called a 
criminal while in reality being something else, and made an eloquent defence: 
 
‘The Love that dare not speak its name’ in this century is such a great 
affection of an elder for a younger man as there was between David and 
Jonathan, such as Plato made the very basis of his philosophy, and such as 
you find in the sonnets of Michelangelo and Shakespeare. It is that deep, 
spiritual affection that is as pure as it is perfect. It dictates and pervades 
great works of art like those of Shakespeare and Michelangelo [...]. It is 
beautiful, it is fine, it is the noblest form of affection. There is nothing 
unnatural about it. It is intellectual, and it repeatedly exists between an 
elder and a younger man, when the elder man has intellect, and the 
younger man has all the joy, hope and glamour of life before him.
1
 
 
The passage is well known because it constitutes Wilde’s (literary) defence of his 
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same-sex desires. It is a great irony that the artist who had written (in a qualified 
way) in praise of crime and lying was made to face the public’s judgement of 
what he had preached. In the passage above Wilde engages in a typical activity: 
taking what was, in Victorian England, commonly considered criminal and 
framing it as something artistic and beautiful. 
 Wilde’s interest in the complicated cross-sections of crime, truth and 
aesthetics corresponds to the way in which these issues are viewed in 
postmodernism. The severely problematic concept of truth is key to 
deconstruction. The previous chapter saw the discussion of the specific problems 
that truth represents, especially in its attempt to access a natural, authoritative 
referent. This attitude towards truth – the strong suspicion raised against it – 
pervades much of postmodern thought and has implications, both in Wildean and 
in postmodern terms, that are far-reaching. 
 
Postmodern Attitudes towards Truth and Reality 
Postmodernism’s distrust of terms like truth emerges from the approach’s position 
regarding the period of the Enlightenment. In various ways, the criticism of 
postmodern times is responding to the Enlightenment claim of an absolute truth, a 
claim that ultimately led to, among other things, imperialism and slavery.
2
 After 
the Enlightenment, the concept of truth only gained strength: located in nature, the 
Romantics found the ‘idea of truth-as-self-expression and self-assertion’.3 Though 
now truth was seen as originating in ‘self-expression and self-assertion’, however, 
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it remained entirely objective; the Romantic notion held that it was more easily 
found in sublime nature. This changes with postmodernism, where critics take 
positions that range from entirely dismissing the possibility of truth to seeking to 
maintain as much of a concept of objectivity as possible. The point is that the 
nature of truth itself is very much a matter of debate. In postmodernism there is 
‘violent disagreement among scholars and scientists over the relationship between 
scientific knowledge, truth, and reality, the kinds of ideological and political uses 
to which science and technology are or should be put’.4 At the core of the 
discussion, there is a persistent questioning of the concept of truth in all of its 
implications. 
 Important here is the emphasis on truth as a kind of language-game. The 
language of truth thus becomes not objective truth but linguistic play, constructed 
through metaphor and rhetoric, as noted by Richard Rorty: 
 
certain metaphors which we once used to explicate the notion of truth – 
those which revolve around notions like correspondence and adequate 
representation – need to be abandoned. Doing so will lead us to stop […] 
the language-game which uses the hypostatized adjective ‘truth’ in such 
phrases as ‘the quest for Truth’ or ‘the love of Truth’.5 
 
It is this strong emphasis on truth as a type of language, steeped in metaphor, that 
characterises discussion on truth in postmodernism, for the simple reason that it 
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allows the nature of truth to be discussed rather than simply established: the object 
is no longer a ‘quest’ since there is no single destination – at least, not one that 
could be realistically reached. 
 Though these philosophical and critical positions mark postmodern 
thought, they partly derive from a near contemporary of Wilde. Friedrich 
Nietzsche wrote extensively on issues such as truth and, as early as 1873, lies, in 
an unpublished essay entitled ‘On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense’. In this 
essay, Nietzsche proposes 
 
that ‘truth’ is a mode of illusion and that the schemes our intellects impose 
upon things by means of language, while practically useful, are 
fundamentally deceptive. Moreover, while language is always metaphoric, 
one usually forgets that this is so, imagining that the conceptual schemes 
of one’s own construction are permanent fixtures.6 
 
As Nietzsche himself puts it – in a way that is notably similar to Wilde’s 
distinction on art, truth and lying in his essay ‘The Decay of Lying’, discussed 
later in this chapter – ‘Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions’.7 
These ideas were crucial in the development and articulation – to some 
degree even foundational – of postmodern critical practices. Nietzsche bases truth 
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and illusion in language, something that especially appealed to the linguistic 
models of criticism: 
 
The stock of ‘On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense’ has risen in the 
eyes of many scholars over the past few decades, primarily because it 
analyzes truth in terms of metaphor. Many literary theorists and 
philosophers influenced by literary criticism, in particular, interpret 
Nietzsche as defending a view of ‘truth’ that treats it as an illusion foisted 
upon us by language. Truth, on this view, amounts ultimately to a mode of 
rhetoric.
8
 
 
It is notable that this quotation phrases the importance of Nietzsche’s thought for 
postmodern philosophers and critics as having risen ‘over the past few decades’. 
In contrast, Wilde’s thoughts on truth and lies can be seen as either an 
unconscious parallel or a tacit, unattributed development of Nietzsche’s critical 
ideas; as such it demonstrates all the more how Wilde’s critical thought had failed 
to establish itself as relevant until the second half of the twentieth century. 
Among a number of postmodern thinkers who reframe the concept of 
truth, a prominent name is Michel Foucault. He examines the relationship 
between knowledge and power, and concludes that in areas such as social science 
there are considerable assumptions, rather than evidence-based positions, at the 
base of what is held up as truth. Some of his writings examine those social 
sciences that ‘have tended to operate on the assumption that the 
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investigator/interpreter has a privileged access to explanation and interpretation, 
to the “truth”, and in addition that the knowledge so gained is independent of 
relations of power.’9 Explanation and interpretations, methods of communicating 
knowledge based in language, are now made suspicious. It is Foucault’s emphasis 
that reveals the role that power plays in this, which is to say that an absolute truth 
is a biased position promoted by those who stand to benefit from turning a relative 
position into an absolute truth. Bias such as this is not limited to the (social) 
sciences. Any intellectual becomes, to some degree, suspicious under this 
postmodern idea; because they have been trained to seek out objective truth, now 
‘the contemporary world is ill fitted for intellectuals as legislators’.10  
One additional, resulting problem is the position of law and legislation. 
These, after all, depend on concepts of truth and the possibility of establishing 
clearly whether something is objectively wrong. Foucault, in his analysis of 
power, questions how justice is not necessarily universal or impartial. In 
Foucault’s reading, ‘law is indeed often made the instrument and accessory of 
powers external to it […]. Disciplinary and bio-political operatives and 
knowledges come to invade and inscribe themselves within modern law.’11 Where 
law was previously considered an objective, unquestionable thing, best left to 
legal specialists who attempted to further the process of making law even more 
objective, increasingly in the second half of the twenty first century it was 
perceived as subjective, a mechanism in the hands of specialists whose interests 
lay partly in mystifying the nature of their field. 
 Jean Baudrillard likewise writes on the problem of law as objectively true. 
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His criticism is very direct: he notes that ‘there is something stupid in the current 
forms of truth and objectivity, from which a superior irony must give us leave’.12 
The irony here creates a sort of distance, which will result in the possibility of 
viewing law as other than ‘truth and objectivity’, so that critics can realize that 
‘law and order themselves might really be nothing more than a simulation’.13 
While in the coming chapters there will be a lot more to be said about 
Baudrillard’s theories of reality and simulation, his positioning here of law as a 
kind of simulation (and therefore not real) exemplifies postmodern attitudes 
towards the law.  
 Naturally, the consequences of the deconstruction of truth and objectivity 
reflected not simply on law in the legal sense, but also on the laws governing the 
study of literature: that is, literary theory. Critics such as De Man have made 
extensive forays into this theoretical questioning of truth in literature. This, too, is 
not just a reiteration of deconstruction, but rather an extension and logical 
continuation of its reading of truth. Like law, literary theory had previously 
worked with the aim of finding the ‘true’ meaning in literature – its relationship 
with reality – and, like law, this relationship is questioned and complicated rather 
than negated. A key step is moving (literary) theory away from the traditional 
ideas of mimesis, where art imitates life and can be easily categorised based on 
how this imitation is done. Deconstructionist critics such as De Man accomplish 
this by removing theory from preset notions, as argued by McQuillan: 
 
                                                             
12 Jean Baudrillard, ‘Fatal Strategies’, in Selected Writings, ed. by Mark Poster, trans. by Paul 
Foss, Paul Patton and Philip Beitchman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 185-206 (p. 205). 
13 Jean Baudrillard, ‘Simulacra and Simulations’, in Selected Writings, ed. by Mark Poster, trans. 
by Paul Foss, Paul Patton and Philip Beitchman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 166-184 (p. 
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If literary theory rejects a mimetic model of literature and the aesthetic 
categories of art it is not out of a desire to replace them with a purely 
linguistic understanding of the world. One would understand nothing of 
deconstruction and de Man’s work if one thought of it as merely an 
extension of the so-called ‘linguistic paradigm’ (the idealist belief that 
reality is merely a linguistic construct). Rather, de Man wants to free the 
study of literature from naïve oppositions between texts and ‘the real 
world’ and from uncritical conceptions of art. Literary theory does not 
deny the relation between literature and the real world but suggests that it 
is not necessarily certain that language works in accordance with the 
principles of the supposed ‘real world’. Therefore, it is not at all certain 
that texts are reliable sources of information about anything other than 
their own uses of language.
14
 
 
For deconstructionist critics of this type, the aim of approaching literature, and 
thus the aim of literary theory, is to disable a general approach that largely 
determines the reaction to works of art along predetermined ideas. Rather than 
assuming truths that are then to be located within the work of art, this kind of 
postmodern theory presents sets of questions that can be asked of it, an approach 
that negates the existence of an absolute truth that need only be found within that 
work. 
  
                                                             
14 Martin McQuillan, Paul de Man (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 52-53. 
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Wildean attitudes towards Truth 
The discussion of truth in Wilde’s work takes on a variety of forms. ‘The Sphinx 
Without a Secret’, for example, deals with the account of a woman who constructs 
for herself a kind of scandalous life – or at least the semblance of it – in order to 
appear interesting. Both ‘The Model Millionaire’ and ‘The Happy Prince’ deal 
with reality and its outward appearance as two quite different things: ‘Millionaire’ 
through featuring an obscenely rich nobleman posing as a beggar, ‘Prince’ through 
a richly decorated statue that loses its outward lustre as its inner beauty grows 
through good deeds. 
 In ‘The Critic as Artist’, the essay’s two speakers discuss criticism, art and 
truth. At one point Gilbert says to Ernest, ‘if you meet at dinner a man who has 
spent his life in educating himself, […] you rise from table richer, and conscious 
that a high ideal has for a moment touched and sanctified your days. But oh! My 
dear Ernest, to sit next to a man who has spent his life in trying to educate others! 
What a dreadful experience that is!’.15 If truth were attainable, the instruction of 
others would be a very valuable thing; but education, so far removed from life and 
so hopelessly uninteresting for the individualist, becomes something that can only 
be dreaded over dinner. The individual element is a direct result of the status of 
truth in Wilde’s arguments on art and life. 
It is clear that Wilde plays with the idea of an objective truth. He presents 
truth in two ways: an impossible objective truth and an accessible subjective truth. 
In ‘The Critic as Artist’, which deals primarily with criticism and its relationship 
to truth, one of the essay’s key phrases is, after all, that ‘the primary aim of the 
                                                             
15 Oscar Wilde, The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003), 
p. 1140. Further references to Wilde’s work from this edition are given after quotations in the text. 
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critic is to see the object as in itself it really is not’ (p. 1128). The essay presents 
both of these kinds of truth. The accessible subjective truth is alluded to when one 
of the speakers asks: ‘for what is Truth? In matters of religion, it is simply the 
opinion that has survived. In matters of science, it is the ultimate sensation. In 
matters of art, it is one’s last mood’ (p. 1143). A little later on, the objective, 
unattainable side is broached when there is talk of a class of philosopher-critics 
who love truth even though ‘it knows it to be unattainable’ (p. 1153). The former 
is what Wilde champions in essays such as ‘The Critic as Artist’ or ‘The Decay of 
Lying’, but there are hints of the latter, the real but unattainable truth, scattered 
throughout the works as well. One such instance is when Wilde admits that ‘the 
critic will be an interpreter, if he chooses’ and even that in that mode ‘there are 
many delightful things to be said and done’ (p. 1130). 
 This Wildean way of approaching truth is very similar to how critics such 
as Derrida view the matter. Like Wilde, Derrida does not believe in the possibility 
of objectivity, though he does believe in the existence of objective truth. The 
obstacle – really the intervening, insurmountable barrier – is language. Any kind 
of expression of truth must, after all, happen in a language, which, as noted, is the 
complicating factor: ‘for Derrida truth is inescapably dependent upon the work of 
difference and thus typically relative to a language because truths are primarily 
statements made in a language.’16 This, then, is the truth which the Wildean 
philosopher loves even though he ‘knows it to be unattainable’. This does not 
eliminate the theoretical possibility of truth: ‘as long as there are “stable contexts 
of interpretation”, and thus stable meanings, there is every reason to expect truth 
                                                             
16 Thomas Baldwin, ‘Presence, Truth and Authenticity’, in Derrida’s Legacies: Literature and 
Philosophy, ed. by Simon Glendinning and Robert Eaglestone (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 
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to be objective.’17 Until mankind gets away from language, truth remains 
unattainable. Thus, for Derrida, truth must be separated from the facts that are 
obtained from a reality mediated through language. 
 Wilde makes a similar point in that he detaches truth from the 
interpretation of facts. At the end of ‘The Truth of Masks’, Wilde writes about 
truth in theatre, having just defended an archaeological interpretation of a 
Shakespeare play. Generalizing for a moment towards truth in general, he states 
that ‘of course the aesthetic value of Shakespeare’s plays does not, in the slightest 
degree, depend on their facts, but on their Truth, and Truth is independent of facts 
always, inventing or selecting them at pleasure’ (p. 1166). Wilde’s phrasing partly 
obscures that the second ‘Truth’ is general, rather than theatrical or aesthetic, so 
that his point here is that ‘Truth is independent of facts’, subject to creative whim 
because the facts that construct it are chosen, and even invented, as desired. As 
with Derrida, Wildean Truth (the kind written with a capital letter) is by necessity 
divorced from reality through its mediated status. 
There is more discussion on truth in ‘The Critic as Artist’, which takes the 
form of ‘insincerity’. In the section where this is discussed, Ernest has been 
asking what the traits of a good critic are, and finally enquires whether the critic 
will, at least, be sincere. Gilbert scoffs at the notion: 
 
A little sincerity is a dangerous thing, and a great deal of it is absolutely 
fatal. The true critic will, indeed, always be sincere in his devotion to the 
principle of beauty, but he will seek for beauty in every age and in each 
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school, and will never suffer himself to be limited to any settled custom of 
thought or stereotyped mode of looking at things. He will realise himself 
in many forms, and by a thousand different ways, and will ever be curious 
of new sensations and fresh points of view. Through constant change, and 
through constant change alone, he will find his true unity. He will not 
consent to be the slave of his own opinions. For what is mind but motion 
in the intellectual sphere? The essence of thought, as the essence of life, is 
growth. You must not be frightened by words, Ernest. What people call 
insincerity is simply a method by which we can multiply our personalities. 
(pp. 1144-1145) 
 
Gilbert makes an argument for insincerity, or lying. The truth becomes irrelevant 
to the critic and growth, or at least personal growth, is achieved through following 
the many paths that are generally considered untrue. This is another instance 
where Wilde sees constant motion, or difference, as an alternative to a stagnant 
concept of truth. Moreover, the passage presents a next step in this Wildean view 
on truth. Gilbert refers to insincerity as a ‘method by which we can multiply our 
personalities’. The development is quite similar to another postmodern element 
arising from the discussion of truth: that of a fractured reality, of the loss of a 
single unifying type of truth. In the absence of truth, multiple viewpoints can be 
asserted; it also becomes problematic to argue, so that rather than presenting 
arguments towards one central point, postmodern approaches often present one 
possible view out of many (though this does not mean that approaches do not 
sometimes place themselves above others in terms of importance). 
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 The reasoning in ‘The Critic as Artist’ reflects a particular stance on truth, 
but in its discussion is limited to art, or even simply to just literature; and so it 
may seem that the arguments presented in that essay pertain only to literary 
criticism, while postmodernism deals with the topics of truth, subjectivity and 
fracturing in relation to all facets of life. Wilde, however, moves to establish that 
the points on criticism in ‘The Critic as Artist’ are really also about life. After all, 
the two highest arts, according to Gilbert, are ‘Life and Literature, life and the 
perfect expression of life’ (p. 1114). Wilde does not juxtapose literature and 
criticism against living one’s life, which makes sense given the earlier collapse of 
the critical distinction between different kinds or genres of text. In equating life 
with literature as an art – even if the wording seems to suggest a hierarchy – 
Wilde also suggests that the rules which apply to art, and thus to criticism, must 
apply to life in turn. 
 Wilde, however, is not content to represent life in quite so straightforward 
a way. Elsewhere, in ‘The Decay of Lying’, he comments that ‘literature always 
anticipates life’ (pp. 1083-1084). This presents an obvious problem, in that 
literature is already the perfect expression of life; it seems contradictory that 
literature should precede the thing that it expresses. The order of things appears 
disrupted. This has to do with Wilde’s interpretation of cause and effect: with 
objective truth being unavailable, it is very much possible that effects cause the 
thing that they construct. This turns a straightforward idea of life as truth into a 
complex system in which cause and effect are never clearly distinguishable – in 
which, in a sense, the ‘true’ cause of something is never without risk of really 
being a creative invention called into being to explain the thing it has supposedly 
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caused. This Wildean approach entails exactly what has also been defined as a key 
element of the postmodern problem with truth: that meaning is a ‘complex 
interaction of signifiers, which has no obvious endpoint. Meaning is the spin-off 
of a potentially endless play of signifiers’.18 At the same time, Wilde’s discussion 
of cause and effect here is very similar to Nietzsche, who places doubt with their 
combination and relationship in The Gay Science: ‘An intellect that saw cause and 
effect as a continuum, not, as we do, as arbitrary division and dismemberment – 
that saw the stream of the event – would reject the concept of cause and effect and 
deny all determinedness’.19 
 Wilde’s championing of a personal, subjective criticism is similar to the 
claims Roland Barthes would later make with regard to the ‘death of the author’. 
Barthes writes that ‘the explanation of a work is always sought in the man or 
woman who produces it, as if it were always in the end, through the more or less 
transparent allegory of the fiction, the voice of a single person, the author 
“confiding” in us.’20 For both Barthes and Wilde, the explanation of a literary 
work lies not with the author but with the reader, even if Wilde then takes that 
argument in a different direction when he claims it as the basis for calling the 
reader, or critic, an artist in their own right. Barthes and Wilde both see the text 
itself as the basis for interpretation – in combination with a (critical) reader – but 
Barthes’s emphasis is very much on the text: ‘Where does such a writing, free 
from the confines of the author, exempt from any final signified, exist? The 
                                                             
18 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), p. 100. 
19 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, ed. by Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), p. 113. 
20 Roland Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’, in Modern Criticism and Theory: a Reader, ed. by 
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answer for Barthes is in the notion of the text, which is clearly distinguished from 
the more traditional notion of a work with an author behind it’.21 In the case of 
both Wilde and Barthes, then, readers need only concern themselves with the text 
at hand when it comes to interpretation. 
 Another indication of Wilde’s interpretation of truth arises in ‘The Soul of 
Man Under Socialism’. Having postulated the conditions of socialism that will 
make an intense individualism possible for all, Wilde speculates on the true 
personality of man, the personality that will reveal itself once man is freed from 
the considerations of everyday life. He contrasts this true personality of man with 
those personalities developed through a life of adversity, so that ‘half their 
strength has been wasted in friction’ (p. 1179). Wilde sees the true personality 
develop in the ‘simply, flowerlike’ quotation referred to above: 
 
It will grow naturally and simply, flowerlike, or as a tree grows. It will not 
be at discord. It will never argue or dispute. It will not prove things. It will 
know everything. And yet it will not busy itself about knowledge. [...] It 
will not be always meddling with others, or asking them to be like itself. It 
will love them because they will be different. (p. 1179) 
 
Two things stand out in this passage. First of all, Wilde notes that this person ‘will 
never argue or dispute’ nor try to ‘prove things’. It has already become clear that 
Wilde does not see truth as being attainable, and so the idea of not disputing or 
arguing, of not having to or being able to prove anything, fits this proto-
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postmodern attitude towards truth. The next lines, ‘it will know everything’, 
seems to contradict this; yet the following ‘it will not busy itself with knowledge’ 
places this back in line with the reading that doubts truth. Knowledge here refers 
to the idea of an objective truth that need not be bothered with, because it is 
unattainable; what is available instead is the subjective truth, one which will be 
fully knowable – hence ‘know everything’ – because it is based on the individual. 
The closing line again links Wilde’s thought to Derrida, emphasizing, as it does, 
difference (though Derrida’s concepts of difference and différance are notably 
more complex than Wilde’s use of the term difference here). 
 Wilde’s phrasing does, however, introduce a possible confusion. At the 
start of the passage he states that the true personality of man ‘will grow naturally 
and simply, flowerlike, or as a tree grows’ (p. 1179). The use of the word ‘natural’ 
here would seem to imply that Wilde does subscribe to a sort of natural, objective 
truth that could be got at by the critic. However, a closer look at what ‘natural’ 
means exactly, both in postmodern approaches and in the essay ‘The Decay of 
Lying’, reveals that his use of the word is still very much proto-postmodern. 
 
Nature and Lying: The Arboreal and the Rhyzomatic 
Wilde deals primarily with Nature in his essay ‘The Decay of Lying’. Where in 
‘The Critic as Artist’ Wilde focussed more on the role of criticism and its place 
within the arts, in ‘Decay’ he introduces another set of speakers, Cyril and Vivian, 
whose discussion focusses on the Wildean lie. The essay carries on from the same 
points of truth that are also present in ‘The Critic as Artist’, but those points are 
more pronounced here. 
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 ‘Who wants to be consistent?’ asks Vivian, stating that he wishes to ‘write 
over the door of my library the word “Whim”’ (p. 1072). He makes it quite clear 
that he distinguishes between lying as an artistic endeavour – the form he is 
defending – and lying merely for personal gain. This view excludes politicians, 
according to Vivian, as ‘they never rise beyond the level of misrepresentation, and 
actually condescend to prove, to discuss, to argue. How different from the temper 
of the true liar, with his frank, fearless statements, his superb irresponsibility, his 
healthy, natural disdain of proof of any kind!’ (p. 1072). This signals the sort of lie 
that Wilde is talking about: not the one that sets out to deceive, but the one that 
acknowledges that, on some level, a lie is simply the way in which people 
represent individual truth. This individual truth is represented in the essay by the 
juxtaposition of nature and art. It is signalled in the beginning of the essay, when 
Vivian says that, when he goes outdoors into nature, ‘one’s individuality 
absolutely leaves one’. By extension, this individuality is gained when indoors, or 
in the presence of art: ‘what Art really reveals to us is Nature’s lack of design, her 
curious crudities, her extraordinary monotony, her absolutely unfinished 
condition’ (p. 1071). In short, nature is crude and unfinished whereas art is 
constructed and designed. If nature is equated with truth and art equated with 
lying, this means that lying represents a constructed version in contrast to the 
unfinished, flawed version called truth. (It is important to note that this does not 
necessarily entail that art is a finished version of nature; Wilde’s essay argues 
quite the opposite, and nowhere can the claim be found that art represents a later, 
polished version of an earlier, crude version in nature. Rather the two are both 
versions of the same thing, but different and non-sequential versions.) Thus lying 
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becomes something to be constructed and honed. In this sense, Vivian classifies it 
as a kind of art, like sculpting or poetry: 
 
Lying and poetry are arts—arts, as Plato saw, not unconnected with each 
other—and they require the most careful study, the most disinterested 
devotion. Indeed, they have their technique, just as the more material arts 
of painting and sculpture have, their subtle secrets of form and colour, 
their craft-mysteries, their deliberate artistic methods. (p. 1073) 
 
This draws attention to the nature of reality. By conceptualizing the debate as art 
against nature, Wilde again touches upon the juxtaposition of objective and 
subjective criticism. The realization of the nature of reality as not accessibly 
objective requires that readers pay close attention. Later in the passage from 
which the above quotation originates, Vivian will speak of the ‘careless habit of 
accuracy’ (p. 1073). What this means is that, through laziness and carelessness, 
there might be a fall back to notions of accuracy and objectivity – that dictum to 
‘see the object as in itself it really is’ – and forget that this position really 
represents that ‘natural’ rather than the preferable, constructed view of reality. 
 The main point of ‘The Decay of Lying’ is thus that truth and nature are 
constructions. They arise from fragments, from the ‘complex interaction of 
signifiers’ mentioned earlier – without an ‘obvious endpoint’ or, to phrase it 
differently, without a natural form. Such a view of reality as fragmented and 
constructed is at the heart of many approaches to postmodernism. Its underlying 
theoretical assumption is exactly the absence of a unified, organic whole. Critics 
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such as Gilles Deleuze and Pierre-Félix Guattari are associated with this 
exploration of the so-called rhizomatic, the non-hierarchical structuring as 
opposed to something representing a ‘natural’ order. They share with Wilde a deep 
suspicion of the term ‘natural’. This suspicion goes back to a postmodern distrust 
of anything that is taken for granted – the same sort of distrust that is found in the 
questioning of images and the kind of postmodern thinking that led to the 
conception of hyperreality and simulacra – discussed in Part 2 of this thesis. 
Deleuze and Guattari reject the concept of the ‘tree’ or ‘root’ (the terms vary 
depending on the translation; another frequent concept is ‘the arboreal’) for 
similar reasons. For them, it represents a kind of fictional version of nature and 
reality: 
 
The tree is already the image of the world, or the root the image of the 
world-tree. This is the classical book, as noble, signifying, and subjective 
organic interiority (the strata of the book). The book imitates the world, as 
art imitates nature. The law of the book is the law of reflection, the One 
that becomes two. […] Nature doesn’t work that way: in nature, roots are 
tap-roots with a more multiple, lateral and circular system of ramification, 
rather than a dichotomous one. Thought lags behind nature.
22
 
 
The problem, for Deleuze and Guattari, is not the existence of the tree, or of its 
image; rather, they see matters are being complicated by writing, or ‘the classical 
book’. This book, or the human representation of the world, ‘imitates the world’ 
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and through its imitation becomes a construct rather than another natural thing. 
Additionally, nature is not an orderly affair. The above passage represents the 
orderly representation of nature in the model of ‘One that becomes two’, a nicely 
closed and predictable system that can be neatly imitated and overseen. ‘Nature’, 
however, ‘doesn’t work that way’; Deleuze and Guattari feel that nature is far 
more chaotic than its representations suggest. 
 In order to demonstrate this, they juxtapose the concept of the natural or 
the ‘tree’ with that of the ‘rhizome’. This is an entity that lacks the sort of order 
supposed in more classical representations of nature, while still being natural. 
Rhizomes are masses more akin to amorphous entities than the classic (and 
problematic) representation of a tree: examples include things like potatoes, 
crabgrass or swarms of rats. ‘Any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything 
other, and must be. This is very different from the tree or root, which plots a point, 
fixes an order’.23 Thus the difference between a root and a rhizome is, at least in 
the aspect relevant here, one between arbitrary interconnection and order; between 
the imagined order of nature, and the actual random connections of the rhizome. 
This is what leads to fracturing: the breakup of a natural order leaves the reader 
stranded with fragments that may be interconnected in any way the reader likes. 
The term ‘fragmentation’ suggests that this one-time concept of unity has been 
shattered into pieces, but it would be misleading to think that those pieces might 
then be utilized to rebuild the natural order. To extend the metaphor, the former 
cracks and break lines would remain visible, a reminder of the ultimately 
constructed nature of that so-called unity. 
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 From there on, this concept of the rhizome feeds into other postmodern 
aspects. The fact that ‘any point […] can be connected to anything other, and must 
be’ leads, among other things, to concepts of intertextuality, where, as Frederic 
Jameson has said, ‘everything can now be a text’ because a text is essentially a 
collection of connections; thus such connections are no longer subject to dismissal 
based solely on not being a traditional, or ‘natural’, text. 24 This has implications 
for textuality which will be explored in Chapter VII. The rhizome itself underlies 
more than just intertextuality, however. The fragmentation that it leads to is a vital 
part of Deconstruction, which relies on the ability to make unexpected 
connections that are not a part of the traditional interpretation of texts or concepts. 
 ‘The Decay of Lying’ provides a link between Deleuze and Guattari on the 
one hand and Wilde on the other. There, Wilde takes this same concept of nature 
and subjects it to equally critical – though much more playful – questioning. 
Deleuze and Guattari counter the phrase ‘as art imitates nature’ by stating that art 
has not, in fact, imitated nature, but rather has imposed a representation upon it. 
This matches Wilde’s statement that ‘Nature, no less than Life, is an imitation of 
Art’ (p. 1086). These words arise when Cyril sums up what Gilbert, the defender 
of the nature-as-art theory, has been saying; Cyril then challenges him to prove it, 
which Gilbert consents to do. He drives the point home by arguing that the 
perception of nature ‘is our creation. It is in our brain that she quickens to life. 
Things are because we see them, and what we see, and how we see it, depends on 
the Arts that have influenced us. To look at a thing is very different from seeing a 
thing’ (p. 1086). For Wilde, nature is constructed. As ‘our creation’, people 
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construct an idea of nature through its representation in art. This is the same 
situation that leads, in the view of Deleuze and Guattari, to the misconception of 
nature. In both views, nature has been constructed through people’s perception of 
it, rather than through something actually ‘natural’. It is the way the ‘classical 
book’ is constructed: not as a natural element, but as a projection of the human 
mind on an artistic phenomenon.  
 Additionally, this manner of constructing natural objects is a concern for 
both. Deleuze and Guattari base their juxtaposition of tree and rhizome on it; 
Wilde, somewhat more cryptically, cautions that ‘to look at a thing is very 
different from seeing a thing’, suggesting that the lazy observer will fall prone to 
the same errors of misconception mentioned above. Presumably ‘seeing’ the thing 
will lead to a less misguided perception of it, although ultimately the point for 
Wilde will be more artistically oriented than the general philosophical point 
Deleuze and Guattari are trying to make. 
 Elsewhere, Wilde engages with the fragmentation that arises from this sort 
of thinking. It is a frequent focus of Wilde, who incorporated it into his work as 
much as he sometimes praised it in others. Thus Wilde ‘praised in his friend E.W. 
Godwin’s sets and costumes for Helena in Troas, performed in London in 1886 
with Mrs. Oscar Wilde in a nonspeaking part’; most importantly, he did so 
because it was ‘not a slavish imitation of Greek originals but a harvesting of 
details from different sources and their unification in a designed whole’.25 It is 
important to note that Wilde does indeed praise someone for achieving a 
‘unification in a designed whole’, which may suggest that Wilde favours 
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unification rather than fragmentation. However, the connections are not natural, 
but designed. In other words, it is up to the artist to construct meaning out of the 
many fragments available to them. Artistic endeavour always entails unification in 
that sense; it is simply not a ‘natural’ unification, but rather a constructed whole, a 
rhizomatic unification. The problem lies in the way in which such unification is 
discussed, for if the discussion becomes too careless, the reader ceases ‘seeing’ 
and resumes merely ‘looking’. 
 There are additional moments where Wilde shows what he sees as proper 
ordering principle. At one point he notes that ‘one does not see anything until one 
sees its beauty’ (p. 1086). Here he is suggesting that beauty might be some kind of 
ordering principle instead of nature. Again the reader is not dealing with a natural, 
hierarchical order, but with a series of (randomly) interconnected fragments, 
which is similar to postmodernism: ‘an integral and especially important aspect of 
postmodern approaches is a refusal to avoid conflict and irresolvable differences 
or to synthesize these differences into a unitary, univocal whole’.26 Both in Wilde 
and in postmodern approaches the emphasis is on synthesis, the construction of a 
whole from fragments. Though Wilde’s desire to establish an overarching 
principle (Beauty) in the place of what came before (nature) may seem to indicate 
his preference for one grand narrative over the other, Wilde’s beauty is, after all a 
product of synthesis. 
 Another element that makes this very postmodern is the attitude towards 
the disavowal of the natural. Both Wilde and, for example, Deleuze approach this 
with a sense of liberation. Wilde’s whole essay is a staunch defence of this idea of 
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lying – of constructing a personalized reality from whatever is available or 
desirable – and it is clearly presented as a positive outcome. Likewise for 
Deleuze:  
 
in Deleuze’s case, like many other post-structuralists, this recognised 
impossibility of organising life into closed structures was not a failure or 
loss but a cause for celebration and liberation. The fact that we cannot 
secure a foundation for knowledge means that we are given the 
opportunity to invent, create and experiment.
27
 
 
However, this does lead to a problem, in that postmodernism does not merely 
discard old ways and patterns of thinking (an act which itself raises resistance) but 
engages in this discarding with eagerness, joy and even ‘celebration’. Yet the 
results of such approaches are ways of thinking that may be called alien; certainly 
the replacement of a natural approach for a rhyzomatic one is, in a sense, 
monstrous. Exactly that idea of a new way of thinking that appears monstrous in 
its newness to the older ways is one that is taken up both by Wilde and by 
postmodern critics. 
 
The Monstrous 
Derrida notes that there is a historical trend to label newly emerging approaches as 
repulsive and even monstrous, especially if such a break is radical: ‘all history has 
shown that each time an event has been produced, for example in philosophy or in 
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poetry, it took the form of the unacceptable, or even of the intolerable, of the 
incomprehensible, that is, of a certain monstrosity.’28 Here monstrosity is equated 
with both the intolerable and the incomprehensible, clearly indicating that it 
entails a fearful reaction to something new, something which is not yet 
understood. Derrida speaks of the arrival of something so significantly new as to 
cause a traumatic break. Evoking childbirth, he notes that he deliberately chooses 
this vocabulary 
 
with a glance towards those who […] turn their eyes away when faced by 
the as yet unnamable which is proclaiming itself and which can do so, as is 
necessary whenever a birth is in the offing, only under the species of the 
nonspecies, in the formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form of 
monstrosity.
29
 
 
This goes some way to explain hostile reactions to postmodern approaches such as 
deconstruction or post-structuralism, which seek radically to reframe the way that 
critics and thinkers approach truth. 
 One such analysis that places this clearly in a postmodern context is Jean 
Baudrillard’s highlighting of the metaphorical nature of law. He does this by 
linking it to the metaphor of a Sphinx, the creature that asks riddles of men. He 
writes: 
                                                             
28 Jacques Derrida, ‘Passages – from Traumatism to Promise’, trans. by Peggy Kamuf, Points … 
Interviews, 1974-94, ed. by Elisabeth Weber (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995) pp. 372-
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Today it is man who puts to the sphinx, to the inhuman, the question of the 
inhuman, of the fatal, of the world’s indifference to our endeavors and to 
objective laws. The object (the Sphinx) is more subtle and does not 
answer. But, by disobeying laws and thwarting desire, it must answer 
secretly to some enigma. What is left but to go over to the side of the 
enigma?
30
 
 
In this quotation there is another approach to the idea of ‘real’ reality, of a kind of 
real truth, existing yet unattainable; and of the need to look for alternatives when 
such truth is not available. Baudrillard writes of the ‘world’s indifference’ 
regarding ‘objective laws’, making the point that such supposedly objective laws 
do not necessarily resonate with reality. He then represents the alternative, the 
‘enigma’, a kind of alternative to objective knowledge. Clearly Baudrillard is 
glorifying mystery in this quotation; it represents the logical choice when previous 
interpretations of reality, the ‘endeavours’ and ‘objective laws’, have failed to 
grant insight into what things really are. The answer lies somewhere else, in 
mystery – in the monstrous sphinx. 
 The same is found in Wilde. Having proposed in ‘The Critic as Artist’ that 
critics could pursue the less interesting path of attempting to represent truth by 
explaining a work of art, Wilde then proposes that really the preferable course of 
action would be to glorify the artwork’s mystery. Ideally the critic’s ‘object will 
not always be to explain the work of art. He may seek rather to deepen its 
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mystery, to raise round it, and round its maker, that mist of wonder which is dear 
to both gods and worshippers alike’ (p. 1130). For Wilde this mystery is key, just 
as with Baudrillard. Wilde’s essay, however, goes a step farther in this 
comparison. Shortly after the above quotation, the speaker returns to his point on 
art as a mystery, stating that the critic ideally ‘will not treat Art as a riddling 
Sphinx, whose shallow secret may be guessed and revealed […]. Rather, he will 
look upon Art as a goddess whose mystery it is his province to intensify, and 
whose majesty his privilege to make more marvellous in the eyes of men’ 
(p.1130). The second part of the quotation is a logical extension of Wilde’s 
previous words, reinforcing the importance of truth as mystery. It is the first part 
of the quotation that is crucial here, as it urges that art not be portrayed ‘as a 
riddling Sphinx’. Like Baudrillard’s version, Wilde’s Sphinx is not someone 
whose secrets are guessed, but rather the reverse. Neither man believes that the 
Sphinx will, or should, answer. 
 This position is reinforced in Wilde’s poem, ‘The Sphinx’. Here, the 
Sphinx is once again portrayed as a monstrous keeper of secrets. Thus the poem’s 
speaker at one point urges the creature: ‘Get hence, you loathsome mystery! 
Hideous animal, get hence! | You wake in me each bestial sense, you make me 
what I would not be’ (p. 882). However, before this point the speaker has been 
fascinated by the Sphinx, asking what secrets it holds and even desiring it. The 
first part of the poem consists mostly of questions that the speaker puts to it, such 
as the request to know about Egyptian gods and historical figures:  
 
O tell me, were you standing by when Isis to Osiris knelt? | And did you 
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watch the Egyptian melt her union for Antony | And drink the jewel-
drunken wine and bend her head in mimic awe | To see the huge proconsul 
draw the salted tunny from the brine?’ (p. 875) 
 
Then there is a passage where the speaker contemplates the Sphinx sexually, 
which shows in the language: for example the speakers describes how the Sphinx 
‘watched with hot and hungry stare’ and asks ‘Which was the vessel of your lust?’ 
before launching into a fantasy of how the god Mammon must have been the 
Sphinx’s lover. Clearly the speaker desires knowledge from the Sphinx. It, 
however, ‘is more subtle and does not answer’, as Baudrillard puts it. Finally the 
speaker grows desperate and starts to view the Sphinx as a monster, with the 
sensuous contemplation of the Sphinx mixing with more monstrous imagery: its 
‘eyes are like fantastic moons that shiver in some stagnant lake, | Your tongue is 
like a scarlet snake that dances to fantastic tunes’ (p. 881). This monstrosity is the 
face of the mystery that emerges as an alternative to truth, and just as in 
postmodern approaches, it is horrifying in its becoming. 
 
Wilde and Postmodern Crime Fiction 
Crime is a form of monstrosity, in that it is a deviation from the norm that 
normally requires identification and punishment. This is a major recurring theme 
in the works of Wilde. Its most frequent appearance is in Lord Arthur Savile’s 
Crime and Other Stories, where three of the five stories contain crime in some 
way. It also features heavily in The Picture of Dorian Gray, with murder being 
part of the protagonist’s moral descent; and in An Ideal Husband, where the risk 
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of exposing the criminal past of one of the central characters is a driving force of 
the play. These works all contain a criminal protagonist, whose transgressions 
often go unpunished – at least in a social context. Wilde’s essay ‘Pen, Pencil and 
Poison’ celebrates – though not without some irony – a criminal artist, and ‘The 
Soul of Man under Socialism’ foresees the disappearance of the criminal entirely. 
The crime of forgery is, in a complicated way, glorified in ‘The Portrait of Mr. W. 
H.’. ‘The Portrait’ offers another postmodern overlap, specifically with the first 
part of Paul Auster’s The New York Trilogy.31 Both stories are about crime, feature 
a literary forgery (Wilde’s forgery of a painting to prove the existence of Willie 
Hughes, Auster’s forgery of a Bostonian colonial who authors a crucial pamphlet), 
and contain passages that a reader would conventionally expect to be in an essay 
than a crime story. Finally, there is the work that shows the misunderstood 
criminal in a different light, ‘The Ballad of Reading Gaol’. 
 In general, crime fiction becomes different in postmodern times as 
opposed to earlier incarnations. It has to take into account the changing attitudes 
towards truth and law, so that ‘in postmodern fiction coincidence, overlapping 
accounts, indeterminacy are the plot motifs and parody, irony and inconsequence 
are technical tools to dislodge the idea of a single knowing and moralising subject, 
operating in ordered time and with purposive function.’32 This is not to say that 
there is not still a healthy mainstream genre of traditional crime fiction; however, 
this specifically postmodern crime fiction complicates crime and punishment in 
the same way that critics have called into question the concept of law. It is this 
branch of crime fiction, too, that contains elements to which Wilde’s writing 
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demonstrates a remarkable similarity. 
Victorian novels usually deal with crime in a moralising way and generally 
tie up stories of crime so that the criminal is punished. None of Wilde’s works, 
however, present crime as something necessarily bad or objectively evil. The 
nearest thing to crime as something undesirable is when Dorian Gray finally 
crosses over into the criminal realm with his murder of Basil Hallward. There are 
rumours before that point in the book, but here Dorian finally and clearly arrives 
at a criminal state. It is remarkable that the thoroughly criminal nature of this 
action is hardly part of its impact; Dorian has already begun a kind of moral decay 
that supersedes his shift into actual crime by far. By the time of the murder, crime 
has become simply a symptom. As the background to the central event – Dorian’s 
descent – the criminal nature of the murder is largely drowned out. Dorian has 
already killed another person (though Sybil Vane was murdered through his 
words, not his actions), and what stands out in the murder of Basil Hallward is not 
its brutally criminal nature, but the seemingly random impulse that triggers it. 
Dorian murders Basil on a whim, succumbing when ‘suddenly an uncontrollable 
feeling of hatred came over him’ (p. 117). The deed being done, his impulse 
vanishes as quickly as it arose: ‘How quickly it had all been done! He felt 
strangely calm, and, walking over to the window, opened it, and stepped out onto 
the balcony’ (p. 117). Wilde’s focus is not on the crime, but on Dorian’s 
psychological development. The actually criminal element is clearly less 
important. 
Aside from Dorian, there are other Wildean criminal protagonists who fit 
the description of postmodern crime fiction. The elements of coincidence, 
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indeterminacy, overlapping accounts, and highlighted parody and irony are 
present in ‘Lord Arthur Savile’s Crime’. The main use of coincidence in the story 
(other than its use of Lord Arthur in choosing his ‘victims’) is his final meeting 
with the cheiromancer. The whole story consists of following Lord Arthur’s most 
carefully laid out plans, juxtaposing careful planning and chance, and subverting 
them by rewarding chance instead of planning. Lord Arthur meets his victim by 
chance; and it is chance alone that allows him to fulfil his murderous destiny, 
thereby granting him his happily ever after. Chance, then, plays a central role in 
these events. 
 Indeterminacy is present in the story’s refusal to keep to prescribed roles 
and social stations. A clergyman becomes a target for murder based on rather 
trivial reasoning, none of it to do with controversial elements like religion. The 
anarchist constructor of bombs turns out to be quite the gentleman, offering tea 
and, after the failure of one of his devices, something that amounts almost to 
customer service in his offer to provide an explosive umbrella. Lord Arthur spurns 
his fiancée time and again due to his sense of duty regarding the murder he has to 
commit, yet she waits patiently for him despite the fact that the events can only 
look entirely random to her. And finally Lord Arthur himself is a blend of the 
well-mannered gentleman and the sociopathic murderer: informed of his destiny, 
he seeks out opportunities for murder with a ruthless determination, yet his 
gentlemanly sensibilities are in striking contrast. All these elements serve to keep 
the reader from accurately determining these characters in the story. 
 Overlapping accounts appear primarily in the explanations given to Lord 
Arthur’s various murderous acts, so that the explosive clock is misread as being 
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symbolic, Lord Arthur’s numerous spurnings of his fiancée are not explained in 
the way he himself represents them, and in how an anarchist bomb maker is 
interpreted as civil – more of a hobbyist. Parody and irony are also rife in ‘Lord 
Arthur Savile’s Crime’, such as when the cheiromancer who foretells Lord 
Arthur’s murderous deed, thus upsetting the balance in his life, ultimately ends up 
as the victim himself. 
There can be no doubt that there are striking similarities between the 
elements in ‘Lord Arthur Savile’s Crime’ and those listed as common elements to 
postmodern crime fiction. However, Wilde also complicates the distinction of 
crime itself, which he turns into necessity in this particular instance. As Simon 
Joyce has remarked, ‘Wilde seems instead to offer here a powerful critique of the 
tendency to flatten out the differences between crime and culture’.33 There is an 
indication here of Wilde’s theoretical stance on crime. 
He develops this theory of the nature of crime centrally in several essays. 
In ‘The Soul of Man Under Socialism’ Wilde discusses crime and its origins 
briefly while aiming for the larger point of individualism. He starts by clarifying 
that he believes there are two types of criminals. The first, petty criminals, he sees 
as a problem caused by society: 
 
Starvation, and not sin, is the parent of modern crime. That indeed is the 
reason why our criminals are, as a class, so absolutely uninteresting from 
any psychological point of view. They are not marvellous Macbeths and 
terrible Vautrins. They are merely what ordinary, respectable, 
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commonplace people would be if they had not got enough to eat. (p. 1182) 
 
These ‘uninteresting’ criminals are hardly worthy of Wilde’s notice, and a few 
quick comments on starvation are enough to dismiss this problem entirely. For 
Wilde, there is a second class of criminal, who is really not a criminal at all, but 
rather someone who has been branded as such by the state’s desire to punish: 
 
One is absolutely sickened, not by the crimes that the wicked have 
committed, but by the punishments that the good have inflicted; and a 
community is infinitely more brutalised by the habitual employment of 
punishment, than it is by the occurrence of crime. It obviously follows that 
the more punishment is inflicted the more crime is produced, and most 
modern legislation has clearly recognised this, and has made it its task to 
diminish punishment as far as it thinks it can. Wherever it has really 
diminished it, the results have always been extremely good. The less 
punishment, the less crime. When there is no punishment at all, crime will 
either cease to exist, or, if it occurs, will be treated by physicians as a very 
distressing form of dementia, to be cured by care and kindness. (p. 1182) 
 
For Wilde the problem lies with the punishment. The criminal, in this sense, is 
entirely innocent – after all, Wilde’s point is ‘the less punishment, the less crime’. 
There really are only two options: either the crime is no crime at all, and as its 
punishment will go away, it will be perceived as such; or it will be a kind of 
criminal insanity, a ‘dementia’ to be treated by medical, not legal, experts. Normal 
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crime is simply an invented cause to justify the effect of punishment. Just as with 
literature anticipating life, Wilde here returns to the point that some truths are 
synthesized constructions that come into being to justify an already existing effect 
– in this case, the punishment for a supposed crime. 
 Wilde’s vision of crime in the essay, then, entails a kind of deconstruction 
of crime. Aside from the type of crime that arises from real mental issues, Wilde’s 
analysis destabilizes the concept of the criminal – pointing out the role of the 
state, which turns people into criminals by failing to provide food, as opposed to 
making crime disappear through punishment. Crime becomes merely a point of 
view, as illustrated when Wilde moves into his main topic, individualism, and 
differentiates individualism in art from individualism in crime: 
 
art is the most intense mode of Individualism that the world has known. I 
am inclined to say that it is the only real mode of Individualism that the 
world has known. Crime, which, under certain conditions, may seem to 
have created Individualism, must take cognisance of other people and 
interfere with them. It belongs to the sphere of action. (p. 1184) 
 
What separates crime from art, in Wilde’s view, is merely the course that the true 
criminal’s individualism sets them upon, and crime, being a kind of action, cannot 
attain the true, detached individualism that Wilde here champions. It is telling that 
Wilde dismisses crime on these grounds while keeping morality out of it. 
 Further development of the theme of crime can be found in ‘Pen, Pencil 
and Poison’, where Wilde develops the idea during a discussion of the historical 
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figure Thomas Wainewright, both a writer and poisoner. Wilde praises 
Wainewright’s artistic personality, but is more careful in his comments on the 
quality of Wainewright’s actual output: for example, he comments on a passage 
describing a Romano that ‘were this description carefully re-written, it would be 
quite admirable. The conception of making a prose poem out of paint is excellent’ 
(p. 1100). It is not so much Wainewright’s work that is being praised, but rather 
his life. Within the broader discussion on Wainewright’s life, Wilde’s interest in 
turn lies with Wainewright’s personality. At one point Wilde observes that ‘his 
crimes seem to have had an important effect upon his art’. Within the same 
paragraph he speculates that ‘One can fancy an intense personality being created 
out of sin’ (p. 1106). Clearly there are hints of an innate link between crime and 
art. While Wilde’s notion of individuality causes him to see crime as the lower of 
the two, it is certainly not placed in an entirely negative light here. 
 Though Wilde is careful to distinguish between crime and art, there are 
constant signals of his acceptance, even tacit approval, of the man who became an 
artist by yielding to his criminal urges. Wainewright, writes Wilde, was eventually 
sentenced for forgery; ‘there is, however, something dramatic in the fact that this 
heavy punishment was inflicted on him for what, if we remember his fatal 
influence on the prose of modern journalism, was certainly not the worst of all his 
sins’ (pp. 1104-1105). For Wilde, the one destructive act that Wainewright 
deserves punishment for is not poisoning, but a bad literary style. Later in the 
essay Wilde again happens on this subject when he recounts the biographical 
treatment of Wainewright after his death, observing with some disappointment 
that the poisoner’s works were being underrated. ‘This,’ he notes, ‘seems to me a 
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shallow, or at least a mistaken, view. The fact of a man being a poisoner is nothing 
against his prose’ (p. 1106). Instead, crime, in Wilde’s eyes, was instrumental to 
Wainewright’s art. This, again, is a far cry from a more conventional view of 
crime as being worthy only of punishment. 
 Part of the reason for the indeterminacy of crime fiction, both postmodern 
and Wildean, is the distance that readers have from the narrative. Far removed 
from omniscient narration, readers are instead presented with accounts that are 
sometimes intensely personal, sometimes quite unreliable. A reliable narrator is 
‘one whose rendering of the story and commentary on it the reader us supposed to 
take as an authoritative account of the fictional truth’.34 However, the reader may 
be dealing with an unreliable narrator, ‘one whose rendering of the story and/or 
commentary on it the reader has reasons to suspect’.35 
As a storyteller, Wilde unobtrusively achieved distance; he is often at least 
one step removed from a kind of accessible, objective truth. His narrator in 
Dorian Gray is unpredictable, jumping from one person to the next and never 
staying with one character long enough to see their mind in any consistent 
fashion. The reader does not always follow Dorian’s thoughts; rather, they are 
pulled away at crucial moments, such as when Basil Hallward is asking Dorian 
about the sins he has committed, or when Dorian writes something onto a piece of 
paper to convince Alan Campbell to dispose of Basil’s corpse. Likewise the reader 
is allowed access to Lord Henry and Basil Hallward respectively, but again never 
in any consistent manner that would give the reader considerable insight into their 
mind. Even while the reader is given Lord Henry’s thoughts at least half the time, 
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the other half they are forced to guess at them through his actions, often at crucial 
moments. Moreover, Basil’s reasoning is almost completely unknown after being 
presented very clearly during the first few chapters, leaving the reader in the dark 
as to his final feelings and motives towards Dorian. While the narrator of The 
Picture of Dorian Gray seems clear and reliable, the inconsistency in relaying 
facts about the narrative keeps readers from gaining any objective knowledge 
about the novel’s action, forcing them to guess in the face of what appears to be a 
very helpful and, indeed, quite verbose narrator. This is actually an act of 
considerable subterfuge aimed at masking that a more clearly subjective narrator 
is at work, rather than a normal extradiegetic (a narrator who stands outside the 
narrative, rather than being part of it) narrator who is implicitly trusted: ‘when an 
extradiegetic narrator becomes more overt, his chances of being fully reliable are 
diminished, since his interpretations, judgements, generalizations are not always 
compatible with the norms of the implied author’.36 
 In ‘The Decay of Lying’ Wilde even goes so far as to remove himself 
twice. The essay is set up, like ‘The Critic as Artist’, to have two speakers. From 
the start, this allows Wilde not to speak in his own voice, as he does in the other 
essays in Intentions. Both of the essays draw deliberate attention to their being 
(theatrical) dialogues. This is achieved through the inclusion of such things as 
settings, actions, and comments on the other speaker’s facial expressions, all of 
which are generally reserved for theatre; additionally, much like an evening at the 
theatre, ‘The Critic as Artist’ is divided in two parts. There is also something 
theatrical about a number of descriptive speeches, such as when Cyril reproves 
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Vivian for spending time in his library. He feels Vivian would be better off 
outside, saying ‘it is a perfectly lovely afternoon. The air is exquisite. There is a 
mist upon the woods, like the purple bloom upon a plum’ (p. 1071). 
In addition to the distance created by the theatrical nature of the setting 
and dialogue, Wilde introduces another level of distance by having the main point 
of the essay, the discussion on the nature of lying, take the form of an essay, 
written earlier by Vivian and read out to Cyril with interspersed comments. Wilde 
deliberately brings all of these elements to the attention of the reader: beginning 
his argument, Vivian states ‘Now, if you promise not to interrupt too often, I will 
read you my article’ (p. 1073). When Cyril does interrupt some pages later, he is 
reproached: ‘Please don’t interrupt in the middle of a sentence’ (p. 1074). Finally, 
towards the end of the essay-within-dialogue-within-essay, the approaching 
conclusion is also signalled clearly: asked whether his last speech was the end of 
the essay, Vivian replies ‘No. There is one more passage, but it is purely practical’ 
(p. 1082). These interludes, of which the above are only a few examples, are not 
in any way necessary in establishing the essay’s critical point; they are reminders 
of the framing device, the essay-within-essay. Constantly reminded of this 
additional distance, the reader is kept at arm’s length from the original discussion, 
presented with a representation of its representation. Even in the essay, the truth – 
the original – is something beyond the access of the reader. 
 The postmodern questioning of truth does not stop here. Now that truth has 
become, from the postmodern viewpoint, simply a representation, the next step is 
a closer examination of the intricacies and power of representation, with a specific 
eye towards things that appear real, but are not. Baudrillard plays a major role in 
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developing this theory of hyperreality and simulacra. This further step in 
postmodern philosophy is one that has its mirrors in Wilde, too; it is therefore to 
these theories that Part 2 of this thesis now turns. 
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Part 2 The Nature of Reality 
 
One direct result of postmodernism is a questioning of the nature of reality: where 
prior to postmodernism, reality was something that might be taken for granted, in 
postmodern approaches there arose increasing scepticism about the perception and 
representation of what is real. Postmodernism often calls into question not just the 
way in which reality is represented, but the power of representation itself, not 
merely for its unreliability, but for its capacity for outright deception. Certainly 
one of the most powerful voices in this debate is that of Jean Baudrillard, the 
French philosopher who theorized a way in which representation creates its own 
reality through a process of copies without original. 
 Chapter IV picks up Baudrillard’s articulation of these copies, the 
simulacrum, and examines it alongside Wilde’s treatment of the stock imagery 
that surrounds, for example, romantic love or the soul, but also relates to the 
representational media in Wilde’s work – statues and paintings primarily. Chapter 
V then moves on to examine the resulting concept of a fake reality built out of 
simulacra, called hyperreality; the chapter returns to Wilde’s discussion of 
‘natural’ reality and of crime, showing how, in light of Baudrillard’s further 
exploration of these themes, Wilde’s treatment of them is also deepened. Finally 
in this part of the thesis, Chapter VI focusses on the idea of representation itself, 
exploring postmodern problems such as the generating of meaning, unification 
and fragmentation, and the representation of the self and the other.  
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Chapter IV  Simulacra 
 
In the letters of Wilde’s friends dating back from his time as a student in England 
there is the indication that Wilde was, at least from the moment he went to 
Oxford, very preoccupied with the image he projected. Wilde was always 
dishonest about his age and lied at his Oxford matriculation about the number of 
years he had spent studying at Trinity College. At Oxford, Wilde had ‘determined 
to be beyond rather than behind the English’.1 Then, in America, Wilde again 
assumed another manner and way of clothing, opening in a high register when he 
famously said: ‘I have nothing to declare except my genius’ upon entering 
America.
2
 As for the clothes, there is a telling letter that Wilde wrote to Colonel 
W.F. Morse. Morse arranged lectures and practical matters for him during his 
lecture tour of America, and one of Wilde’s letters to him shows the kind of attire 
Wilde favoured for his public appearances: 
 
26 February 1882 
Dear Colonel Morse, Will you kindly go to a good costumier (theatrical) 
for me and get them to make (you will not mention my name) two coats, to 
wear at matinées and perhaps in evening. They should be beautiful; tight 
velvet doublet, with large flowered sleeves and little ruffs of cambric 
coming up from under collar. I send you design and measurements. They 
should be ready at Chicago on Saturday for matinée there – at any rate the 
black one. Any good costumier would know what I want – sort of Francis I 
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2 Ellmann, p. 152. 
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dress: only knee-breeches instead of long hose. Also get me two pair of 
grey silk stockings to suit grey mouse-coloured velvet. The sleeves are to 
be flowered – if not velvet then plush – stamped with large pattern. They 
will excite a great sensation. I leave the matter to you. They were 
dreadfully disappointed at Cincinnati at my not wearing knee-breeches. 
Truly yours  Oscar Wilde.
3
 
 
Wilde would alter his appearance again after America, changing hair styles a few 
times; by the time of his first theatrical success in Great Britain, he had abandoned 
the idea of knee-breeches. He was still anxious about how he appeared to people, 
a preoccupation which culminated in another often-related moment of Wilde’s 
life: after the opening night of Lady Windermere’s Fan caused cries of ‘author!’, 
Wilde appeared in front of the audience, a cigarette in hand, thanking the audience 
for thinking almost as highly of the play as he himself did.
4
 It was a studied pose, 
and even if there is uncertainty as to the exact wording of Wilde’s message that 
night, the cigarette, and the fact that this was simply not done in front of a 
Victorian public, remain a provocative assertion of appearance. The public 
forgave him, perhaps because in the coming years he gave them A Woman of No 
Importance, An Ideal Husband and finally The Importance of Being Earnest. 
 Public opinion would reverse only a few years after Lady Windermere’s 
Fan, when yet another aspect of Wilde’s life, this one hidden from most of his 
audience, was revealed before the court and the press. Wilde’s life was shown to 
be a projection – a mask – covering his double life as a lover of young men. 
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Tellingly the revelation did not lead to a realisation of the ‘true’ Wilde: if he was 
not the dedicated husband and father, or the author and playwright who ultimately 
accepted Victorian morals even as he playfully poked fun at them, then neither 
was he the degenerate corrupter of innocent young men, the worthless sodomite, 
and the perpetrator of ‘unmentionable acts’.5 His projections of himself were 
representations: first of what it meant to be English at Oxford, then of what it 
meant to be a dandy in America, and finally, back in Britain, what it meant to be 
an Aesthete along the lines of Walter Pater. After the 1895 trials Wilde would 
come to live with others’ representations of him: those of an immoral man, of a 
prisoner, of a fallen artist in exile – all with their preconceived narrative, none of 
them necessarily indicative of Oscar Wilde. With the decriminalization of 
homosexuality in Great Britain in 1967, the unreality of those post-trial images of 
Wilde was reinforced. 
 Within the body of his work and life, then, Wilde himself was one of the 
best examples of a simulacrum. The image of the author is always a copy, a 
collection of fragments taken from many places – aestheticism, the Renaissance, 
Beau Brummell, or the fear of those with a different sexuality. All of these images 
purport to represent the real Wilde – and yet all of them are versions, leaving no 
concrete indication of the author himself. Wilde is, to his readers as to his 
biographers, what has come to be known as a simulacrum: his copy is 
everywhere, but the original is lost. (It is worth noting, for example, that even in 
Wilde’s emulation of the dandy as he knew it in Beau Brummell, the original 
dandy, there is something of the simulacrum: Wilde favoured knee-breeches, the 
                                                             
5 Ed Cohen, Talk on the Wilde Side (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 184. 
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very fashion which Brummell discarded in favour of the long trousers.
6
 Wilde’s 
knee-breeched version of the dandy was indeed, in that respect, a copy without 
original.) 
 
The Simulacrum in Postmodernism 
Wilde’s work contains a very large number of instances of what would come to be 
called simulacra. This term, coined by Jean Baudrillard, refers to a process by 
which the ‘real’ (already a problematic subject, as seen in the previous three 
chapters) is gradually replaced by a copy: ‘Reference to the real is supplanted by 
constant processes of signification which double and reiterate one another.’7 This 
supplanting of the real means that the copy, constantly reiterated, eventually loses 
all its ties with the original. As a result, this original vanishes. This simulacrum is 
part of a larger process, which causes the appearance of hyperreality – a version of 
reality constructed through representations of the actually non-existent, further 
detailed in Chapter V – and strands the reader or observer in a place where there 
can be no distinction between simulation and supposed original. The end result of 
the appearance of simulacra and the substitution of reality for hyperreality is, then, 
a sea of images without any land in sight: ‘The procession of simulacra means 
appeal cannot be made to external referents or to an objective real. 
Representations can no longer be compared, contrasted, and evaluated in terms of 
an independent real.’8 What this leads to, then, is the substitution of ‘real’ items 
                                                             
6 Ian Kelly, Beau Brummell: The Ultimate Man of Style (London: Free Press, 2006), p. 61-62. 
7 Julian Wolfreys, ‘Simulacrum / Simulation’, in Critical Keywords in Literary and Cultural 
Theory (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 226-231 (p. 228). 
8 Barry Smart, ‘Europe/America: Baudrillard’s Fatal Comparison’, in Forget Baudrillard? ed. by 
Chris Rojek and Bryan S. Turner (London: Routledge, 1993), pp.47-69 (p. 52). 
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(which is to say, items that previously appeared to be grounded in some sort of 
recognizable reality) by ‘fake’ items that, though they start off as copies, 
eventually come to fully replace, and stand for, the original, ‘real’ items. These 
simulacra arise ‘when a plastic Christmas tree is more appealing than a real one; 
when a television show exhibits contestants participating in melodramatic ways 
while insisting to be “reality”; or when a lottery or casino promises large cash 
payouts while smugly cheating its players’.9 Thus a reality show may purport to 
show its participants behaving as they would normally, all the while masking that 
such behaviour is obviously modified to a great extent by its participants’ 
knowledge of being filmed, or the selective editing of such shows to establish 
characters and narrative. Reality in this sense is very much a simulacrum rather 
than real. 
 Here it becomes necessary to clarify terms such as ‘truth’ or ‘reality’ in the 
context of Baudrillard’s treatment of simulacra. In the first part of the present 
thesis, deconstruction’s intense scrutiny of the nature of truth and the accessibility 
of reality was discussed; there, postmodernism positioned truth as a construct, 
theoretically accessible but practically unattainable. Reality became mediated 
through language and therefore always already a subjective reading of a 
theoretically objective phenomenon. This is a different approach to truth from 
Baudrillard’s. Both the simulacrum and deconstruction do not deny an objective 
truth and reality; likewise, both approaches see truth and reality as essentially 
unattainable. Baudrillard’s simulacrum, however, much more easily discusses the 
idea of a naturally true element that, if it has not been copied, escapes simulation 
                                                             
9 Garen Torikian, ‘Against a Perpetuating Fiction: Disentangling Art from Hyperreality’, The 
Journal of Aesthetic Education, 44.2 (2010), 100-110 (p. 103). 
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and thus remains available. The Christmas tree in the above quotation is one clear 
example, as the original, ‘natural’ tree has not necessarily been lost and remains 
accessible. 
 Baudrillard touches on the possibilities for reality even in the presence of 
simulacra in this interview with Guy Bellavance, answering the question on his 
use of the word ‘crystal’ in relation to simulacra: ‘what is the “crystal”? It is the 
object, the pure object, the pure event, something which no longer really has an 
origin or an end. The object to which the subject has wanted to give an origin and 
a purpose, even though it has none, is today perhaps starting to recount itself’.10 
The crystal here represents objectivity, or things as they are without human 
attributions such as ‘origin’ or ‘purpose’, and Baudrillard’s phrase ‘starting to 
recount itself’ suggests that he, like for example Derrida, does view it as 
theoretically accessible. Still, the emphasis there is on the object itself 
communicating; human interference, it is implied, could result in the construction 
of subjective meaning. 
 Such attribution of subjective meaning does mean that simulacra are 
capable of taking over broader narratives. So, for example, the process assimilates 
even history as it turns the certainties of what has happened into uncertainty: ‘The 
producers of culture have nowhere to turn but to the past: the imitation of dead 
styles through all the masks and voices stored up in the imaginary museum of a 
now global culture. […] The past as “referent” finds itself gradually bracketed, 
and then effaced altogether, leaving us with nothing but text.’11 Wilde himself 
                                                             
10 Jean Baudrillard, ‘The Revenge of the Crystal: Interview with Guy Bellavance’, in Baudrillard 
Live, ed. by Mike Gane (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 50-66 (p. 51). 
11 Frederick Jameson, Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 
1991), pp. 17-18. 
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very much engaged in this ‘imitation of dead styles’ when he copied, with his own 
modifications, the dandy as exemplified by Brummell. 
Wilde and Baudrillard both approach this concept of losing the referent in 
a similar way: they have a tendency to develop their argument in sweeping terms. 
Both thinkers often construct their essays in a playful manner, evoking, with some 
imagination, the consequences of their particular line of thinking; at times they 
take their points to the logical extreme, unafraid to show the limits of their 
thinking. For example, at one point Baudrillard analyses psychology and medicine 
in relation to the simulation of symptoms, when he concludes that as soon as 
symptoms are seen as possible simulations, everything grinds to a halt: medicine 
and psychology are 
 
forestalled by the illness’s henceforth undiscoverable truth. For if any 
symptom can be ‘produced,’ and can no longer be taken as a fact of nature, 
then every illness can be considered as simulatable and simulated, and 
medicine loses its meaning since it only knows how to treat ‘real’ illnesses 
according to their objective causes.
12
 
 
While reasonable, Baudrillard is in fact suggesting that medicine is meaningless 
because of its inability to distinguish between real and simulation. This goes too 
far for many thinkers, and ‘Baudrillard’s analysis of the ways in which simulacra 
function’ sometimes finds itself criticized, for example as ‘far from sufficient’, 
because ‘it is often marred by his penchant for overstatement, by the inexactitude 
                                                             
12 Jean Baudrillard, ‘Simulacra and Simulations’, in Selected Writings, ed. by Mark Poster, trans. 
by Paul Foss, Paul Patton and Philip Beitchman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp.166-184 (p. 
168). 
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of his terminology, and by an over-eager application to phenomena they don’t 
quite fit, for instance, to psychosomatic illness.’13 This quotation also touches on a 
good example of the inexact tendency in Baudrillard (as in Wilde), since it sees 
Baudrillard applying the idea of psychosomatic illness to a situation where 
‘medical symptoms can be effectively simulated, in the sense of a person really 
becoming ill’.14 The fact of an illness caused by simulated symptoms rather than 
‘real’ ones brings the illness into the realm of hyperreality. Whether this sort of 
philosophical approach to a very real illness (in which the simulation of symptoms 
is perhaps a symptom in and of itself) has any place in medical practice is very 
much up for discussion; Baudrillard uses this example to create a compelling 
illustration of simulation in action and, in the course of doing this, opens himself 
up to criticism. 
 This ‘over-eager’ tendency that Wilde shares with Baudrillard is 
demonstrated most clearly in the essays. There is, for example, the previously 
discussed argument in ‘The Decay of Lying’, which reverses the relationship 
between art and life and states that life follows from art rather than the other way 
around. After making this point with regard to the appearance of fog in London 
(an eye for which they owe the artistic rendering of these fogs by impressionists), 
Vivian moves on to the Japanese style of art, another trend in British art of the 
time. Vivian declares that ‘in fact the whole of Japan is a pure invention’.15 This 
statement, a playful continuation of Wilde’s arguments on what can also be called 
                                                             
13 Paula E. Geyh, ‘Assembling Postmodernism: Experience, Meaning, and the Space In-
Between’, College Literature, 30.2 (2003), 1-29 (p. 13). 
14 Victoria Grace, Baudrillard’s Challenge: A Feminist Reading (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 
108. 
15 Oscar Wilde, The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003), 
p. 1088. Further references to Wilde’s work from this edition are given after quotations in the text. 
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hyperreality, seems unbelievable, suggesting as it does that there is really no such 
thing as Japan. Yet the statement is made perfectly acceptable: Vivian is arguing 
that ‘the actual people who live in Japan are not unlike the general run of English 
people; that is to say, they are extremely commonplace, and have nothing curious 
or extraordinary about them [...] the Japanese people are, as I have said, simply a 
mode of style, an exquisite fancy of art’ (p. 1088). The point here is nothing less 
than that the Japanese people, presented from the viewpoint of the late-Victorian 
person, are a kind of simulacrum. Their image exists in art, but it would be a folly 
to go to Japan to seek them, as one would find something unsettlingly familiar, 
rather than the exotic fantasy that exists only in British art: a copy lacking an 
original. Wilde here seems to overstate his argument drastically by claiming that 
Japan does not exist, placing himself at risk of criticism; yet the argument, if 
brought in a similar but less drastic way, is perfectly valid. 
 
Love and the Soul as Simulacra 
In his discussion of the crystal, Baudrillard continues his description of the 
objective thing by noting that he sees a kind of passion at work in it. Here he 
distinguishes between a subjective passion and an ‘object-passion’, which is more 
ironic: 
 
It quite pleased me to see that the object exists in a relatively passionate 
form, and that there should be passion in objects and not only passion in 
subjects: passions in the mode of the ruse, irony, indifference, inertias, in 
opposition, precisely, to those of the subject which are purposeful, 
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stimulate … desire, for example. Whereas object-passion, that would be 
indifference. It certainly is a passion in my opinion, an ironic passion.
16
 
 
These forces of irony and passion are similarly present in Wilde. It is exactly in 
the emphasis on passion that the overlap with Wilde’s writings occurs here. 
Passion and love regularly result in images that are intimately familiar and 
sometimes clichéd, such as the heart struck by Cupid’s arrow, or the bouquet of 
roses. More often than not Wilde presents these images in a way that matches the 
simulacrum, using them in juxtaposition to the elements that conclude a story or 
round up the argumentation in an essay. For example, there is a creation (quite 
literally) of an image of the soul in ‘The Fisherman and his Soul’ and a similar 
creation of an image of love in the eponymous rose of ‘The Nightingale and the 
Rose’. Love and passion also play a large role in The Picture of Dorian Gray, 
which presents perhaps the most clear and sustained instance of a simulacrum in 
all of Wilde; and passion and portraiture finally lead to ‘The Portrait of Mr. W. 
H.’, which foregrounds the lack of reality through its use of forgery. 
 The story of ‘The Fisherman and his Soul’, from the collection A House of 
Pomegranates, tells of a fisherman who falls in love with a mermaid. In order to 
marry her, he agrees to give up his soul. Told by a witch how to separate himself 
from his soul, the fisherman sends it out into the world while he goes to live with 
the mermaid. The soul sees more and more of the world as the story progresses, 
eventually becoming powerful but corrupted. It returns every year to the 
fisherman and asks him to take it back. Since this act would result in the 
                                                             
16 Revenge of the Crystal, p. 51. 
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fisherman’s separation from his beloved mermaid, the soul is refused every time, 
until finally it tempts the fisherman away to a city a day’s walk away. The 
fisherman’s soul, by now thoroughly corrupt, returns to him, but cannot enter into 
his heart because that heart is encased by love. When the mermaid dies as a result 
of the soul’s return, the fisherman dies with her. The rest of the story relates the 
effects of the deaths on the local priest, who finally learns to accept love as part of 
his religion. 
 The soul in ‘The Fisherman and his Soul’ is presented as something fairly 
recognizable at the start of the story. In his quest to get rid of his soul, the 
fisherman encounters familiar reactions: he muses, for example, ‘how strange a 
thing this is! The Priest telleth me that the soul is worth all the gold in the world, 
and the merchants say that it is not worth a clipped piece of silver’ (p. 239). Then 
another stock image appears: that of a demonic figure interested in the fisherman’s 
soul – a figure which flees, moreover, when the fisherman ‘made on his breast the 
sign of the Cross, and called upon the holy name’ (p. 242). The expectation is 
evoked that the fisherman will lose something higher – perhaps even the 
capability for true love – in giving up his soul and will be trapped instead in the 
baser impulses of the body. This expectation is then further aroused by the 
description of the soul as mirroring the fisherman himself. The suggestion is that 
the ‘real’ self is found in the soul. After having been told how to separate himself 
from his soul, the fisherman ‘cut away his shadow from around his feet, and it 
rose up and stood before him, and looked at him, and it was even as himself’ (p. 
243). Again, as his mirror image, the soul is assumed to carry something essential 
of the fisherman with it. 
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 At this point, however, the story subverts expectations. The fisherman goes 
off to become happy and the story makes no mention of him being any different 
for the loss of his soul. The suggestion is that he is happy just through his love for 
the mermaid. The soul, however, goes out into the world, and, bereft of his body, 
becomes corrupted. Furthermore this corruption of the soul has its source directly 
in the lack of a physical thing: the soul, having been given no heart, falls to 
corruption. At one point in the story the fisherman asks why his soul, newly 
reunited with him, has forced him to kill a merchant in order to acquire money. 
‘And his Soul answered him, “When thou didst send me forth into the world thou 
gavest me no heart, so I learned to do all these things and love them”’ (p. 254). 
 The image evoked by Wilde here is that of the soul as a simulacrum. The 
soul, separated from the fisherman, becomes his copy; but also, more importantly, 
becomes a copy of the concept of the soul, burdened with all its ethereal, moral 
connotations. Wilde emphasizes these connotations when he discusses the soul in 
terms of its spiritual worth and corporeal worthlessness and in terms of its 
association with the demonic figure. The story then sets out to show how the soul 
is none of these things. Things turn out to be quite the opposite and, bereft of a 
physical anchor, the soul falls quickly to the kind of corruption that would 
normally be associated with a body that does not have a soul. Much as it 
introduces the question of what a soul really is – and utilizes the question to 
explore, in the story, the concept of love – the representation of the soul in this 
way leads to the introduction of that soul as a simulacrum. 
 The image of the soul as a double was certainly nothing new. Before and 
during Wilde’s time, the literary theme of the doppelgänger was widespread, and 
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he is certainly drawing upon it here, as elsewhere (something which will also be 
explored later in the context of The Picture of Dorian Gray and the Victorian 
magic picture tradition). A way of introducing sinister doubles, or sometimes the 
suggestion of the double, this literary tradition of the doppelgänger entailed ‘a 
recurring motif in Gothic and horror literature, mostly in the nineteenth century, 
ultimately coming from the anthropological belief in an innate duality in man’; 
however, it lost ‘its referential power in the early decades of the twentieth century, 
after the discoveries of psychoanalytic theory’.17 Examples include James Hogg’s 
The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner (1824), Edgar Allan 
Poe’s William Wilson (1839), and even Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s The Sign of Four 
(1890), which was famously suggested during the same dinner with Joseph 
Stoddart where Wilde proposed The Picture of Dorian Gray for publication in 
Lippincott’s Monthly Magazine. In this sense, Wilde’s treatment of the double, 
though in itself explicitly proto-postmodern, hardly occurs in a vacuum. 
 The soul of ‘The Fisherman and His Soul’ functions in the story partly as a 
representation of the traditional, religious soul. It is also, however, the exact copy 
of the fisherman. After being given the knife by a witch, the fisherman ‘cut away 
his shadow from around his feet, and it rose up and stood before him, and looked 
at him, and it was even as himself’ (p. 243). That the soul is ‘even as himself’ can 
be taken to mean a physical similarity, but it is more likely that the soul’s being 
‘as’ the fisherman implies a deeper similarity. The soul and the fisherman are 
identical copies, save for two differences: the fisherman has no soul, and the soul 
has no heart. Thus, in addition to being a simulacrum in the realm of traditional 
                                                             
17 Antonio Ballesteros González, ‘Doppelgänger’, in The Handbook of the Gothic, ed. by Marie 
Mulvey-Roberts, 2nd edn (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 119. 
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views of the soul and morality, the fisherman’s separated soul is his double. 
 In this regard it is crucial that the soul falls from grace whereas the 
fisherman lives happily with love in his life. The soul returns to the fisherman 
three times, offering first wisdom, then riches and finally temptation itself. The 
fisherman rejects all three of the soul’s offerings, although the third time around 
the soul manages to trick the fisherman into taking it back. By the end of the story, 
the soul’s callous murder is proof of its degeneration, making the point that love, 
the one thing that the soul did not have, is what saved the fisherman from a 
similar fate. 
 The character of the Priest also illustrates Wilde’s point about love. The 
holy man initially rejects love on purely theological grounds: after being 
confronted with the fisherman’s earthly love, the priest says to the fisherman: 
‘alack, alack, thou art mad, or hast eaten of some poisonous herb, for the soul is 
the noblest part of man […] The love of the body is vile’ (p. 238). The story will 
go on to prove the opposite. At the end of the story, the priest will have a change 
of heart: attempting to preach his normal sermon, which is based on the wrath of 
God, the priest finds instead that ‘there came another word into his lips, and he 
spake not of the wrath of God, but of the God whose name is Love’ (p. 258). The 
story thereby establishes love as a worthwhile thing. It is contrasted with the 
rigidly religious conception of the soul, which is a false image without original, a 
simulacrum. 
Where love is something real in ‘The Fisherman and his Soul’, it becomes 
instead the subject of another simulacrum – this time connected to a rose – in ‘The 
Nightingale and the Rose’. Here Wilde uses a strategy similar to the one employed 
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in ‘The Fisherman and his Soul’ when he chooses an image overburdened with 
attributed meaning; he then sets out to expose that meaning as essentially 
meaningless. In this story, the titular nightingale comes upon a young student who 
is in love. The girl he is in love with has promised to dance with him if he brings 
her a red rose. Impressed with this boy’s love, the nightingale asks for a rose from 
the Rose-tree. The tree informs the bird that death is required to create the rose. 
The nightingale then sacrifices herself by singing to the tree all night and finally 
having her heart pierced by one of its thorns. This creates a rose, which the 
student brings hastily to the girl the next morning; however, she has received 
jewellery from the Chamberlain’s nephew, and thus chooses the other. The rose is 
discarded into a gutter, where it is driven over by a cartwheel, and the student 
returns to his room to study metaphysics from a great dusty book.  
As with the previous story, there are expectations set up at the start. In this 
instance it is a rose that becomes an image of romantic love. It is particularly an 
early passage in the story that affirms the romantic imagery that is to become 
represented by the rose: 
 
‘The Prince gives a ball to-morrow night,’ murmured the young Student, 
‘and my love will be of the company. If I bring her a red rose she will 
dance with me till dawn. If I bring her a red rose, I shall hold her in my 
arms, and she will lean her head upon my shoulder, and her hand will be 
clasped in mine. But there is no red rose in my garden, so I shall sit lonely, 
and she will pass me by. She will have no heed of me, and my heart will 
break.’ (p. 278) 
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The story thus invokes a number of stock associations with romance: dancing till 
dawn, breaking hearts, and loneliness are only three elements which are touched 
on in this short passage. Crucially all of these elements are evoked because of the 
lack of a red rose, and indeed the pursuit of the rose becomes the focus of the 
story, so that the rose immediately becomes the symbol for all of the romantic 
elements, the very image of romantic love. This is further strengthened when, by 
the end of the story, the nightingale dies for the sake of love; here the association 
is with tragic romance, something Wilde had already explored to a degree in his 
plays The Duchess of Padua and Vera, or The Nihilists. The rose also contains 
romantic connotations from places outside of Wilde’s work. All these concepts 
and associations are infused into the rose, the focal point for the Student’s love for 
the girl. 
 As in ‘The Fisherman and his Soul’, though, the rose is unmasked. As an 
image of romance, the rose is powerful; in the story, however, it undergoes two 
processes leading to its ultimate unveiling as a simulacrum. The first of these 
occurs when the girl rejects the Student, the rose only eliciting a frown: ‘“I am 
afraid it will not go with my dress,” she answered; “and, besides, the 
Chamberlain’s nephew has sent me some real jewels, and everybody knows that 
jewels cost far more than flowers”’ (p. 281). Here the power of the rose falters, its 
imbued romance powerless because someone else has given the girl jewellery. It is 
arguable, though, that this reflects simply the materialism of the girl in question, 
preferring physical things over the phenomenon of love. However, the second step 
towards the rose as a simulacrum simultaneously disbands this possibility. The 
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Student, spurned by the girl, ‘threw the rose into the street, where it fell into the 
gutter, and a cart-wheel went over it’ (p.281). He goes to study his books, turning 
his back on love, since, in his words, ‘It is not half as useful as Logic, for it does 
not prove anything, and it is always telling one of things that are not going to 
happen, and making one believe things that are not true. In fact, it is quite 
unpractical’ (p. 282). It is not simply the girl, but also the Student himself who 
rejects love, going against the expectations set up by the invocation of romance. 
The rose, the image (and signifier) of that romantic love, finds its original (its 
signified) missing in the story: there is no romantic love, as indeed the outcome of 
the story seems to question its existence, suggesting perhaps youthful infatuation 
in its stead. It leaves the rose as a simulacrum, a copy of the concept of romantic 
love which turns out to be absent in ‘The Nightingale and the Rose’. 
 
Simulacra and Personification 
The simulacrum can take the form of personification, as in the case of the soul in 
‘The Fisherman and his Soul’. Another possibility in this vein is the author’s 
muse, and in this sense, Wilde’s work corresponds to that of the postmodern 
author John Fowles. One of Fowles’s later works, Mantissa (1982), deals with the 
simulacrum of a personified concept in much the same way as Wilde’s soul and 
rose discussed above.
18
 Mantissa is a story about the struggle between a writer 
and his muse, in which there is the same kind of personification in the case of the 
muse, Erato. The name is no coincidence: Erato is one of the Classical muses, 
specialising in lyrical poetry, with an emphasis on love and the erotic; Fowles 
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himself emphasizes this when he starts the book off with a very explicit sex scene. 
Rebellious and not content to feature in the writer’s (mostly pornographic) 
fantasies, she gives him a run for his money, thereby going against the 
preconceived representations of a kind as serving the (male) artist: in the book, 
Erato is represented as ‘contrary to the traditional image of muse as nurturing of 
and responsive to the creative demands of the male artist’.19 Just as with Wilde’s 
rose, Fowles presents his readers with the simulacrum of the muse: based on 
traditional assumptions both of their role and the traditional roles of men and 
women, he shows that she is a copy without an original, as Erato confounds 
expectations time and again. 
 It might be said that by being wilful, she is actually following, rather than 
confounding, traditional expectations of the muse. This would be true if she 
merely refused, at times, to give her master his creativity freely; and there 
certainly exists a certain romantic tradition of seeing the artist as serving his muse. 
However, the struggle between Erato and the writer Miles runs deeper than that, 
and is situated in part in Erato’s struggle to represent herself as she chooses. ‘By 
constantly changing her identity, Erato evades Miles’s efforts of signification and 
challenges his power of authorship.’20 She is not merely being fickle, she is 
actively fighting the writer over control of the creative narrative – very unmuse-
like behaviour, indeed. 
 Alongside the simulacra of the rose and the soul, there is a third instance 
of a simulacrum in Wilde’s presentation of the relationship between Dorian and 
Basil. In the beginning of The Picture of Dorian Gray Basil very much views 
                                                             
19 Jane O’Sullivan, ‘Cyborg or Goddess: Postmodernism and its Others in John Fowles’ 
Mantissa’, College Literature, 30.3 (2003), 109-123 (p. 110). 
20 O’Sullivan, p. 115. 
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Dorian as a kind of muse. He describes Dorian in ways that leave very little room 
for error: 
 
What the invention of oil-painting was to the Venetians, the face of 
Antinous was to late Greek sculpture, and the face of Dorian Gray will 
some day be to me. It is not merely that I paint from him, draw from him, 
sketch from him. […] I know that the work I have done, since I met 
Dorian Gray, is good work, is the best work of my life. But in some 
curious way – I wonder will you understand me? – his personality has 
suggested to me an entirely new manner in art, an entirely new mode of 
style. I see things differently, I think of them differently. I can now recreate 
life in a way that was hidden from me before. (p. 23) 
 
Not only does Dorian feature in a number of art works that Basil considers ‘the 
best work of [his] life’, but he is deeply and fundamentally inspired by the young 
man. This goes so far as to inspire a whole new way of seeing things; Basil clearly 
feels that the influence of Dorian’s personality has allowed him to attain a next 
level in his art, expanding his technique ‘in a way that was hidden’ from the 
painter before he knew Dorian. 
 Yet Basil’s attribution of all these things to Dorian will ultimately ruin 
him: he will die by Dorian’s hand and moreover, he will die because of the 
corruption the young man experiences as a direct result of the portrait. This 
suggests that Basil has severely misjudged his muse, or, to be more precise, that 
what Basil sees as his muse is actually something altogether different. At the start 
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of the novel, the reader already receives hints that Basil himself is dimly aware of 
a problem when he states that he will refuse to exhibit the portrait. He knows that 
he has been taken over by this vision of Dorian and therefore strayed from his 
own views on the artist’s role: ‘Hallward has an ideal conception of the role of the 
artist, and he realizes from the outset of the novel that he has not lived up to his 
conception. […] The artist has put into the picture his own idolatry and worship of 
the physical embodiment of his ideal; he vows, therefore, never to exhibit the 
portrait’.21 Basil strongly feels that something transgressive has happened, 
something that has been drawn out by his muse beyond what he himself has been 
willing to give up. It remains unclear what exactly that something is; following 
‘The Critic as Artist’ and its central point of the personality of the artist and critic 
in achieving great art and/or criticism, the reader should expect personality to be 
positive, rather than the negative sense in which Basil approaches it here. 
 The error, such as it is, that Basil makes here is the attribution of muse-like 
qualities to Dorian. As a muse, Dorian is equally a simulacrum, like the rose and 
the soul; he becomes burdened with all kinds of associations, which Wilde then 
goes on to reject. For example, just as the muse is supposed to, Dorian frustrates 
his artist with his fickle attitude and his eventual refusal to sit again for Basil – a 
refusal that can only seem to Basil to be motivated solely by whim. What Basil 
fails to see that in one sense ‘Dorian is what people make out of him. He is the 
perfect artist’s model but little more than that. His soul is a perfect tabula rasa, 
and anything of value derived from him must have existed in the eye of the 
                                                             
21 Houston Baker, ‘A Tragedy of the Artist: The Picture of Dorian Gray’, Nineteenth-Century 
Fiction, 24.3(1969), 349-355 (p. 352).  
157 
 
beholder’.22 Dorian is ready to become that model that is idealized in ‘The Critic 
as Artist’, something that will give itself wholly over to the artist’s personality. 
Basil, in choosing instead to view Dorian through the empty lens of the muse-
simulacrum, misses this opportunity. That Dorian is ‘the perfect artist’s model’ is 
all the more significant in terms of the simulacrum; as a model, he is much more 
prone to become a copy of the artist’s desires and observations, rather than a copy 
of himself – something which is exemplified in Basil’s remark that he has painted 
Dorian as ‘Paris in dainty armour, and as Adonis with huntsman's cloak and 
polished boar-spear’, or ‘crowned with heavy lotus-blossoms you had sat on the 
prow of Adrian's barge, gazing across the green turbid Nile’ or even leaning ‘over 
the still pool of some Greek woodland and seen in the water's silent silver the 
marvel of [his] own face’ (p. 89). 
What Fowles and Wilde show here is a problem inherent in some 
personified simulacra. Erato, like the fisherman’s soul in Wilde’s short story, turns 
out entirely differently than expectations. With the muse unwilling to follow 
traditional depictions, the reader is presented with a contrasting image: the 
classical image of a muse and the actual, frustrating grapple with artistic creation. 
This highlights the difference between that struggle and the romanticized image of 
the writer’s inspired creativity. The contrast effectively questions this romantic, 
classical, false sense of the creative muse in a very postmodern way: the process 
makes use of the simulacrum as a central tool in showing this difference. In this 
postmodern way, Fowles employs a method that closely resembles Wilde’s own 
approach in ‘The Fisherman and his Soul’ and ‘The Nightingale and the Rose’; 
                                                             
22 Robert Keefe, ‘Artist and Model in “The Picture of Dorian Gray”, Studies in the Novel, 5.1 
(1973), 63-70 (p. 64-65). 
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this indicates the proto-postmodernism of those works. 
The problems that arise when personifying a simulacrum such as love or 
the muse are explored in other places in Wilde’s work. These problems are linked 
to physical similarity, a key part of the theoretical discussion on simulacra: 
 
Simulacra, on the other hand, are not internally proportionate to the 
original, thus their resemblance-effects are produced by an entirely 
different mechanism. […] Resemblance-effects are obtained by 
introducing the external regime of appearance: from an external 
perspective, simulacra appear to be proportionate to the original. […] Like 
an enormous statue that looks proportionate to the subjective eye, 
simulacra incorporate an external perspective into their structure, thereby 
producing their resemblance-effect.
23
 
 
The ‘resemblance-effect’, then, means that simulacra derive their effectiveness 
from a strong resemblance to their original, even when they demonstrably are not 
the original – a illustrated by the example of the statue, which ‘looks 
proportionate’ even when in reality it is far too large to really resemble its 
original. This is due to the ‘external regime’, which is to say an appearance that is 
convincing enough in copying select aspects of the original so as to project 
similarity. This is not just a complicated way of stating that simulacra have their 
effect because they simply look like the things they copy; rather, they only copy 
specific elements, such as perspective and proportion. After all, a complete copy 
                                                             
23 John Muckelbauer, ‘Sophistic Travel: Inheriting the Simulacrum Through Plato’s “The 
Sophists”’, Philosophy and Rhetoric, 34.3 (2001), 225-244 (p. 235). 
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without any modification would not result in a simulacrum, but in a duplication of 
the original. 
 It is this point of resemblance-effect that Wilde uses in ‘The Happy Prince’ 
for the statue of the prince. As with the soul, love and Dorian as muse, Wilde is 
interested in exposing the simulacrum as a copy without an original. The statue 
presented in ‘The Happy Prince’ conforms to the rich, majestic representations 
normally associated with royalty: the statue is ‘gilded all over with thin leaves of 
fine gold, for eyes he had two bright sapphires, and a large red ruby glowed on his 
sword-hilt’ (p. 271). This statue has as its original a prince who lived an extremely 
sheltered life and, as a result, has known no sorrow until now. The statue tells a 
swallow that is resting beneath it: 
 
I did not know what tears were, for I lived in the Palace of Sans-Souci, 
where sorrow is not allowed to enter. In the daytime I played with my 
companions in the garden, and in the evening I led the dance in the Great 
Hall. Round the garden ran a very lofty wall, but I never cared to ask what 
lay beyond it, everything about me was so beautiful. My courtiers called 
me the Happy Prince, and happy indeed I was, if pleasure be happiness. So 
I lived, and so I died. And now that I am dead they have set me up here so 
high that I can see all the ugliness and all the misery of my city, and 
though my heart is made of lead yet I cannot choose but weep. (p. 272) 
 
The story presents two views on the statue. The one side values the outward 
splendour and callous magnificence of the Prince, represented both by the Prince’s 
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courtiers in Sans-Souci and by the grown-up townsfolk who admire the statue’s 
appearance, calling it ‘beautiful as a weathercock’ (p. 271). The story clearly 
presents them as undesirable. The Happy Prince’s statue is stripped of all 
outwardly beautiful and valuable things, which he wants to be given to the needy 
people of the city; when the mayor and the town councillors, who are apparently 
unaware of all the suffering in their city, pass the now-unglamorous statue, they 
can only comment on how shabby it looks and decide to melt it down and to use 
the iron for a statue of the mayor instead. The other view is represented most 
pronouncedly by God and the angels, who choose the statue’s least ‘beautiful’ 
part, its broken lead heart, as the vehicle with which to allow the Happy Prince 
into Heaven; but also by the young children, who are able to compare the Happy 
Prince to an angel because they have seen these in their dreams – much to the 
chagrin of the Mathematical Master, one of the more outwardly-oriented group, 
who does ‘not approve of children dreaming’ (p. 271). The second group does not 
fall for the statue’s resemblance-effect, but rather chooses to see the Happy Prince 
as both outwardly splendid but also inwardly compassionate. In this context it is 
very relevant that Wilde shows those who can look past the statue’s resemblance-
effect as either dreaming – thus bringing their own creativity to the act – or as 
divine, such as God and the angels. This portrays the effect very much in the same 
vein as the postmodern simulacrum, which is equally powerful and hard to resist 
or pierce. 
In The Picture of Dorian Gray the relationship between Dorian and his 
portrait is typical of the simulacrum due to the book’s emphasis on appearance. In 
the novel, Dorian is one of the characters whose identification with another, be it 
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art or theory, leads to a problem: ‘Dorian Gray blurs the boundaries between 
identities, between the physical Dorian and his painted representation, between 
Dorian and Wotton with his vicarious pleasure in Dorian’s career, and between 
Dorian and Basil Hallward, the unwitting creator of his alter-image’.24 Basil’s 
mistake in losing himself in Dorian while assuming that the latter is his muse was 
discussed above; but Dorian himself makes a similar mistake in regards to his 
portrait as a simulacrum. 
 Dorian’s picture starts off resembling him in appearance, even though its 
changing appearance soon becomes crucial to the development of the narrative. In 
this resemblance lies the core of the nature of the portrait as a simulacrum, as it 
introduces an important shift when Dorian himself becomes the thing with 
unchanging appearance and the portrait takes on the ageing qualities of the man. 
The shift signals a change which turns Dorian himself into the simulacrum, rather 
than the portrait. Dorian’s exchange with his artistic representation comes about 
through a fervent wish that the portrait will age instead of him, so that he can be 
forever young; however, what youth means to Dorian, and what he sees as the 
implications of eternal youth, introduce the same kind of false assumption behind 
images that already featured in ‘The Fisherman and his Soul’ and ‘The 
Nightingale and the Rose’. For ‘by exchanging places with his own portrait, 
Dorian becomes an image pretending to be a man, a “gracious shape of art” that 
assumes the appearance of life’.25 Dorian the image is fixed, and now has a 
resemblance-effect: he has the right sort of outward features so that he looks like 
                                                             
24 Linda Dryden, The Modern Gothic and Literary Doubles: Stevenson, Wilde and Wells (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 118-119. 
25 Elena Gomel, ‘Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray, and the (Un)Death of the Author’, 
Narrative, 12.1 (2004), 74-92 (p. 80). 
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he should as a young, virtuous man. 
 However, as the novel progresses the falseness of Dorian’s assumptions 
about ageing and the toll of his extreme life come to the foreground. One of the 
things that The Picture of Dorian Gray deals with is the juxtaposition of youth and 
age in terms of passion. Dorian, who has remained ‘young’ throughout the novel, 
finds towards the end that he has no capacity to enjoy things: ‘“I wish I could 
love,” cried Dorian Gray with a deep note of pathos in his voice. “But I seem to 
have lost the passion and forgotten the desire. I am too much concentrated on 
myself. My own personality has become a burden to me. I want to escape, to go 
away, to forget”’ (p. 147). Given eternal youth, Dorian had assumed that he could 
sample all things in life, and experience life to the fullest, without limitation; this 
is the essence of Dorian the image. But by this point in the novel that assumption 
has proven false. Having paid no price for his experience, he finds that things 
quickly become meaningless. He lacks the time limit put upon the experience of 
pleasure by the process of ageing, and lacks the physical toll of the life of 
debauchery that would heighten its experience through rarefying it. This leaves 
Dorian a simulacrum, a copy of the man of eternal youth who may experience 
anything, whereas in fact that youth does not exist. 
 It is not until the moment of his death that Dorian apparently regains 
himself: through stabbing the portrait, the earlier exchange is undone. When he is 
found by his servants, it is the old, wrinkled, loathsome version of Dorian 
previously confined to the portrait, while the portrait has once again assumed its 
representation of the eternal youth. Again the transference is neat, but now the 
portrait in itself becomes another simulacrum, reflecting something that no longer 
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exists: for the portrait was of Dorian, by the hand of Basil, and partly inspired by 
Lord Henry (who produced the expression on Dorian’s face that is immortalized 
in the portrait). Dorian, however, is the monster lying dead on the floor before the 
beautiful thing; Basil has been murdered, his love for Dorian proven hollow and 
fatal; and Lord Henry’s words set Dorian upon his ruinous course in the first 
place, so that they, too, become suggestions without any underlying meaning. 
Thus to the degree that the portrait is not still the simulacrum that Dorian was, it 
has become another, a combination of the particular falsehoods of three men. 
 
The Power of Mr. W. H.’s Simulacrum 
The story ‘The Portrait of Mr. W. H.’ features another very clear simulacrum: a 
forgery. This forgery, a portrait created to prove a literary theory, bases itself on 
Elizabethan conventions and literary assumptions so as to produce something that 
is so compelling that it will inspire faith in a theory even to the point of death; 
this, in turn, illustrates how the simulacrum itself is both amoral and seductive. 
 Identifying the genre of ‘The Portrait of Mr. W. H.’ is complicated, as it is 
alternately classified by critics as a short story, a piece of very Wildean literary 
criticism (due to its heavy emphasis on textual analysis of Shakespeare’s Sonnets), 
or a mix of the two. For reasons of space, that discussion will not be explored 
here, although the mixed form does allow for a few considerations that link form 
and genre to concepts like the simulacrum. The form of a given genre, for 
example, gives rise to expectations that might start to live a life of their own, as in 
the phrase ‘the butler did it’ in murder mysteries (this is almost never the case, 
except in stories by Agatha Christie or Conan Doyle). In any case, the story 
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concerns itself with a literary theory which identifies a boy actor named Willie 
Hughes as the addressee of Shakespeare’s Sonnets. The main feature of the story – 
other than the playfully convincing exploration of this possible reading of the 
Sonnets – is the titular portrait. This portrait is a forgery commissioned by the 
man who came up with the Willie Hughes theory of the Sonnets, carefully 
constructed to follow portraiture conventions of Elizabethan times (even down to 
the style of a painter of the period, Clouet). He commissions it in order to prove 
his theory, having been challenged to produce some kind of physical proof in 
order to verify Willie Hughes’s historical existence. Belief in the Hughes theory is 
transmitted between the three characters of the story, with them falling in, and 
sometimes falling out, of love with the theory; however, those who fall out of love 
with the portrait and the theory show a remarkable susceptibility to becoming re-
enchanted by them. 
This belief, fall from faith, and restoration of faith is tied to ownership of 
the portrait. The principal action of the story concerns the characters of Cyril 
Graham, the originator of the Hughes theory who, by the start of the story, is 
already dead; Erskine, who collaborated with him on the theory and owns the 
forgery at the start of the story; and the narrator, whose interest in forgeries sparks 
the whole narrative. The reader learns that Erskine thought the Hughes theory 
convincing, but did not fully subscribe to it until he came into the presence of the 
portrait. The narrator himself first becomes convinced after glimpsing the portrait, 
inspiring him to explore the Hughes theory in detail alone, since Erskine has 
become disenchanted with it. After he sends the result of his ardent analysis over 
to Erskine, however, he feels spent and almost immediately ceases to believe in 
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the thing he has just worked hard to prove. Erskine, who is in possession of the 
portrait, becomes re-enchanted through the narrator’s renewed presentation of the 
Hughes theory (in essence mirroring Graham’s arguing of the theory to Erskine), 
and renews his dedication to it; however he dies shortly afterwards, taking pains 
to make it look like he sacrificed his life for the theory, much like Cyril Graham 
actually did. The portrait at that point comes into the possession of the narrator, 
and resumes its influence over him: for, in the closing lines of the story, the 
narrator muses that ‘sometimes, when I look at it, I think that there is really a 
great deal to be said for the Willie Hughes theory of Shakespeare’s Sonnets’ 
(p.350). 
That the portrait of Willie Hughes can be conceived of as a simulacrum is 
clear; it is a copy without original, and in an even closer move to simulation, the 
existence of the boy depicted in the portrait is impossible to ascertain, thus 
blurring distinctions between reality and simulation. The interest here lies in the 
way in which this archetypal simulacrum shows how Wilde’s use of the device 
anticipates quite strongly the simulacrum’s power as image. 
The portrait of Willie Hughes undoubtedly is a powerful thing, clearly 
imbued in some way with the ability to inspire faith in the Hughes theory. 
However, this power need not necessarily be attributed to the portrait in itself, but 
rather arises from those who view it and the information available at the time. In 
this way ‘The Portrait of Mr. W. H.’ presents its portrait in the same manner as 
The Picture of Dorian Gray, though the latter painting is overtly magical, and is 
frequently attributed its own will by observers – especially Dorian himself, who at 
times feels mocked by it. The effect that the painting has on people is always in 
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things that are attributed to it by others. Though it is prominent (and fulfils its role 
of showing the ‘true’ Dorian) it is indifferent towards its onlookers, who must 
bring their own interpretations to it. The same is true for Willie Hughes’s portrait, 
which does not necessarily inspire belief in and of itself. Erskine has it in his 
possession for a long time, after all, and only becomes susceptible to re-
enchantment after not just owning the portrait, but being brought face to face once 
more with the full seductive force of the theory – it is the two working in unison 
that triggers his new commitment. 
The use of a forgery or simulacrum points to the powerfully seductive 
aspects of images even in the face of their apparent indifference. The point is very 
like that of Baudrillard, who described this power of images in the following way: 
‘There is a kind of primal pleasure, of anthropological joy in images, a kind of 
brute fascination unencumbered by aesthetic, moral, social or political judgment. 
It is because of this that […] they are immoral, and that their fundamental power 
lies in this immorality.’26 The image, and in this case Willie Hughes’s portrait, is 
not moral. This is illustrated by the fact that Hughes’s portrait is known to be a 
forgery to all three men who defend, at one time or another, the Hughes theory; 
yet this has no bearing on the effect it engenders in its observers and their belief in 
that theory. 
It is the very fact that the theory is partly communicated by the portrait that 
explains its potency: ‘Communication by images seldom, if ever, leaves room for 
doubt because their truthfulness is taken for granted: images are reality’.27 Thus 
                                                             
26 Jean Baudrillard, The Evil Demon of Images (Sydney: The Power Institute of Fine Arts, 1987), 
p. 28. 
27 Eugene L. Arva, ‘Writing the Vanishing Real: Hyperreality and Magical Realism’, Journal of 
Narrative Theory, 38.1 (2009), 60-85 (p. 63). 
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the doubt is very prevalent, for example, in Erskine, who asks Graham for 
evidence of Hughes’s existence before being able to allow for a theory that solves 
the mysterious identity of Shakespeare’s ‘W. H.’; but as soon as Erskine is 
confronted with an image, he is won over. The theory is – certainly within the 
confines of the story – quite plausible, but it repeatedly takes an image to bring 
about conversion or re-enchantment: the image, the form, must be there before the 
rest can be fully believed. It is something that Wilde also explores in his essays 
when he writes that ‘The Creeds are believed, not because they are rational, but 
because they are repeated. Yes; Form is everything. It is the secret of life. Find 
expression for a sorrow, and it will become dear to you. Find expression for a joy, 
and you intensify its ecstasy’ (p. 1149). One need not be logical if one has the 
power of a repeated image, of repeated form. 
This emphasis on the image being able to convince even in the face of its 
clear status as falsehood, as forgery, suggests finally a celebration of the surface 
rather than an exploration of depth. This, too, is a crucial factor in the concept of 
the simulacrum, which has no depth, and relies on its surface for its suggestive 
power. It is here that the work of simulacra can be fully observed, where the move 
to hyperreality is made. Describing this function of simulacra, Zygmunt Bauman 
has remarked on ‘the decomposition of structured, “hard” reality into the play of 
simulacra, in which simulation and dissimulation merge, in which a deeper reality 
is implied where it is all displayed at the surface’.28 The creation of an implied 
deeper reality where really ‘it is all displayed at the surface’ again fits precisely 
with ‘The Portrait of Mr. W. H.’ where a whole, rich explanation of Shakespeare’s 
                                                             
28 Zygmunt Bauman, ‘The Sweet Scent of Decomposition’, in Forget Baudrillard?, ed. by Chris 
Rojek and Bryan S. Turner (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 22-46 (p. 43). 
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Sonnets is suggested by what amounts to a forged image, one that is moreover 
nothing but a surface. Yet its implications are many, not merely within the story, 
but also outside of it; it glorifies, after all, the love of a great artist for a same-sex 
young actor, in that way coming close to Wilde’s own repeated modelling of his 
same-sex affairs on the Greek ideal of the older man teaching his younger boy-
lover. All of these things imply a ‘deeper reality’, and yet they all depend on the 
power of the one image – that one simulacrum – of the boy that, quite possibly, 
never existed. 
 The story of simulacra does not end here; rather, Baudrillard envisioned 
their coming together into a kind of simulated reality, called hyperreality. Just as 
simulacra come together to form this hyperreality, so do Wilde’s ideas on the 
various representations of reality come together in a view on the – at times 
preferred – artificiality of the real. And it is to this larger picture of hyperreality 
that the next chapter turns. 
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Chapter V  Hyperreality 
 
When Wilde changed his accent after arriving Oxford, it was one of the 
indications that he was paying close attention to the way he appeared to others. 
Arriving in England after his graduation from Trinity College in Dublin, Wilde 
immediately started to alter how he represented himself, and ‘the accent went 
first’, to be replaced by a leisurely English drawl.1 Another indication of Wilde’s 
close attention to his image is reflected by one of his well-known phrases: having 
bought two large French porcelain vases of blue china, Wilde, who was very 
astutely aware that these vases projected an image of some kind, could not let the 
opportunity slip to point this out. The vases ‘may have inspired the remark which 
reverberated first round the university, then round the country, “I find it harder and 
harder every day to live up to my blue china”’.2 The contrast between the vases’ 
projected reality and Wilde’s own – whatever it may have been – suggests a focus 
on representation very much grounded in its malleability. 
 The illusion of a projected life is one that provides fertile grounds for 
examining Wilde. Biographically, this is often linked to Wilde’s double life as 
married man and lover of men in late-Victorian times, a connection made, for 
example, in Neil McKenna’s recent biography.3 It also allows for post-colonial 
inroads, justifying Wilde as an Irishman working in England. However, the 
distinction also indicates a strong resemblance to the postmodern concept of 
hyperreality. 
                                                             
1 Barbara Belford, Oscar Wilde: A Certain Genius (London: Random House, 2000), p.50. 
2 Richard Ellmann, Oscar Wilde (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1987), p. 45. 
3 Neil McKenna, The Secret Life of Oscar Wilde: An Intimate Biography (New York: Basic 
Books, 2005). 
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The Hyperreal 
The term ‘hyperreality’ was originally coined by Jean Baudrillard in order to 
describe the logical result of the presence of simulacra. It describes a process 
whereby the representations of reality used in daily life (especially in such media 
as film or television) are themselves based on representation instead of the reality 
(or original) they are supposed to be representing. Thus a series of simulacra 
dislodge ‘actual’ reality in order to replace it with hyperreality. In Simulacra and 
Simulation Baudrillard defines hyperreality simply as ‘the simulation of 
something which never really existed’.4 Umberto Eco, another theorist who has 
written extensively on hyperreality, defines it in relation to America by stating that 
‘the American imagination demands the real thing and, to attain it, must fabricate 
the absolute fake’.5 Hyperreality in part arises when something is created to 
emphasize a possibly fictitious contrast between real and fake. As a general term, 
and like deconstruction, it is sometimes seen as nebulous due to its (postmodern) 
claim of the impossibility of the real and the unavailability of reality. And, just as 
with some of the other postmodern terms, such as the monstrous and the 
simulacrum, the concept of hyperreality has created considerable friction within 
academic quarters and with names such as Christopher Norris and Douglas 
Kellner. 
 Hyperreality, then, is mainly a blurring of reality and illusion to the point 
where the two have become indistinguishable, or rather, something else entirely. It 
                                                             
4 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. by Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2006), p. 46. 
5 Umberto Eco, ‘Travels in Hyperreality’, in Travels in Hyperreality: Essays, trans. by William 
Weaver (London: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1986), pp. 1-58 (pp. 7-8). 
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is ‘an imaginary effect concealing that reality no more exists outside than inside 
the bounds of the artificial perimeter’.6 The nature of the hyperreal as an 
‘imaginary effect’ is crucial, since hyperreality is not the same as reality. 
However, it is not illusion either: ‘Of the same order as the impossibility of 
rediscovering an absolute level of the real, is the impossibility of staging an 
illusion. Illusion is no longer possible, because the real is no longer possible.’7 
The entire problem that hyperreality concerns itself with is not necessarily the 
inaccessibility of the real, which is only part of the problem: it is the degree to 
which reality and illusion can no longer be separated. The two have become 
something else entirely, a third option that is neither, but occupies the positions of 
both. 
 The steps leading to the emergence of hyperreality can be concisely 
summarized as follows: 
 
Before it becomes simulation, the image – reality relationship follows four, 
more or less distinct stages: in the first, the image still reflects reality; in 
the second, it disguises reality; in the third, it masks the absence of reality; 
and in the last, it loses all connection with reality and becomes its own 
simulacrum. The image ultimately loses its old functionality as a 
representation of reality to become a model – a real without origin or 
reality: a hyperreal.
8
 
                                                             
6 Jean Baudrillard, ‘Simulacra and Simulations’, in Selected Writings, ed. by Mark Poster, trans. 
by Paul Foss, Paul Patton and Philip Beitchman (166-184), p. 172. 
7 ‘Simulacra and Simulations’, p. 177. 
8 Eugene L. Arva, ‘Writing the Vanishing Real: Hyperreality and Magical Realism’, Journal of 
Narrative Theory, 38.1 (2009), 60-85 (p. 64). Arva adopts and clarifies these phases of 
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To clarify, the term simulacrum stands for a copy without an original, whereas 
hyperreality is a ‘real without reality’, which is to say, a complex assertion of truth 
that cannot be verified. Hyperreality is made up of simulacra; thus hyperreality is 
made up of images which are not images of anything specific – they do not 
represent anything real. Importantly, these images are taken as referring to 
something real even when they do not. Baudrillard famously asserted, for 
example, that the event known as the Gulf War did not actually take place: the 
images that the world received to represent the war had nothing to do with the war 
itself.
9
 Because of the war’s representation as clean and efficient, and because it 
was represented in a very distinct way so as to maintain popular support for the 
war, the constructed event that was presented as the real war struck many critics 
as ‘a pure product of Baudrillardian hyperreality in which the distinction between 
reality and its representation had become increasingly difficult to sustain’.10 
Baudrillard’s claim about the Gulf war was controversial and has prompted 
several critical responses, mostly notably from Christopher Norris.
11
 Norris 
criticizes Baudrillard for portraying the war as fictitious, essentially considering 
him ‘a nihilist denying physical reality’.12 
 Because it is part of a process, as outlined above, the move to hyperreality 
is gradual. The effacement of the distinction between reality and reproduction 
                                                                                                                                                                       
hyperreality from Jean Baudrillard, ‘Simulacra and Simulation’, in Selected Writings, ed. by Mark 
Poster, trans. by Paul Foss, Paul Patton and Philip Beitchman (166-184), p. 170. 
9 Jean Baudrillard, ‘The Gulf War: Is it Really Taking Place?’, in Postmodern Debates, ed. by 
Simon Malpas (New York: Palgrave, 2001) pp. 63-74. 
10 Paul Patton, ‘This is not a War’, in Art and Artefact, ed. by Nicholas Zurbrugg (London: Sage 
Publications, 1997), pp. 121-134 (p. 122). 
11 Christopher Norris, ‘Lost in the Funhouse: Baudrillard and the Politics of Postmodernism’, 
Textual Practice, 3.3 (1989), 360-387. 
12 William Merrin, Baudrillard and the Media (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), p. 86. 
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happens through that process of repeated reproduction, resulting in ‘a world in 
which the distinctions between signified and signifier have all but disappeared 
through successive reproductions of previous reproductions of reality’.13 The 
result is something that appears real, and that is taken generally to be real. It is not 
until closer examination that it reveals its nature as not real, but hyperreal: based 
on a simulacrum, a copy of a copy, long since divorced from its original. 
 Critics writing on the hyperreal have often found a gratifying source for 
their discussion in the American phenomenon of Disneyland. Disneyland (or 
sometimes Disney World, the complete resort in Florida) is seen as a prime 
instance of the hyperreal because it is a fantasy world which is supposed to 
contrast with reality, but in fact does not. Disneyland exists as one supposed end 
of the spectrum, with everything about the amusement park representing fantasy 
and illusion; the other end of the spectrum is reality. This turns out to be a false 
dichotomy, as Baudrillard points out ‘it is no longer a question of a false 
representation of reality (ideology), but of concealing the fact that the real is no 
longer real, and thus of saving the reality principle’.14 
 The crucial point involving hyperreality is that in order for Disneyland to 
represent a fantasy world, there must be such a thing as a fantasy. There are many 
implications of this presence of fantasy, the main one being a counter-presence of 
fantasy, a state that can be distinguished from fantasy by being absolutely real. In 
Disneyland it is possible to see animals and princesses in the street, and moreover, 
it is possible for those animals to live there and to entertain visitors, and for the 
princess to sell goods. The implication is that the reverse becomes true for reality: 
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174 
 
animals have no place in the city, and royalty must be aloof, above petty concerns 
of buying and selling. This distinction, however, does not hold: a city can be full 
of animals, and many countries in possession of a royal house provide their 
monarchy with funds. The theme park is also seen as a confirmation of adulthood: 
‘Disneyland is meant to be an infantile world, in order to make us believe that the 
adults are elsewhere, in the “real” world, and to conceal the fact that real 
childishness is everywhere, particularly among those adults who go there to act 
the child in order to foster illusions of their real childishness.’15 In both cases the 
existence of Disneyland creates a false binary. By creating an opposite, desirable 
position, an orderly reality is implied where it does not exist. 
 Another aspect of Disneyland in terms of hyperreality is the active blurring 
of the boundaries between reality and illusion that takes place within the 
amusement park. Umberto Eco, writing about the concept of Disneyland as a 
hyperreality as opposed to something like a wax museum, notes that ‘Disneyland 
is more hyperrealistic then the wax museum, precisely because the latter still tries 
to make us believe that what we are seeing reproduces reality absolutely, whereas 
Disneyland makes it clear that within its magic enclosure it is fantasy that is 
absolutely reproduced. The Palace of Living Arts presents its Venus de Milo as 
almost real, whereas Disneyland can permit itself to present its reconstructions as 
masterpieces of falsification, for what it sells is, indeed, goods, but genuine 
merchandise, not reproductions’.16 Instead of selling fakes, Disneyland sells real 
fakes – an apparent contradiction in terms – and this is another source of the 
hyperreal. 
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Hyperreality in Intentions 
In ‘The Critic as Artist’, speakers Ernest and Gilbert turn their attention to the 
repercussions of a critic who foregrounds personality in criticism. Arguing that 
this produces a renewal of the artwork, as every critic will provide a new (and, 
arguably, wonderful) reading, Gilbert states: 
 
He will always be reminding us that great works of art are living things – 
are, in fact, the only things that live. So much, indeed, will he feel this, that 
I am certain that, as civilisation progresses and we become more highly 
organised, the elect spirits of each age, the critical and cultured spirits, will 
grow less and less interested in actual life, and will seek to gain their 
impressions almost entirely from what art has touched.
17
 
 
The above passage is based on a disconnection of perception and reality – one that 
is actively suggested in Wilde’s phrasing that people will grow ‘less interested in 
actual life’. The quotation proposes that people’s ‘impressions’ will be gained 
solely from art – thus implying that they will no longer be taken from reality. 
Elsewhere, in ‘Pen, Pencil, and Poison’ and ‘The Decay of Lying’, Wilde has 
already argued that the base of art is the lie. The result is that the ‘elect’ will base 
themselves on impressions and images that are suggested by, but not tied to or 
representative of, a kind of truth, or true life. These words seem to mirror a 
                                                             
17 Oscar Wilde, The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde (London: HarperCollins, 2003), p. 1132. 
Emphasis is Wilde’s. Further references to Wilde’s work from this edition are given after 
quotations in the text. 
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specific current which is also found in hyperrealism. After all, the argument of 
hyperrealism also rests on a disconnection of a supposed underlying reality and a 
perceived version of it. For Wilde, the situation is one of preference and of choice, 
but the resemblance is nevertheless striking. 
 Furthermore, in proposing why the ‘elect spirits’ will choose to live on 
only those impressions that are derived from art, Wilde presents a further 
indication of something resembling hyperreality. Gilbert argues that the elect will 
not base themselves on life because it is ‘deficient in form’. Life is not right, an 
imperfect work of art. This is what Gilbert has to say on the subject: ‘There is a 
grotesque horror about its comedies, and its tragedies seem to culminate in farce’ 
(p. 1132). The key lies in the terms Gilbert uses to describe life: he speaks of its 
‘comedies’ and of life’s ‘tragedies’ ending in ‘farce’. The very terms used to 
describe reality are here terms borrowed from theatre, a form of representation. 
While ‘life’s tragedies’ could conceivably be assumed to be an expression 
regarding unpleasant events in life, the usage of the terms ‘comedy’ and ‘farce’ in 
close conjunction definitely indicates a level of staging, of performance and 
artificiality, which fits hyperreality quite closely. This suggests something 
different from the hyperreal; after all, hyperreality is not optional, but rather a 
blurred area that becomes impossible to escape due to a loss of distinction 
between the real and the illusionary. However, the above quotation hints at that 
very thing even though the line of reasoning seems to diverge. More importantly, 
this shows the Wildean process of vanishing reality as one much like hyperreality: 
though voluntary, it represents a shifting from the second position – disguised 
reality – to the third, where reality’s absence starts becoming masked. The 
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discussion in ‘The Critic as Artist’ then moves on to the familiar Wildean theme of 
immorality as a defining characteristic of art, and ultimately to the reasons why 
doing nothing is the most important thing of all – but this moment in the essay is 
quite revealing in terms of the correspondence between Wildean thinking and 
hyperreality. 
 Wilde also incorporates those points on artificiality and performance in 
terms of drama later on in The Picture of Dorian Gray. Drama is used explicitly as 
a method for reframing the reality of Sybil’s death. He prefers to take up the 
illusion rather than the reality when he ‘embraces the illusion of drama and 
refuses the world of genuine feeling. The narrative of Sibyl and her tragic death is 
critical in establishing the detachment that Dorian cultivates throughout the 
remainder of the story’.18 The thought of Sybil as theatre is suggested by Lord 
Henry and briefly discussed and agreed upon by Dorian; then, very shortly after 
Lord Henry leaves, the reader is confronted with Dorian’s thoughts, which have 
already begun to replace reality with the hyperreality of Wildean art: 
 
Poor Sibyl! What a romance it had all been! She had often mimicked death 
on the stage. Then Death himself had touched her and taken her with him. 
How had she played that dreadful last scene? Had she cursed him, as she 
died? No; she had died for love of him, and love would always be a 
sacrament to him now. She had atoned for everything by the sacrifice she 
had made of her life. He would not think any more of what she had made 
him go through, on that horrible night at the theatre. When he thought of 
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her, it would be as a wonderful tragic figure sent on to the world’s stage to 
show the supreme reality of love. A wonderful tragic figure? Tears came to 
his eyes as he remembered her childlike look, and winsome fanciful ways, 
and shy tremulous grace. (p. 83) 
 
Words such as ‘romance’ and the pondering of her death as playing ‘that dreadful 
last scene’ signal Dorian’s reframing of Sybil as theatre; likewise, thoughts of her 
cursing him as she dies, or dying for love of him, bear the mark of fiction rather 
than fact. When he finally resolves to think of her ‘as a wonderful tragic figure 
sent onto the world’s stage to show the supreme reality of love’ she has crucially 
left the stage of the theatre for the world’s stage. The illusion of theatre and the 
reality of the world have become mixed, and the reality of Sybil’s death has 
become a hyperreality out of theatre. This shows clearly how Dorian, through 
self-delusion, makes the move from disguised reality (in this case, theatre) to the 
absence of reality, which is to say that he makes Sybil disappear behind the 
characters she has played. 
 Wilde makes another point on the topic of real and illusion in ‘The Critic 
as Artist’. In the essay Gilbert is defending the foregrounding of creativity in 
criticism when Ernest professes his doubts as to whether such a thing could really 
be considered criticism. Gilbert responds that this ‘is the highest Criticism, for it 
criticises not merely the individual work of art, but Beauty itself, and fills with 
wonder a form which the artist may have left void, or not understood, or 
understood incompletely’ (p. 1127). The criticism that Wilde advocates here is 
allowed to empty its subject and to fill it with the critic’s own personality, which 
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will ‘fill it with wonder’ even if the artist has not entirely understood their own 
form. Essentially, Wilde is arguing a kind of indifference to the original artwork: 
the work of art – the illusion – is in itself meaningless and, according to Wilde’s 
theory, awaits the critic’s personality to remove the indifference and inertia, 
transmuting it into something ‘which in the hands of the real artist becomes not 
merely a material element of metrical beauty, but a spiritual element of thought 
and passion’ (p. 1111). The words ‘indifference and inertia’ may sound heavy and 
negative here, but nevertheless this is essentially what Wilde, too, is arguing, and 
it is exactly how hyperreality deals with the concept of illusion: 
 
The illusion of the world is preserved even in a simulacral world, though 
with a slight twist: originally, illusion is the possibility of meaning (things 
are meaningful insofar as they are different from themselves), but in a 
world where things have become themselves, illusion exists only as the 
absolute meaninglessness of everything, as indifference and inertia.
19
 
 
Another main argument that is put forward by Wilde in Intentions is the 
relationship between art and nature. Here again Wilde’s critical thought matches 
the concept of hyperreality in his reversal of the roles of nature and art. Wilde 
broaches this subject in ‘The Truth of Masks’ when he discusses the importance of 
staging and costume in a theatrical production. While stressing natural costume 
and the importance of actors familiarizing themselves early on with costume and 
props, Wilde casually notes that ‘a scene is primarily a decorative background for 
                                                             
19 Temenuga Trifonova, ‘Is There a Subject in Hyperreality?’, PMC, 13.3 (2003), 1-36 (p.14). 
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the actors, and should always be kept subordinate, first to the players, their dress, 
gesture, and action; and secondly, to the fundamental principle of decorative art, 
which is not to imitate but to suggest nature’ (p. 954). As with the previous 
quotation, the importance lies in the details of the words. Wilde suggests here the 
principle of ‘decorative art’, which in his lecture ‘Art and the Handicraftsman’ he 
had described as the highest art: ‘For we should remember that all the arts are fine 
arts and all the arts decorative arts. The greatest triumph of Italian painting was 
the decoration of a pope’s chapel in Rome and the wall of a room in Venice. 
Michael Angelo wrought the one, and Tintoret, the dyer’s son, the other.’20 This 
implies that all art is decorative art. Additionally, in ‘The Truth of Masks’ Wilde 
argues that this decorative art, which is to say all art, ideally suggests nature rather 
than imitating it. This entails another reversal of the normal order: art informs 
nature, rather than being informed by it. This implies that art must come first. 
‘The Critic as Artist’ already establishes that art is detached from reality; here is 
another step, which takes this art that is divorced from nature – essentially isolated 
into an autonomous position – as the basis for creating, rather than representing, 
nature. This autonomous position also represents the point where Wilde’s thinking 
crosses into the fourth and final step on Arva’s path to hyperreality: that last step 
entails losing ‘all connection with reality’ in order to become hyperreal. 
 While the autonomy is an important argument for Wilde, he primarily 
discusses theatrical techniques and methods of staging in ‘The Truth of Masks’, 
and does so in a very practical manner – his discussion is grounded in an 
archaeological production of Shakespeare that was staged just prior to his writing 
                                                             
20 Oscar Wilde, ‘Art and the Handicraftsman’, in Art and Decoration (London: Methuen & Co, 
1920), pp. 17-38 (p. 28). 
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the essay. In ‘The Decay of Lying’ Wilde takes the topic on in greater depth, 
however. In this essay, it arises over the course of the argument that lying should 
be considered far superior to telling the truth – and the reasons here go farther 
than those used by Gilbert to dismiss life in favour of art. 
 After Vivian has read most of his article to Cyril, the two pause when 
Vivian introduces the reversal of nature and art. Cyril is unwilling to accept this 
theory without some further corroboration: ‘you don’t mean to say,’ he asks, ‘that 
you seriously believe that Life imitates Art, that Life in fact is the mirror, and Art 
the reality?’ (p. 1082). To prove his point, Vivian launches into a long discussion 
on the proper place for nature and art, one that will ultimately create the lie as a 
point in between the two. One of his playful examples concerns a woman that he 
had supposedly met a while ago, who had a very malleable personality. She falls 
under the fatal influence of art when she is exposed to a character that strongly 
resembles her, originating in the story of a long-dead Russian author: 
 
Some months afterwards I was in Venice, and finding the magazine in the 
reading-room of the hotel, I took it up casually to see what had become of 
the heroine. It was a most piteous tale, as the girl had ended by running 
away with a man absolutely inferior to her, not merely in social station, but 
in character and intellect also. I wrote to my friend that evening […] 
Before my letter had reached her, she had run away with a man who 
deserted her in six months. I saw her in 1884 in Paris, where she was 
living with her mother, and I asked her whether the story had had anything 
to do with her action. She told me that she had felt an absolutely 
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irresistible impulse to follow the heroine step by step in her strange and 
fatal progress, and that it was with a feeling of real terror that she had 
looked forward to the last few chapters of the story. (p. 1085) 
 
In this passage, the force of art is such that it influences, even moulds, reality. A 
little later, Vivian muses on a more likely point of the images created by 
Impressionist painters and their power to influence the way people perceive the 
world: 
 
Where, if not from the Impressionists, do we get those wonderful brown 
fogs that come creeping down our streets, blurring the gas-lamps and 
changing the houses into monstrous shadows? To whom, if not to them and 
their masters, do we owe the lovely silver mists that brood over our river, 
and turn to faint forms of fading grace curved bridge and swaying barge? 
(p. 1086) 
 
The argument here is the same as in ‘The Truth of Masks’ but much more clearly 
articulated: there is a definite reversal regarding the representation of art or nature. 
 In clarifying his argument, Vivian takes another important step towards 
hyperreality. Expanding on the previous quotation, he states that ‘things are 
because we see them, and what we see, and how we see it, depends on the Arts 
that have influenced us. […] At present, people see fogs, not because there are 
fogs, but because poets and painters have taught them the mysterious loveliness of 
such effects’ (p. 1086). With this step, the move to art as the basis of all perception 
183 
 
is now complete: after all, it is argued here that what people perceive is 
determined by what is provided to them by art. Vivian argues that these fogs ‘did 
not exist till Art had invented them’ even though ‘there must have been fogs for 
centuries in London’ (p. 1086). This leaves reality and representation – nature and 
art – indistinguishable from each other. The reader is left with the concept of art, 
which is no longer fully a representation of anything; if anything, it is instead a 
thing that serves as a source of its own. Yet it is still a form of representation, 
since Vivian concedes the fogs must have been there to begin with. Just as with 
the blurring of reality and illusion in hyperreality, the real and its impressionist 
representation are now entirely entangled. 
 Additionally it is possible to see the argument presented above as 
essentially the same as the concept of hyperreality itself. The ‘problem’ of 
hyperreality is that observers end up with a representation without an available 
original, a copy of a copy. This problem is mirrored when Art is considered as 
representation, and the resultant fogs perceived by people as the representation of 
that representation, the copy of the copy. So in the above example someone might 
comment on the fog, or write about the fog, in which case the resulting writing 
would be a manifestation of hyperreality. 
 Furthermore there is a suggestion that Wilde pursued actively, rather than 
theoretically, this reversal of art and nature in his first staging of The Importance 
of Being Earnest. Katherine Worth remarks on an interesting phenomenon 
involving the play and costume. She tells of Wilde’s audiences finding themselves 
face to face with a mirror image: 
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The elaborate formality of the costumes worn on George Alexander’s stage 
reflected the clothes of the audience with a precision which made for a 
rather uncanny mirror image effect. Who was imitating whom? Gentlemen 
were said to study Alexander’s immaculate dandy’s outfits - of which Jack 
Worthing’s mourning garb is the supreme example - before ordering their 
own clothes: presumably they thought theirs the real thing and the actors’ 
make-believe, but Wilde knew that it was not so simple.
21
 
 
The audience, made part of the performance by Wilde in his attempt to erase 
differences between the performer and the observer, crosses over into the realm of 
the hyperreal. The boundary between the artistic representation (The Importance 
of Being Earnest) and the supposed reality (the audience watching the play for the 
actors’ costumes) collapses insofar as the audience starts to clothe themselves as 
the actors, who in turn wear a stylized version of what a Victorian person would 
wear either way. The ‘original’ is then made unrecognisable; audience and actors’ 
costume is based on each other. 
 
Crime, Punishment and the Real 
In this way there are remarkable similarities between the arguments presented by 
Wilde in Intentions and the general concept of hyperreality. To an extent these 
arguments are also present in ‘The Soul of Man Under Socialism’. However, a 
very interesting correspondence specifically between Wilde’s words in that essay 
and the writing of Baudrillard surfaces here. This has less to do with the nature of 
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the theory as Baudrillard describes it, but rather with the outcome that he foresees 
in terms of that theory – an outcome that matches Wilde’s own theoretical 
outlook. 
 In his essay, Wilde muses on the abolition of matters such as crime and 
hunger, but the ultimate outcome of socialism in Wilde’s eyes will be an intense 
individualism. There will be a change in social condition, and an increased 
independence for everyone, for the true socialism will radiate a sort of almost 
enlightening individualism: ‘And yet while it will not meddle with others, it will 
help all, as a beautiful thing helps us, by being what it is. The personality of man 
will be very wonderful. It will be as wonderful as the personality of a child’ (p. 
1179). The way in which such an individual interferes in other people’s lives is 
exactly by not interfering: it helps by being beautiful, by being what it is. In some 
ways that individual is almost like an inanimate object, the ‘beautiful thing’, as 
Wilde puts it. There is something very non-social to Wilde’s individualism. 
 Furthermore, the advent of this individualism through socialism will bring 
about the destruction of certain social institutions. ‘Yes;’ Wilde admits, ‘there are 
suggestive things in Individualism. Socialism annihilates family life, for instance. 
With the abolition of private property, marriage in its present form must 
disappear’ (p. 1181). He then assures that there will be a place for love – in fact 
Wilde believes that love will be the greater for being freed from the legal 
constraints of marriage – but nevertheless the structure of social life has to 
disappear. To take matters even farther, Wilde suggests that there is an actual 
opposition between individualism and the public, an opposition that he sketches in 
his description of public reaction to art: 
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In England, the arts that have escaped best are the arts in which the public 
take no interest. Poetry is an instance of what I mean. We have been able 
to have fine poetry in England because the public do not read it, and 
consequently do not influence it. The public like to insult poets because 
they are individual, but once they have insulted them, they leave them 
alone. In the case of the novel and the drama, arts in which the public do 
take an interest, the result of the exercise of popular authority has been 
absolutely ridiculous. No country produces such badly-written fiction, 
such tedious, common work in the novel form, such silly, vulgar plays as 
England. (p. 1185) 
 
The social, meaning the public, will become a thing of the past under Wilde’s 
socialism. In its place will come Wilde’s individuals, a strangely detached state in 
which interaction might take the form of inspiring others in the same way that 
beautiful objects might. 
 The same sentiment in relationship to the same kind of effect would later 
be voiced by Baudrillard himself. Writing on hyperreality and politics, he comes 
onto the point of socialism. ‘By an unforeseen twist of events and an irony which 
no longer belongs to history, it is through the death of the social that socialism 
will emerge – as it is through the death of God that religions emerge.’22 Naturally 
Wilde’s socialism seems to have more in common with what must be called 
communism – the abolishment of personal property, and so forth – while 
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Baudrillard believes that socialism will be the result of a desire for the social after 
hyperreality has complicated that concept. This certainly validates a historicist 
reading of the essay; at the same time, however, it continues to develop an 
argument along the lines of hyperreality. The very strong connections between the 
breakdown of the social and socialism does not so much link Wilde to 
hyperreality as it shows how both Wilde’s and Baudrillard’s thinking on the 
consequences of hyperreality overlap: Wilde’s art and beauty, which are linked to 
Wilde’s version of hyperreality, lead to the same kind of socialist consequences as 
Baudrillard’s hyperreality. 
 The point of Baudrillard’s preoccupation with politics leads to another 
aspect of hyperreality in Wilde’s work. The thinking on hyperreality as a state of 
being affecting social life partly deals with relationships of power and some of its 
resulting manifestations, such as crime and desire. Baudrillard’s arguments on 
crime were introduced in Chapter Three: he calls into question the existence of 
crime, on the basis that crime and innocence require a kind of objective real in 
which to be grounded. In this manner it becomes impossible, for example, to 
create a fake robbery. Baudrillard muses on this at one point in ‘Simulacra and 
Simulations’: 
 
For example: it would be interesting to see whether the repressive 
apparatus would not react more violently to a simulated hold-up than to a 
real one? For a real hold-up only upsets the order of things, the right of 
property, whereas a simulated hold-up interferes with the very principle of 
reality. Transgression and violence are less serious, for they only contest 
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the distribution of the real. Simulation is infinitely more dangerous since it 
always suggests, over and above its object, that law and order themselves 
might really be nothing more than simulation.
23
 
 
This quotation illustrates the sort of transgression that fascinated Wilde in his 
writing. Wilde challenged Victorian public perceptions to some degree, whether it 
was by calling art immoral during an age of intense moralization, or by insulting 
their taste in one of his many epigrams on England. He specifically speculates on 
positive artistic outcomes of crime and sin in ‘Pen, Pencil and Poison’. Wilde is 
constantly looking to explore how crime might be defined differently, something 
which matches Baudrillard’s thoughts on crime in the above quotation – thoughts 
arising from his theory of simulacra and hyperreality, rather than from a direct 
correspondence between Baudrillard’s hyperreality and Wilde’s artistic 
representation. 
 Law and order as simulations are illustrated in “The Canterville Ghost”. In 
this story an American family purchases Canterville Chase, an estate that is said to 
be haunted by the Canterville Ghost. The story enacts a number of themes, such as 
the clash of old-world England and new-world America, or the pure maiden 
whose innocence brings salvation and happiness at the end of the story. The 
salient points here, however, have to do with the nature of the ghost and his 
clashes with the American family. The Canterville Ghost haunts the estate 
ostensibly because he is guilty of murder and is cursed until he is forgiven by an 
innocent girl, who must cry over his sins. Quite quickly, however, one of the 
                                                             
23 ‘Simulacra and Simulations’, p. 177. Emphasis is Baudrillard’s. 
189 
 
points of the story becomes who is haunting whom. The American family proves 
remarkably resistant, even unhelpful, when it comes to the ghost’s attempts at 
haunting. The father steadfastly attempts to remove a phantom blood stain with 
American detergents, the mother is simply inspired to join the ‘Psychical Society’, 
and two of the sons rather enjoy taunting the ghost, even to the point of calling the 
ghost’s uniqueness into question by tricking him with a fake ghost that scares him 
because, ‘never having seen a ghost before, he naturally was terribly frightened’ 
(p. 192). Upon further investigation he even finds a placard with the fake ghost 
which reads ‘YE OLDE GHOST. Ye Onlie True and Originale Spook. Beware of 
Ye Imitationes. All Others are Counterfeite’ (p. 192). In an almost hyperreal turn, 
the children bring into doubt the ghost’s status as the real thing. This is Wilde very 
actively setting up expectations which he can then, in a postmodern way, play 
with. Those expectations are linked here with what Tzvetan Todorov has called 
the Fantastic, which 
 
is characterized by the hesitation that the reader is invited to experience 
with regard to the natural or supernatural explanation of the events 
presented. More precisely, the world described in these texts is indeed our 
own world, but within that universe an event occurs for which we have 
difficulty finding a natural explanation.
24
 
More important, though, is that the respective natures of reality, crime, and 
punishment are comically blurred in the story. First of all, the characters of the 
narrative – with the exception of the pure daughter, Virginia – refuse to act out the 
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stereotypes otherwise associated with their roles in a typical haunting story. The 
American family is not afraid of the ghost; rather than the ghost haunting them, 
they end up haunting the ghost instead. The ghost himself approaches his curse 
more like an actor, portraying his various ghastly personae as roles: he plays, for 
example, the character of “Dumb Daniel, or the Suicide’s Skeleton,” a rôle in 
which he had on more than one occasion produced a great effect, and which he 
considered quite equal to his famous part of “Martin the Maniac, or the Masked 
Mystery”’ (p. 191). The actor’s approach to haunting that the ghost takes, and the 
haunting itself as a kind of performance, bring these matters into the realm of art 
and representation. Immediately reality – insofar as it can be present in a ghost 
story – becomes lost. At the very least, in the play expected to be enacted at 
Canterville Chase, none of the principal actors are fulfilling their role: the family 
is not scared, the ghost is not scary. On another level, the events taking place in 
the story are a particular kind of hyperreality: the story itself models the humorous 
reactions of the main characters on the template of a ghost story, projecting the 
expected reactions in fiction onto practical everyday life. In either case the 
original situation, the ghost being cursed for a crime, has receded to the 
background, and the story’s transgressors become instead the family, whose 
crimes are not the expected kind, like murder, but transgressions against the 
‘proper’ behaviour towards the ghost. 
 In this situation, what is real has become hopelessly lost within a set of 
prescribed roles – victim, family member, ghost, actor – which all blur together. 
This happens within the structure of a story which otherwise follows a predictable 
pattern, with a traditional opening and an almost fairytale ending. Moreover, it 
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leaves none of the characters with any power over the course of events until the 
final phases of the story, when Virginia redeems the ghost. The central segment of 
the story consists of a situation that is essentially circular: the ghost continues 
failing to scare the family and the family continues failing to be victims. This 
situation could go on forever, especially given the ghost’s seemingly inexhaustible 
roles and methods of scaring people. This problem of power is similar to a 
problem in hyperreality, also to do with the exercise of power. Regarding the 
danger for society of hyperreal events, Baudrillard notes: 
 
On the contrary, it is as hyperreal events, no longer having any particular 
contents or aims, but indefinitely refracted by each other (for that matter 
like so-called historical events: strikes, demonstrations, crises, etc.), that 
they are precisely unverifiable by an order which can only exert itself on 
the real and the rational, on ends and means: a referential order which can 
only dominate referentials, a determinate power which can only dominate 
a determined world, but which can do nothing about that indefinite 
recurrence of simulation, about that weightless nebula no longer obeying 
the law of gravitation of the real – power itself eventually breaking apart in 
this space and becoming a simulation of power (disconnected from its 
aims and objectives, and dedicated to power effects and mass 
simulation).
25
 
 
Power loses its effect – joins, in effect, the hyperreal – because what it attempts to 
                                                             
25 ‘Simulacra and Simulations’, p. 179. Emphasis is Baudrillard’s. 
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hold power over is not itself real. This fits the situation of the American family 
and their ghost. Neither has power in the narrative, because each denies the 
other’s reality: the ghost refuses to accept that the American family is not going to 
cooperate with being haunted, the American family does not accept that the ghost 
expects the proper reactions to being haunted. Of course this state of affairs ends 
as soon as the daughter does find the underlying truth of the ghost; the realm of 
the hyperreal is left behind, the ghost laid to rest, and the daughter marries a 
beautiful English man. The ending is fairytale, almost too much so – and in being 
in this sense unreal, the conclusion turns out to be that there is no escaping the 
hyperreal after all. Reality, in ‘The Canterville Ghost’, is deferred through its 
representation as picture-perfect. Again Wilde’s writing shows remarkable 
similarities with the postmodern theory on hyperreality. 
 Such picture-perfection is satirized again by Wilde in The Importance of 
Being Earnest. There, too, Wilde defers reality in the ending by creating an end 
that is unlikely in its perfection: all of the characters end up reunited and happy in 
some form or another, sometimes in the most implausible manner. Critics such as 
Christopher Craft and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick have read the ending of The 
Importance of Being Earnest in the context of Wilde’s same-sex desires, reading 
the joking perfection of the play’s oddly sterile heterosexual resolution as an 
explicit comment on Victorian restrictions on the matter: ‘in lieu of “serious” 
closure, and as if to deride even the possibility of formal solution to the fugitivity 
of Bunburying desire, Wilde terminates his play, farcically and famously, with an 
impudent iteration of his farce’s “trivial” but crucial pun’.26 Such representations 
                                                             
26 Christopher Craft, ‘Alias Bunbury: Desire and Termination in The Importance of Being 
Earnest’, Representations, 31.3 (1990), 19-46 (p. 34). 
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are another kind of Wildean hyperreality, as Wilde very much questions the 
hyperreality of a picture-perfect heterosexual ending in much the same way as he 
questions the picture-perfect ending of ‘The Canterville Ghost’. 
 Additionally, The Importance of Being Earnest again confirms that Wilde’s 
thought follows the development of hyperreality as defined by Arva. Wilde 
subverts the genre of the play – specifically the late-Victorian social comedy – by 
actively playing with its generic conventions, or as Todorov has stated, ‘we would 
have to say that a given work manifests a certain genre, not that this genre exists 
in the work’.27 The manifestation is where Wilde employs the stages of 
hyperreality, starting with normal human beings who reflect reality; then with the 
men attempting to resemble fictitious people, such as Ernest; finally with the 
confusion between a human and ‘a three-volume novel of more than usually 
revolting sentimentality’ (p. 413). These are the first three steps, with only the 
complete loss with reality still to come. The ending of Earnest seems to suggest a 
return to normal reality, but the ridiculously picture-perfect ending is in effect so 
artificial – especially considering the normal endings of other plays in the genre – 
that it resembles much more the final stage of hyperreality, the loss of all 
connection with reality. 
Magical Realism in The Picture of Dorian Gray 
Baudrillard argues that power is not entirely defenceless against the nullifying 
effects of hyperreality. ‘The only weapon of power, its only strategy against this 
deflection’, he writes, ‘is to reinject realness and referentiality everywhere, in 
order to convince us of the reality of the social, of the gravity of the economy and 
                                                             
27 Tzvetan Todorov, The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre, trans. by Richard 
Howard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), p. 21. 
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the finalities of production. For that purpose it prefers the discourse of crisis, but 
also – why not? – the discourse of desire’.28 And the topic of desire signals some 
additional ways in which Wilde’s writing resembles writing on hyperreality in The 
Picture of Dorian Gray, the story of the man who fell through the fulfilment of his 
every desire. 
 The Picture of Dorian Gray’s hyperreality is in part linked to the critical 
term ‘magical realism’. Magical realism is a postmodern narrative mode closely 
linked to hyperreality, which is to say that ‘magical realist representation and 
hyperreality are, in fact, mutually inclusive’.29 The key here lies in the need for 
magical realism necessarily to try and represent reality, meaning that ‘magical 
realism, a postmodern phenomenon par excellence, does not so much create new 
realities as re-create our own reality – often by pushing its limits, true, but even 
more often by enhancing its black holes, its inaccessible spaces’.30 Thus magical 
realism is a specific and artificial representation of reality, just as hyperreality is. 
 Perhaps the most well-known novel that employs magic realism is the 
Booker of Bookers, Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children (1980). Like Dorian 
Gray, it is a work of magical realism, in the sense that it introduces a supernatural 
or magical effect into an otherwise mundane setting. The story is told in a realistic 
manner, but with the introduction of fantastical elements: in the case of Dorian, a 
magical portrait that will bear his ageing and sins, while in the case of Midnight’s 
Children’s protagonist, Saleem Sinai, a supernatural gift of telepathy or smell due 
to a birth close to the hour of India’s independence on the night of August 15th, 
1947, their powers dependent on the exact moment of birth: ‘the closer to 
                                                             
28 ‘Simulacra and Simulations’, p. 179. 
29 Arva, p. 70. 
30 Arva, p. 69. 
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midnight our birth-times were, the greater were our gifts’.31 The objective tone of 
Wilde’s novel coupled with its logical progression suggest that Dorian Gray is a 
suitable example of the genre; in addition, it may be classed as magical realism 
due to the nature of its storyteller, the events and distinct shift in narrative at the 
end, and the nature of the portrait. All of these resemble hyperreality in 
conjunction with magical realism. 
 Dorian’s portrait itself has already been described as a simulacrum: with 
its detachment from Dorian’s appearance early on in the novel, the portrait 
essentially loses its connection with its original and a step is made towards 
hyperreality. This happens when Dorian and his portrait move farther and farther 
apart in terms of appearance. The reader must trust the portrait – which is no 
longer a direct physical representation of Dorian – to provide information on the 
depth of Dorian’s downward spiral. To make matters worse, when Dorian reveals 
the portrait to Basil, the figure in the portrait has aged horribly despite Dorian 
being thirty-eight years old. This is described first in chapter thirteen, where the 
portrait is observed by Basil, who notices ‘there was still some gold in the 
thinning hair and some scarlet on the sensual mouth. The sodden eyes had kept 
something of the loveliness of their blue, the noble curves had not yet completely 
passed away from chiselled nostrils and from plastic throat’ (p. 115). Then in 
chapter twenty it is described through Dorian’s eyes: ‘He could see no change, 
save that in the eyes there was a look of cunning and in the mouth the curved 
wrinkle of the hypocrite […] And why was the red stain larger than it had been? It 
seemed to have crept like a horrible disease over the wrinkled fingers’ (p. 158). 
                                                             
31 Salman Rushdie, Midnight’s Children (London: Vintage, 2006), p. 275. 
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Clearly the portrait has aged considerably – it could be said excessively – and this 
brings into question the accuracy of the portrait: the reader is left to determine for 
themselves whether Dorian has aged more quickly because of his debauched 
lifestyle, or whether the portrait is simply giving an exaggerated or stylized 
representation of Dorian’s decay. And these are just two of the many options. The 
portrait does not allow itself to be accurately perceived. Nor is Dorian himself 
trustworthy: his corruption is constantly hinted at by the narrator, and his name is 
rumoured, though never connected, throughout the narrative with scandal. 
Nevertheless he remains beautiful, perhaps the kind of beauty that Wilde describes 
in ‘The Soul of Man Under Socialism’, that true beauty which inspires. What the 
actual state of affairs is, however, remains clouded, shielded from the reader. The 
portrait should be the reality, with Dorian the lie, but under closer consideration 
these two collapse into something less definite. There is a single thing: Dorian, the 
pure, beautiful, corrupt, ugly man and/or portrait, neither truth nor lie, neither real 
nor illusionary. 
 The book shares this feature with Midnight’s Children. Here, too, there is a 
portrait that bears sins – although in the case of Rushdie’s novel, the protagonist is 
himself the portrait, incorporating within his body the unification of India. This is 
meant both literally – Saleem and India both enter the world at the exact same 
moment, and Saleem seemingly disintegrates as India does when it cedes, for 
example, Pakistan – but also figuratively, as the narrator envisions the story, a 
uniquely intimate view on Indian independence, as blood seeping from a 
disintegrating body: ‘history pours out of my fissured body’.32 
                                                             
32 Rushdie, p. 45. 
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 There is another magical reality element to The Picture of Dorian Gray at 
the end of the novel, which conforms to the way magical realist narratives 
represent traumatic events: a hyperreal occurrence called ‘traumatic 
imagination’.33 This traumatic imagination entails the deferral of reality, as 
previously mentioned by Baudrillard. Rather than render whatever the traumatic 
event is, it is transferred into the imagination. In short, the event is constructed in 
imagination rather than produced directly. There are specific types of moments 
during narrations where such deferral manifests itself: ‘as a process of traumatic 
imagination, magical realist writing keeps alive the illusion and the mystery 
inherent in phenomenal knowledge, particularly when the object of that 
knowledge is pain or death.’34 
 This narrative technique is found several times in the novel, but the most 
striking example comes at the end, when Dorian impulsively attacks his portrait. 
He has just found out that the remorse and the subsequent new beginning, which 
he was trying to claim for himself, amount to nothing but another ugly twist in the 
portrait’s appearance, and another fresh bloodstain. At the moment of the attack, 
the narrator pulls away to focus on the reactions of others to the murder, most 
notably the things heard by Dorian’s servants. The moment is deferred at exactly 
the point where the death takes place. Wilde in this way ‘keeps alive the illusion 
and the mystery’, and moreover does so at the moment of death, which is singled 
out by the quotation as an important defining feature. Furthermore, with this 
disappearance from the narrative Dorian in a sense becomes  
 
                                                             
33 Arva, p. 61. 
34 Arva, pp. 73-74. 
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the hyperreal, the constantly vanishing real: a world void of original 
referents either because extreme events have rendered them inaccessible, 
or because they have become too familiar and too trite, blurred by the 
successive layers of simulacra that pervade all too much of contemporary 
discourse.
35
 
 
Dorian’s fate indeed becomes inaccessible; the reader is told some things through 
the words and reactions of others, but Dorian himself has departed from the 
narrative. 
 Again there is a parallel with Midnight’s Children, where the narrator is 
also doomed. This death, too, is deferred – and must be, as Rushdie’s suggestion 
is that Saleem’s final disintegration on the eve of 31 years will simultaneously be 
the disintegration of India. Saleem’s final words ring before his own death, an 
event constantly foretold in the book, but averted as a traumatic event – after all, 
Saleem describes his own death as ‘cracking now, fission of Saleem, I am the 
bomb in Bombay, watch me explode, bones splitting breaking beneath the awful 
pressure of the crowd’ – a rather gruesome anticipation, indeed.36 
 Finally, the novel’s ending provides another link between Wildean writing 
and hyperreality in the role played by deterrence. According to Baudrillard, 
‘hyperreality and simulation are deterrents of every principle and of every 
objective; they turn against power this deterrence which it so well utilized for a 
long time itself’.37 This allows an ending for the novel in which the painting is 
considered to be hyperreal. Following Baudrillard’s quotation, this explains 
                                                             
35 Arva , p. 81. 
36 Rushdie, p. 647. 
37 ‘Simulacra and Simulations’, p. 179. 
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Dorian’s rashly impulsive act in terms of an attempt to reassert his power. 
Manifesting power’s desire to reinject reality into an uncertainty (a portrait that 
seems to twist whatever good intention he might have), Dorian tries to destroy the 
painting. The painting, however, can be said to ‘turn against power this 
deterrence’ quite literally. Dorian has not been exposed to reality, but his attempt 
to attack the painting causes the painting to turn it against him. Crucially this 
riposte on the portrait’s behalf is not to return Dorian’s ‘true’ appearance to him, 
but to manifest the fact that their beings are blurred, confused. Dorian and his 
portrait, in the hyperreal sense, cannot be told apart, and so Dorian’s attack on the 
canvas is also an attack upon himself. 
 Thus, Wilde’s work explores representation in similar ways to 
Baudrillard’s simulacrum and hyperreality. There is more, however, in Wilde’s 
discussion of representation, especially considering the many ways in which 
portraiture of one sort or another plays a part in his many works. This further 
exploration of representation is the topic of the next chapter. 
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Chapter VI  Portraiture, Reading and the Surface 
 
Curiously enough for someone whose complete works evoke only a few 
photographic portrait but at least six painted portraits, Wilde never had himself 
painted – that is to say, never by anybody but himself, through his own words. 
Instead there are the posed photographs that pervade editions of the biographies 
and collected works: Wilde, here with short hair, here with long; here posing as a 
dandy, here as a Victorian gentleman; here an artist, here a man of rich 
commercial and theatrical success. Richard Ellmann captured this part of Wilde’s 
life well when he wrote of him: 
 
Wilde had long been concerned with images. He had painted self-portrait 
after self-portrait: at Trinity College he experimented with a beard, then 
shaved it off; he let his hair grow long at Oxford and had it waved, then in 
Paris had it cut and curled Roman-style, then let it grow long again. […] 
No wonder he spoke often about poses and masks. ‘The first duty in life is 
to assume a pose,’ he said, ‘what the second duty is no one yet has found 
out.’1 
 
The pervasive concept of portraiture suggests an opposition of surface and depth. 
After all, Wilde cryptically states that ‘all art is at once surface and symbol. Those 
who go beneath the surface do so at their peril’.2 This statement conflates surface 
                                                             
1 Richard Ellmann, Oscar Wilde (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1987), pp. 293-294. 
2 Oscar Wilde, The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003), p. 
17. Further references to Wilde’s work from this edition are given after quotations in the text. 
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and symbol, with the symbol being the suggested depth. Wilde’s warning about 
going beneath the surface is ambiguous: either the depth beneath the surface is 
full of peril, or the notion of going beneath the surface is perilous in itself, 
because Wilde states there is no such thing as depth beneath the surface, only an 
amalgamation of the two, the surface and symbol at once. The first indicates a 
classic signifier – signified relationship in the Saussurian tradition, while the latter 
is along the lines of deconstruction’s collapsed binary – as established in Chapters 
I and II. Thus it would be a tenuous assumption to attribute an automatic other 
half – depth – to Wilde, simply and only because he shows great interest in image 
and surface. 
 Wilde’s interest in foregrounding the problem of depth and surface is 
something he has in common with postmodernism. This common link shows in 
his strong interest in portraiture: in Wilde’s portraits there is often the suggestion 
of depth where there actually is nothing – an element shown, for example, in ‘The 
Sphinx Without a Secret’, or in The Picture of Dorian Gray, where Dorian 
confuses depth and surface in his wish to become ageless like the portrait. The 
problematic issue of depth is there throughout Wilde’s writing. 
 
Surfaces 
The distinction between depth and surface originates in the idea of meaning – the 
very idea undermined by the disappearance of the stable self in postmodernism. 
The complication of surface and depth is basically the move from structuralism to 
post-structuralism and the complication of the Saussurian binary relationship 
between signifier and signified. Previously any surface – be it a poem, a statue, a 
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painting, or any such thing – had encoded within it, somehow, its meaning, which 
is to say that the meaning was inherent in the thing itself, so that careful analysis 
would decode the meaning of such things hidden beneath the surface; there was, 
in other words, a clear distinction between the signifier and the signified. With the 
advent of postmodernism, however, the idea of something intrinsically carrying 
meaning – the ‘natural’ meaning encoded into it – became suspect (see Chapter 
III). As post-structuralists pointed out, signifiers ultimately point only to other 
signifiers. Previously there had been depth; now there is only surface. The reader 
is left ‘on a surface which seems happy to be nothing but surface, without the 
depths of significance which a literary education trains us to seek out’.3 Crucially, 
this is not to say that meaning becomes impossible in postmodernism. There is 
still meaning – and plenty of it – but it is engendered within the observer, or 
rather, the reader. With meaning thus becoming the responsibility of a reader, the 
text is left with only one aspect: the surface. 
 It is perhaps more accurate to say, however, as some critics have argued, 
that depth has not simply disappeared, but rather that the binary opposition of 
surface and depth has been collapsed. Thus it is possible to view the collapse of 
depth and surface in light of a similar collapse of other binaries with similar 
suggestions of separated appearance and content, as sketched by Gerd Gemünden: 
 
Conflation of inside and outside is indicative of the disappearance of other 
oppositions that are at the core of modernism, including the dialectics of 
essence and appearance; the Freudian model of latent and manifest, of 
                                                             
3 Peter Barry, Beginning Theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002). p. 86. The 
emphasis is Barry’s. 
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repression; the existential model of authenticity and inauthenticity 
(alienation and disalienation); and the great semiotic opposition between 
signifier and signified. The disappearance of these oppositions has 
radically changed our understanding of the relation of art to politics. 
Culture can no longer claim an autonomous or semi-autonomous sphere in 
the practical world.
4
 
 
To say that things are only surface is to be too literal; the capability of generating 
meaning is after all still there, somewhere. The distinction is no longer possible 
because meaning is not intrinsically present in the text, be it a poem, statue, or 
building. Thus the binary opposition regarding surface and depth becomes 
meaningless in this regard. The attention to ‘surface’, then, must be seen as an 
attention to the text after the ‘depth’ of intrinsic meaning has been stripped away. 
The emphasis on the collapse of this particular binary is a key postmodern idea: 
 
Attention to surfaces has, of course, always been important to modernist 
thought and practice (particularly since the cubists), but it has always been 
paralleled by the kind of question […] about urban life: how can we build, 
represent, and attend to these surfaces with the requisite sympathy and 
seriousness in order to get behind them and identify essential meanings? 
Postmodernism, with its resignation to bottomless fragmentation and 
ephemerality, generally refuses to contemplate that question.
5
 
 
                                                             
4 Gerd Gemünden, ‘The Depth of the Surface, or, What Rolf Dieter Brinkmann Learned from 
Andy Warhol’, German Quarterly, 68.3 (1995), 235-250 (p. 235). 
5 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1990), pp. 58-59. 
204 
 
This quotation also illustrates a problematic point in postmodern theory: the 
apparent disappearance of depth. This disappearance arguably entails a misreading 
of the surface versus depth argument, which does not so much get rid of depth, 
but, as stated before, transfers it to the realm of the subject, who is not the focus of 
the analysis. An example is the work of historical fiction, which presents the 
surface of a fictional account set in the supposed depth of actual historical 
circumstance. Wilde himself wrote two historical works, his two plays The 
Duchess of Padua and Vera, or the Nihilists (a third, A Florentine Tragedy, was 
never finished and remains only a small fragment). Of these two, Vera entails 
historical events, based as it is on the actions of Vera Zasulich in Russia in 1878. 
In general terms, the collapse of the specific surface/depth binary conflates both 
fictional narrative and historical circumstance into a single story, rather than 
fiction being overlaid on fact. In this way ‘postmodern fiction involves both the 
“installation” and the “subversion” of the history/fiction divide.’6 The work, 
presenting itself specifically as historical fiction, calls upon the concept of history, 
but proceeds to undermine, through the ‘subversion of the history/fiction’ 
opposition, that concept as part of its postmodern process. In Vera, for example, 
Wilde picks up several facts from Vera Zasulich’s story – her involvement in a 
plot that led to an assassination, the Russian Nihilist’s plot (and eventual success) 
to murder Tsar Alexander II, Vera’s own resistance against such ideas – but very 
emphatically constructs his own story, choosing to read history as inspiration 
rather than fact. Thus Zasulich’s murder of a Russian colonel becomes a meeting 
with a colonel in the play’s prologue as well as her assignment to assassinate 
                                                             
6 Michael McKeon, ‘The New Novel, the Postmodern Novel’, in Theory of the Novel: a Historical 
Approach, ed. by Michael McKeon (London: John Hopkins University Press, 2000), pp. 803-808 
(p. 808). 
205 
 
Alexis; the Nihilists become the driving motivation in forcing Vera to attempt the 
assassination; and Vera’s reluctance translates to a story of love and self-sacrifice 
when she stabs herself in order to save Alexis from his impending death. 
 The disappearance of the distinction between surface and depth is not 
limited to text. In photographic portraits, for example, it is impossible to find 
meaning beneath a surface because of a lack of determinable intent on the part of 
the photographer. ‘The body holding the camera can never be known by touch or 
sound but only by the photograph’s depiction of what was in front of the 
photographer’s eyes when the picture was taken.’7 Everything – including any 
conclusion about the person taking the photograph – must be observed in the 
surface of that photograph. The ‘reader’ of such a photograph has no intrinsic 
tools, no ‘touch or sound’, but must bring their own reading of the surface to bear 
on the photograph to be able to make any kind of conclusion, even about 
something as simple as the photographer responsible for the photograph. 
 Frederic Jameson has been vocal in proposing this collapse of the 
surface/depth binary. Though he is by no means the only one to explore this issue, 
he treats that collapse extensively in Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism. Here the foregrounding of surface is at the heart of his theoretical 
argument (though in Jameson the argument later takes a turn towards the 
textuality of perceived reality). Like other critics, Jameson argues that ‘depth is 
replaced by surface, or by multiple surfaces (what is often called intertextuality is 
                                                             
7 Laura Mandell, ‘Imaging Interiority: Photography, Psychology, and Lyric Poetry’, Victorian 
Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Social, Political, and Cultural Studies, 49.2 (2007), 218-
227 (p. 223). 
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in that sense no longer a matter of depth)’.8 Like other critics, he locates the 
disappearance of the surface-depth model in the context of the disappearance of 
binaries in general: 
 
In the shrinking world of the present day, with its gradual levelling of class 
and national and racial differences, and its imminent abolition of Nature 
(as some ultimate term of Otherness or difference), it ought to be less 
difficult to understand to what degree the concept of good and evil is a 
positional one that coincides with categories of Otherness.
9
 
 
This quotation echoes earlier points by Wilde on the disappearance or falsehood 
of the natural, as well as introducing several political points on Jameson’s part. 
The conflation of surface and depth, in the context of the binary in general, leads 
attention away from the text’s depth, its intrinsic meaning. 
 A Wildean interest in the surface has been remarked on by several critics, 
most notably by Jonathan Dollimore, who states that Wilde’s ‘transgressive 
aesthetic anticipates post-modernism to the extent that it suggests a culture of the 
surface, the decentered and the different’.10 Wilde cryptically stated his own 
position as art being ‘at once surface and symbol’. In the same preface, following 
his remarks on surface and symbol, he also states that ‘it is the spectator, and not 
life, that art really mirrors’ (p. 17). This suggests that the reader, the observer of 
                                                             
8 Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 
1991), p. 12. 
9 Frederic Jameson, ‘Magical Narratives: On the Dialectical Use of Genre Criticism’, in Modern 
Genre Theory, ed. by David Duff (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2000), pp. 167-192 (p. 
174). 
10 Jonathan Dollimore, Sexual Dissidence: Augustine to Wilde, Freud to Foucault (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 73. 
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the mirror’s surface, is really the one responsible for generating meaning. In just 
the same way, postmodern critics must ask where the interpretation of text comes 
from. In this regard, Jameson’s theoretical thought leads into another central 
approach: the rise, in the 1970s, of reader-response criticism. It is here that the 
strong correlations with Wilde resume. 
 
Reader Response 
One of the consequences of Jameson’s logic is that the surface becomes readable 
text: he concludes that ‘everything can now be a text in that sense (daily life, the 
body, political representations)’ and as a result ‘objects that were formerly 
“works” can now be reread as immense ensembles or systems of texts of various 
kinds, superimposed on each other by way of the various intertextualities, 
successions of fragments’.11 The disappearance of the surface-depth model 
transfers the emphasis to the role of the reader. With everything having become 
text, the observer – the reader of that text – is now seen to be responsible for 
constructing meaning.  
 The change foregrounds the approach of reader-response criticism, a 
critical approach that has its origins before the advent of postmodernism with 
thinkers such as Hans Robert Jauss and Wolfgang Iser. It concerns itself with the 
reader of literary works as much as, if not more than, with the work itself. It does 
so in light of its assumption that ‘literary works do not function as self-contained, 
autonomous objects, but rather as realities that become established by the readers 
                                                             
11 Cultural Logic, p. 77. 
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who consume them’.12 One of its most recognized proponents is Stanley Fish, 
who is most representative of a postmodern tradition that places the responsibility 
of generating meaning, much like Wilde, most emphatically with the reader. 
 Fish’s contribution to the debate is his assertion that it is not simply the 
reader in isolation who manifests meaning, but rather that such meaning is 
generated by groups of readers and in the context of a shared agreement of what a 
text can mean. As he puts it: 
 
It is the reader who ‘makes’ literature. This sounds like the rankest 
subjectivism, but it is qualified almost immediately when the reader is 
identified not as a free agent, making literature in any old way, but as a 
member of a community whose assumptions about literature determine the 
kind of attention he pays and thus the kind of literature ‘he’ ‘makes’. […] 
Thus the act of recognizing literature is not constrained by something in 
the text, nor does it issue from an independent and arbitrary will; rather, it 
proceeds from a collective decision as to what will count as literature, a 
decision that will be in force only so long as a community of readers or 
believers continues to abide by it.
13
 
 
First of all, Fish himself points out his problematic position, in that his approach 
seems to open the field to anyone, and to come up with any reading of any work, 
thus abandoning literary criticism to anarchy (something which, to a degree, is 
                                                             
12 Julian Wolfreys, Ruth Robbins and Kenneth Womack, Key Concepts in Literary Theory, 2nd 
edn (Edingburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), p. 149. 
13 Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities 
(London: Harvard University Press, 1982) p. 11. 
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less of a problem with Wilde, whose emphasis is partly on an elaborate, intensive 
process of art and criticism). However, in general readers do not manifest 
extremely varying readings of certain texts, and readings tend to be moderately 
stable, so that, for example, The Picture of Dorian Gray is often read as a novel 
about sexuality, or reading, or morality, but is unlikely to be read as an allegory of 
space travel or as addressing the problems of slavery, to name two outlandish 
examples. To account for this fact, Fish locates the reader within a community, 
which enforces certain types of reading while rejecting others. These various 
communities have varying, rather than set, rules for interpretation. This prevents 
readers from being entirely ‘free agents’, but still leaves a very considerable 
amount of freedom to the reader. 
 In the above passage, Fish stresses that interpretive communities are 
changeable: a way of reading is valid ‘so long as the community of readers or 
believers continues to abide by it’. This is his account of the changing nature of 
literary criticism: change happens simply because readers stop abiding by a 
previous interest and move on to the next. In order to account for changes in 
approaches to reading, strong readers (like, for example, Derrida or Jameson) 
persuade others of their approach: they ‘persuade by pointing to the aspects of the 
work that have not been pointed out before. Interpretation is thus inescapably 
descriptive, and what we describe is the way the work appears to us, the shape it 
has for us’.14 Others have since contributed other ways of explaining how 
interpretative approaches might change, suggesting, for example, a focus on 
connectivity. This solution requires an emphasis of the connection between 
                                                             
14 Reed Way Dasenbrock, ‘Accounting for the Changing Certainties of Interpretive 
Communities’, MLN 101.5 (1986), pp. 1022-1041 (pp. 1034-1035). 
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communities (for example, the connections between structuralism and post-
structuralism) rather than viewing communities as self-reliant islands, or 
deconstruction appearing as though out of nowhere. This is valid for both 
literature and criticism, as Reed Way Dasenbrock notes: ‘something similar is 
involved in the reading of criticism. No reader is ever as dominated or passive in 
the act of persuasion as Fish’s conversion model suggests. There is a general 
connection between our old position and our new’.15 
 Because of these problems, however, the idea of interpretive communities 
remains problematic. One critic summarizes the problems with Fish’s theoretical 
approach as follows: 
 
Can Fish be right, for example, in arguing that interpreters ‘create’ 
meanings without prompting from any preexistent text? Can it be true, as 
Fish argues in ‘How to Recognize a Poem When You See One,’ that the 
‘act of recognition’ is not ‘triggered’ by the features of texts or other 
objects, but itself ‘produces’ or ‘creates’ those features that we then 
imagine to exist independent of us? (325-7). And can the fact that 
interpreters come in subcommunities sufficiently explain how they change 
their minds? Don’t we necessarily assume that our readings are answerable 
to something outside our orbit of expectations?
16
 
 
In addition, readers can subscribe to theories but maintain their own variations on 
what they accept or reject in a theory. Such minor variations are also hard to 
                                                             
15 Dasenbrock, p. 1035. 
16 Gerald Graff, ‘Headnote to ‘Is there a Text in This Class?’’, in The Stanley Fish Reader, ed. by 
H. Aram Veeser (Oxford: Balckwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 38-40 (pp. 38-39). 
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account for in this theory; readers will have a hard time to determine ‘precisely 
what constitutes an interpretive community, how one enters such a community, 
how subgroups of individuals can be said to share meanings, truths, and so forth, 
within such a community’, which ultimately means that ‘for different individuals, 
everyone [forms] his/her own interpretive community of one’.17 This last point is 
extremely important, since rather than entailing a fatal criticism of interpretive 
communities, it instead points to the logical end-point of the critical journey. 
Readers are part of an interpretive community in a broad sense, but on an 
individual level, minor variations in the critical positions that the reader holds 
ultimately result in individual opinion. In other words, the more finely the 
community is defined, the more individual it becomes – and the closer, also, to a 
principle of Wildean individualism. 
 The emphasis on the problems with Fish’s theory of reader-response 
criticism presented above is important, because the same sorts of problems are 
contained in Wilde’s work. Fish’s arguments are persuasive but at times vague 
and, as seen above, do not always work when taken to logical extremes; Wilde’s 
arguments often suffers the same fate. 
 Wilde overlaps with the idea of interpretive communities in his strong 
awareness of the communal nature of approaches to reading and art – though for 
Wilde this often takes a negative form – and in the resulting emphasis on how 
meaning is generated. Wilde’s hostility to the public is obvious and apparently 
contradicts the idea of an interpretive community, as he seems to reject the idea of 
a communal approach to art and criticism as undesirable. So, for example, he 
                                                             
17 Hogan, pp. 145-46. 
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bitingly remarks that ‘The public imagine that, because they are interested in their 
immediate surroundings, Art should be interested in them also, and should take 
them as her subject-matter’ (p. 1077). He sees this as a bad influence that the 
‘public’ has on art. Yet in the acknowledgement of the fact of that influence, Wilde 
confirms that groups, rather than individuals, form such readings. Elsewhere he 
confirms clearly both that a group – in this case, a theatre audience – can hold 
communal views and that such views change. Speaking on the movement in 
theatre that seeks to introduce archaeological theory into artistic representation, he 
notes:  
 
The public have undergone a transformation; there is far more appreciation 
of beauty now than there was a few years ago; and though they may not be 
familiar with the authorities and archaeological data for what is shown to 
them, still they enjoy whatever loveliness they look at. (p. 1169) 
 
Wilde may not agree with the ways of reading promoted by these interpretive 
communities, but he clearly sees such communities at work, even when he does 
not explicitly name them. 
 This reading does go against the individualism that Wilde espouses 
elsewhere. In The Soul of Man Under Socialism, after all, Wilde argues that the 
quintessentially collectivist movement would ultimately lead to more and stronger 
individualism; and in The Critic as Artist, when Ernest protests that ‘the world’s 
greatest poems, great poems of the early world, the primitive, anonymous 
collective poems, were the result of the imagination of races, rather than of the 
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imagination of individuals’, Gilbert counters this by reducing the number of the 
group back to one: ‘Not when they became poetry. Not when they received a 
beautiful form. For there is no art where there is no style, and no style where there 
is no unity, and unity is of the individual’ (p. 1119). This last quotation, however, 
shows a process that Wilde has in common with Fish’s interpretive communities: 
like those communities, which go from many down to one depending on the 
specifics, Wilde emphasises that the sort of style he considers best is one of unity, 
‘and unity is of the individual’. Even in that fragment there is a move from the 
larger to the singular. And in any case, Wilde has already reserved the right for an 
artist to contract themselves, as explored in this thesis’ chapter on deconstruction. 
 Reader-response criticism, including the idea of interpretive communities, 
requires that the attention shifts to the reader. As Wilde puts it, criticism  
 
does not confine itself—let us at least suppose so for the moment—to 
discovering the real intention of the artist and accepting that as final. And 
in this it is right, for the meaning of any beautiful created thing is, at least, 
as much in the soul of him who looks at it, as it was in his soul who 
wrought it. (p. 1127) 
 
Rather than paying attention to only the artist’s intention (in the above quotation 
Wilde’s speaker has not quite worked up the courage to argue that those intentions 
are irrelevant) it is worthwhile to look at the observer’s reaction, at ‘him who 
looks at’ the beautiful works of art. 
In ‘The Critic as Artist’ Gilbert comments that ‘people sometimes say that 
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actors give us their own Hamlets, and not Shakespeare’s; and this fallacy – for it is 
a fallacy – is, I regret to say, repeated by […] the author of Obiter Dicta. In point 
of fact, there is no such thing as Shakespeare’s Hamlet’ (p. 1131). The ideal 
portrayal of Hamlet on stage signals that what the critic is looking for is, in other 
words, not within the text, but within themselves. Or, as Fish points out, ‘the 
reading or hearing of any play or poem involves the making of judgments, the 
reaching of decisions, the forming of attitudes, the registering of approval and 
disapproval, the feeling of empathy or distaste, and a hundred other things’.18 
Wilde and Fish agree on interpretation, even as it is being played out on stage. 
In terms of the role of the reader, Wilde goes one step further in ‘Pen, 
Pencil and Poison’. Here he introduces into the consideration of reading and 
morality a point that is quite similar to Fish’s concept of interpretive communities. 
At the end of the essay, after having narrated the events of Thomas Wainewright’s 
death, there is a short consideration on art, sin, and morality. Wilde, in this case, is 
writing in defence of sin, insofar as he feels that it should not preclude the artist’s 
work from being considered, if that artist has committed some kind of sin or 
crime. In fact Wilde can imagine ‘an intense personality being created out of sin’ – 
the personality that is, as argued earlier, the source of interpretation (p. 1106). 
However in doing so, Wilde acknowledges the weight of public morality that is 
against him. He protests against this, arguing that ‘there is no essential incongruity 
between crime and culture’ in an attempt to keep the consideration of 
Wainewright’s art a possibility, and follows by suggesting that ‘we cannot re-write 
the whole of history for the purpose of gratifying our moral sense of what should 
                                                             
18 Stanley Fish, ‘With the Compliments of the Author: Reflections on Austin and Derrida’, The 
Stanley Fish Reader, ed. by H. Aram Veeser (Oxford: Balckwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 56-113 (p. 
68). 
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be’ (p. 1106). 
In this suggestion Wilde acknowledges the idea of an interpretive 
community, in that he envisions such a community at work judging Wainewright’s 
art in view of his life. The community is one that favours moral elements in 
interpretation. Crucially Wilde’s objection is not against this communal sense, but 
rather against the – in his eyes faulty – critical assumptions made by that group, 
the prioritization of morality over artistic appreciation. This is a common move in 
Wilde, who often speaks in a demeaning manner about the English public or other 
such group, but the fault always lies in that group’s moral decisions. In fact Wilde 
is not opposed to groups banding together if they share a common interpretative 
goal. In one of the essays, there is even a name for one of these: the ironically 
named ‘tired hedonists’ of ‘The Decay of Lying’, whose stated goals are both ‘a 
sort of cult for Domitian’ – presumable Wilde’s reference to the Roman emperor 
instituting a cult of personality – and boredom, which ‘is one of the objects of the 
club’ (p. 1073). And in his two essays ‘The Decay of Lying’ and ‘The Critic as 
Artist’ the speakers are attempting to sway others to join them in their style of 
criticism, showing that the theoretical idea of individualism does not exclude the 
sharing of the practice (all approaching the text by foregrounding one’s subjective 
approach). After all, both Vivian and Gilbert could have excluded their 
conversation partners from the full brunt of their argument, thus manifesting true 
individualism; but rather they work to include them in their interpretive 
community. Or, to phrase it differently: at the smallest level the work may be 
individual, but the theory requires a group of people espousing it, an interpretive 
community. 
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It would be too far-reaching to suggest that Wilde champions the idea of 
the interpretive community, and with good reason; after all he is a proponent of 
the personal, and of personal freedom, and, as noted, is repeatedly hostile to larger 
groups of people (even if that hostility is directed more to their unthinking nature 
than to their unification). Wilde is undeniably aware of the effect, though, and 
acknowledges it even as he sees it as fraught with danger. That danger, however, 
is inherent in many of the ways in which he explores theories or puts them into 
practice in his fiction, poetry, and theatrical work. After all, when he relates the 
incident of life following art in ‘The Decay of Lying’, it is a story of the downfall 
of a woman through art’s influence. Similarly Dorian Gray meets his doom when 
he misattributes meaning to a portrait, where meaning is actually not inherent in 
the work of art, but rather in the observer. And, as will be shown, the attribution of 
meaning, the searching for depth beneath the surface, is repeatedly a very 
dangerous activity in Wilde’s fiction. 
 
Portraiture and the Surface 
Wilde’s short story ‘The Sphinx Without a Secret’ deals with portraiture as a 
theme playing on the distinction between surface and depth. It presents Lady 
Alroy, a woman who is surrounded by an air of mystery. She is desired by Lord 
Murchison, who follows her one day to unknown rooms, where she spends a few 
hours. Thinking he has found out some terrible secret she is attempting to hide, 
perhaps having caught her at an affair, he confronts her. She denies that anything 
went on, but he does not believe her and leaves England for a month. When he 
returns she is dead, and he goes to the rooms that she visited, only to learn that the 
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woman came to them a few hours every so often, and took tea there and read – 
nothing else. The story’s narrator, who has just heard this account from the man in 
question, then guesses at the facts of it all: the woman was after all speaking the 
truth, and she had just rented the rooms to add to her air of mystery. She is the 
titular Sphinx without a secret. 
 In this very short story, Wilde is playing with depth and surface, as is first 
signalled by the way in which Lady Alroy is introduced: through her photographic 
portrait. Here immediately Wilde brings the surface to the foreground, first in the 
nature of the photograph being only a surface, but also in it being the only 
physical representation of Lady Alroy, who by the start of the story has already 
died. The man who loved her literally has nothing but her surface left to him. 
 Upon observing the portrait, the narrator describes his reaction, first by 
noting how she appears: ‘She was tall and slight, and strangely picturesque with 
her large vague eyes and loosened hair. She looked like a clairvoyante, and was 
wrapped in rich furs.’ Immediately, however, the narrator picks up on something 
more in the photograph: 
 
It seemed to me the face of some one who had a secret, but whether that 
secret was good or evil I could not say. Its beauty was a beauty moulded 
out of many mysteries – the beauty, in fact, which is psychological, not 
plastic – and the faint smile that just played across the lips was far too 
subtle to be really sweet. (p. 205) 
 
This description, coming naturally after the introduction of Lady Alroy as all 
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surface – a photograph – seems to enact the depth-surface binary rather than 
collapse it, and furthermore it seems to suggest some inherent meaning in the 
photograph; after all the narrator glimpses Lady Alroy’s obsession for secrets just 
from looking at the photograph, without a word about her having been said to him 
by anyone. However, there is neither depth under the photograph’s surface, nor 
inherent meaning in the thing itself, as it turns out. 
 First of all, the idea that there is somehow inherently a kind of meaning in 
the photograph turns out to be, upon closer examination, due to something else 
entirely. Earlier in the story, the narrator and Lord Murchison have been talking 
about women, with Murchison admitting that he does not understand them; his 
enigmatic replies and obviously anxious state cause the narrator to remark ‘I 
believe you have a mystery in your life, Gerald’ (p. 205). The concept of mystery 
appears again when Gerald tries to steer the conversation away from Lady Alroy. 
The narrator refuses: ‘“I want to hear about you first,” I said. “Tell me your 
mystery”’ (p. 205). In response to this, the narrator is given the photograph that he 
then describes as mysterious. This can be no surprise, though, and the mystery 
hardly lies in the photograph itself; it is clearly very much in the narrator’s mind, 
who has referred to mystery twice just before being handed, in mute (and 
enigmatical) response, Lady Alroy’s picture. He is thus not responding to 
something inherent in the photograph, but rather to something within himself that 
is drawn out by his ‘reading’ of the photograph, namely ‘the forming of attitudes, 
the registering of approval and disapproval, the feeling of empathy or distaste’ that 
Stanley Fish has noted accompany the act of reading.
19
 
                                                             
19 Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in 
Literary and Legal Studies (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), p.50. 
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 The rest of the story can almost be read as a parable in terms of Wilde’s 
warning, in the introduction to The Picture of Dorian Gray, that one can only go 
beneath the surface at one’s own peril. For this is exactly the error that Lord 
Murchison makes. When he confronts her, Lady Alroy rightly tells him that she 
has done nothing at the mysterious rooms where she spent a few hours. Although 
she does not tell him that she goes there only to create a sense of mystery about 
her, she is not lying to him at all, and perhaps is unable to relate to him exactly 
what it is she does, for fear that it will drive him away. However, Lord Murchison 
does not choose to take the image as it is – the surface only – and assumes that 
there is something beneath the surface. He concludes that she must be hiding it 
from him, and leaves her. Murchison is then appropriately punished for this 
mistake (much like Dorian will be punished for his) by losing the woman he 
loves. It is an essential moment where the course of the story may be taken in a 
fairly straightforward manner to follow the contrast between surface-only and 
surface-depth models, with the negative development in the story bound to the 
wrong choice of models. 
 This suggests a necessary revisiting of the lines on surface and symbol in 
the preface of The Picture of Dorian Gray. The surrounding lines are as follows: 
 
All art is at once surface and symbol. 
Those who go beneath the surface do so at their peril. 
Those who read the symbol do so at their peril. 
It is the spectator, and not life, that art really mirrors. (p. 17) 
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In the context of ‘The Sphinx Without a Secret’, where the danger of assuming 
depth where there is none is made clear, one way of reading these lines becomes 
immediately obvious. The line ‘all art is at once surface and symbol’ could entail a 
collapsing of the surface-depth binary, with the next line warning about the 
dangers of it. ‘The Sphinx Without a Secret’ clearly signals that danger. The next 
line, ‘those who read the symbol do so at their peril’ then links together the 
concepts of going beneath the surface, and reading the symbol, by their 
association with peril, thus suggesting their similarity. This again combines the 
idea of depth with the idea of danger, and again in the context of the Sphinx 
suggests the absence of depth. But now the following line also becomes 
important. Wilde’s claim that ‘it is the spectator, and not life, that art really 
mirrors’ already confirms what was argued earlier: that he views the burden of 
meaning to be on the shoulders of the reader or ‘spectator’, rather than that burden 
being intrinsically there in an art that carries within itself some fact about ‘life’. 
Now, in the context of these other lines, this suggestion becomes even stronger, as 
Wilde provides exactly the reason why it is the spectator who is mirrored. It is 
precisely because there is only the surface – a point reinforced also because Wilde 
combines, in this short passage of four lines, the words ‘surface’ followed by 
‘mirrors’. 
 However, a few instances in Wilde’s work seem to suggest that he does 
believe in a clear distinction between depth and surface, many of which are to do 
with various kinds of representation. There is, for example, the line in ‘The Truth 
of Masks’ where Wilde writes on a speech in Shakespeare that it ‘shows us the 
depth of feeling that underlies Rosalind’s fanciful wit and wilful jesting’ (p. 1158). 
221 
 
In every instance there is something that complicates this apparently 
straightforward presentation of surface and depth. The best example of a story that 
seems to introduce this distinction clearly is ‘The Model Millionaire’, from Lord 
Arthur Savile’s Crime and Other Stories. In this story, a distraught gentleman, 
Hughie Erskine, a ‘delightful, ineffectual young man with a perfect profile and no 
profession’, comes face to face with a modelling vagrant in a painter’s studio (p. 
209). Hughie is distraught because he is in love, but does not have the money to 
be allowed to marry the girl. He does, however, give some of it to the vagrant out 
of pity. The vagrant then turns out to be one of the richest men in Europe, a 
millionaire who is having himself painted as a beggar on a whim; touched by 
Erskine’s kindness, the millionaire gives him the £10,000 required to marry. 
 The problems in this story, in terms of surface and depth, become 
immediately obvious. Like Lord Murchison and Dorian Gray, the main character 
mistakes the surface and depth – but rather than those two characters, he 
immediately assumes the surface is all there is, and acts accordingly: he is faced 
with a beggar, and therefore gives him money. He is not punished for his 
misreading, like the other two characters. Furthermore there seems to be a clear 
distinction here between the appearance of the beggar (surface) and his actual 
nature as a millionaire (depth). 
 However, in reading the story like a parable (much like ‘The Sphinx 
Without a Secret’) it actually turns out to be an endorsement of reading the surface 
rather than assuming the depth. Hughie Erskine follows all the rules of a good 
Wildean critic. His interpretation of the figure in rags as a beggar comes from the 
man’s appearance; furthermore, it fits in the context of the narrative for Erskine to 
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assume the figure to be an unfortunate man in need of some money, because that 
is exactly what is on Erskine’s mind as he enters the painter’s studio: Hughie 
‘looked very glum in those days’ on account of lacking the money to be allowed 
to marry his love (p. 209). His response to the man is based on his own reading, 
which is informed by his state of mind when he first sees him. It would rather 
have been a problem if Erskine had somehow picked up on the ‘true’ nature of the 
man as being a millionaire – but there is no trace of that in the narrative; indeed 
Erskine is surprised when the true nature of the vagrant is revealed to him. It is 
also important that Erskine is actively rewarded for this version of reading. He 
takes things to be as they appear on the surface and, as a result, ends up with the 
money he needs to marry. In this sense, too, the millionaire’s appearance being 
distinguished through either surface or depth becomes unimportant: it is the 
acknowledgement of what he is projected to be, and not the search for something 
hidden behind that appearance, that is rewarded in the story. 
 It was shown in the previous chapter that, in ‘The Portrait of Mr. W. H.’, 
Wilde presents meaning as transmitted through the portrait – or rather that the 
Willie Hughes theory of the Sonnets was transmitted through the portrait. Though 
the theory did not originate from the portrait itself, but had to be supplied in the 
portrait’s presence for the effect to occur, this still leaves some impression that 
there is something inherent in the portrait that causes this conversion or re-
enchantment with the Hughes theory. 
 It becomes possible now, after the discussion on surface and reading, to 
clarify exactly how the portrait achieves its effects. The forgery in ‘The Portrait of 
Mr. W. H.’ consists of surface only – much like the postmodern historical novel, it 
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is a representation that suggests a surface (Hughes’s portrait) and a depth (Hughes 
having existed) with that depth essentially missing, since Hughes never existed. It 
does gain power in the presence of the Hughes theory, but it is utterly dependent 
on that theory for its power, having none of its own. The portrait-effect that the 
painting has is very similar to the effect of the photograph of Lady Alroy: where 
the Sphinx’s photo gained mystery and power because of prior mentioning of 
mystery and distress, the forgery gains power and influence exactly because it is 
presented to the narrator after a long discussion on forgeries, and with a certain air 
of importance: the owner of the portrait refers to it, before its unveiling, as ‘the 
only legacy I ever received in my life’ (p. 302). Additionally death surrounds the 
portrait as much as it does the photograph, and in the same way as Murchison is 
punished for confusing surface with the hint of depth, so is there a similar 
succession of deaths in ‘The Portrait of Mr. W. H.’: first Erskine loses Graham in 
the first misreading (mistaking the portrait as carrying truth about the Hughes 
theory), and then the narrator loses Erskine in a repetition of the first situation. 
Indeed all meaning is attributed to and through the portrait, and resides in the 
minds of its observers, or spectators, or readers; and the penalty for misreading, 
for assuming depth where there is only surface, is grave indeed. 
 
(Auto)biography as Portraiture 
Another aspect of portraiture, especially portraiture in text, is the (auto)biography. 
Traditionally the field has been very strongly delineated, with biographers being a 
particular category of writers and academics: not quite literary critics, not quite 
historians (though in many instances those critics and historians do engage in 
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biography). As with other (literary) fields, however, this has changed, and the 
status of biography is less clearly demarcated than it previously was. The unified 
whole of biography used to include such things as truthfulness, for example; but 
as it turns out, such assumptions are being questioned with the move of biography 
into the field of the literary. 
 Biography is also a theme in literature, however, and that is the starting 
point. One writer who is also a critic, and whose creative work touched on 
(auto)biography, is David Lodge. Though Lodge was always a writer, he was 
simultaneously also an academic, holding a position at the University of 
Birmingham. There he taught most notably in Victorian literary subjects until his 
retirement in 1987, after which he became a full-time novelist. His work 
frequently deals with academics and the world of the university; thus, Lodge 
writes from a position that is uniquely suited to Wilde’s ideal as the critic-artist 
producing both criticism and fiction. 
 Lodge’s use of academics in fiction can be seen in what has been dubbed 
Lodge’s ‘critifiction’, a term suggested by Siegfried Mews and meant to describe 
writing ‘that is penned by critics and professors of literature who consciously 
endeavor to combine (critical) theory and (fictional) practice by engaging in the 
production of both sorts of texts’. One of the main authors ‘of the novel that is 
both inspired and informed by critical theory is David Lodge’.20 Such ‘critifiction’ 
might well be another term for the work of a critic-artist, if the requirement was 
loosened that it is only done by critics ‘and professors of literature’, a restriction 
that does not necessarily correspond with Wilde’s approach. 
                                                             
20 Siegfried Mews, ‘The Professor’s Novel: David Lodge’s Small World’, MLN, 104.3 (1989), 
713-726 (p. 714). 
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 More specifically, there is a correspondence between Wilde and Lodge in 
the treatment that both authors give to the concept of the autobiography: Lodge in 
Author, Author and Wilde in ‘The Critic as Artist’. This latter work presents a 
rather poor opinion of autobiography; indeed, Wilde’s opinion of autobiography in 
general is not very high. In the opening paragraphs of the dialogue, one of Wilde’s 
speakers notes of biographers: ‘we are overrun by a set of people who, when poet 
or painter passes away, arrive at the house along with the undertaker, and forget 
that their one duty is to behave as mutes. But we won’t talk about them. They are 
the mere body-snatchers of literature’ (p. 1109). Elsewhere, Wilde allows for a 
little more variation, though even there the position is all or nothing: in the 
preface to The Picture of Dorian Gray he writes that ‘the highest, as the lowest, 
form of criticism is a mode of autobiography’ (p. 17). The lowest form mentioned 
by Wilde here is one that both biography and autobiography have in common. 
That form deals with facts, with the representation of a life in dry, inartistic tones. 
It is that ‘highest’ mode, rather than the lowest, that is relevant here: it pertains to 
how Wilde believes the personality needs to be incorporated. 
 Wilde’s main objection to the biographers he so dismissively describes in 
‘The Critic as Artist’ is that they focus on others’ personalities rather than their 
own. Here again the central matter is art through intensified personality. The 
‘body-snatchers of literature’ do not follow this tenet; they write colourlessly on 
other literary personalities without projecting any of their own. Wilde would 
rather have it the other way: the inward eye is the best. As was already noted in 
Chapter III, Gilbert reminds Ernest:  
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If you meet at dinner a man who has spent his life in educating himself—a 
rare type in our time, I admit, but still one occasionally to be met with—
you rise from table richer, and conscious that a high ideal has for a 
moment touched and sanctified your days. But oh! my dear Ernest, to sit 
next to a man who has spent his life in trying to educate others! What a 
dreadful experience that is! (p. 1140) 
 
It is better, for Wilde, to increase your own personality rather than focus on that of 
others. It is, after all, through one’s own personality that others might be 
understood: ‘As art springs from personality, so it is only to personality that it can 
be revealed, and from the two comes right interpretative criticism’ (p. 1132). Here 
as in the rest of Wilde’s work, the focus is on the personal and the personality. 
 Perhaps the best example of Wilde’s idea of a biography is presented in 
The Portrait of Mr. W. H., where his portrayal of Willie Hughes centres on 
personality. Rather than giving a straightforward account of Hughes’s life as it 
might be gleaned from the Sonnets, Wilde has him presented through personality, 
or, to put it more clearly, has him created through strong individual acts. Hughes 
is a construct of the various characters in the story – including, crucially, the 
story’s narrator – and he is glimpsed only when they tease him out of the various 
details in Shakespeare’s Sonnets. Even the forged portrait is, in that sense, a 
manifestation of strong personal will, a criminal act undertaken to reinforce a 
highly personal assumption about a literary work. 
In Author, Author Lodge undertakes a biography of a real person, Henry 
James – an act that ought to damn him in Wilde’s eyes. However, Lodge’s project 
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is a fictional autobiography. The book makes use of historically accurate facts, of 
existing characters and even the actual words of books, novels, and so forth. This 
might only make matters worse, except that Lodge does more with James than 
merely hide behind the Victorian’s life and present a possible version of facts 
enhanced with some imaginative guesswork. Lodge’s treatment of James also 
contains Lodge’s own thoughts on the literary world and on being a writer, 
thoughts that come quite close to himself: 
 
David Lodge’s own writing, including fiction, drama and criticism, has of 
late frequently dealt with the literary marketplace and the issue of literary 
reputation. One sometimes senses — for example, when reading The Year 
of Henry James — that he feels he has never quite received his due as a 
writer. This topic informs Author, Author in a profound way, and the novel 
is an often moving reflection on the passions of the literary life.
21
 
 
Author, Author is primarily a book on Henry James, but through it, Lodge also 
explores the nature of authorship, of literary success and failure; and he does so 
through his own personal interpretation of it. In other words, the book gives its 
reader not simply Henry James, but James through the lens of David Lodge. 
 This, after all, is what autobiography – and criticism – is to Wilde, in the 
end. It is both autobiography and criticism (if the two could be kept separate) that 
rest on exactly this element on personality: as far as Wilde is concerned, it 
 
                                                             
21 J. Russell Perkin, ‘Imagining Henry: Henry James as a Fictional Character in Colm Tóibín’s 
The Master and David Lodge’s Author, Author’, Journal of Modern Literature, 33.2 (2010), 114-
130 (p. 123). 
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is what the highest criticism really is, the record of one’s own soul. It is 
more fascinating than history, as it is concerned simply with oneself. It is 
more delightful than philosophy, as its subject is concrete and not abstract, 
real and not vague. (p. 1125) 
 
Additionally, that is really where autobiography is to be found: ‘It is the only 
civilised form of autobiography, as it deals not with the events, but with the 
thoughts of one’s life; not with life’s physical accidents of deed or circumstance, 
but with the spiritual moods and imaginative passions of the mind’ (p. 1125). 
These are apt words for Lodge’s Author, Author, which engages with the same 
‘spiritual moods and imaginative passions of the mind’ in examining Henry 
James’s life. With its decidedly postmodern narrator, the book touches the same 
points on autobiography as the proto-postmodern Wilde. 
 Lodge, however, is far from being the only writer who has worked with the 
concept of autobiography. A.S. Byatt, like Lodge, is an academic who in later life 
turned to a writing career. She lectured in English at various academic institutions 
(mostly in London) from 1962 until 1983, at which point she was already a well-
known novelist. Byatt’s subsequent work retains a strong interest in the world of 
the university, including two novels set expressly within academic worlds: 
Possession (1990) and The Biographer’s Tale (2000). As such, she is another good 
example of the kind of artist-critic that is described by Wilde in Intentions. 
 In general, her writing achieves the same kind of blend of critical and 
creative thinking that also characterizes Lodge’s ‘critifiction’. Byatt shares these 
interests:  
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Like David Lodge, she has tended to produce novels which reflect her 
literary and theoretical interests. This tendency can be seen as part of a 
more general postmodernist movement towards a self-reflexive, knowing 
‘critical creativity’ in Derrida, Hartman et al., as they erase the divide 
between Dichter and Denker.
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Byatt herself has stated as much: ‘I have myself always felt that reading and 
writing and teaching were all part of some whole that it was dangerous to 
disintegrate.’23 As such she represents a good example of those proto-postmodern 
ideas that are present in Wilde – in this case, the blending of literature and 
criticism. 
 As with Lodge, the specific point of interest with Byatt lies in her use of 
biography. Biographical information forms the basis for the two aforementioned 
books, The Biographer’s Tale and Possession. Byatt’s approach to the former is to 
make use of an actual blend of fact and fiction: her protagonist becomes the 
biographer of a fictional biographer called Scholes Dentry-Scholes, but along the 
way learns a few things about that fictional biographer’s very real subjects, such 
as Ibsen and Linnaeus. Here, Byatt is not afraid to lie, in the Wildean sense of 
lying as (literary) art: some of these facts are true, some are false – or, at least, are 
true only within the world of the novel. It represents a playful attitude towards 
                                                             
22 Chris Walsh, ‘Postmodernist Reflections: A.S. Byatt’s Possession’, in Theme Parks, 
Rainforests and Sprouting Wastelands: European Essays on Theory and Performance in 
Contemporary British Fiction, ed. by Richard Todd (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000), pp. 185-194 (p. 
186). 
23 A.S. Byatt, ‘True Stories and the Facts of Fiction’, in On Histories and Stories: Selected Essays 
(London: Random House, 2000), pp. 91-122 (p. 92). 
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biography, where the biographer tells her readers that the work is fiction, but then 
introduces fact in order to blur boundaries between the two. 
 More clearly biographical in a Wildean sense is Possession. The literary 
subjects of the book’s biographer protagonists are themselves constructs; none of 
these figures or works exist, with the exception of a slight name or reference here 
and there, meant to believably fit these characters into their otherwise real literary 
period. In this regard the book is less playful than The Biographer’s Tale. Its only 
attempt at blurring boundaries between reality and fiction is the extent to which its 
invented literary characters and their works are brought to life. In Possession, 
Byatt presents the reader with two sets of parallel characters: a pairing of 
Victorian-era poets and their postmodern-era biographers. One clear way in which 
these characters are linked is through their biographical treatment, which starts out 
as typically impersonal. The main character Roland Michell’s work on the poet 
Randolph Henry Ash is portrayed as monotonous, grey, and leading him down 
what appears to be a dead end. Likewise academic Maud Bailey appears very 
stifled in the narrative, trapped, as it seems, in a rigidly determined, 
unquestioningly feminist way of life – her problem being neither her subject nor 
her place as a feminist, but a too-narrow, dogmatic adherence to working within 
the lines of that approach (rather than a (Wildean) blurring of boundaries). Roland 
and Maud’s respective biographical pursuits have not led anywhere. It is not until 
they start making a series of choices for themselves, and against the established 
grain, that their personal stories come alive for them, and ultimately the successful 
conclusion of their story – both biographically and romantically – hinges to a 
large degree on a sense of having found their own versions of the historical 
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literary figures they had been studying. Personality must be added to biography 
before it becomes worthwhile. 
 Byatt is also a storyteller. Some of the narratives of Possession are 
academic, but just as many are simply stories. Byatt’s interest in biographers is 
closely tied to an interest in storytelling in this respect; two other novels, The 
Children’s Book and The Djinn in the Nightingale’s Eye revolve centrally around 
it, and it is one of the main subjects of one of her collections of essays, On 
Histories and Stories. Once again taking Possession as an example, that interest in 
stories translates into an interest in the intertextual, in the various ways in which 
they may be told. In the novel, the reader gains information not merely from the 
main narrative following the character of Roland Michell, but from letters, journal 
entries, and poems, to name a few things. This is a typical way in which Byatt 
explores the possibilities of storytelling, and ‘intertextuality in her fiction works 
organically: her probing of the processes of narrative illuminates, and is 
inseparable from, the stories she tells’.24 This returns to the same point made 
earlier on Wilde’s own verbose storytelling. It also makes the point that this aspect 
in itself is not Victorian or dated, if such might be thought. 
 Byatt shows that a rich storyteller allows the exploration of intertextual 
elements. This, too, is the (proto-postmodern) Wildean storyteller, who digresses 
into vast descriptive passages; the critical voice that appears inconsistent within 
the span of a single critical volume; the narrator whose descriptions of a 
particularly seductive theory may or may not be given under influence of a 
strangely influential portrait. Moreover, the intertextual exploration points to 
                                                             
24 Jane Campbell, ‘Confecting Sugar: Narrative Theory and Practice in A.S. Byatt’s Short 
Stories’, Critique, 38.2 (1997), 105-122 (p. 106). 
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another way in which Wilde’s writing resembles postmodernism: the approach of 
intertextuality itself, and the crossover of academic disciplines that is in some way 
the result.  
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Part 3 Crossing Boundaries 
 
Wilde’s writing straddles many boundaries. The attempt to erase the lines between 
art and criticism signals a tendency in his work to cross boundaries of any kind. 
Wilde is constantly bringing elements into different genres: there is theatre in his 
essays, just as those essays contain lengthy visual descriptions, there is music in 
his poetry and his plays, and there are deliberate and clear lies in his truth. The 
author who moved from poetry to prose and criticism, and finally crowned that 
list with playwriting, did not limit himself to the idea that one thing should not be 
another. 
In this vein, Wilde’s work strongly resembles postmodern critical practice 
and ideas. Whereas previous approaches emphasized the isolated domain – 
isolating the study of language and meaning in, for example, formalism and 
structuralism – postmodern theory increasingly pays attention to combination, on 
the assumption that outlines of fields are always constructed and never ‘natural’ 
delineations of inherently stable, unified theoretical positions. This development 
had not only led to prominent theorists such as Derrida and De Man being able to 
move freely between diverse fields such as sociology and literary studies; it led to 
new theoretical factions. For example, no longer is the study of words and images 
strictly divided between literary and art criticism; now ekphrastic theory is 
entitled to speak for both. 
Chapter VII starts this discussion by examining the roots of fragmentation 
in postmodernity with a study of postmodern ideas of intertextuality, coupled with 
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Wilde’s own intertextual (and sometimes plagiarist) practice. Chapter VIII 
combines an overview of the newly emergent discipline of word and music 
studies with a survey of Wilde’s use of musical themes and techniques in his 
poetry, prose and in Salome. Finally, Chapter IX compares Wilde’s great attention 
and frequent invocation of the visual arts to the postmodern theoretical study of 
images represented in words, a recently re-developed critical field called 
ekphrasis. 
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Chapter VII Intertextuality and Plagiarism 
 
In 1881, in a well-known incident early in his career, Oscar Wilde sent a copy of 
his poems to the Oxford Union Library. The librarian had ordered the book from 
Wilde after it had appeared earlier that year. It was a standard move in the budding 
career of the young Wilde, who had yet to go to America, and who was at that 
time working to establish a reputation as a poet. Unfortunately for Wilde’s poetic 
aspirations, the Oxford Union was not to assist him in this particular literary 
ascent: in a narrow vote, the Union rejected the book and levelled an allegation of 
plagiarism against it, noting that the poems were ‘in fact by William Shakespeare, 
by Philip Sidney, by John Donne, by Lord Byron, by William Morris, by Algernon 
Swinburne, and by sixty more […]. The Union Library already contains better and 
fuller editions of all these poets’.1 
The charge of plagiarism, while a disappointment, was not one that Wilde 
actively sought to avoid. Rather he acknowledged it, and indeed seemed to have 
made it part of his literary technique. This tendency has been noted by many 
Wildean scholars such as Josephine Guy and Ian Small in Oscar Wilde’s 
Profession. Wilde’s stance towards plagiarism is neatly summed up in this way: 
 
Over the course of his literary career, he was repeatedly charged with 
plagiarism, and in at least one case he clearly practiced it: his 1886 
Chatterton lecture, the bulk of which he purloined from two other writers. 
In 1893 he boasted to Max Beerbohm: ‘Of course I plagiarise. It is the 
                                                             
1 Richard Ellmann, Oscar Wilde (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1987), p. 140 
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privilege of the appreciative man. I never read Flaubert’s Tentation de St 
Antoine without signing my name at the end of it. Que voulez-vous? All 
the Best Hundred Books bear my signature in this manner.
2
 
 
Indeed the charge of plagiarism is at the forefront of Wildean scholarship and its 
undeniable presence in the works of Oscar Wilde creates a problem for those 
scholars seeking to affirm Wilde’s place among English writers being read today. 
Arguably, interest in plagiarism has always been at the forefront of Wildean 
scholarship; before his partial rehabilitation by gender or queer studies in the 
1980s, Wilde was seen as derivative, and even today discussions of Wilde’s poems 
seldom escape the charges of imitation of poets such as Keats or Coleridge. The 
discussion also frequently arises with works such as An Ideal Husband or The 
Importance of Being Earnest – not to mention The Picture of Dorian Gray. These 
critical discussions often see Wilde’s plagiarism as a problem in the corpus that 
needs to be addressed, and offer various explanations before analysing Wilde’s 
frequent borrowings. Even a book as recent as Florina Tufescu’s Oscar Wilde’s 
Plagiarism: the Triumph of Art over Ego (2008) seeks to ‘settle the last remaining 
dispute in the field of Wilde studies, to remove the last objections to Wilde’s 
canonization’ by devoting a whole chapter (‘Plagiarism: A Decadent Tradition’) 
not to Wilde’s plagiarism, but rather to traditions of plagiarism itself, seeking to 
exonerate the tradition in order to exonerate the perpetrator.
3
 Another particular 
strategy has been to attempt to place Wilde’s plagiarist tendencies in the context of 
                                                             
2 Paul K. Saint-Amour, ‘Oscar Wilde: Orality, Literary Property, and Crimes of Writing’, 
Nineteenth-Century Literature, 55.1 (2000), 59-91 (p. 61). 
3 Florina Tufescu, Oscar Wilde’s Plagiarism: the Triumph of Art over Ego (Dublin: Irish 
Academic Press, 2008), p. 1. 
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political rebellion, as an act of appropriation on the part of an Irish writer targeting 
the English language. This particular reading of Wilde’s work may be too easy, 
however – even if Wilde, in this case, may very well be a criminal by choice. 
In fact Wilde’s (self-)plagiarism has seen attempts to explain it in ways 
ranging from criminality through orality to his Irish upbringing – all of which 
have seen ample critical attention and should come as no surprise to anyone 
familiar with scholarship on Wilde. However, there is one reading – a proto-
postmodernist reading – which has not been attempted: that of seeing Wilde’s 
plagiarism as an anticipation of the intense postmodern interest in intertextuality. 
It is entirely possible to put the Wildean ‘problem’ of borrowing and plagiarism 
into that different context, and to show a kind of justification for these literary 
crimes. When taken as proto-postmodernism, it becomes possible to read the 
instances of plagiarism as an intense interest, on Wilde’s part, in experimentation 
with intertextuality.  
 
Theories of Intertextuality 
The intertextuality under discussion here is of a specific kind. Intertextuality and 
borrowing in general have a long history, and it would be a mistake to claim that 
they manifest only in postmodern times. Literature has contained various degrees 
of intertextuality during different phases in literary history; for example, Anglo-
Saxon and early modern English literary tradition placed great emphasis on 
retelling rather than inventing stories, while the Renaissance saw a strong focus 
on imitation of the classical period, and the writer Sir Phillip Sidney wrote around 
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1579 in his Defense of Poesy that ‘Poesy, therefore, is an art of imitation’.4 
Originality and plagiarism as they are viewed currently are more recent terms, 
introduced later in literary history. The variation discussed here is specifically the 
keen critical interest that arose in the late twentieth century, signalled by critics 
like Barthes and Jameson, in the status of texts as interwoven with other texts, 
rather than being unique, autonomous works. 
The basic concept of intertextuality thus focuses on relationships between 
texts. As with any critical term used in delineating postmodernism, there is some 
debate about its exact nature; but the following standard definition gives a good 
impression: 
 
Intertextuality is the process whereby meaning is produced from text to 
text rather than, as it were, between text and world. The relationship 
between criticism and literature, for example can be seen to be of this 
kind. Elements from one text are offered to legitimate elements of another. 
The process though does not stop there, for many critical essays proceed 
from earlier essays, and it is a common critical play to legitimise a reading 
by way of such reference. The point is that this effort at meaning is 
vertiginous, and at no point arrives at a position of stability. The whole 
process cannot at any point insist upon ‘truth’.5 
 
The deferral of meaning links this particular concept of intertextuality very 
                                                             
4 Phillip Sidney, The Defense of Poesy, otherwise known as An Apology for Poetry, ed. by Albert 
S. Cook (Boston: Ginn & Company, 2011), p. 15. 
5 Rick Rylance, ‘Introduction’, in Debating Texts: Readings in 20th Century Literary Theory and 
Method, ed. by Rick Rylance (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), pp. 110-114 (p. 113). 
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strongly with postmodern approaches, primarily through its association with post-
structuralism. Thus there is a way in which the attention to signs and their 
unstable relationship is foregrounded in the postmodern take on intertextuality 
through an emphasis on textual relationship: ‘Thinking in Post-Structuralism […] 
tended to emphasize the ways in which signs, and their more complex relations – 
texts – depend upon each other for their meaning within the structures and 
frameworks of genre and discourse.’6 The whole of the system is interdependent, 
with a text’s only point of reference being other texts. In this way it becomes 
impossible to find a beginning, and the reader is left with only a mass of text. 
Within this postmodern – rhizomatic – mass, a concept of origin is meaningless: 
‘Every text, being itself the intertext of another text, belongs to the intertextual, 
which must not be confused with a text’s origins: to search for the “sources of” 
and “influence upon” a work is to satisfy the myth of filiation.’7 Postmodern 
intertextuality thus represents a greatly varied collection of signs without external 
reference points or, indeed, any form of escape. 
The discussion on intertextuality links up, in this way, to discussions in 
Part 1 of this thesis relating to post-structuralism and deconstruction. This is not 
the only way in which it builds on subjects discussed earlier, however. Returning 
to the discussion on reader-response, there is a clear common element in 
intertextuality and reader-response theory, in that knowledge of particular 
intertextual elements strongly determines what any given reader will pick up on. 
In this way 
                                                             
6 Peter Child and Roger Fowler, The Routledge Dictionary of Literary Terms (London: Routledge, 
2006), p. 121. 
7 Roland Barthes, ‘From Work to Text’, in Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism, ed. by Johué V. Harari (London: Methuen, 1980), pp. 73-81 (p. 77). 
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intertextuality tends to privilege the reader as indispensable to the creative 
process. […] The “meaning” that is derived from any given text (whether 
it be a novel, a poem, a film, a sitcom, an advertisement) depends upon the 
reader’s prior encountering of the intertexts that are invoked – without the 
necessary semiotic exposure the reception of the work would inevitably 
bring forth different, but equally valid interpretations.
8
 
 
Key here is that intertextuality should not be treated as presenting pieces of a 
puzzle; the point is not that texts can only be understood if the reader has 
knowledge of all of the particular intertextual references and is capable of placing 
them correctly, but rather that different readers will pick up on different 
intertextual references (and might even create their own), thus creating a unique 
assembly upon every reading. 
 In this vein, the concept of intertextuality is similar to another postmodern 
phenomenon discussed in Part 2: the (erroneous) juxtaposition of surface and 
depth. Again this is due to a shared element, in that intertextuality occupies a 
theoretical space similar to that of the surface – at least according to Frederic 
Jameson, who argues that ‘depth is replaced by surface, or by multiple surfaces 
(what is often called intertextuality is in that sense no longer a matter of depth)’.9 
Jameson’s attention to intertextuality, linking it among other things to 
postmodernism, brings up another point – that of scope: given the overlapping 
qualities of intertextuality and the surface, he posits (as quoted in the previous 
                                                             
8 Child, pp. 122-123. 
9 Jameson, p. 12. 
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chapter) that ‘everything can now be a text’. The most important point here is that 
‘objects that were formerly “works” can now be reread as immense ensembles or 
systems of texts of various kinds, superimposed on each other by way of the 
various intertextualities, successions of fragments, or, yet again, sheer process’.10 
Also reinforced in this way is the notion that intertextuality represents a 
postmodern mass without beginning or end, rather than a logical, organic whole. 
 Two radically opposite ends of the critical spectrum illustrate the range of 
critics who have investigated intertextuality. These are brought up by M.H. 
Abrams in a survey of critical approaches to literature. At one end he situates 
Harold Bloom, who, despite his agreement with some postmodern elements in 
literary criticism, has made no secret of his resistance to notions of 
deconstruction. Abrams invoked Bloom’s end of the spectrum by noting that 
‘Harold Bloom’s theory of reading and writing literature centers on the area that 
[…] structuralists call “intertextuality.” Bloom, however, employs the traditional 
term “influence”’.11 In juxtaposition to this, there is Derrida, whom Abrams also 
marks as distinctly intertextual, albeit in a different way: ‘The apocalyptic 
glimpse, it would seem, is of a totally textual universe whose reading is a mode of 
intertextuality whereby a subject-vortex engages with an object-abyss in infinite 
regressions of deferred signification.’12 Derrida is at the other end of that 
spectrum as the foremost figure in deconstruction. Widely different critics as 
Bloom and Derrida, then, both have a keen interest in intertextuality, illustrating 
the scope of that interest in postmodern critical thinking. 
                                                             
10 Jameson, p. 77. 
11 H.M. Abrams, ‘How to Do Things with Texts’, in Critical Theory Since 1965, ed. by Hazard 
Adams and Leroy Searle (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1986), pp. 436-451 (p. 445). 
12 Abrams, p. 441. 
242 
 
 Finally, intertextuality also allows approaches to critical material much 
like the ones presented in Part 1 of this thesis, in that it allows critics a less 
restrictive approach to criticism. With an abundance of references and options 
comes the chance for critical freedom: ‘Intertextuality and the proliferation of 
choices need not present added weight to wearied minds but an invitation to 
consider the claims of reason as coextensive with the pleasures of imagination, 
both of which seek the good.’13 This is another way in which the postmodern part 
of intertextuality is highlighted – the reader is allowed a selection of choices, none 
of them presented as objectively more truthful or valid than the others. And, 
through the arguments Wilde presents in Intentions, it will become clear that this 
is precisely where Wilde shows another side of proto-postmodernism. 
 
Wilde and Intertextuality: Intentions 
To understand Wilde’s arguments regarding intertextuality, it is necessary to return 
to the earlier discussion on the priority of life and art. Earlier it has been noted 
that Wilde insists on suggesting that life follows art, rather than the other way 
around. Where that argument served to show the suggestive power of simulacra, 
here it sheds light on another aspect. For if art does not gain its material from life, 
then the question becomes what the source of art is. Wilde argues quite clearly 
that ‘Life’ draws on art, but where, then, does art come from? As it turns out, 
Wilde’s preferred source for art is other art. 
 This is demonstrated when the discussion in ‘The Decay of Lying’ runs 
                                                             
13 Leroy Searle, ‘Afterword: Criticism and the Claims of Reason’, in Critical Theory Since 1965, 
ed. by Hazard Adams and Leroy Searle (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1986), pp. 
856-872 (p. 872). 
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into the problem of where art comes from. Wilde, as usual, brings in a whole 
range of examples before generalizing to conclude that ‘the whole truth of the 
matter is this: The proper school to learn art in is not Life but Art’ (p. 1080). What 
he is suggesting here is that art looks to other art as an example – the same 
practice that underlies postmodern notions of intertextuality. There is still an 
implied hierarchy in the way Wilde writes these words: for some reason or other 
he capitalizes the ‘Art’ juxtaposed to ‘Life’, but does not capitalize the other 
mention of art; and yet in both cases the subject under discussion is still basically 
that: art. If he instils a hierarchy into different types of art, with some of them 
more inspiring than others (and this is entirely possible, given that he glorifies 
some artists just as he ridicules, say, Wordsworth), the fact still remains that it is 
one type of art looking to another type of art. 
 However, Wilde then moves to produce an example of the intertextuality 
that he has just conjured up, by referring to the art of medieval England. In the 
following fragment, Vivian is responding to Cyril’s claim that, despite higher arts 
being abstract, nevertheless ‘for the visible aspect of an age, for its look, as the 
phrase goes, we must of course go to the arts of imitation.’ Vivian objects to this 
notion of imitation and its suggestion of following the natural world: 
 
Surely you don’t imagine that the people of the Middle Ages bore any 
resemblance at all to the figures on mediaeval stained glass, or in 
mediaeval stone and wood carving, or on mediaeval metal-work, or 
tapestries, or illuminated MSS. They were probably very ordinary-looking 
people, with nothing grotesque, or remarkable, or fantastic in their 
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appearance. The Middle Ages, as we know them in art, are simply a 
definite form of style, and there is no reason at all why an artist with this 
style should not be produced in the nineteenth century.
14
 
 
Thus Wilde is here cancelling out the idea of some kind of higher/lower 
distinction in art, with the one following art and the other merely following life. 
The suggestion here is that of, again, a uniform field, of a kind of art that a reader, 
observer or critic may have preferences about, but which does not possess a kind 
of natural hierarchy. 
Additionally, by noting that ‘there is no reason at all why an artist with this 
style should not be produced in the nineteenth century’, Wilde’s attitude towards 
this kind of intertextuality is shown as positive – indeed, encouraging. Wilde also 
presents intertextuality as a large homogeneous field, a theoretical position made 
clear in his review of Whistler’s lecture. Here Wilde speaks on the distinction 
between the different arts, saying that 
 
there are not many arts, but one art merely; poem, picture, and Parthenon, 
sonnet and statue – all are in essence the same, and he who knows one, 
knows all. But the poet is the supreme artist, for he is the master of colour 
and of form, and the real musician besides, and is lord of all life and all 
arts. (p. 949) 
 
There is again that problematic notion that Wilde suggests a hierarchy of 
                                                             
14 Oscar Wilde, The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003), 
p. 1088. Further references to Wilde’s work from this edition are given after quotations in the text. 
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preference at the same time as he argues a kind of intertextual equality. However, 
Wilde’s phrasing actually suggests otherwise. The poet is ‘the supreme artist’, but 
attains that status by being a ‘master of colour and of form’, which seems to 
suggest painting; and ‘the real musician besides’, thus moving into the realm of 
the instrumentalist and the composer. Rather than simply claiming these for 
poetry, then, Wilde lists the many aspects that a poet must have mastered to be a 
poet. So Wilde seems to suggest that poetry is simply art that is most honest about 
its intertextuality. 
It is worthwhile to refer back to the quotation by Frederic Jameson in this 
light. Jameson had written that ‘everything can now be a text’, and this seems the 
natural destination of the argument that Wilde is presenting in ‘The Decay of 
Lying’. And indeed one example even goes so far as to embody this completely: 
the story, told by Vivian, of the woman who is doomed to follow the example set 
out by a French serial. (This part of the essay was already explored in Part 2, but 
bears repeating here.) Vivian tells of an acquaintance of his who seems very 
susceptible to suggestion. She will fall under the power of simulacra as the story 
progresses, but there is already some interest in how her character is described: 
Vivian notes, for example, that they ‘became great friends […] yet what interested 
me most in her was not her beauty, but her character, her entire vagueness of 
character. She seemed to have no personality at all, but simply the possibility of 
many types’ (pp. 1084-85). Already present here is a kind of negative 
intertextuality – a void in the woman’s personality that is waiting to be filled up 
not by one thing, but by fragments of many things: ‘sometimes she would give 
herself up entirely to art […] then she would take to attending race-meetings […]. 
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She abandoned religion for mesmerism, mesmerism for politics, and politics for 
the melodramatic excitements of philanthropy’ (p. 1085). Ready as she is to be a 
vessel of intertextuality, she becomes the victim of a serial running in a French 
magazine on account of the resemblance between herself and the story’s 
protagonist; in other words, when she is offered intertextual elements that fit 
easily into her personality and life (and this is life as written by the author who 
championed that living life was a type of art in itself), she takes in these 
fragments, no matter what the cost. 
Nor does Wilde limit his discussion on intertextuality to ‘The Decay of 
Lying’. There are also references to it in ‘The Critic as Artist’, where Wilde again 
engages with the idea over the course of discussing something else entirely. In this 
essay, Wilde’s speaker has the goal of convincing the other person that critics are 
like artists, and in doing so he engages in a little showing as well as telling. At 
various stages during this essay, the speaker diverges from his main argument to 
go into long monologues on art. It seems very likely that the speaker at these 
points wants to be taken as an artist-critic himself. So, for example, when Gilbert 
is talking on the point of emotional responses to books, his example is a 
description of Dante’s Divine Comedy. That description is very long, going far 
past the amount required to establish the point. Instead, it becomes a little passage 
of artistic description in and of itself – another intertextual fragment. Wilde 
borrows without qualms the references and effects created by Dante, perhaps 
aware all the time that the Divine Comedy itself does the same in regards to its 
source material, the Bible. 
Crucially Wilde is bringing material from a poem into his critical or 
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theoretical text, thus making two points: one, that, as his characters have been 
arguing, criticism and art are one and the same, and two, that in this intertextual 
field there is no textual hierarchy. This last point is visible again in ‘The Critic as 
Artist’ when Gilbert brings up the list of requirements, however jokingly, to study 
Shakespeare. Again two things happen: by ridiculing the serious, arduous study of 
Shakespeare, Wilde is again levelling the field towards a more egalitarian one; but 
more importantly, in creating the list Wilde is acknowledging the highly 
intertextual nature of literature. So the reader finds that textual fragments that can 
be put alongside Shakespeare include Elizabeth and James’s historical periods, 
various forms of theatre and their rivalries, the concepts of the Renaissance and 
Reformation, literary criticism in Shakespeare’s day, theatrical technique and 
practice, and so forth. Clearly, even as Wilde drives home the point perhaps a little 
too far for comfort, the main emphasis is on showing the many different 
intertextual elements that could be brought into a consideration of a given literary 
text. It is easy to mistake this intertextual focus with a plea for bringing the author 
into consideration of the work; but this is both going against Wilde’s greater 
project in ‘The Critic as Artist’ and misreading the list of factors that can be 
considered in relation to Shakespeare’s work, where, for example, the call to study 
‘the connection between the art of the creator of Agamemnon and the art of the 
creator of Macbeth’ is actually a comparative exercise rather than strictly looking 
at Shakespeare’s influences (p. 1130). 
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The Plagiarist’s Game: Wilde’s Intertextual Poetry 
The essays of Intentions are not the only place where Wilde’s treatment of 
intertextuality comes to the forefront. There is some indication that his discussion 
of these matters in the essays merely constitutes a crystallization of what Wilde 
had already been practising in earlier work. As indicated in the opening of this 
chapter, it is particularly Wilde’s poetry which has suffered from accusations of 
plagiarism. These are problems not just of too-obvious inspiration, but of what 
appears to be outright imitation. And where Wilde does not seem to plagiarise 
others, there is still the matter of an abundant self-plagiarism. 
Criticism of Wilde takes into account this plagiarism usually in a 
problematic way. Critics normally do not view the plagiarist’s act with approval, 
such as when Josephine Guy discusses Wilde’s self-plagiarism in ‘The Decay of 
Lying’ in the following way: 
 
When faced with cases like the reuse of the passage on Balzac […] it is 
hard to avoid the conclusion that, lacking inspiration and under pressure to 
produce copy, Wilde expanded new works by incorporating passages from 
old ones, presumably in the hope that his readers would not notice.
15
 
 
In a similar but much more damning vein, criticism of Wilde’s poetry, which has 
traditionally been seen as marginal, suffers from the same antipathy towards his 
borrowing tendencies. Even the latest edition of Wilde’s poems only defines their 
quality positively in relation to Wilde’s other work: 
                                                             
15 Josephine Guy, ‘Oscar Wilde’s “Self-Plagiarism”: Some New Manuscript Evidence’, Notes 
and Queries, 52.4 (2005), 485-488 (p. 485). 
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To judge Wilde’s poetic achievement against that of contemporaries such 
as Thomas Hardy and W.B. Yeats, who made poetry their central 
creativity activity, inevitably tends to reflect poorly on him. It is much 
more appropriate to evaluate Wilde’s poetry in relation to his own 
development as a writer – to see it in the context of the successful author 
he became in his criticism, fiction, and drama.
16
 
 
In its own right, then, the poetry is not seen as remarkable. In fact, a review of 
critical work on Wilde’s poetry could tempt the reader to go as far as to conclude 
that an unqualifiedly positive evaluation of a poem of Wilde’s has yet to be made; 
it certainly appears that way. In that vein, the following evaluation of ‘The Ballad 
of Reading Gaol’ is both typical and telling: ‘Despite its intermittent bathos and 
too-obvious looting of Coleridge’s “Rime of the Ancient Mariner”, the ballad does 
not fail to live, being if not exactly a great poem, then at least one which has the 
whiff of greatness about some of its stanzas.’17 The use of terms such as ‘bathos’ 
and ‘too-obvious’ (let alone ‘whiff of greatness’) clearly signals a dismissive 
attitude, and the appearance of the word looting does nothing to allow any 
consideration as to why Wilde engages so clearly in the appropriation of other 
texts. In both instances here, there is a typical move in the criticism of Wilde’s 
work: ignoring the possibility of some kind of intention on Wilde’s part, the 
possibility that a small part of his work may be perceived as an intentional choice, 
                                                             
16 Ian Small, ‘Introduction’, in Oscar Wilde, The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde, vol.1, ed. by 
Bobby Fong and Karl Beckson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. ix-xxvi (p. x). 
17 Declan Kiberd, ‘Introduction to the Poems’, in The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde, by Oscar 
Wilde (London: HarperCollins, 2003), pp. 739-743 (p. 742). 
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or as outstanding, rather than an inevitable result of his circumstances. This is not 
to say that the charge of plagiarism and self-plagiarism out of some kind of 
economic standpoint holds no merit; but it also obscures a far more interesting 
approach that Wilde may have taken. 
When it comes to the poetry, there is no point at which it becomes truly 
haphazard, as would be expected if Wilde’s poetry consisted of measured copying 
and pasting. The poetry is familiar, but also of considerable quality: ‘The 
derivative quality of his verse is unquestionable, but there is also nothing inept 
about it.’18 The poet whose verse has only a ‘whiff of greatness’ to it also wrote 
‘On the Sale By Auction of Keats’ Love Letters’ and ‘Requiescat’, to name but 
two of the many poems that are hard to dismiss as second-rate. The latter was 
written in memory of Wilde’s sister Isola, who died at the age of nine, when Wilde 
was twelve years old. The poem ‘was most likely written in his early Oxford 
years’, supposedly at Avignon; Wilde ‘may have visited Avignon while en route to 
Italy in 1875 […]. His Roman Catholic preoccupations during that period may 
have inspired the poem.’19 It contains a beautifully restrained evocation of grief, 
presented in words and echoed in the poem’s rhythms and structure. Thus, for 
example, the poem’s first stanza evoked the buried girl: ‘Tread lightly, she is near | 
Under the snow, | Speak gently, she can hear | The daisies grow’ (p. 748). The 
image of snow is used to conjure up frost and thus stasis, linked here to a kind of 
preservation in death; ‘Under the snow’ evoked both the sense of burial and the 
sense of preservation in cold. Although it seems that the reader is presented with a 
                                                             
18 Anne Varty, A Preface to Oscar Wilde (London: Longman, 1998), p. 76. 
19 Bobby Fong and Karl Beckson, Commentary, in Oscar Wilde, The Complete Works of Oscar 
Wilde: Volume I: Poems and Poems in Prose, ed. by Bobby Fong and Karl Beckson (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 219-316 (p. 221). 
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description of a winter burial place, the stanza actually places them in the 
speaker’s imagination, something that becomes clear when he states that the 
buried girl ‘can hear the daisies grow’. As a symbol of innocence, the flower 
represents not the girl, but the mourner’s image of her, still young and innocent 
when she died. This youthful death is made all the more poignant when 
considering that, already during Victorian times, the daisy was being used for that 
practice of tearing off individual petals of the daisy, alternating ‘he loves me, he 
loves me not’ while doing so; the girl can hear these daisies grow, but will never 
herself experience the love that they represent. It is this sense of unfairness that 
pervades the entire poem, which expresses a desire to gain peace with the death. 
In this sense the title is very telling: translatable as ‘may he/she rest’, it could, on 
one level, refer to the girl; but on another it refers to the mourner, who is 
continually afflicted by a deep sense of loss, as when he states that ‘All my life’s 
buried here, | Heap earth upon it’ (p. 749). These closing lines may go so far as to 
suggest a despair so painful that it would lead to suicide, judging by the mourner’s 
wish to have his life buried with the girl. For all its simplicity and solemn pace, 
then, the poem goes beyond that first level to engage on a second, being a 
portrayal not just of a lost girl, but of a grieving mind. 
It is true that Wilde’s inspiration lies with other poets; for ‘Requiescat’, for 
example, ‘the similarity between [Wilde’s] poem and Thomas Hood’s “The 
Bridge of Sighs” has often been noted’ and ‘Matthew Arnold’s “Requiescat” may 
also have been an inspiration’.20 Another possible source could be Ben Jonson’s 
‘An Elegy’, which contains the following lines: 
                                                             
20 Fong and Beckson, p. 221. 
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His falling temples you have rear’d,  
The wither’d garlands ta’en away;  
His altars kept from that decay  
That envy wish’d, and nature fear’d:  
 
And on them burn so chaste a flame,  
With so much loyalty’s expense,  
As Love to acquit such excellence  
Is gone himself into your name.
21
 
 
Wilde’s great early influence, however, is Keats, and in his early poetry ‘Wilde 
plays upon themes which, though largely unoriginal, clearly are close to his heart. 
[…] His penchant for mythmaking and his zest for sensuous paganism remind one 
inevitably of Keats’s early poetry’.22 It is fitting that ‘On the Sale By Auction of 
Keats’ Love Letters’ reflects Wilde’s obvious love for Keats, while at the same 
time being an example of a very good later poem by Wilde. The sonnet neatly 
opens with the selling of the letters: ‘These are the letters which Endymion wrote | 
To one he loved in secret, and apart. | And now the brawlers of the auction mart | 
Bargain and bid for each poor blotted note’ (p. 870). These first four lines very 
precisely and strikingly establish the situation, not merely rarefying the love 
letters themselves, but at the same time evoking a sense of frenzied, philistine 
                                                             
21 Ben Jonson, The Complete Poems, ed. by George Parfitt (London: Penguin, 1996), p. 156. 
22 James G. Nelson, ‘“The Honey of Romance”: Oscar Wilde as Poet and Novelist’, in Redefining 
the Modern: Essays on Literature and Society in Honor of Joseph Wiesenfarth, ed. by William 
Baker and Ira B. Nadel (London: Associated University Presses, 2004), pp. 130-147 (p. 133). 
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buyers, more or less evoking the image of pearls before swine. The lines that 
follow are some of the most succinct condemnations of economics over art: ‘Ay! 
For each separate pulse of passion quote | The merchant’s price. I think they love 
not art | Who break the crystal of the poet’s heart | That small and sickly eyes may 
glare and gloat’ (p. 870-871). 
What these poems have in common is a restrained form. In both of the 
above examples of good Wilde poems, the writer works under strong restrictions 
in form and length, while at the same time communicating something close to the 
heart – the death of a sister in the one, the disgracing of an admired poet in the 
other. The same can be said for ‘The Ballad of Reading Gaol’, which, though 
lengthy, limits the length and volume of each stanza through its ballad form. At 
the same time, many earlier poems, such as ‘The Garden of Eros’ or ‘Panthea’ are 
very long and, due to their many allusions to mythology, sometimes read more 
like an academic exercise than a striking poem. Like any poet, Wilde’s poetic 
work has both its great moments and its weak moments – after all, as Walter Pater 
remarks in The Renaissance of Wordsworth: ‘The heat of his genius, entering into 
the substance of his work, has crystallized a part, but only a part, of it; and in that 
great mass of verse there is much which might well be forgotten’.23 
Though Wilde’s allusions sometimes produce this sort of inflated poetry, at 
other times allows him to make a stunning point. In comparison, the name and 
image of Endymion appear several times in ‘The Garden of Eros’, where the very 
lengthy poem ultimately leads to an eloquent defence of art against material 
interests:  
                                                             
23 Walter Pater, The Renaissance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. xxxi. 
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Methinks these new Actaeons boast too soon | That they have spied on 
beauty; what if we | Have analysed the rainbow, robbed the moon | Of her 
most ancient, chastest mystery, | Shall I, the last Endymion, lose all hope | 
Because rude eyes peer at my mistress through a telescope! (p. 850) 
 
Here the numerous allusions to Endymion lead to the name becoming a shorthand 
for those people willing to look for mystery rather than dispel it, but the metaphor 
is almost exhaustively explored, including its links with the night-time as a time 
of inspiration. Much more powerful is Wilde’s same use of the name Endymion in 
the two opening lines of the sonnet on Keats’s love letters, ‘These are the letters 
which Endymion wrote | To one he loved in secret, and apart’, where the name is 
evoked only once, with no additional information, to sketch Keats himself. The 
allusion is all the stronger if the reader connects it to the earlier ‘The Garden of 
Eros’, allowing all of those connotations to seep into Wilde’s one use of the name 
in the later poem. 
While it would be unrealistic to view each and every moment of allusion, 
quotation or echoing in Wilde’s work as a deliberate intertextual act, there is more 
at work here than literary thievery. Wilde discusses matters related to his poetic 
technique in Intentions when he deals with the role of the poet in relation to lying 
in ‘The Decay of Lying’. In equating the lie and the poetic utterance, Vivian says: 
‘we need not say anything about the poets, for they, with the unfortunate 
exception of Mr. Wordsworth, have been really faithful to their high mission, and 
are universally recognized as being absolutely unreliable.’ And a little later: 
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‘Herodotus, who, in spite of the shallow and ungenerous attempts of modern 
sciolists to verify his history, may justly be called the “Father of Lies”’ (p. 1080). 
Vivian contrasts the Victorian concept that poetry ought to be moral and in some 
sense ‘true’ with a kind of poet-criminal, who deliberately goes against traditional 
moral concepts such as truth. In fact Ellmann, in his biography of Wilde, suggests 
that Wilde looked to Chatterton, the famous poetic forger, as a possible model: ‘In 
some ways Chatterton, whom Wilde had read carefully, was a better model for 
him than Keats, because of his criminal propensities, and a better model than the 
forger Wainewright, because of his artistic power.’24 But another step is required, 
and it comes in the form of Wilde’s reaction to the previous movements of 
Realism and Romanticism. 
Many critics have noted that Wilde, finding himself at the receiving end of 
a long Victorian tradition of Realism, rebelled against it in a simultaneous move 
backward and forward: forward by developing Aesthetic or Decadent theories of 
art, backward by looking to Romanticism and earlier. The latter move was 
especially suited to Wilde, as his own individualistic aims were located in the 
Romantic period, where ‘there was a glorification of the individual and the 
authentic artistic imagination as a source of truth’.25 However the era that gave 
rise to Romanticism also gave the world plagiarism in its current sense, as 
‘plagiarism is in fact a modern Western construct which arose with the 
introduction of copyright laws in the eighteenth century’.26 Michel Foucault has 
explored this idea in the context of an ‘author’ whose creative force manifests in a 
                                                             
24 Ellmann, p. 268. 
25 Shelley Angélil-Carter, Stolen Language? Plagiarism in Writing (Edinburgh: Pearson, 2000), 
p. 19. 
26 Angélil-Carter, p. 2. 
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unique product that can be owned. Such constructs of an author, he claims are 
misleading: the author-function ‘is not formed spontaneously through the simple 
attribution of a discourse to an individual. It results from a complex operation 
whose purpose is to construct the rational entity we call an author.’27 As such, the 
author is really a way in which the reader interprets the work, because despite 
such things as the creativity or intentions of an author,  
these aspects of an individual, which we designate as an author (or which 
comprise an individual as an author), are projections, in terms always more 
or less psychological, of our way of handling text: in the comparisons we 
make, the traits we extract as pertinent, the continuities we assign, or the 
exclusions we practice.
28
 
Such emphasis on an author has nevertheless generated a need for differentiation, 
and thus for the generation of unique material: 
 
What is of significance in the description of these shifts of creativity and 
authorship is the need to see a stress on ‘new’ meaning, on originality, on 
individual creativity, as very much an aspect of Western modernity, and 
thus both a very particular cultural and a very particular historical 
emphasis, albeit one with a great deal of salience in the world today. It is 
                                                             
27 Michel Foucault, ‘What is an Author?’, in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected 
Essays and Interviews, ed. by Donald F. Bouchard, trans. by Donald F Bouchard and Sherry 
Simon (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977), pp. 113-138 (p. 127). 
28 Foucault, p. 127. 
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with the rise of such individualization that the history of literary plagiarism 
started to emerge.
29
 
 
This presents an apparent problem: Wilde’s notion of individual freedom both 
matches the Romantic ideal of the creative genius, and contrasts sharply with the 
idea of creative property that originates from those very developments. This 
element of creative property contrasts with Wilde’s notion of freedom, which 
includes the freedom to copy, sometimes verbatim, another artist’s work; it is in 
that sense much more radical than its Romantic counterpart. In fact there is a 
sense of selective rejection of Romanticism, as illustrated in the above quotation 
from ‘The Decay of Lying’ in which Wilde makes fun of Wordsworth. Crucially 
this distances Wilde from the earlier artistic movement, in that he fully 
appropriates certain issues while all the same rejecting a few of its core rules. 
Thus in his sonnet on Keats’s love letters, he is able to glorify the concept of an 
artist’s most personal work – love letters – and their individuality, as in the 
opening lines, ‘These are the letters which Endymion wrote | To one he loved in 
secret, and apart’ (p. 870). Here words like ‘secret’ and ‘apart’ signal a preference 
for the individualistic; at the same time there is a rejection of the concept of 
literary ownership in the few lines deriding those who would purchase Keats’s 
letters, to whom Wilde refers as men who ‘love not art’, with ‘small and sickly 
eyes’ whose only goal is to ‘glare and gloat’ (p. 870-871). In a sense, then, the 
poem can be read as a lament on the intrusion of literary ownership into artistic 
individualism. 
                                                             
29 Alastair Pennycook, ‘Borrowing Others’ Words: Text, Ownership, Memory, and Plagiarism’, 
TESOL Quarterly, 30.2 (1996), 201-230 (p. 205). 
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Corresponding to this stance against literary ownership, Wilde developed 
an intertextual literary technique. How this was achieved in his short stories and 
his plays will be discussed later in the chapter, but for Wilde’s poetry, his last 
poem sheds additional light. ‘The Ballad of Reading Gaol’ has very strong 
intertextual elements. In this long poem, with its already mentioned ‘too-obvious 
looting of Coleridge’s ‘Rime of the Ancient Mariner’’’, the strong allusion to the 
other poem is – partly – something other than looting. That Wilde binds his poem 
strongly to Coleridge’s is beyond doubt. Both are long poems in ballad form, 
divided up into several numbered parts – six for Wilde, seven for Coleridge – 
telling the story of a condemned man. Wilde’s stanzas are also very similar 
formally and tonally to many of Coleridge’s. Coleridge’s poem contains stanza 
such as ‘Like one that on a lonesome road | Doth walk in fear and dread, | And 
having once turned round walks on, | And turns no more his head; | Because he 
knows a frightful fiend | Doth close behind him tread’.30 Wilde’s, meanwhile, has 
lines like these: ‘And never a human voice comes near | To speak a gentle word: | 
And the eye that watches through the door | Is pitiless and hard: | And by all 
forgot, we rot and rot, | With soul and body marred’ (p. 898). Here the tone is quite 
similar, and the simple rhyme is another clear correspondence. 
By incorporating such strong intertextual references to Coleridge’s poem, 
the Ballad gains a distinct quality: one of exile and punishment leading to 
revelation – as in the poem’s final, famous stanza: ‘And all men kill the thing they 
love, | By all let this be heard, | Some do it with a bitter look, | Some with a 
flattering word, | The coward does it with a kiss, | The brave man with a sword!’ 
                                                             
30 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ‘Rime of the Ancient Mariner’, in The Major Works, ed. by H.J. 
Jackson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 48-87 (p. 63). 
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(p. 899). There is a certain half-confessional, half-revelatory element to this final 
stanza. In this sense Coleridge’s poem goes much farther, outrightly invoking the 
idea of prophecy. This is never named in the ‘Ballad’; its strong link to the 
‘Ancient Mariner’ brings this aspect in silently in conjunction with the poem’s 
final lines. The narrator of ‘The Ballad of Reading Gaol’ tells his story, much like 
the Mariner tells his. It is important to be reminded here, too, that Wilde wrote 
letters on two occasions to a newspaper in an effort to enlighten the public on the 
unnecessary harshness of prison life, and in that regard this revelatory element to 
the poem, strengthened by the intertextual allusions to the Ancient Mariner, is 
convincing. Rather than looting a great literary work merely to pad his own, 
Wilde is making a literary choice that brings additional elements (such as the echo 
of the horrors faced by the Mariner) to his poem. Or, as Harold Bloom has 
remarked, ‘Good poems, novels and essays are webs of allusion, sometimes 
consciously and voluntarily so, but perhaps to a greater degree without design’.31 
So there is a move away from literary ownership that is manifest both in 
the content and the technique of some of Wilde’s poetry. Through subversion and 
borrowing, Wilde is creating new things out of existing material. There is a certain 
irony to it, not least because Wilde will borrow from any source – including 
himself. ‘He was as willing to plunder his own writing as that of other people: the 
sonnet “At Verona”, “How steep the stairs within Kings’ houses are” marks the 
beginning of his most characteristic of literary misdemeanours – self-plagiarism – 
for this is lifted from “Ravenna”.’32 It is this self-plagiarism that represents 
perhaps the greatest problem in Wildean scholarship: if the ‘theft’ of the words of 
                                                             
31 Harold Bloom, ‘Plagiarism – a Symposium’, Times Literary Supplement, 9 April 1982, p. 413. 
32 Varty, p. 76. 
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other poets make Wilde seem like a literary criminal, the reuse of his own material 
on several occasions runs the risk of making him simply look lazy. However, even 
this problem may be approached from two sides. The plagiarism problem can be 
seen as intertextual; and Wilde’s notion of intertextuality in Intentions is, like that 
of postmodern thinkers, based on a non-hierarchical organisation. What is at work 
in Wilde’s self-plagiarism, then, is simply an extension of this negation of a 
hierarchy; if there really is only text and everything can be read as text, then the 
self-plagiarism fits into a proto-postmodern model of the negation of textual 
ownership. It simply means that Wilde includes himself in the great intertextual 
field, available alongside all other great textual models and names such as 
Shakespeare, Keats, and Shelley. (If Wilde’s individualism were to be followed, 
he would have to see his own individualistic achievements rank with theirs.) 
It is important, however, not to overestimate the level of deliberation that 
goes into Wilde’s intertextual trespasses. Many critics of Wilde have 
understandable issues with the intertextual explanation; it could be said, for 
example, that ‘the idea that [Wilde’s plagiarism] might be a form of intertextual 
play, a deliberate attempt to undermine normative expectations about authorial 
originality, holds weight as a credible explanation only when the repeated 
fragment is relatively small’.33 While this need not necessarily be true, it shows 
the danger of reading too much into what seems to be, at times, sloppiness rather 
than deliberate choice. 
It is also worth mentioning that Wilde never fully abandoned creative 
ownership, as might be expected if he was truly interested in furthering a theory 
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of free intertextual play. Many letters survive that show Wilde asking for royalties, 
or to determine exactly how, and in what context, work of his was to be printed or 
displayed, as in letters to John Lane and George Alexander.
34
 He even, in one 
instance, asks for royalties regarding a play for which he delivered none of the 
writing, but helped come up with its original idea. However, these are motivated 
by economic rather than artistic aims, and many of the letters stem from periods in 
which Wilde had financial difficulties – especially during the last part of his life, 
after he had left Britain. Rather than refute the idea that there was an intertextual 
element to Wilde’s artistic thinking, these illustrate that Wilde was human, and 
that not all of his writing arose out of detached, purely theoretical considerations. 
It is therefore important to find a balance. If one end of the spectrum there 
is an emphasis on plagiarism as just that, the other end would be to entirely 
overestimate Wilde’s literary aims, and to view him as a sort of literary 
mastermind, for whom ‘self-referentiality is an elaborate and self-conscious game, 
one played with only the most alert and discriminating reader’. It is this kind of a 
view of Wilde that ‘in turn gives us a “Wilde”’ who can once again be 
accommodated to a certain reading of the life. This time, however, the emphasis is 
not on the ordinariness of the apprentice or journeyman writer, but rather on the 
more traditional view of Wilde the supreme artist who is always in control.’35 This 
is perhaps as seductive a reading as the purely plagiarist one, commonly practiced 
for about a hundred years now, that sees much of Wilde’s literary achievement as 
unremarkable; neither way seems particularly enlightening. There is some middle 
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ground, and it is there that Wilde’s engagement with intertextuality is best 
considered: as an experiment with its concept and uses, and in a way that can be 
labelled proto-postmodern. Wilde is clearly interested in intertextuality; both 
Intentions and Wilde’s poetry show this to be, at least in part, the result of thought 
rather than crime. Moreover Wilde’s intertextual interests do not stop there; the 
things he experimented with in his poetry, he puts to more mature and playful use 
in his fiction. 
 
Intertextuality in Wilde’s Fiction 
The critical reception of Wilde’s fiction has been much less marked by problems 
of plagiarism than his poetry. In part this is remarkable, because the nature of the 
plagiarism in Wilde’s short stories is quite similar to that in the poems. This is 
perhaps due to the nature of the genres, with originality being more highly valued 
in poetry than in fiction; but the fact remains that for every poem of Wilde’s that 
echoes the voice of Keats or Coleridge, there is a story that reproduces the stock 
elements of its particular genre (though reproduction in itself is not plagiarism). 
And so it is that readers can find traces of the sensation novel in ‘Lord Arthur 
Savile’s Crime’ and ‘The Canterville Ghost’, and perhaps even in ‘The Sphinx 
Without a Secret’; likewise remnants of a vibrant magic picture tradition have 
their echoes in ‘The Portrait of Mr. W. H.’ and of course The Picture of Dorian 
Gray. All of these things have been commented on by many critics, but the 
intertextual, proto-postmodernist argument has not surfaced yet. 
The years directly after Wilde’s American tour were those during which 
early unsuccessful works such as The Duchess of Padua and Vera, or The Nihilists 
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were created. Those years are marked by an increasing engagement of Wilde with 
the popular literary genres of his day. One direct result of this is that Wilde turned 
to writing children’s tales, which, as a result of writers such as Hans Christian 
Andersen, were very popular during Wilde’s time. Yet Wilde’s children’s tales are, 
aside from the choice of genre, not very derivative, and especially the later A 
House of Pomegranates is a very original work that is hardly even suitable for 
children. 
Much more telling are the collection Lord Arthur Savile’s Crime and Other 
Stories, the short story ‘The Portrait of Mr. W. H.’ and The Picture of Dorian 
Gray, of which one critic has noted that ‘One thing is clear: careers can still be 
made in the hunt for originals of The Picture of Dorian Gray’.36 Of these, the 
collection of short stories is the most intertextual in terms of popular genres, 
whereas the two tales of portraits tap immediately into a (now mostly lost) 
tradition of stories about magical portraits. The origins of these stories have all 
been explored, and it suffices here quickly to touch upon the similarities to 
illustrate the deeply intertextual nature of the works. 
During the middle of the nineteenth century, author Wilkie Collins had 
pioneered a genre that would later become the detective novel. This type of story, 
called a ‘sensation novel’, revolved around themes such as crime, adultery, 
scandal, and other such aspects. Many such novels had hints of the supernatural in 
them, which in the end were explained rationally. There are two stories in Lord 
Arthur Savile’s Crime and Other Stories that refer to this tradition: the titular 
‘Lord Arthur Savile’s Crime’ and, to a lesser degree, ‘The Canterville Ghost’. In 
                                                             
36 Jerusha McCormack, ‘Wilde’s Fiction(s)’, in The Cambridge Companion to Oscar Wilde, ed. 
by Peter Raby (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 96-117 (p. 110). 
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the former, Wilde plays with the concept of crime, scandal, and infidelity. 
Naturally these are turned on their head as the story’s protagonist is also the 
‘supernaturally’ destined criminal, and the infidelity is turned into a problem of 
that same protagonist who feels it would not be honourable to marry until he has 
murdered. The story also subverts at least one other facet of the sensation novel: 
its setting. Novels such as Collins’s The Moonstone (1868) were typically set in 
domestic surroundings rather than exotic locations. In Wilde’s story the ironic 
suspense affects ordinary people, such as the bomb-maker, who is oddly polite, 
offers tea to his visitors, and babbles on quite affably; or the supposed victim of 
the bomb, a very ordinary clergyman in the countryside. The ‘Canterville Ghost’ 
also works in this vein, turning the sensation of a ghost story around by 
contrasting the servants’ fearful reactions to the American family’s inappropriately 
down-to-earth attitude towards hauntings. 
In addition, ‘The Canterville Ghost’ picks up on the tradition of the 
Victorian gothic novel. Gothic, though preceding the Victorian era, was still very 
popular during Wilde’s lifetime (illustrated for example in the penny dreadfuls) 
and would culminate in Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde 
(1886), which is referred to twice in ‘The Decay of Lying’; and ultimately in 
Bram Stoker’s Dracula (1897), although that book came out after Wilde’s 
imprisonment. Wilde himself drew heavily on previous Gothic stories for some of 
his works, in part due to their subject matter: he was drawn to the ‘central 
technique of focusing on a strong-willed central protagonist whose goals are not 
narrowly defined’.37 These can be located in the protagonist of Charles Maturin’s 
                                                             
37 Lewis J. Poteet, ‘“Dorian Gray” and the Gothic Novel’, Modern Fiction Studies, 17.2 (1971), 
239-248 (p. 244). 
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Melmoth the Wanderer, in ‘Ambrosio (hero of The Monk, 1794) and even 
Manfred (The Castle of Otranto, probably the first Gothic novel)’ whose key 
characteristics are ‘both their self-absorbed, narcissistic egomania and the fluidity 
of their aims’.38 While those traits of personality are more appropriate for Wilde’s 
later novel The Picture of Dorian Gray, these Gothic tales also influence the 
stories, though here Wilde is more interested in subverting than following the 
generic tropes. In ‘The Canterville Ghost’ Wilde’s subversion lies in the 
interaction between the American family, and in introducing fairytale elements 
towards the end by giving the later heroine a prince to marry; and additionally in 
portraying the ghost as a vain actor looking back on his many hauntings as 
successful theatrical parts. 
In a similar way ‘The Sphinx Without a Secret’ and ‘A Model Millionaire’ 
have their origins in detective fiction, but the point is clear: as a collection, Lord 
Arthur Savile’s Crime and Other Stories plays a highly intertextual game with 
other existing genres of Wilde’s day. The collection is remarkable not because one 
of the stories engages with an existing trend, or because they all do; it is 
remarkable because each story plays with different trends, even as it forges its 
own unique space for itself. Wilde does not settle for modelling the book on a 
particular type of literature, but rather creates his own unique approach from the 
various available models by picking not one, but many of them at once. Just as 
Wilde’s poetry does not settle on imitating only Keats or only Coleridge, his book 
of short stories does not settle for one style merely. (This Wildean technique also 
conforms to the postmodern rhizome, discussed in Chapter 3.) 
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A similar case of following a literary trend intertextually occurs in both 
The Picture of Dorian Gray and ‘The Portrait of Mr. W. H.’, which follow a 
Victorian tradition of magic pictures. The novel’s debt to that tradition becomes 
apparent when considering just one of its many sources, which is ‘a long-ignored 
story called Ashes of the Future (A Study of Mere Human Nature): The Suicide of 
Sylvester Gray (1888), written by Wilde’s friend Edward Heron-Allen and 
featuring a hero of Dorian’s own surname, with a sister named Sybil, who kills 
himself at age thirty after a career of unrepentant hedonism’.39 The similarities are 
striking, and indicative of a much broader way in which Wilde approaches the 
telling of Dorian’s tale in much the same way as he did those of Lord Arthur 
Savile, the ghost of Canterville, and the others in that collection of short stories. In 
fact a search for sources for the novel ‘among the detritus of popular literature’ is 
likely to yield ‘a thriving subgenre of fiction in which the props, the themes, and 
even to some degree the dialogue and characterization of Dorian Gray are 
anticipated.’ This is not to downplay the book’s qualities: ‘despite its 
extraordinary reliance on previous fiction, Dorian Gray remains a brilliantly 
original novel – by any just estimate, the most successful work of its kind’.40 This 
evaluation shows the result of Wilde’s intertextual technique brought to bear on 
his only novel: rather than producing evidence in a case against literary theft, it 
delivers a piece of literature worthy of the individualistic genius envisioned by 
Wilde. And the novel is not without self-plagiarism either, as when one of Wilde’s 
favourite phrases makes an appearance: commenting on a woman who has been 
married several times, Lord Henry says ‘When her third husband died, her hair 
                                                             
39 Kerry Powell, ‘Tom, Dick, and Dorian Gray: Magic-Picture Mania in Late Victorian Fiction’, 
Philological Quarterly, 62.2 (1983), 147-170 (p. 147). 
40 Powell, pp. 147-148. 
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turned quite gold from grief’ (p. 129). That phrase will make at least one other 
appearance, as in The Importance of Being Earnest the character of Algernon 
says, in a rather similar situation: ‘I hear her hair has turned quite gold from grief’ 
(p. 364). 
The magic picture tradition also influenced ‘The Portrait of Mr. W. H.’ 
where another portrait appears, this one, too, with a strange but subtle influence. 
The portrait’s powers of conversion have already been discussed; and even 
without the more subtle point of how belief in the Willie Hughes theory of the 
Sonnets moves in conjunction with the portrait’s presence, the portrait’s influence 
is made clear in the opening few pages of the story. There, even though he has just 
seen it, the narrator confesses that the portrait ‘had already begun to have a 
strange fascination for me’ (p. 303). Immediately Wilde is incorporating the same 
sort of reference that he used for Dorian Gray by putting a kind of power into the 
portrait. But even more interesting is that ‘The Portrait of Mr. W. H.’ incorporates 
criticism into its main narrative – and it is criticism that remains entirely 
unreferenced. The only name that is attributed is Shakespeare’s own; the rest of 
the criticism, existing as it does in a supposed work of fiction, is presented as all 
the three characters’ own. In the ideal fictional world where art has the power to 
inspire and transmit theory and life itself, criticism is spontaneous; it is the result 
of a personal engagement with a work of art. Wilde returns here to the intertextual 
idea of not owning text, except in this case he has made the next step he proposed 
in ‘The Critic as Artist’ and has equated criticism and art. 
 
 
268 
 
Wilde’s Theatre as Intertextual 
So far intertextuality has been either a prominent element or an important 
undercurrent in all of Wilde’s literary genres and forms: poetry, criticism and 
fiction. His career took off when he became a playwright primarily, but he did not 
abandon his artistic theories, and indeed intertextuality remains at the forefront of 
his work in the theatre as much as it did previously in his other work.  
For several of his social comedies, Wilde made subversive use of an 
existing theatrical tradition, much in the same way that he drew on literary 
traditions for Lord Arthur Savile’s Crime and Other Stories. The tradition 
employed here is ‘the popular dramatic form inherited from the French 
playwrights, Eugene Scribe and Victorien Sardou, of the “well-made play” with 
its four-Act structure comprising exposition, complication, obligatory crisis scene 
and dénouement’.41 Even as he follows its formula at some length, Wilde 
introduces crucial subversions in at least two of his plays. 
In Lady Windermere’s Fan Wilde plays with the traditional distribution of 
roles in a well-made play. The role of the ‘raisonneur’, traditionally an older man, 
was to resolve the mysteries and crises at the heart of the play and to make a 
happy ending possible. Yet, there is no such older man in this particular play; or if 
there is, he comes in the form of Lord Augustus, who allows himself to be fooled 
by the end of the play, thus providing Mrs. Erlynne a way of escape. Rather, the 
closest the play comes to a ‘raisonneur’ is Mrs. Erlynne herself, the supposedly 
fallen woman. She holds the knowledge of the play’s secrets, and it is within her 
power alone to set things right and allow a happy ending. Thus, ‘because Wilde 
places Mrs Erlynne in this unique position of knowledge, authority and power, the 
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outcome is technically unconventional and thematically unpredictable’.42 As with 
the short stories, Wilde is achieving his effects by intertextual play upon previous 
traditions or, in this case, plays. Another such example is An Ideal Husband, 
where Wilde again turns things on their head. The play features a corrupt 
politician – another stock character of Victorian plays at the time – but contrary to 
the traditional treatment of such themes, the politician, Sir Robert Chiltern, is 
allowed to succeed at the end. ‘The terms on which resolution is based are in fact 
radical, pointing to far-reaching social and moral change, while the exaggerated 
manner in which Wilde fulfils the demands of the well-made play suggests a 
burlesque of the very form deployed.’43 Again there is the subversion, and again it 
is based on intertextual play. 
But surely the most radical intertextuality is to be found in The Important 
of Being Earnest. Before Earnest, Wilde worked to incorporate references to, and 
subversions of, previous theatrical traditions; in his last play, he takes a drastic 
next step. As explored in the two chapters on The Importance of Being Earnest in 
Kerry Powell’s book Oscar Wilde and the Theatre of the 1890s, the play 
essentially does two things in intertextual terms. Firstly, it takes its intertextual 
cue not merely from the well-made play tradition, but freely begs, borrows and 
steals from the myriad stock elements of the range of Victorian plays in theatres at 
the time of Wilde’s writing Earnest.44 Secondly, Wilde undertakes a much more 
radical intertextual project – one that once again uncomfortably strides into the 
realm of possible plagiarism – when he takes the material for The Importance of 
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Being Earnest almost entirely from a play that ran almost simultaneously. The 
play is called The Foundling, which Wilde might have seen around September 
1894 (when he was writing Earnest, and a few months before it was performed in 
February 1895) and which contains almost all of the ingredients that make up 
Wilde’s play.45 For a full exploration of how this is done, Powell’s book is very 
enlightening; it suffices here to highlight that, even in the theatrical phase of his 
career, Wilde did not shy away from his earlier intertextual approach, but rather 
seems to have embraced it as never before. 
Theories and concepts of intertextuality at work in Oscar Wilde’s body of 
writings, either as conscious choice or unconscious reflex, have been explored at 
length, especially in more recent critical work. Criticism and analysis regarding 
this has spawned many debates, articles and books, ranging from dismissive 
accusations of plagiarism to politicized postcolonial defences. And so the idea of 
Wilde’s intertextuality is not new. What is striking is that this radical 
intertextuality, starting at poetic (self-)plagiarism and ending in the ironic near-
copying of an entire play, has hitherto not been seen as a very postmodern 
technique in and of itself. Moreover, it opens the door to various interdisciplinary 
approaches, each proto-postmodern in the way that Wilde deals with them. One 
such interdisciplinary approach, which has been gaining much critical attention in 
the second half of the twentieth century, is the study of words and music, to which 
the next chapter turns.  
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Chapter VIII Words and Music 
 
The main speaker in one of the two major essays on art and criticism plays the 
piano. It is, in fact, where the reader finds Gilbert as he is approached by Ernest in 
‘The Critic as Artist’. The latter has to urge him to get away from the piano in 
order to discuss art and criticism; Gilbert in turn spends most of the early part of 
the essay trying to get back behind the piano, offering to play Ernest ‘some mad 
scarlet thing by Dvorák’.1 Only by repeated cajoling can Ernest keep him on 
track. 
This is a sentiment echoed in many different parts of Wilde’s work. The 
Importance of Being Earnest has Algernon playing piano at two separate moments 
during the first act. Whenever courts come up in any of the short fiction, 
musicians are named. The Nightingale uses it to create the perfect red rose in ‘The 
Nightingale and the Rose’, and music wakes the Selfish Giant when spring has 
returned to his garden. The cheiromantist Mr. Podgers in ‘Lord Arthur Savile’s 
Crime’ declares one of the ladies at the party to have the hands of ‘an excellent 
pianist, but perhaps hardly a musician’ (p. 162). Dorian Gray himself is introduced 
to Basil as someone who plays either the violin or the piano (like Gilbert, it is the 
latter). Even Vivian, main speaker of ‘The Decay of Lying’, repeatedly finds 
himself describing language, poetry and art in musical terms or simply music 
altogether. 
Clearly music and the performance of music form a central theme in much 
of Wilde’s work. In part, this has to do with the interest Wilde had in music as an 
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1114. Further references to Wilde’s work from this edition are given after quotations in the text. 
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art form. It has also to do with thinking that was current during Wilde’s time. 
Wilde himself refers to Walter Pater on occasion, and Pater’s The Renaissance had 
already engaged the topic of music, art, and the essence of art forms. As a topic, 
music had also been widely discussed in the French tradition that Wilde admired – 
Baudelaire and Mallarmé had both written extensively on the topic as part of a 
larger group of poets and musicians doing thinking on the matter. Wilde had 
certainly read both Baudelaire and Mallarmé and had met the latter in Paris. 
Writing on music, and writing as music as a discourse in nineteenth 
century Britain and France has been extensively explored, for example by Ruth 
Solie in Music in Other Words: Victorian Conversations (2004) and Helen Abbot 
in Between Baudelaire and Mallarmé: Voice, Conversation and Music (2009) – to 
name but two.
2
 The topic has also, however, become a distinct field of criticism in 
the second half of the twentieth century. Critics such as Roland Barthes wrote 
with an interest in the combinations of words and music, for example in Barthes’s 
collection of miscellaneous essays, entitled Image, Music, Text (1977).
3
 This is an 
interest arising from structuralism but continuing after Barthes and others had 
moved on. The critical discipline of words and music studies has arisen over the 
last forty years or so, primarily (though hardly exclusively) within the French 
critical tradition. Its interest varies from investigations of song settings to opera to 
the formal and systematic comparison of music and language. Familiar names 
include Peter Dayan and Werner Wolf, whose theories feature prominently in this 
chapter; Delia da Sousa Correa, who has worked on Victorian fiction and music; 
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and Music (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009). 
3 Roland Barthes, Image, Music, Text (London: Fontana Press, 1977). 
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and Steven Scher, who has worked on German subject matter and the field of 
words and music theory in general. Broadly speaking, recent interest in word and 
music studies has moved away from detailed analysis seeking to show the 
underlying theoretical similarities between words and music, in favour of an 
investigation of how each of the two subjects illuminates the other. In this way, 
words and music studies has entered postmodernism not merely in being 
contemporary with it, but also in moving away from strictly objective theory, as 
will be shown in the discussion on Peter Dayan’s work, below.  
It is in that distinction that Wilde comes in as a proto-postmodernist. 
Wilde’s intertextual interests coupled with his use and discussion of the theme of 
music combine into an approach that resembles current practices in word and 
music studies. This is an approach that culminates in Salome, and that presents 
both formal aspects in making use of musicalized fiction, and postmodern ideas 
on overcoming the inherent otherness and incompatibility of words and music. 
And while these ideas combine most clearly in Salome, the theoretical strands of it 
are to be found throughout Wilde’s earlier work. 
 
Wilde: Rhythm, Poetry, Music 
Ideas on music, at first, may seem scattered and sporadic in Wilde’s works, with 
little consistency in their use. Certainly it is one of the aspects that Wilde does not 
talk about as directly as, say, originality in artistic work or powerful imagery. 
Music is discussed in no central place; rather, the discussion on words and music, 
more so than with any other Wildean critical idea, has to be pieced together from 
the entire body of work. Wilde’s ideas eventually do come together in Salome, but 
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the interest in music is present, in some scattered form or another, in most of his 
creative and critical work, starting with his poetry. 
That references to music appear in Wilde’s earlier poetic efforts is in itself 
hardly surprising, given the traditional use of musical terms in poetry. Thus music 
appears in very early poems, such as in the titles of ‘Chanson’ and ‘Nocturne’, and 
in ‘Endymion’, which is subtitled ‘for music’. Wilde writes in one of the earlier 
poems, ‘Charmides’: ‘Those who have never known a lover’s sin | Let them not 
read my ditty, it will be | To their dull ears so musicless and thin | That they will 
have no joy of it’ (p. 800). These lines suggest the place that music holds in 
Wilde’s view: firstly, that music and poetry share something – the lengthy work 
itself is called by Wilde a ‘ditty’ in an odd combination of musical identification 
and self-deprecation – and secondly, and tellingly, that the enjoyment of music has 
as one of its necessary components an element of ‘sin’. Another poem, 
‘Humanitad’, which follows ‘Charmides’ quite closely chronologically, shows the 
other end of this spectrum: ‘The minor chord which ends the harmony, | And for 
its answering brother waits in vain | Sobbing for incompleted melody, | Dies a 
swan’s death; but I the heir of pain, | A silent Memnon with blank lidless eyes, | 
Wait for the light and music of those suns which never rise’ (p. 818). Here music 
is presented as a healing force, the antidote to pain and blindness, a ‘light’ that 
will likely not arrive. In the lines from ‘Charmides’ it is a measure of experience, 
while in ‘Humanitad’ it is linked strongly to death, comparing as it does the 
swan’s death of a melody with the death of Memnos at Troy. Life, in other words, 
is music, but it must be lived. 
The idea inherent in these thoughts is one that Wilde would later develop 
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in Intentions as the concept of music as an art with strong, often overriding links 
to all other types of art. Thus in ‘The Critic as Artist’ Wilde speaks of Life and 
Literature: when asked what the two supreme and highest arts are, the answer is 
‘Life and Literature, life and the perfect expression of life’ (p. 1114). A large 
section speaking specifically about literature as poetry, and here music – or at any 
rate, audible elements of literature – features strongly: 
 
I have sometimes thought that the story of Homer’s blindness might be 
really an artistic myth, created in critical days, and serving to remind us, 
not merely that the great poet is always a seer, seeing less with the eyes of 
the body than he does with the eyes of the soul, but that he is a true singer 
also, building his song out of music, repeating each line over and over 
again to himself till he has caught the secret of its melody, chaunting in 
darkness the words that are winged with light. [...] When Milton became 
blind he composed, as every one should compose, with the voice purely, 
and so the pipe or reed of earlier days became that mighty many-stopped 
organ whose rich reverberant music has all the stateliness of Homeric 
verse, if it seeks not to have its swiftness, and is the one imperishable 
inheritance of English literature sweeping through all the ages, because 
above them, and abiding with us ever, being immortal in its form. (p. 1115) 
 
Wilde is alluding here to formal features that strongly link music and the literary 
discipline of poetry: rhythm, metre, rhyme and the sound of poetry – those 
elements that came to the fore when poetry is read aloud. The link between music 
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and poetry is emphasized when the poet is described as a singer, using words such 
as ‘music’, ‘chaunting’ and ‘melody’. In these passages of poetry and essay, Wilde 
is asserting that, as one modern critic puts it, ‘when we speak of the music of 
poetry, we tend to mean prosody: the rhythm or meter of syllables, the harmony of 
rhyme. Such musical elements are of course not marginal to the poem. They are 
fully subsumed by it, proper to it’.4 Such an emphasis is not uniquely postmodern 
in any sense, but bears pointing out here, as it shows Wilde’s strong association of 
poetry with music. 
Furthermore, Wilde takes this musical element of poetry and takes it one 
step farther. There is, to name one example, the line in The Picture of Dorian 
Gray where Lord Henry describes a particular woman by saying: ‘When her third 
husband died, her hair turned quite gold from grief’ (p. 129). As discussed in the 
previous chapter, this is a well-known instance of self-plagiarism, where Wilde 
later lifts the line for use of Algernon in The Importance of Being Earnest: ‘I hear 
her hair has turned quite gold from grief’ is what he says of Lady Harbury, who is 
thought by Aunt Augusta ‘to be living entirely for pleasure now’ (p. 364). There is 
a change in the later line, where Lord Henry’s ‘when her third husband died’ is 
replaced by Algernon’s ‘I hear’, thus introducing an extra element of alliteration 
into the line, so that ‘gold from grief’ is now accompanied by ‘I hear her hair’. It 
highlights the already poetic nature of the sentence in the novel’s version. This, in 
turn, shows how poetry is an element that occurs beyond poetry in Wilde’s other 
literary writing, one condition of the musicality of literary language – or, as 
another modern critic reminds readers of poetry and music, ‘one should also take 
                                                             
4 Katherine Bergeson, ‘A Bugle, a Bell, a Stroke of the Tongue: Rethinking Music in Modern 
French Verse’, Representations, 86 (2004), 53-72 (pp. 56-57). 
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phonological recurrences (rhythm, rhyme, metre) into consideration. In this 
respect metrical literary language can also be said to have more affinities with 
music’.5 
To return to the earlier point of literature as ‘the perfect expression of life’, 
it now becomes clear that Wilde’s literary language contains a sustained musical 
element. As shown above, modern literary criticism or theory acknowledges this 
theoretical position. In his poems, Wilde demonstrates this idea, but still only in 
the roundabout way of using musical terms in poetic description – a practice that 
is as prevalent in Shakespeare and the Bible as it is in Victorian literature. The 
step beyond this poetic conceit comes when Wilde writes critically on art. In the 
preface of The Picture of Dorian Gray, Wilde writes that ‘from the point of view 
of form, the type of all the arts is the art of the musician’ (p. 17). This is a critical 
step that takes the poetic usage of words related to music one step farther, in that it 
broadens the range of music. Just as literature is the expression of life, so is music 
the type of all art; it must therefore follow that since life is in all arts including 
literature, so is music. There exists, in other words, a strong link between 
literature and music, and that link is simply that, from an artistic standpoint, both 
are inseparable from life. The question then becomes what, exactly, this link 
entails. 
The link is intimated in a number of places in Intentions. It surfaces, for 
example, in a passage where Gilbert discusses what happens to him after playing a 
few passages of Chopin. He very clearly references not simply the effect of music 
on life, but also the tendency of music to create stories: ‘After playing Chopin, I 
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(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1999), p. 27. 
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feel as if I had been weeping over sins that I had never committed, and mourning 
over tragedies that were not my own. Music always seems to me to produce that 
effect. It creates for one a past of which one has been ignorant, and fills one with a 
sense of sorrows that have been hidden from one’s tears’ (p. 1110) Note that in 
this passage, too, music is also linked to sin – another mark of life and experience. 
Additionally, the passage contains a direct reference to literature in the use of the 
word ‘tragedies’. 
Another passage links music even more clearly to life and literature. 
Comparing lying and poetry, the essay’s main speaker Vivian describes the 
technical requirements of both: 
 
Indeed, they have their technique, just as the more material arts of painting 
and sculpture have, their subtle secrets of form and colour, their craft-
mysteries, their deliberate artistic methods. As one knows the poet by his 
fine music, so one can recognise the liar by his rich rhythmic utterance, 
and in neither case will the casual inspiration of the moment suffice. (p. 
1073) 
 
Two key words appearing in the final sentence of the passage are again very 
telling. First there is the word ‘music’, linked as it is to the poet; then there is the 
word ‘rhythmic’, linked to the liar. Wilde will go on to have Vivian argue, in the 
essay, that lying is the foundation of good art; here he is already linking it to 
music and rhythm, elements that already had a strong connection to literary 
language (and thus poetry) from Wilde’s earlier work. Musical elements come into 
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play anywhere that literature does. In this light, it is also significant that the 
passage mentions painting, sculpture and poetry in a single thrust: given Wilde’s 
earlier remarks on music as, formally, the type of all arts, this can only reinforce 
the idea that Wilde’s theoretical position incorporates music into any verbal act. 
Wilde’s ideas on literature and music are defined clearly in Intentions, but 
they already went beyond musical-poetic word use in Wilde’s poetry. For 
example, the names and arrangement in Poems point to a kind of thinking on 
words and music that goes beyond poetic device. As Peter Wagner has noted, the 
book itself is ordered along intermedial lines: 
 
The edition [of Wilde’s Poems] of 1881 can be cut down into four 
‘movements’: in addition to the lyrics in the section entitled ‘The Fourth 
Movement,’ a term that immediately introduces the notion of musicality 
and of musical composition […], we find three sections or ‘movements’ 
separated by five larger poems. [...] The very context of the poem 
introduces the important issues of synesthesia and intermediality (i.e. the 
mingling of music, painting, and writing).
6
 
 
Leaving the mention of painting aside for the discussion of ekphrasis in the next 
chapter, it is clear that this quotation highlights musical elements not just in the 
poems themselves, but in the way in which they are distributed throughout the 
book. 
Wilde does not clarify the exact nature of the relationship between words 
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and music. Beyond the terms set out in Intentions (and incorporated in the other 
works), the relationship remains positively vague. It is exactly this element, 
however, that introduces the proto-postmodern factor of this part of Wilde’s 
literary theory. 
 
Vagueness and the Difficulty of Musical Description 
At the start of ‘The Critic as Artist’ a curious line appears. Turning down the offer 
of being played to because he wants to hear Gilbert talk instead, Ernest remarks: 
‘No; I don’t want music just at present. It is far too indefinite’ (p. 1109). This is a 
remark that echoes Wilde’s entire critical treatment of music. One critic puts it in 
the following way: ‘Wilde’s references to music, although frequent, are generally 
lackadaisical and, at their most deliberate, rise only to the provocatively 
impressionistic;’ and a little farther on, there is talk of ‘the consistently 
uninspiring quality of Wilde’s musical acumen’.7 These critical notes may be fair 
in some sense, but they miss the larger theoretical point: that precision and close, 
objective description of music is neither the goal of Wilde nor, as it turns out, 
modern critics working in word and music studies. 
This may at first appear contrary, as Wilde states on several occasions in 
Intentions that there is a problem with vague art and criticism. Thus he writes of 
criticism that it emerges from the soul, and as such ‘is more delightful than 
philosophy, as its subject is concrete and not abstract, real and not vague’ (p. 
1125). Put into contrast with abstract, vague philosophy, criticism is real and 
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Musicality’, Mosaic: a Journal for the Interdisciplinary Study of Literature, 33.1 (2000), 15-38 
(pp. 18-19). 
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concrete, giving the impression that Wilde feels criticism must be as precise as 
possible. However, as it turns out, Wilde is talking here of the subject matter of 
both, not the method, for he continues: ‘It is the only civilised form of 
autobiography, as it deals not with the events, but with the thoughts of one’s life; 
not with life’s physical accidents of deed or circumstance, but with the spiritual 
moods and imaginative passions of the mind’ (p. 1125). Criticism is precise 
because it knows what it deals with: thoughts, moods and passions of the mind; 
and these matters in themselves, though more clearly defined than those things 
studied by philosophy (at least in Wilde’s terms), are in themselves in no way 
precise. 
Much clearer is Wilde’s rejection of vagueness a little later on in the same 
essay – and far less ambiguous too: he states clearly that ‘to the aesthetic 
temperament the vague is always repellent’ (p. 1137). Again, however, the context 
of the discussion clarifies much. Wilde has been talking about subjects for art and 
criticism. The contrast here is between concepts such as heaven or Plato’s 
philosophy and tangible, visible things such as daffodils. ‘Art is mind expressing 
itself’, he states, ‘under the conditions of matter, and thus, even in the lowliest of 
her manifestations, she speaks to both sense and soul alike’ (p. 1137). The 
vagueness that Wilde abhors is not the vagueness of subject matter, but the 
tackling of big, formless, intangible things rather than more concrete subjects. So 
rather than engaging in an analysis of art in general, Wilde negates the need for 
that analysis (partly by turning its core activity, criticism, into a subjective, 
individual act) and talks instead about the concrete manifestations of art: writing, 
painting and music. These things in turn are discussed not in generality, but in 
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concrete points, so that it is not music that creates the sense of sin, but Chopin 
specifically – as Gilbert notes in ‘The Critic as Artist’ when he says: ‘after playing 
Chopin, I feel as if I had been weeping over sins that I had never committed’ (p. 
1110). 
 Personality plays a pivotal role in music as always, further adding to the 
aforementioned vagueness or ‘impressionistic’ approach in Wilde. This 
personality element has already been explored in previous chapters, but one of the 
examples used there engages with music, and so bears returning to. Gilbert is 
talking about the role of personality in interpretations when he notes: 
 
When Rubinstein plays to us the Sonata Appasionata of Beethoven he 
gives us not merely Beethoven, but also himself, and so gives us 
Beethoven absolutely – Beethoven reinterpreted through a rich artistic 
nature, and made vivid and wonderful to us by a new and intense 
personality. (p. 1131) 
 
This puts into practice what had already been gathered from Wilde’s writing on 
music throughout the rest of the essays: that the key lies not in the objective 
knowledge of it, but in subjective approach – through the personal. In this sense, 
Wilde’s approach to music is the same as it is to the text: words and music are to 
be approached from the same angle. 
This exact comparison was also made by one of the early postmodern 
critics commenting on words and music. Barthes writes, also on Beethoven, about 
the reading of a musical score: ‘Just as the reading of the modern text […] 
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consists not in receiving, in knowing or in feeling that text, but in writing it anew, 
in crossing its writing with a fresh inscription, so too reading this Beethoven is to 
operate his music, to draw it (it is willing to be drawn) into an unknown praxis.’8 
Just as Wilde wants Beethoven to be presented afresh through a vivid personality, 
so does Barthes suggest that a personal approach is necessary when thoroughly 
engaging with – ‘operating’ – Beethoven’s work. 
Barthes, however, does not comment on the other Wildean component: 
there is personality, but the vagueness resulting from such personality is only 
hinted at. That element is brought into words and music studies much more 
clearly with Peter Dayan’s Literature Writing Music. The book, which is a study 
of words and music in a series of French artists and/or critics ranging from 
Georges Sand to Jacques Derrida, identifies the heart of word and music studies 
by looking at the way the two can be studied in combination. In his conclusion, 
Dayan makes the point that there is no way to establish a set of rules for the 
interpretation of words and music. Here is the passage that conveys the essence of 
that conclusion, quoted almost in its entirety for the sake of showing how Dayan 
reaches his exact point: 
 
Literature writing music […] shows how and why we see representations 
in music, and consider them determined by the music; it demonstrates that 
they are never as determined as we think they are, and starting from that 
demonstration, it corrodes, evaporates, or expands them towards a 
generality which empties them of all localized sense, so that each equation 
                                                             
8 Roland Barthes, ‘Musica Practica’, in Image, Music, Text (London: Fontana Press, 1977), pp. 
149-154 (p.153). 
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between music and extra-musical meaning becomes, not the legitimate 
view of an interpretive community, but an error […], a betrayal of music’s 
true character. This writing of music pushes it inexorably towards the point 
of an absolute singularity, which requires both that each musical 
experience be different from every other, and music as such and in general 
be considered to exist as a singular entity beyond the reach of any science 
[…]. This singular music is never ‘entendue’, never understood as it is 
heard; it remains unspoken. Music returns the favour to literature.
9
 
 
What is most notable here is that Dayan’s point of departure is the single work, 
both for music and literature. It is the singular work that is different for every 
listener, just as the interpretation of a given work is different for every Wildean 
critic. As the interpretation moves outward towards a more generalized 
consideration, it becomes an error, ‘a betrayal of music’s true character’. This is, 
of course, strikingly similar to Wilde’s approach in the essays of Intentions, where 
the general and vague is to be rejected in favour of the manifestation itself – not to 
be objectively described, but, as Wilde and Dayan here agree, to be ‘never 
understood as it is heard’; ‘to deepen its mystery, to raise round it, and round its 
maker, that mist of wonder which is dear to both gods and worshippers alike’ (p. 
1130). 
Another influential critic in the development of the field of word and 
music studies is Werner Wolf, who has approached word and music studies from a 
different direction – the more exact, structurally-oriented approach often 
                                                             
9 Peter Dayan, Music Writing Literature, from Sand via Debussy to Derrida (Farnham: Ashgate, 
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associated with German critics. Wolf writes, with an eye towards such structural 
analysis of words and music, that ‘“musicalization” can at best exist in literature, 
let alone fiction, in an implicit and “indirect” mode’.10 In addition to this implicit 
descriptive practice, Wolf finds the approach to music functions along the lines of 
an aesthetic that closely matches Wilde: ‘In fact, the musicalization of fiction is 
often […] a means of revealing non-intellectual, sensory qualities of literature’.11 
This is strongly reminiscent of the basis of Wilde’s own aestheticism, which 
emphasizes in part sensations and the senses as a basis for art. It is worth noting 
here, too, that Wolf foregrounds the non-intellectual, or in other words the vague, 
that which is ‘never understood as it is heard’. 
It may be hard to imagine that the aforementioned approaches represent a 
way to practice criticism, on the part both of Wilde and of postmodern critics such 
as Dayan and Wolf. After all, it would be problematic to study something which 
does not allow itself to be generalized beyond the singular, and which in singular 
form remains open only to individual approach – something that was already 
touched upon in Chapter VI’s discussion of interpretive communities. Wilde’s 
solution to the problem is to turn criticism into an art form in itself, and thus to 
allow it to speak a kind of personal truth through self-expression. Dayan’s 
position is similar: he sees such criticism as ‘a difficult mission for the critic. It 
would never be enough to describe music or literature objectively. […] If I may be 
allowed a comparison from the nineteenth century: we would aim to tell the truth, 
but in a way that only our own invented fiction can make possible’.12 For Dayan, 
as for Wilde, the truth is entirely personal. 
                                                             
10 Wolf, p. 1. 
11 Wolf, p. 34n. 
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The ‘Puerile’ 
All of the above approaches share one crucial step: that the perception of words, 
music and the link between the two cannot be seen as absolutely objective. This, 
however, presents an obstacle. If these elements cannot be studied in some kind of 
conjunction – if, as Dayan seems to conclude, the step of getting away from a 
single work through generalisation eventually means arriving at something empty 
and meaningless – then how can word and music studies be justified? 
Postmodern critics have their own positions, and they are aided by the 
general attitude of postmodernist criticism, which is naturally suspicious of set, 
objective positions at any rate; the contention that words and music may be 
fruitfully studied from a more subjective position is generally acceptable partly 
for that reason, and has consequently yielded a body of results that places the 
field’s right to exist beyond structural reproach. Wilde is similarly beyond such a 
critique because of the central role of the personality and the singular in his 
critical approach. However, Wilde and Dayan share another aspect in their 
theoretical consideration, one that Dayan uses to further justify the non-objective 
study of words and music: the puerile. 
The idea of being ‘puerile’ relates specifically to how the connection 
between words and music might be approached. To Dayan, there exists a kind of 
reaction to music which desires to represent the music in some way, to translate it 
into directly definable things; his example is the idea that a certain piece of music 
could represent raindrops. This he posits as the normal reaction to hearing music: 
‘we see representations in music, and consider them determined by the music.’ Yet 
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‘they are never as determined as we think they are’.13 It is this error, perhaps one 
of oversimplification, that Dayan identifies (following a term used in one of 
George Sands’s books) as the ‘puerile’. In Dayan’s own example, the music may 
express a complex concept of raindrops, but never just the raindrop in and of 
itself. 
Yet the impulse is inescapable: 
 
We long to hear the confirmation that there can be a correspondence 
between music and letters, an overlap, a common cause of the signified; 
and we cannot express that longing […] without looking for ways to 
translate. But at the moment of translation, we stumble; we see that 
translation is puerile, offensive, ridiculous, or simply unconvincing. What 
passes between, and reciprocally validates, music and letters, escapes the 
industrial, and escapes translation.
14
 
 
Dayan here emphasizes two aspects: firstly, that the reader/listener is continuously 
drawn into looking for meaning in music, and secondly that this meaning cannot 
be easily put into words or writing. In other words, a listener wanting to put 
music’s meaning into words quickly runs into trouble, as any description that goes 
above the level of the individual piece (such as the sound of raindrops, a general 
thing) quickly runs into the problem that description at that level becomes general 
and therefore meaningless. This is not entirely hopeless, as the appearance of 
music in literature allows for it to be given descriptions that, while not musical in 
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14 Dayan, p. 75. 
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themselves, allow the critic to describe music literarily: ‘music without literature 
may be given specific meanings, but can possess no general meaning. Within 
literature, on the other hand, music is endlessly emptied of its specific meanings; 
but it is rewarded by being allowed to acquire a general meaning, to become a 
distinct category and type of meaning.’15 
The resulting problem is that, paradoxically, in order to describe music in 
literature, the critic must first accept that what is being described in literature is 
not music, but a literary representation of music. It is different from the musicality 
of language, the rhythmic and formal aspects of it usually associated with poetry. 
In other words, a gap opens between music and literature, and in order to speak 
meaningfully about music in any other way than to ask for silence as it is being 
listened to, the critic must find a way to bridge that gap. It is here that Dayan’s 
term of the puerile comes to rest – it represents the stance of the author towards 
the problem of that gap. The normal reaction perhaps should be to note the 
technical impossibility of the undertaking of writing on music. The puerile 
reaction is to change that reaction to a personal one. In order to bridge the gap 
generated by the general approach to music necessitated by literary description, a 
critic in the puerile mode accepts straight off that their reaction may only be 
personal, thus making it easier to speak of music by avoiding generality wherever 
possible. Dayan seems to have picked the term for its association with an attitude 
both of wonder and of a certain kind of egocentrism. 
There are two ways in which this concept of the puerile, and its centrality 
to Dayan’s link between words and music, resembles Wilde. In the first sense, it is 
                                                             
15 Dayan, p. 95. 
289 
 
very close to how Wilde himself hoped that his second book of children’s tales 
would be read. In the second sense, it is very close to the wilfulness and moods 
that play a central role in Wildean criticism. 
The reception of Wilde’s fairy tales is an interesting story all on its own. 
When he had The Happy Prince and Other Tales published in 1888, Wilde was 
still very much at the start of his prose career. Intentions, Lord Arthur Savile’s 
Crime and Other Stories and The Picture of Dorian Gray were still all to come; 
Wilde was read at that point mostly as a poet – as shown from Walter Pater’s 
comments on the fairy tales: he called them ‘genuine little poems in prose’.16 
When Wilde had A House of Pomegranates published, things had changed 
considerably. By this point he had published his novel, and his theatrical career 
was well under way. The difference shows: the two books, both fairy tales and 
thus ostensibly meant for children, could not be less alike. Whether this has 
anything to do with its intended audience is a matter of debate – one that is still 
ongoing. Some believe that the classification of A House of Pomegranates as fairy 
tales is the result of Wilde miscalculating his audience, while others feel that he 
really did intend the later book for a different readership.
17
 However, whether or 
not Wilde wrote the stories with an audience of children in mind, there remains an 
idea behind them – explained by Wilde in his letters – that is valid despite 
economic arguments. 
It is evident, from the stories themselves and from remarks in Wilde’s 
correspondence, that there is a theoretical element of the childlike at work here. 
                                                             
16 Walter Pater, ‘Walter Pater, letter to Wilde’, in Oscar Wilde: The Critical Heritage, ed. by Karl 
Beckson (London: Routledge, 1970), pp. 59-60. 
17 Michelle Ruggaber, ‘Wilde’s The Happy Prince and A House of Pomegranates: Bedtime 
Stories for Grown-Ups’, English Literature in Transition, 1880-1920, 46.2 (2003), 141-153 (p. 
142). 
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Wilde himself states as much when he writes, in one of his letters, that they were 
‘written, not for children, but for childlike people from eighteen to eighty’.18 
There is an immediate overlap here with Dayan – the puerile and the childlike 
seem very close. However, Wilde’s ‘childlike’ attitude is not the same as just 
being a child: Wilde was very aware of the audience he was writing for, and it was 
comprised of adults. As Michelle Ruggaber puts it, ‘Although Wilde’s life is a 
lesson in paying attention to an audience, a response he wrote to a review of A 
House of Pomegranates suggests disgust at the idea that he had any intention of 
writing to a particular audience, much less to one audience rather than another.’ To 
reinforce this point, she draws attention to some of Wilde’s correspondence: 
‘Wilde wrote in the Pall Mall Gazette in late 1891, “Now in building this House of 
Pomegranates I had about as much intention of pleasing the British child as I had 
of pleasing the British public.”’19 There may have been some manoeuvring on 
Wilde’s part, as this quotation is from a direct response to reviews that had called 
A House of Pomegranates unsuitable for children. However, the important point is 
that Wilde was not writing for one particular audience, but rather for a particular 
attitude in an audience, which was available to children but apparently often lost 
in adults. This shows from yet another passage in Wilde’s letters, where he 
describes his fairy tales in The Happy Prince and Other Tales as ‘studies in prose, 
put for Romance’s sake into a fanciful form: meant partly for children, and partly 
for those who have kept the childlike faculties of wonder and joy, and who find in 
simplicity a subtle strangeness’.20 The comment seems to contradict his previous 
                                                             
18 Oscar Wilde, The Complete Letters of Oscar Wilde, ed. by Merlin Holland and Rupert Hart-
Davis (London: Fourth Estate, 2000), p. 388. 
19 Ruggaber, pp. 142-142. 
20 Complete Letters, p. 352. 
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statement regarding audiences, but it is important to note that the first quotation 
reflects Wilde’s later thinking, after publishing the vastly different volume of fairy 
tales. What happens between The Happy Prince and Other Tales and A House of 
Pomegranates is a refinement of Wilde’s approach to the concept of childlike: it is 
no longer seen as belonging to children, but rather as an attitude that is desirable 
in adults. 
This attitude is found in some of the stories, with the notable early 
example being ‘The Nightingale and the Rose’ from The Happy Prince. In that 
story, the concept of the childlike is associated directly with words and music – 
the story, after all, is about love being expressed in words and in music. Two of 
the story’s main characters represent these aspects. The student is highly textual: 
in his own garden he engages in a monologue about his frustrated love; his object 
of desire is the daughter of a professor; and following one of the Nightingale’s 
beautiful songs, he breaks out into quite verbal critical analysis: ‘the Student got 
up, and pulled a note-book and a lead-pencil out of his pocket. “She has form,” he 
said to himself, as he walked away through the grove—“that cannot be denied to 
her; but has she got feeling? I am afraid not. In fact, she is like most artists; she is 
all style, without any sincerity”’ (p. 280). By contrast, the Nightingale is quite 
musical: her birdsong contains the power to make a rose bloom in winter. Music is 
the Nightingale’s prime contribution to the story, and her death while singing is 
what ultimately allows the Rose-tree to create the rose that will – supposedly – 
allow the Student to win his love’s heart. ‘“If you want a red rose,” said the Tree, 
“you must build it out of music by moonlight, and stain it with your own heart’s-
blood”’ (p. 279). The result of this combination of the verbose Student and the 
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musical Nightingale results in death for love and the creation of the great romantic 
symbol of the single red rose. 
This is an obvious combination of words and music, but it links up with 
the childlike in another way. After all, from reading the story, the reader may 
conclude that romance is a bad thing. The story may be read as suggesting that 
romance has no place in the world. It is, in other words, childish to think that a 
rose will outweigh jewels and silver buckles on shoes, just as it is only in 
children’s stories that a Nightingale can sing with such power and beauty as to 
make roses bloom in winter. Yet with Wilde’s urge to see the story in a childlike 
way – in a puerile way – the eyes are opened to the contrast of a magical, 
beautiful reality of romance, which is placed as an ideal against the grim reality 
where winter roses are run over by cartwheels, and the power of music, imbued 
into the rose, is unable to make the words of love strong enough. 
There is one other effect of critics being puerile in words and music that 
Dayan emphasizes. In his introduction to Literature Writing Music, he mentions 
the following: 
 
Meanwhile, however, a small number of writers, usually occupying 
eccentric positions within or without the academy, to a greater or lesser 
extent, and with variable degree of success, resisted the trend [of objective 
modern reading]. Among them, for me, two stand out. Roland Barthes and 
Jacques Derrida, quite explicitly in both cases, revived the nineteenth 
century tradition of using music to push criticism towards literature […]. 
They showed how, if we know how to admit music, to introduce 
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musicality, we can enable a truly literary critical discourse to survive in 
our postmodern thoughtworld – provided we are brave enough.21 
 
It is immediately clear from this quotation that the effect of bringing criticism 
closer to literature can be traced back to Victorian times. Dayan here writes about 
the French nineteenth century (the book focuses on French critics, authors and 
composers, at any rate), but the same effort was present in author-critics such as 
Pater and Wilde: Wilde, in his ‘The Critic as Artist’, and Pater, for example, 
whose criticism of a Giorgione painting calls for something other than purely 
critical reason: ‘the “ideal” meaning of Giorgione's paintings is intimated rather 
than indicated, suggested rather than described. It is addressed neither to the 
intellect nor to sense but to the imaginative reason’.22 
The concept that Dayan links so closely to the ‘postmodern thoughtworld’ 
is already very closely linked to specifically what Wilde does. Again the path 
leads ultimately to Wilde’s individualist approach to criticism. However, now a 
new element has been added: the possibility that it may be childish to think that 
criticism should not be general or that it need not present a generally acceptable 
reading or explanation of a work of art; the kind of childishness that Wilde and 
Dayan promote in their work; the kind that leads Wilde’s criticism, as it does 
Barthes’s and Derrida’s, to an unusual ‘postmodern thoughtworld’. 
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Salome 
If there is any work that is the culmination of Wilde’s efforts to marry words and 
music in an artistic and theoretical sense, then it must be Salome. The play comes 
at what appears to be the end of Wilde’s critical (if not artistic) interest in words 
and music; after its publication, the theme of music, or a possible discipline to be 
blended into verbal work, recedes from Wilde’s writing. (The Importance of Being 
Earnest and An Ideal Husband were still to come. Obviously ‘The Ballad of 
Reading Gaol’ also follows and its use of the term ‘ballad’ might suggest some 
interest in music, but, as shown in Chapter 7, it is much more likely a reference to 
the poetic forms of Wordsworth and Coleridge.) The Biblical tragedy had, as 
Wilde wrote in the famous letter to Alfred Douglas, ‘refrains whose recurring 
motifs make Salome so like a piece of music and bind it together as a ballad’.23 
Kerry Powell spends some time on the perception, both by Wilde and his 
contemporary critics, of Salome as a verbal approximation of music.
24
 Music had 
not appeared in previous works of Wilde as a structuring device, or indeed as 
anything other than a theoretical point to be touched upon only fleetingly. Now it 
had taken centre stage. 
Music as a theme returns in Salome. As in previous works, it is associated 
with love and power. Just as the Nightingale’s song emerges from romantic love, 
Salome’s desire for Iokanaan emerges from her in musical description: ‘Speak 
again, Iokanaan’, she urges, ‘Thy voice is as music to mine ear’ (p. 589). When he 
has finally been beheaded, she laments: ‘when I looked on thee I heard a strange 
music’ (p. 604). Moreover, the play’s centrepiece is the ‘Dance of the Seven 
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Veils’, as a result of which Salome can convince Herod to have Iokanaan 
executed. Here, again, it is a musical activity that ultimately carries the power of 
convincing. 
Thus music is infused into the narrative, yet the most notable instances of 
music in the play are not accompanied by words at all. Crucially, the Dance of the 
Seven Veils is never described: the stage direction simply reads ‘Salome dances 
the dance of the seven veils’ (p. 600). Herod’s reaction is no more descriptive: 
‘Ah! Wonderful! Wonderful! You see that she has danced for me, your daughter’ 
(p. 600). The rest of the passage is primarily about the dance’s reward. 
Additionally, when Salome is cradling Iokanaan’s head a little later on, she is 
partly lamenting his silence when she says ‘I heard a strange music’ in the past 
tense. At these moments where the pairing of words and music should produce 
their ultimate peak, Wilde takes a step back. Words cannot finally unify in a 
description with music, nor is music present during the verbal description or 
reaction. In this, Wilde links up with Dayan’s puerile assumption that music and 
words may be expressed in one another, as well as with Wolf’s assertion that the 
musicalization of fiction may only occur in an indirect mode. 
An additional musical element of Salome can be found in the pattern of its 
dialogue. As discussed earlier, poetic language is in and of itself also musical. 
There are certainly poetic elements to the language use in Salome: aside from the 
musicality introduced through poetic language, ‘Salome also suggests a kind of 
musicality in its elaborately artificial, highly mannered patterning of dialogue’.25 
While the language of the play is also obviously biblical, this repetition, viewed 
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from Wilde’s interest in words and music, and supported by the way in which 
music is incorporated in his other work, points clearly to a sustained effort on the 
part of Wilde to structure Salome partly on musical principles. 
Once again, the music, as an art form penetrating into the text, centres 
around influence and control. Thus at the start of the play, the repetition is 
introduced as the soldiers speak about Salome, and Narraboth’s infatuation with 
her is introduced. Throughout the opening movements of the play, Salome (and, 
linked with her, the moon) is continuously linked with this repetition. As others 
fall under the princess’ influence, so too do they engage in this particular kind of 
language. 
There are only two characters throughout the play who (partially) resist 
this influence, namely Herod and Iokanaan. The latter uses language in a very 
straightforward, biblical way, and the language can really not be called anything 
but biblical. Herod, however, shows a clear change in that he moves from 
controlling Salome to being controlled by her, and his language changes 
accordingly. The point of change is Salome’s Dance of the Seven Veils. Before 
that, Herod speaks more like a typical Wildean cynic, much like Lord Illingworth 
or Darlington. During this part of the play, the only repetition occurs when he 
speaks of the moon or Salome. As soon as he is forced to give Salome something 
in return for her dance and she has demanded Iokanaan’s head, he grows 
repetitious, as in this speech where he attempts to get her to accept an emerald 
instead: 
 
Hearken to me. I have an emerald, a great emerald and round, that the 
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minion of Caesar has sent unto me. When thou lookest through this 
emerald thou canst see that which passeth afar off. Caesar himself carries 
such an emerald when he goes to the circus. But my emerald is the larger. I 
know well that it is the larger. It is the largest emerald in the whole world. 
Thou wilt take that, wilt thou not? Ask it of me and I will give it thee. (p. 
601) 
 
There is a lot of repetition in this section. The word ‘emerald’ appears very 
frequently, as is the invocation of a name of authority and power, ‘Caesar’. 
Additionally, some sentences are constructed simply of a repeated statement, such 
as ‘Thou wilt take that, wilt thou not?’. This particular part of the speech is thick 
with recurrence and, in that way, indicative of the influence that Salome now has 
over Herod. It is an amplified version of Salome-related repetition that has already 
occurred earlier in the play, when Herod enters and notices the Young Syrian’s 
corpse. 
 
HEROD: […] It is strange that the young Syrian has slain himself. I am 
sorry he has slain himself. I am very sorry. For he was fair to look 
upon. He was even very fair. He had very languorous eyes. I 
remember that I saw that he looked languorously at Salome. 
Truly, I thought he looked too much at her. 
HERODIAS: There are others who look too much at her. 
HEROD: His father was a king. I drave him from his kingdom. And of his 
mother, who was a queen, you made a slave, Herodias. So he was 
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here as my guest, as it were, and for that reason I made him my 
captain. I am sorry he is dead. Ho! why have you left the body 
here? It must be taken to some other place. I will not look at it,–
away with it! (p. 592) 
 
In this passage, Herod’s first speech and second speech differ markedly. The first 
has a lot of repetition, where the second has only one small instance – the word 
‘it’ in the last line. In the first speech, Salome (through her connection with the 
Young Syrian) plays a substantive role, while in the second, the connection is 
marginal; Herod is simply speaking of royalty and obligation. Salome is on 
Herod’s mind in the first speech, and thus the repetition is present; in the second, 
neither makes an appearance. 
Thus Herod, who has verbally dominated the play the moment he enters 
(from his entrance, Salome speaks very little until just after she has danced for 
him) is brought into rhythmic submission by Salome. Here music, specifically 
through the influence of Salome, sets the play’s pace: ‘like music, then, the play 
imposes a stylized and even metronomic procession.’26 In this way, the musical 
element functions as a structuring device; Wilde utilizes it as a fusion of words 
and music. 
That Wilde’s Salome in some ways stands for an achievement in the 
combination of words and music is reinforced through Richard Strauss’s choice of 
the play for his opera Salome (1905). After reading a libretto adaptation of the 
play by Viennese poet Anton Linder, which Strauss did not like, he turned to a 
                                                             
26 Thomas, p. 21. 
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German translation of Wilde’s original text. ‘The original prose of Wilde offered 
all the “poetry” Strauss demanded for the opera. He denied typical operatic 
construction and used an abbreviated version, about one-third, of Wilde's prose for 
his libretto.’27 While this is not the place for an in-depth analysis of the opera 
alongside the play, Strauss’s preference for the Wildean text itself – albeit in 
German translation – over an adaptation must clearly signal the musicality that 
Wilde employed in his play. 
Structure, then, is one of the ways in which Wilde puts a theory on words 
and music to use; and this theory, as explored in the current chapter, is decidedly 
proto-postmodern. It resembles postmodernism not just in this structural use, 
however, but also in its ultimate unwillingness to accept the other – words to 
music, music to words – as anything but unalterably other, never to be combined, 
even as it childishly combines these art forms: 
 
Even when it is possible to identify features of Wilde’s Salome that enter 
the terrain of verbal musicality – features that evoke the structural, even 
phenomenological aspect of music – Wilde’s own biases bring him 
inevitably back to music not just as a structure but as a figure, not just as a 
self-sufficient formalism but as the signal art of opposition, difference and 
otherness.
28
 
 
As both Dayan and Patricia Herzog have pointed out, musicality in fiction, and 
the musicalization of fiction, may have been familiar aspects of Victorian literary 
                                                             
27 Carmen Trammell Skaggs, ‘Modernity’s Revision of the Dancing Daughter: The Salome 
Narrative of Wilde and Strauss’, College Literature, 29.3 (2002), 124-139 (p. 133). 
28 Thomas, p. 19. 
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thinking, with critics such as Carlyle and Pater writing on the topic. However, 
Wilde’s approach again shows a proto-postmodern aspect. Music, however, was 
not the only interdisciplinary subject that interested Wilde. In his frequent, and 
sometimes painterly use of imagery – and perhaps in ultimately finding his way 
into theatre, that type of literature where the visual is so much more important – 
Wilde crossed into territories which are, in postmodern theoretical terms, the 
purview of ekphrasis.
  
301 
 
Chapter IX  Ekphrasis 
 
One of the most remarked-on facets of Wilde’s work is his verbosity. Whether it 
be poetry, short story, novel or essay, Wilde often makes great effort to describe 
images or scenes, or to conjure passages from other literary works. In fact, recent 
studies of Wilde’s manuscripts have shown that editors frequently cut a lot of 
extra descriptive material from the works that were to be published.
1
 Description 
quite simply takes centre stage in his work. At times this is caught up in ways of 
approaching music or intertextuality, as shown in previous chapters. However, it 
has another result: it sheds light on Wilde’s critical ideas regarding the description 
of images and words. Additionally, since many of the visual images described by 
Wilde are artistic – such as portraits – these descriptions in turn become 
ekphrastic. 
The term ekphrasis has now come to stand for descriptions of images in 
words; its precise definition varies according to the debate and critics involved, 
and will be addressed in more detail below. The term originates from Greek, 
where it simply meant any type of description. As it progressed through time, it 
came to stand more and more for (sometimes poetic) descriptions of works of art. 
Finally, in the era of postmodern criticism, it came to its current definition. In 
reaching this late development, two names are of consequence: Gotthold Lessing 
and Murray Krieger. Lessing, a philosopher of the Enlightenment, created much 
of the theoretical framework for thinking on ekphrasis in his work Laocoön: An 
                                                             
1 Josephine Guy, ‘Introduction’, in The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde, Volume IV: Criticism, 
ed. by Josephine Guy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. xix – lxxxv. 
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Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry.
2
 Here he argues against the classical 
tenet of the sister arts, which stated ‘as painting, so poetry’. Lessing instead 
argued that the two are based on fundamentally different principles: poetry 
spreads across time, while painting spreads across space. 
Modern debate on ekphrasis started in 1967 when Murray Krieger 
contributed an essay to a volume called The Poet as Critic, entitled ‘Ekphrasis and 
the Still Movement of Poetry: or, Laokoön Revisited’.3 This essay, which argued 
against the clear divide that Lessing had introduced, linked into interest in 
structuralism and semiotics, and propelled ekphrasis into the foreground of 
theoretical discussion. Much as with word and music studies, the critical 
discipline of ekphrastic theory moved in two different directions from its 
reinception in 1967 to present day. One branch, represented by critics such as 
Krieger, Claus Clüver and, to a degree, Tamar Yacobi, approaches ekphrasis very 
much as an analytic tool, complete with a technical vocabulary and classifications 
of types of ekphrasis. The other branch, represented by critics such as James 
Heffernan, chooses a different focus by emphasizing the way in which things like 
‘art’, ‘text’ and ‘description’ are not neatly contained terms, but rather bleed over 
into one another, thus complicating, for example, the difference between a poem 
on a painting and that same painting’s description in a museum catalogue. The 
distinction is not quite so black and white, but this is roughly what is at stake in 
current discussions on the matter. The different sides of the debate have recently 
been gathered by Valerie Robillard in the collection entitled Pictures in Words, 
                                                             
2 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Laocoön: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry (London: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984). 
3 Murray Krieger, ‘Ekphrasis and the Still Movement of Poetry: or, Laokoön Revisited’, in The 
Poet as Critic, ed. by Frederick P. W. McDowell (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1967), pp. 3-26. 
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from which some of the discussion in this chapter is drawn.
4
 
 
Ekphrasis: Some Definitions 
In order to clarify the debate and accurately point out how Wilde’s thinking relates 
to it, it is necessary to look a little more closely at a crucial point in the definition 
of ekphrasis. To do so requires a turn to three distinct ways of looking at ekphrasis 
as a term. These ways will function as a model within which the spectrum of 
approach is (very broadly) conveyed. This spectrum runs from a narrow view of 
ekphrasis as mostly poetic representation of painting and, to a degree, 
photography; passes through a broader description of ekphrasis as really any 
verbal description of the visual; and ends in a view of ekphrasis as something 
almost analogous to intermediality. 
Representing the first of these is John Hollander, whose 1995 book The 
Gazer’s Spirit: Poems Speaking to Silent Works of Art undertakes an examination 
of ekphrasis through the analysis of numerous examples. The following passage 
illustrates Hollander’s view of ekphrasis: 
 
‘Ecphrasis’ (frequently spelled in the directly transliterated form, 
ekphrasis) has been until the last decade or so a technical term used by 
classicists and historians of art to mean a verbal description of a work of 
art, of a scene as rendered in a work of art, or even of a fictional scene the 
description of which unacknowledgedly derives from descriptions of 
scenes. In recent literary theory, considerations of ecphrasis have 
                                                             
4 Pictures into Words: Theoretical and Descriptive Approaches to Ekphrasis, ed. by Valerie 
Robillard and Els Jongeneel (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1998). 
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concerned the ways in which space and time are involved in the various 
mutual figurations of actuality, text, and picture. Classicists are frequently 
concerned with the relation between the ecphrasis of a picture and the 
question of scenic description in fiction generally; of central interest there 
is the relation between the vividness or liveliness (in Greek, enargeia) of a 
painting, say, and the rhetorical vividness of the writing.
5
 
 
Of particular note here are two things. First of all, there is the term ‘enargeia’, 
which is frequently found in discussions on ekphrasis, but just as often seen as 
problematic or even entirely out of place. As Hollander notes, it is a remnant of 
the term’s classical roots. Because attempts are often still made to give enargeia a 
place in the contemporary list of critical terms, it is important to remain aware of 
its participation in ekphrasis. Secondly, it is worth noting Hollander’s emphasis on 
the artistic. This book deliberately sets out to investigate ekphrastic poems, and 
the definition given here mentions ‘a verbal description of a work of art’. 
Hollander’s approach to ekphrasis focuses very clearly on the artistic. Indeed, the 
book describes ekphrasis through the use of a number of pairings of poems and 
paintings or photographs. This is not to say that Hollander primarily believes that 
ekphrasis is only a matter of art – nowhere in the book does he make that claim. 
However, the suggestion remains that, when looking at ekphrasis, the critic ought 
to focus on poetic writing and visual arts. 
This, then, is the most artistic, descriptive side of ekphrasis. Somewhat 
farther down the line towards a purely theoretical, open interpretation of the term 
                                                             
5 John Hollander, The Gazer’s Spirit: Poems Speaking to Silent Works of Art (London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 5. 
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is James Heffernan’s definition, which has become the norm (mostly) in critical 
debates on ekphrasis. According to this critic, ekphrasis is ‘the verbal 
representation of visual representation’.6 This definition has the great advantage 
that it follows the logical extension of the term to a point where it literally comes 
down to any writing on any image – as long as that image is a representation. 
Heffernan emphasizes this clearly: in the theoretical debate, it is necessary and 
useful for critics ‘to distinguish ekphrasis from two other ways of mingling 
literature and the visual arts – pictorialism and iconicity. What distinguishes those 
two things from ekphrasis is that each one aims primarily to represent natural 
objects and artifacts rather than works of representational art’.7 This focus on 
representation rather than natural objects – the term ‘natural’ is problematic, also 
for Wilde – is the same as in Hollander, in that, in the end, most representational 
work is still artistic in nature; yet it also allows for a wider net to be cast. 
Heffernan’s main point, however, is to be found in the phrase ‘verbal 
representation’. What Heffernan’s definition very clearly stakes out for ekphrasis 
is the freedom to include any kind of verbal description. This emphasizes that 
ekphrasis does not revolve around poetry, or indeed around any black-and-white 
approach to ‘high’ artistic writing. Heffernan’s main point, which he develops 
throughout several ‘Museum of Words’ articles and one book, is that even 
explicitly non-artistic descriptions may fall under the purview of ekphrasis: his 
phrase ‘museum of words’ is a reference to the way paintings are displayed in 
museums. They are often accompanied by titles, descriptions and relevant 
                                                             
6 James A. W. Heffernan, Museum of Words: The Poetics of Ekphrasis from Homer to Ashbery 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 3. 
7 James A. W. Heffernan, ‘Ekphrasis and Representation’, New Literary History, 22.2 (Spring 
1991), 297-316 (p. 299). 
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information in catalogues, or even stories told by tour guides; and this does not 
even take into account text that visitors themselves might bring from outside the 
museum to these paintings. 
It is possible to follow this reasoning further along and reach the other end 
of the spectrum. Here arise discussions that focus not on any single manifestation 
of ekphrasis or even representation, nor on broad groupings of such; instead they 
base themselves entirely on the theoretical debate. Critics have long noticed that, 
in some ways, the tenability of the idea of the ‘visual’ is difficult to maintain, 
other than to determine arbitrarily that ekphrasis is limited to the visual. 
Originally the term related to rhetorical description in certain ways and the visual 
aspect was not very heavily emphasized. Additionally, as the ekphrasis debate 
drew more and more on disciplines such as semiotics, critics started to arrive at a 
definition of ekphrasis that seems close to, and at some moments blurs with, terms 
such as intertextuality and intermediality. 
One such critic, Claus Clüver, started examining Heffernan’s definition 
and introducing a number of objections. Building on critical ekphrasis discourse 
by Tamar Yacobi, Clüver eventually arrives at his own definition: ‘Ekphrasis is 
the verbalization of real or fictitious texts composed in a non-verbal sign system.’8 
This definition is obviously quite far away from Hollander’s starting point, which 
focussed very much on artistic matter on both the verbal and the visual side. 
Clüver is concerned solely with a critical vocabulary that allows the definition of 
ekphrasis with absolute precision. Heffernan’s definition is too vague for him. It is 
also noteworthy that Clüver does not believe it is viable to have ekphrasis be 
                                                             
8 Claus Clüver, ‘Quotation, Enargeia, and the Functions of Ekphrasis’, in Pictures into Words: 
Theoretical and Descriptive Approaches to Ekphrasis, ed. by Valerie Robillard and Els Jongeneel 
(Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1998), pp. 35-52 (p. 49). 
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limited to images. As he states himself in the article where he arrives at it, his 
definition is open to anything non-verbal, including such things as music. While 
ekphrasis still covers images, the ‘texts composed in a non-verbal sign system’ 
essentially means that any intermedial activity would fall under the term of 
ekphrasis. At this end of the spectrum, the unique link with the visual is lost. 
The move down the line of this spectrum goes from highly artistic-
oriented, example-driven writing on ekphrasis to a strongly theory-oriented, open 
approach to the term, which drops even the purely visual element. This move is 
also the move from a more classical ekphrasis to a more postmodern ekphrasis. 
Wilde will come into this discussion somewhere around the middle of that range, 
in the vicinity of Heffernan. The openness of Heffernan’s approach is – as will be 
shown – akin to Wilde’s theories of personality-driven artistic freedom. Because 
Wilde never explicitly develops a theory on ekphrasis, the more purely theoretical 
discussion undertaken by critics such as Clüver cannot apply; the latter’s focus on 
terminology makes this end of the spectrum the least fruitful to compare with 
Wilde’s approach to ekphrasis. Additionally, a discussion on postmodern theories 
and words and images is best served by a theory that does focus on those images. 
Even with the focus on visual-based theory, however, there is another issue. The 
problem, familiar by now, is that Wilde’s thoughts are spread throughout his work 
and need to be teased out before they can be clearly identified as critical thought. 
As always, Wilde’s theoretical approach is consistent and identifiable in both 
critical and creative work (if, at this point, that distinction is still valid at all) and 
the starting point, once again, is Intentions. 
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Ekphrasis in Intentions 
Though the term ekphrasis was available to Wilde (although not in its 
(post)modern form), Intentions makes no mention of it. As a trained classicist with 
a clear fondness for ancient Greece, and given that several essays make use of 
original Greek, it must be assumed that Wilde had encountered ekphrasis, even if 
only in its original rhetorical form. There is no use in speculating why the term 
makes no appearance in any of Wilde’s works and there really is no cause to do 
so; the changes that make ekphrasis more of a postmodern element in critical 
thinking, and thus suitable to the discussion of Wilde as a proto-postmodernist, 
occur after 1970. The term as it existed in the latter half of the nineteenth century 
is not as relevant to the present discussion. 
Like music, visual art as a theme comes to the fore repeatedly in Wilde’s 
essays. Unlike music, visual art plays a large role in several of them. Discussion 
of painting and representation is at the heart of ‘The Decay of Lying’ while ‘Pen, 
Pencil and Poison’ is devoted to the life of a man who writes, among other things, 
about works of visual art by famous painters such as Rembrandt. It is in this 
particular essay that Wilde comes closest to defining terms for a critical discussion 
on words and images. Describing how the essay’s subject, Thomas Griffiths 
Wainewright, deals with the description of painting, Wilde writes: ‘he deals with 
his impressions of the work as an artistic whole, and tries to translate those 
impressions into words, to give, as it were, the literary equivalent for the 
imaginative and mental effect.’9 Moreover, Wainewright’s work is indicative of a 
type of writing on images: ‘he was one of the first to develop what has been called 
                                                             
9 Oscar Wilde, The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003), p. 
1098. Further references to Wilde’s work from this edition are given after quotations in the text. 
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the art-literature of the nineteenth century, that form of literature which has found 
in Mr. Ruskin and Mr. Browning, its two most perfect exponents’ (p. 1098). The 
list could easily have included Pater, whose book The Renaissance includes many 
such instances of ‘art-literature’. This term of art-literature refers to a lively debate 
that was going on about verbal writing on art. The debate changed over the course 
of the nineteenth century, eventually serving to highlight how 
 
word and image are countersigns of each other, how the likeness or 
duplication initially disclosed by the verbal and visual representations is 
only apparent, and how, symbolically, the ekphrastic encounter testifies to 
the indeterminate and what Matthew Arnold writing to Clough called the 
general ‘unpoetical’ character of the modern world.10 
 
(It would be worthwhile to survey the topic of art-writing and thus to track what 
theories had influenced Wilde, but that falls outside the space and scope afforded 
here – the aim, after all, is to show how Wilde’s thinking is proto-postmodern, not 
where that thinking in turn may have come from.) 
At any rate, the term ‘art-literature’ appears nowhere else in Wilde’s 
essays. The two men mentioned – Ruskin and Browning – are both poets, 
suggesting that Wilde may have conceived of this approach as purely poetic, much 
like Hollander. However, in the essay itself, Wilde is describing Wainewright, who 
is a critic rather than a poet. This is emphasized by the fact that Wilde mostly 
discusses Wainewright’s writings on art and his predilection for poisoning people. 
                                                             
10 Lawrence Starzyk, ‘“Ut pictura poesis”: The nineteenth-century perspective’, Victorian 
Newsletter, 102 (2002), 1-9 (p. 9). 
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Wainewright is linked with Matthew Arnold’s phrase ‘to see the object as in itself 
it really is’ (p. 1097). That Wilde should bring up the phrase in connection to 
Wainewright is telling, because it places the poisoner strangely between two 
positions. On the one hand, Wilde repeatedly refers to Wainewright’s artistic 
nature, even going so far as to insist that the judgement on him should be artistic: 
‘Of course, he is far too close to our own time for us to be able to form any purely 
artistic judgment about him’ (p. 1106). The implication is that Wilde finds it 
desirable for readers to form an artistic opinion, but that a general public – ‘us’ – 
is not quite capable yet. Clearly, however, Wilde does not view Wainewright as a 
perfect artist in terms of his artistic practices; what interests him are 
Wainewright’s ideas, which allow Wilde to share some of his own thoughts with 
his readers: he sees his forerunner as an imperfect critic, not because the latter is 
wrong, but because his techniques do not yet go far enough. 
Those ideas may be gleaned from the way in which Wilde describes them, 
as well as in the general remarks that Wilde makes about his artistic/critical craft. 
For one thing, he attributes a certain artificiality to Wainewright, since, ‘like most 
artificial people, he had a great love of nature’ (p. 1101). Here the juxtaposition of 
nature and artifice points to that greater Wildean assumption, explored in ‘The 
Decay of Lying’, of the constructed, artificial nature of life. In connection to 
Wainewright, the writer of art-literature, it also points to the same element as 
Heffernan: namely that the reader is dealing with representation and not the 
‘natural object’ itself. 
Wilde also writes of Wainewright: ‘As an art-critic he concerned himself 
primarily with the complex impressions produced by a work of art, and certainly 
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the first step in aesthetic criticism is to realise one’s own impressions’ (p. 1096). 
This is the recurring theme of personality and personal response being the 
cornerstone of any artistic endeavour. Wilde returns to it later in ‘The Critic as 
Artist’, where he writes: ‘To the critic the work of art is simply a suggestion for a 
new work of his own, that need not necessarily bear any obvious resemblance to 
the thing it criticises. The one characteristic of a beautiful form is that one can put 
into it whatever one wishes, and see in it whatever one chooses to see’ (p. 1128). 
Here Wilde anticipates the idea that ekphrasis can be based on images that may 
not necessarily be available for viewing. Hollander calls this idea ‘notional’ 
ekphrasis, ‘the verbal representation of a purely fictional work of art.’ If the work 
of art is itself fictional, it is ‘Notional ecphrasis – or the description, often 
elaborately detailed, of purely fictional painting or sculpture that is indeed brought 
into being by the poetic language itself’.11 This idea of the critical term of 
ekphrasis and its scope is present – in its form of notional ekphrasis – in Wilde’s 
concept of the critic as artist as it is embodied here in Wainewright’s art criticism.  
The broad scope for ekphrasis, introduced by Heffernan, is another thing 
that is already there in Wilde’s critical thought. It may be found in the description 
of Wainewright, especially when ‘Pen, Pencil and Poison’ is compared to ‘The 
Decay of Lying’. During the former essay, Wilde makes a point about 
Wainewright’s criminal acts having made his art more interesting: ‘one can fancy 
an intense personality being created out of sin’ (p. 1106). Such an intense 
personality will lead to better art, as ‘The Critic as Artist’ argues, but here it also 
broadens the range of the artist: the addition of sin to the artist’s personality is 
                                                             
11 Hollander, p. 4. 
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what intensifies and adds interest. This is one of the essential points of ‘The 
Decay of Lying’: art becomes interesting when the artist realises that truth and 
morality have nothing whatsoever to do with art; that, in fact, there is no such 
thing as ‘Truth’ with a capital T, so that ‘Art, breaking from the prison-house of 
realism, will run to greet him, and will kiss his false, beautiful lips, knowing that 
he alone is in possession of the great secret of all her manifestations, the secret 
that Truth is entirely and absolutely a matter of style’ (p. 1081). Artists and critics 
cannot avoid a narrow definition involving things like ‘Truth’, but must assume a 
broad range. 
The comments Wilde makes in the essays are related directly to painters 
and critics (though he writes with reference to all art and criticism), and two of 
Wainewright’s clearest characteristics are his art criticism and his painting. This in 
turn allows for these points to be linked to Wilde’s term of art-literature, the term 
he gives to what is essentially ekphrasis. The point is especially relevant where 
‘The Critic as Artist’ is concerned. Where Wilde claims criticism for the sphere of 
art (and vice versa), he makes the same step that modern critics make in ekphrasis 
in relation to critical writing and visual representation: ‘If ekphrasis is “the verbal 
representation of visual representation”, a definition most experts now seem to 
accept, the first part of that definition can only mean: all verbal commentary 
writing (poems, critical assessments, art historical accounts) on images.’12 This is 
the same position, again, as Heffernan’s, and it puts Wilde’s critical thinking again 
in the middle of that theoretical debate on ekphrasis. 
The question then becomes whether ekphrastic writing includes not simply 
                                                             
12 Peter Wagner, ‘Introduction’, in Icons, Texts, Iconotexts : Essays on Ekphrasis and 
Intermediality, ed. by Peter Wagner (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1996), pp. 1-40 (p. 15). 
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critical writing on visual representation, but theoretical writing in and of itself – 
writing that is no longer the practice of linking theory to a visual work, but talks 
about the theory for its own sake, as Clüver does. In other words, is ekphrasis, to 
some degree, the result of itself – an act of theory on visual representation, and 
therefore, as words on images, ekphrastic? The modern debate on ekphrasis tends 
to lean that way, as exemplified in the following passage, which goes so far even 
as to suggest literary theory as an active ekphrastic practice. In discussing 
ekphrasis, critic Martin Gaughan sees  
 
a concern with contemporary issues in both the production and reception 
of visual art, but a visual art which increasingly consciously problematises 
its own status through its engagement with the verbal (and occasionally 
attendant literary theory), whether inside the frame of the work (on the 
surface) or outside (as title, often of almost textual proportions).
13
 
 
Two things stand out here. The first is that, as said, the reference is specifically to 
‘attendant literary theory’, which makes the article actively engage the suggestion 
that (literary) theory can itself be ekphrastic. The second point of the above 
quotation is that the production of certain kinds of visual representation (the 
article makes no specific mention) represents challenges to verbal elements 
‘outside’ of the frame of the work. This, too, indicates a kind of blurring effect, 
whereby critical and theoretical writing on ekphrasis may in itself become 
ekphrastic. This is not quite the point that Clüver was making; after all, the 
                                                             
13 Martin Ignatius Gaughan, ‘Textual Titles: Resisting Translation’, in Text into Image: Image 
into Text, ed. by Jeff Morrison and Florian Krobb (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997), pp. 257-266 (p. 
257). 
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discussion here is still on the verbal and the visual, not the verbal and the non-
verbal. It is, however, farther down the spectrum in his direction. It links to 
Wilde’s view on the matter: again it concerns Wainewright’s art-literature and the 
non-difference between art and criticism explored in ‘The Critic as Artist’. When 
ekphrasis itself becomes the object of its study and when the theory becomes the 
ekphrastic act, we are left with very little difference between the critical and the 
creative act; as Wilde had been arguing all along, readers should see ‘criticism as 
an essential part of the creative spirit’ (p. 1120). 
Paintings, Portraits and Imagined Images 
In the previous chapters on simulacra and hyperreality, the power of images has 
already been discussed and the separate chapter on portraiture covered specifically 
how Wilde handled concepts of truth, lies and representation. Now, the topic of 
portraiture is taken up again, but here it appears in the context of a discussion on 
ekphrasis as a modern critical theory. 
In light of ekphrastic theory, the two most important works that feature 
portraiture are The Picture of Dorian Gray and ‘The Portrait of Mr. W. H.’ The 
striking thing about both these works is that they actively engage the concept of 
notional ekphrasis: they explore aspects of representing a fictional work of visual 
representation and its implications – directly in the case of Dorian, and indirectly 
in ‘W. H.’. 
In this respect, The Picture of Dorian Gray is quite straightforward in one 
sense: it represents notional ekphrasis. Wilde’s descriptions of Dorian’s portrait 
are typical verbal descriptions of visual representation (in this case, the artistic 
and moral representation of Dorian Gray). What is interesting is the sense of 
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movement, or change, that Dorian’s changing portrait introduces. The concept of 
movement in relation to ekphrasis has not been explored very extensively in 
theory. Yet there is no part of the definition ‘verbal representation of visual 
representation’ that should limit the visual to remaining static. In Wilde’s case, the 
picture changes along with Dorian’s state of mind, and the reader is given 
descriptions of that change throughout the book. In one sense there are several 
different portraits, as Dorian is never faced with the portrait as it is changing, but 
rather with the portrait that has already changed. The movement is implied in the 
writing, such as when the description reads: 
 
Yet it was watching him, with its beautiful marred face and its cruel smile. 
Its bright hair gleamed in the early sunlight. Its blue eyes met his own. A 
sense of infinite pity, not for himself, but for the painted image of himself, 
came over him. It had altered already, and would alter more. Its gold 
would wither into grey. Its red and white roses would die. For every sin 
that he committed, a stain would fleck and wreck its fairness. (p. 75) 
 
First of all, the painting is given a certain sense of agency in this passage: it is 
‘watching him’ and its ‘blue eyes met his own’. The reader is presented with the 
impression that the portrait is alive and active (even if such fancy is, most likely, 
merely in Dorian’s mind). Second of all, the language itself also suggests change, 
almost inevitably: the painting ‘would alter more’ and its ‘red and white roses 
would die’, suggesting a kind of future movement that is unavoidable. This aspect 
of movement, or kinesis, has not been fully investigated, save perhaps for the 
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attempts at defining the ‘lifelike’ qualities of the ekphrastic description – the 
rhetorical term known as enargeia. However, the lifelike and actual kinesis are not 
quite the same. Attention specifically to movement in ekphrasis is currently – at 
the time of writing this thesis – still quite young, happening with new scholars 
who are exploring the new topics of ekphrasis – one example being Elisabeth 
Bruinja, whose work on William Carlos Williams’s ekphrastic poems on Breughel 
explores how ‘the poet creates a kinetic effect by a skilful application of active 
and progressive verbs, by calling attention to the rhythmical aspects of the poetic 
medium, and by guiding the inner eye of the reader through the composition by 
imitating the dynamics of optical or saccadic movement’.14 
Before continuing to discuss how ‘The Portrait of Mr. W. H.’ functions in 
the context of ekphrasis, it is necessary to clarify something about its nature. ‘The 
Portrait of Mr. W. H.’ appeared in Blackwood’s Magazine in 1889 and was 
incorporated in later editions of Lord Arthur Savile’s Crime and Other Stories. 
From its inclusion in that volume, it may be concluded that this is a short story. 
However, ‘The Portrait of Mr. W. H.’ contains a great deal of literary criticism, 
mostly notably efforts in close reading of Shakespeare’s Sonnets. It was this 
critical section that Wilde later expanded, though that second version was 
ultimately never published by Wilde. As a result, the work is normally classified 
as a short story. More recently, Josephine Guy also chose not to include it in the 
fourth volume of Wilde’s works, dedicated to criticism, which does contain the 
essays from Intentions as well as ‘The Rise of Historical Criticism’ and ‘The Soul 
of Man Under Socialism’. Bruce Bashford argues as much when he identified the 
                                                             
14 Elisabeth Bruinja, ‘Anything But Faithful Recordings’ (unpublished master’s thesis, University 
of Groningen, 2009), p. 64.  
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essay/story as an expression of Wilde’s fears about his own theory of criticism as 
art, exposing its dark side by showing how it may go wrong when taken to 
extremes: ‘The story represents an approach to [“The Critic as Artist”] by way of 
a wrong turn. [...] The theory of interpretation Wilde depicts in “The Portrait” has 
an implication that he finds disturbing.’15 Bashford, however, chooses to situate 
the act of criticism as art within the confines of the story, where the critical theory 
on Shakespeare’s Sonnets is the source of death and despair. In considering, 
instead, the whole story itself as Wilde’s critical, artistic act, it becomes an act of 
criticism regarding Shakespeare’s Sonnets, and the ‘wrong turn’ becomes a story, 
one of the creative elements that blur the boundary between the critical and the 
creative. In other words, ‘The Portrait of Mr. W. H.’ is as much a critical essay in 
the Wildean sense as it is a short story in the general sense. 
Returning to the discussion of ‘The Portrait of Mr. W. H.’ as ekphrasis, the 
story is the closest Wilde comes to theoretically discussing notional ekphrasis and, 
additionally, ekphrasis theory as an act of ekphrasis. Central to this reading of the 
narrative is the state of the tale’s titular portrait as a forgery. This imbues the 
portrait with a curiously two-fold status. It is an instance of notional ekphrasis in 
that its description by Wilde constitutes a description of a portrait that has never 
existed. It is also notional in that the theory presented within the story by Cyril 
Graham rests on W. H.’s actual existence – a fact negated, or at least made very 
unlikely, by his portrait’s status as a forgery. With his existence unproven, the 
theory remains an evocation of a fictitious person – notional, in a way – and yet 
the portrait, within the confines of the story, is entirely real. Given the portrait’s 
                                                             
15 Bruce Bashford, ‘Hermeneutics in Oscar Wilde’s ‘The Portrait of Mr. W. H.’’, Papers on 
Language and Literature: A Journal for Scholars and Critics of Language and Literature, 24.4 
(1988), 412-422 (p. 412). 
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existence, technically speaking the ekphrastic description taken from the Sonnets 
and derived from the theory is not notional at all, since it is verbal description of a 
visual representation (even if that representation represents, in fact, a lie). 
Wilde makes use of the same critical ideas on visual representation and 
painting as he does in Intentions, namely that the distinction between the critical 
and the creative is a hard one to make. The use of Mr. W. H.’s portrait brings 
exactly that problem of the link between art and criticism into focus. In this way 
its function resembles a general theory of ekphrasis: 
 
Ekphrasis itself brings the relationship between the creative and critical 
components of the creative act into the sharpest possible focus. A poem 
about a painting is already a critical act [...]. Indeed ekphrasis is a form of 
writing in which multiple participants in the process of literary exchange 
are often more explicitly present and designated than elsewhere.
16
 
 
Through the use of the (notionally ekphrastic) portrait, Wilde arrives at a point 
where the factors in ekphrasis – theory, verbal representation, visual 
representation – are indeed ‘explicitly present and designated’. 
The reading of the relationship between Graham’s theory, Shakespeare’s 
Sonnets, and the forged portrait as Wilde’s incorporation of thinking on ekphrasis, 
allows for the portrait to become a site where theory and the act itself are blurred. 
The portrait’s status as both notional ekphrasis outside of the story and actual 
ekphrasis within the story brings these relationships into the foreground. Fiction 
                                                             
16 David Kinloch, ‘The Poet in the Art Gallery: Accounting for Ekphrasis’, New Writing, 7.1 
(2010), 19-29 (p. 20). 
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and facts mix – this is one of the story’s main points – and this is shown most 
clearly in the portrait itself. It combines the states of being a critical act and being 
a verbal and visual representation. As a critical act, it is part of Cyril Graham’s 
theory on Shakespeare’s Sonnets and Hughes, establishing it as plausible for the 
general critical audience. As verbal and visual representation, it is a description of 
a portrait and thus a fairly straightforward instance of notional ekphrasis. Yet the 
two facets are present at the same time, and thus illustrate a blurring of the line 
between ekphrasis itself and theory on ekphrasis. 
 
Photography and Ekphrasis 
Though previously discussed in this thesis in conjunction with possibilities of 
truth, the discussion of photography is also a part of ekphrasis, one that has 
specific theoretical considerations. In terms of visual representation, photography 
differs from other kinds of images such as painting primarily in the expectations 
associated with it. Photography is, on the whole, conceived of as a more accurate 
representation of reality than painting or drawing; the assumption is generally that 
photography captures a moment of actual reality whereas other visual 
representations capture the impression of that image’s creator. In tandem with a 
questioning of truth in general, that assumption about photography is being 
challenged, and many scholars now debate to what degree photographs are 
genuine representations of reality, and to what degree they are manufactured: 
‘recent poetry has been concerned with photographs as invented pictures in 
themselves – given the history in the twentieth century of various notions and 
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counternotions of “art” photography – as well as with their documentary status.’17 
The possibilities today of altering photographic images through digital processing, 
and the ability to do this on a scale of detail that makes such alteration 
unnoticeable to the human eye, have further diminished photography’s 
‘documentary status’. 
It would be unfair to say that, in Wilde’s time, views on photography were 
unequivocally of the simplistic kind: Victorians did not simply see photographs as 
unproblematic representations of reality. The nineteenth-century discussion did 
not focus as much on realism as it did on representation of form. This means that 
while the link between photography and realism was generally accepted, it was far 
from straightforward: 
 
Some nineteenth-century critics linked novelistic and photographic 
representation in terms of a shared realism. [...] Yet paradoxically, rather 
than focus on a shared devotion to objective representation, Victorian 
critics linked photography and the realist novel through a shared dilemma: 
a preponderance of details without a governing structure.
18
 
 
The ‘objective representation’ was, then, certainly a factor in the thinking on 
photography in Wilde’s time. Photography was deemed capable of objectivity, but 
also of distortion of form. 
In postmodernism, the preoccupations changed. If the photograph is 
naturally capable of objectivity, then the discussion on form is important; if, 
                                                             
17 Hollander, p. 67. 
18 Daniel Novak, ‘Photographic Fictions: Nineteenth-Century Photography and the Novel Form’, 
Novel, 43.1 (Spring 2010), 23-30 (p. 23). 
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however, such objectivity must be called into question, the matter of form is 
settled as the whole discussion switches to subjectivity. That such a clear switch 
was made in terms of thinking on photography is clear, as in the quotation below, 
where critic Janice Hart discusses the difference between photography appearing 
in a Sherlock Holmes story and in a novel published in 2003: 
 
Writers no longer think of photographs in terms of ‘transparency’ and 
concepts of reality are now considered to be more complex than when 
Conan Doyle was writing [‘A Scandal in Bohemia’]. The ‘truth value’ of 
photography has also been systematically questioned by critics from a 
range of subject disciplines.’19 
 
Noteworthy in these discussions are the words ‘objectivity’, ‘transparency’, ‘truth 
value’ and ‘documentary status’ – all indications that the centre of the critical 
debate on photography revolves around its capability to represent reality. 
Wilde’s discussion of photography arises from a single story. In ‘The 
Sphinx Without a Secret’ the reader finds the only instance of photography in 
Wilde’s body of work: the picture of a mysterious woman. The story was 
previously discussed in Chapter VI in terms of portraiture and surface; it is now 
taken up again in terms of visual representation and description. Here is the 
passage where the photograph first appears, near the beginning of the story and 
while the reader knows nothing yet of the fate of Lady Alroy: 
 
                                                             
19 Janice Hart, ‘The Girl No One Knew: Photographs, Narratives, and Secrets in Modern Fiction’, 
Mosaic: a Journal for the Interdisciplinary Study of Literature, 37.4 (2004), 111-126 (p. 114). 
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He took from his pocket a little silver-clasped morocco case, and handed it 
to me. I opened it. Inside there was the photograph of a woman. She was 
tall and slight, and strangely picturesque with her large vague eyes and 
loosened hair. She looked like a clairvoyante, and was wrapped in rich 
furs. ‘What do you think of that face?’ he said; ‘is it truthful?’ I examined 
it carefully. It seemed to me the face of some one who had a secret, but 
whether that secret was good or evil I could not say. Its beauty was a 
beauty moulded out of many mysteries - the beauty, in fact, which is 
psychological, not plastic - and the faint smile that just played across the 
lips was far too subtle to be really sweet. ‘Well,’ he cried impatiently, 
‘what do you say?’ ‘She is the Gioconda in sables,’ I answered. (pp. 205-
206) 
 
It is clear from several instances in this passage alone that the story tackles the 
theme of reality and photography directly. The photograph is housed in a ‘little 
silver-clasped morocco case’ and is thus presented in the context of a piece of art 
– decorate art, as Wilde would have put it. The woman in the photograph looks 
‘picturesque’, as though she herself is also a work of art. Her mysterious nature 
immediately clashes with the concept of photography as having a documentary 
nature, as she appears ‘like a clairvoyante’. Crucially, the pertinent question that is 
then asked about the portrait is: ‘is it truthful?’. These points make up only half 
the passage quoted above. During the rest of it, Lady Alroy’s mysterious nature is 
firmly reinforced, culminating in a reference to the Mona Lisa, whose smile is one 
of the famed archetypes of mystery. The verbal representation of this 
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photographic portrait works predominantly to reinforce the air of mystery. 
If Lady Alroy were mysterious, then the photograph would have reported 
matters truthfully. However, its documentary nature has already been made 
doubtful by its association with art – its decorative container and ‘picturesque’ 
subject – and the story will bear out that Lady Alroy’s mystery is entirely 
constructed. The photograph turns out to be one of the many tools employed by 
Lady Alroy to create the false sense of mystery; in other words, it lies. In terms of 
treatment of photography, this is much closer to the postmodern view of 
photography: Wilde, in the story, is actively questioning the truth-value mentioned 
above by Janice Hart. This is emphasized even by the story’s ending: while just 
having had the truth explained to him by the narrator, the character of Lord 
Murchison is again struck with doubt. ‘He took out the morocco case, opened it, 
and looked at the photograph. “I wonder?” he said at last’ (p. 208). The doubt is 
uttered while the character is glancing at the photograph: it continues the lie and 
mystery even as Lord Murchison is now aware of the true version of reality. 
Photography, rather than documenting reality, represents whatever it is 
made to represent. This is all the more powerful because of the illusion of 
objectivity that photography exudes – a power made clear in the story. Wilde 
actively plays with this documentary status when he foregrounds the photograph’s 
suggestion of mystery and shows its influence on Lord Murchison even in the face 
of truth. It is the proto-postmodernist Wilde at work, for postmodern critics have 
made the same, albeit much more detailed, observation. The description here is of 
the photograph itself: 
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Its lack of continuous motion or explicit narrative duration (its stillness), 
its lack of an acoustic or verbal dimension (its silence), its conspicuous 
spatialization of visual experience (its deployment of three-dimensional or 
perspectival realism), its mechanical-chemical indexical relationship with 
the real that seems to exceed the intentionality of the image-producer (its 
status as the ‘pencil of nature’ rather than of ‘man’): all these give 
photography the appearance of a pure visuality—and unlike painting, it is 
a visuality originating in the (referential) world rather than mediated by the 
(authorial) mind. Photography appears as the antithesis to verbal, textual, 
or even other pictorial systems that move in the noise of subjectivity and 
time.
20
 
 
In other words, the fact that photography supposedly moves straight from reality 
to picture without passing through a creator’s mind is what gives the photograph 
the ‘appearance of pure visuality’ which can be found ‘originating in the world’ 
or, in even simpler phrasing, the idea that a photograph represents an unmediated, 
‘true’ picture of the world makes it such a powerful form of ekphrasis. 
 
Double Coding 
One last phenomenon must be brought up in conjunction to Wilde and theory on 
words and images. The theory originates with Emma Kafalenos (although she, in 
turn, adopts it from the intertextual theories of others), who has investigated a 
kind of embedding of images within words. In her essay ‘The Power of Double 
                                                             
20 Paul Frosh, ‘Industrial Ekphrasis: The Dialectic of Word and Image in Mass Cultural 
Production’, Semiotica, 147.1 (2003), 241-264 (p. 245). 
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Coding’ Kafalenos shows how this process is present in The Picture of Dorian 
Gray, thus making her one of the critics who go as far as to associate a modern 
theoretical idea with Wilde. Kafalenos, however, does not locate thinking on the 
theory in Wilde’s work; she instead points out the presence of double coding in 
Wilde’s novel. That theoretical thinking on it can also be located there is the next 
step undertaken here. 
Double coding is the encoding of one medium into another. In the case of 
Wilde, this means the placement of a visual representation within a verbal context, 
although Kafalenos sees a broader use for the term: ‘a painting within a painting 
but, also, a painting within a novel and a television show within a film. My thesis 
is that double coding can enable representation of new forms of representation (art 
forms, genres, media) that at a given time cannot be represented except through 
the power of double coding.’21 This last addition takes ekphrasis one step farther: 
it becomes allowed to represent something that cannot yet be represented. (This is 
different from Hollander’s concept of notional ekphrasis: double coding includes 
an element of anticipation.) Kafalenos locates such specific use of ekphrasis in 
The Picture of Dorian Gray: ‘In the novel, the representation of the embedded 
image through ekphrasis—the verbal representation of a visually depicted scene—
permits representation of a medium otherwise unavailable in 1891, when the 
novel was published: the moving image that we now call film.’22 
The specific point of double coding here – the thing that makes it not 
simply another term for ekphrasis – is that last element of representing the 
                                                             
21 Emma Kafalenos, ‘The Power of Double Coding to Represent New Forms of Representation: 
The Truman Show, Dorian Gray, “Blow-Up,” and Whistler’s Caprice in Purple and Gold’, Poetics 
Today, 24.1 (2003), 1-33 (p. 2). 
22 Kafalenos, p. 7. 
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unrepresentable. No such theoretical element has been discussed in the context of 
ekphrasis. Yet Kafalenos foregrounds this aspect of double coding: ‘double coding 
can enable representation of new forms of representation (art forms, genres, 
media) that at a given time cannot be represented except through the power of 
double coding’23 That this is present in Wilde’s novel is something that she points 
out; however, traces of it may also already be pointed to in ‘The Decay of Lying’. 
Wilde’s playful juxtaposition of realism versus lying is essential in that 
discussion. By favouring lying, Wilde rejects representing reality strictly as it is. 
This, in turn, opens up the possibility that his approach to art – the imaginative lie 
rather than the Truth – allows exactly what Kafalenos is writing about. Indeed, it 
lies in the way in which Wilde subverts the binary oppositions of real and 
imaginary. He has Vivian put it this way: 
 
Art begins with abstract decoration, with purely imaginative and 
pleasurable work dealing with what is unreal and non-existent. This is the 
first stage. Then Life becomes fascinated with this new wonder, and asks 
to be admitted into the charmed circle. Art takes life as part of her rough 
material, recreates it, and refashions it in fresh forms, is absolutely 
indifferent to fact, invents, imagines, dreams, and keeps between herself 
and reality the impenetrable barrier of beautiful style, of decorative or 
ideal treatment. (p. 1078) 
 
The reader can find in this passage the movement that leads towards the (as yet) 
                                                             
23 Kafalenos, p. 2. 
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unrepresentable: they are told that art creates the ‘purely imaginative work’ 
dealing with the ‘unreal and non-existent’. From this envisioning of what does not 
exist, the move is towards a state of what does not yet exist, as ‘Life becomes 
fascinated with this new wonder’. Finally it may move from here to fact, just as 
Wilde’s conception of a moving portrait anticipated what would later become the 
moving image of film (even if he, himself, does not anticipate film in and of 
itself). For Wilde, things are quite clear: ‘The imagination is essentially creative, 
and always seeks for a new form’ (p. 1083). That new form, coupled with the 
ideas of ekphrasis already explored in Wilde’s work, is what makes for the 
anticipation of double coding. But at the same time this ‘essentially creative’ 
imagination, seeking ‘a new form’ is exactly what the discussion of Wilde’s work 
has been about – not simply in ekphrastic terms, but in terms of postmodernism as 
a whole – for it shows that Wilde’s form, firmly rooted in his own time, was 
nevertheless something essentially creative, and in its newness looked forward to 
the theoretical movements and approaches now known as postmodernism. 
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Conclusion 
 
In Paris, on December 28th, 1895, Auguste and Louis Lumière premiered work 
that consisted of very short films showing everyday activities. Their Paris-based 
performance, one of the first showings of film that an audience could buy tickets 
for, would have delighted the francophone Wilde; he was unable to attend, of 
course, having already been arrested and imprisoned after the 1895 trials. Wilde’s 
likely admiration would have lain in the fact that the brothers Lumière were 
projecting onto a screen what he had already been conceiving, in some form, in 
his writing. 
 The recording and projection of film was being pioneered during Wilde’s 
lifetime. America had the lead with Thomas Edison, who had developed a camera, 
but ‘where Edison concentrated on the camera, these French brothers put their 
inventive effort into a projector – as did other Europeans’.1 In fact, in terms of 
performance, the brothers Lumière had been beaten by the brothers Skladanowsky 
by only a little under two months: they were preceded on ‘November 1, 1895, 
when Max Skladanowsky – working together with his brother Emil – showed a 
fifteen-minute series of eight short movies as the main attraction in a vaudeville-
like program at Berlin’s Wintergarten theater’, remarkable among other things 
because ‘this was the first showing of a movie before a paying audience in 
Europe’.2 
                                                             
1 Douglas Montgomery and Clara Pafort-Overduin, Movie History: A Survey, 2nd edn (London: 
Routledge, 2011), p. 13. 
2 Stephen Brockmann, A Critical History of German Film (Rochester: Camden House, 2010), p. 
13. 
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 There is no evidence from Wilde’s letters, or from the known activities of 
his associates, that he was particularly engrossed in the budding form of moving 
pictures. Yet his work shows the interest keenly: he is clearly captivated by the 
power of images, and ideas about moving, or at least changing, pictures are 
evident in some of the poems and in The Picture of Dorian Gray. Of the latter, 
critic Ronald Thomas notes that the novel features passages, in which Wilde 
imagines something like a moving picture, such as when the novel’s narrator 
states: ‘our eyelids might open some morning upon a world that had been 
refashioned anew in the darkness for our pleasure, a world in which things would 
have fresh shapes and colours, and be changed’.3 Thomas remarks on this passage 
that ‘it is worth noting that more than twenty different screen adaptations of 
Wilde’s novel were produced in the first hundred years since its publication, as if 
to fulfil this prophecy in the most literal terms’ and, to emphasize the point 
further, that ‘six silent movie version of the novel from six different countries 
were made between 1910 and 1918 alone, more than any other single literary text 
in this seminal period for the development of narrative film’.4 
 Yet it must be said that Wilde’s images remain static. They are powerfully 
suggestive – as in both of the paintings in ‘The Portrait of Mr. W. H.’ and The 
Picture of Dorian Gray inspiring death, or Lady Alroy’s photograph in ‘The 
Sphinx Without a Secret’ channelling profound mystery – but they are never 
described to the reader as actually moving. Instead, Wilde explores a number of 
ideas that are connected to film; there is, for one, Emma Kafalenos’s assertion that 
                                                             
3 Oscar Wilde, The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003), p. 
100. 
4 Ronald R. Thomas, ‘Poison Books and Moving Pictures: Vulgarity in The Picture of Dorian 
Gray’, in Victorian Vulgarity: Taste in Verbal and Visual Culture, ed. by Susan David Bernstein 
and Elsie B. Michie (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 185-200 (p. 195). 
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Wilde anticipated the medium of film in his novel through the use of double 
coding. Part of this can be explained by Wilde tapping into the magic-picture 
tradition as mentioned in Chapter VII, but, as Kerry Powell mentions, one of the 
book’s most remarkable features is Wilde’s ‘transformation of mostly dull and 
uninspired precedents into vivid fiction surviving the century which produced it’.5 
Wilde did not slavishly follow the preceding tradition, but used it, among other 
things, as a receptacle for his critical ideas. In short, his anticipation of film has 
been explored by a number of critics, but what it really illustrates here is Wilde’s 
tendency to draw upon contemporary influences and to refine them into critical 
and philosophical ideas that very strikingly resemble postmodernism. 
 Wilde’s use of language, particularly in epigrams, can be linked to the 
postmodern interest in binary oppositions, and from there to deconstruction and to 
a general postmodernist distrust of overarching concepts such as the ‘natural’ or 
‘truth’. His discussion on reality and its implications finds strong parallels in the 
very postmodern interpretation of reality as hyperreality, while his desire to place 
the burden of interpretation solely on the reader – to move it away from meaning 
(and obligation) inherent in the text – corresponds to ideas on reader response 
theory, the postmodern narrator, and biography. Even his treatment of particular 
subjects such as literary theft, music, or the representation of images resembles 
very closely the theoretical approaches to these in postmodernism. 
This is why Wilde is relevant, and why he is still being read. Over the past 
decades, his reputation as a writer has been salvaged by a few dedicated critics, 
and brought back through the effort of gender studies and Irish post-colonialism. 
                                                             
5 Kerry Powell, ‘Tom, Dick, and Dorian Gray: Magic-Picture Mania in Late Victorian Fiction’, 
Philological Quarterly, 62.2 (1983), 147-170 (p. 166). 
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Despite continuing mixed assessments of his work – including a pervasively 
negative attitude towards his poetry – these critics have managed to point readers 
to Wilde’s brilliance. This thesis proposes that the underlying reason for Wilde’s 
enduring, even rising, popularity among these postmodern readers is a shared 
foundation of ideas, which are Wilde’s as much as they are key issues to 
postmodernism. Thus, when post-colonialism finds in Wilde someone who is 
willing to play with language and to subvert authority, this taps into Wilde’s 
general attention to language, the same sort of attention which inspired Jacques 
Derrida to postulate deconstruction; when Alan Sinfield rightly acknowledges 
Wilde as a pivotal force for queer theory, this is also because Wilde consistently 
questions ideas of what it means for something to be called ‘natural’ in the same 
way that postmodernism as a whole must question such sweeping assumptions. 
Wilde, and more specifically, the literary, critical theory proposed by Wilde in his 
criticism and incorporated into his fiction, is apt now because it shares so much 
with the basic theoretical assumptions that inform many of the critical practices of 
the twentieth and twenty first century. 
Such a reading of Wilde has several consequences. Firstly, it validates the 
various isolated hints in the critical literature, indicated in the Introduction of this 
thesis, of Wilde as apparently resembling postmodernist attitudes. As a result of 
the research and discussion presented here, such hints can now be replaced with 
the definitive statement that Oscar Wilde is a proto-postmodernist. Secondly, it 
frees Wilde’s works from a necessarily historicist interpretation, which is not to 
say that they should no longer be interpreted in that way, but that additional 
avenues of interpretation have opened up. 
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For example, The Importance of Being Earnest has seen some variation, 
such as an all-male adaptation by director Hugh Hysell that casts all characters as 
male homosexuals, a move similarly made in one of the play’s graphic novel 
adaptations by Tom Bouden and Gerrit Komrij.
6
 These readings of the play are 
valuable interpretations clearly inspired by the queer interpretation of Wilde. 
However, The Importance of Being Earnest could go beyond an immaculate 
Victorian comedy and the comments it allows on gender roles; Wilde’s 
subversion of authority and social roles in general could inform a modern setting 
of the play, especially when a director follows Wilde’s advice of a personalized 
interpretation aimed at beauty. It is thus with all of Wilde’s social comedies, 
which present barriers to performance in terms of their close link to time and 
place; yet recent scandals in British politics might easily call to mind An Ideal 
Husband, with its complicated, ambiguous treatment of morals in politics. 
Likewise, a reading of Salome that is open to Wilde’s very active intertextual and 
interdisciplinary choices in the play might present new avenues for performance. 
Salome is certainly the most musical and poetic of Wilde’s plays – more so, 
perhaps, than the experiments with blank verse that entailed The Duchess of 
Padua and the starting of A Florentine Tragedy. At present, Strauss’s opera 
commands a better reputation than the play, the opera being commonly described 
as ‘a work that is so manifestly popular’ that it almost works against it being 
considered a serious artistic achievement.
7
 The play, by contrast, is not quite so 
                                                             
6 Oscar Wilde, Het Belang van Ernst, ed. and illustrated by Tom Bouden, trans. by Gerrit Komrij 
(Amsterdam: Atlas, 2004). 
7 Derek Puffett, ‘Introduction’, in Richard Strauss: Salome, ed. by Derek Puffett (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 1-10 (p. 8). 
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popular, as William Tydeman and Steven Price have shown.
8
 By focussing on the 
powerful music within Wilde’s text alone, and by taking a cue from Wilde’s own 
original intentions – which even included an olfactory dimension to the 
performance – a performance that is interdisciplinary in its own right could be 
realized. No doubt some, or even all, of the matters presented above have been 
attempted, but they present an exciting additional direction for the performance of 
Wilde’s work in the current century, and one that is validated by the proto-
postmodern reading of Wilde.  
Finally, there is the sense in which Wilde’s critical ideas could inform the 
critical practices of today. This thesis has not explicitly explored what it would 
mean, in a twenty-first century sense, to be a Wildean critic. It has sought to place 
Wilde’s criticism with Wilde himself and within his works, and moreover has 
done so, to some degree, ahistorically. This maintains the traditional division: 
Wilde’s criticism is not divorced from the past, and is maintained as a version of 
his historical moment, tied as it is to Aestheticism, decadence, and late-Victorian 
thinking by philosophers and critics like Pater, Arnold or Carlyle, even as it 
resembles other, later modes of thought. More specifically, Wildean practice 
remains divorced from the present, where the names of Derrida, Baudrillard, 
Lyotard, Norris, and so forth, are representative of contemporary (literary) 
criticism. Yet Wilde’s criticism has much to offer. It would need to be tempered 
by an understanding of his time and of the ways in which it is explicitly not for 
the twenty-first century – the way, for example, in which Wilde portrays some of 
his women, such as Lady Chiltern of An Ideal Husband. Given such caution, 
                                                             
8 William Tydeman and Steven Price, Wilde: Salome (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996). 
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reading a text as a Wildean critic is as relevant as ever. He asks that his critics 
foreground their own carefully constructed interpretation – not as a path towards 
isolation, but in the sense that he presented in The Soul of Man Under Socialism: 
as part of a group, but foremost as an individual within that group, neither 
imposing nor being imposed upon, but certainly not in unthinking anarchy. He 
asks that the critic reads with an eye for paradox, with a desire to upset (and 
sometimes ridicule) complacency, with humour, with dedication, and above all 
with a love for the pleasure and beauty of a text. And such a critic is not a relic of 
the late-Victorian period, but would be a welcome addition to the range of 
criticism available today.  
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